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WASHINGTON SUMMIT PREVIEW

SUMMARY

1. A WORKING SUMMIT, BUT WITH THE CEREMONIAL OF A STATE VISIT, AND HENCE VERY DIFFERENT IN ATMOSPHERE FROM GENEVA AND REYKJAVIK. SIGNATURE OF INF AGREEMENT THE PUBLIC CENTREPIECE. NEGOTIATIONS AND POSSIBLE PROGRESS ON START: BUT DISCUSSION PROBABLY LIMITED TO SPARRING ON OTHER ISSUES, UNLESS GORBACHEV COMES WITH SOMETHING TO OFFER ON AFGHANISTAN.

DETAIL

2. GORBACHEV ARRIVES IN WASHINGTON ON 7 DECEMBER FOR THE FIRST VISIT TO THE US BY A SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY SINCE THE BREZHNEV/NIXON SUMMIT OF 1973. HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A DELEGATION OF SOME 70 OFFICIALS INCLUDING SHEVARDNADZE, DOBRYNIN AND AKHROMEYEV (FULL LIST BY BAG TO SOVIET DEPARTMENT). THE WHITE HOUSE ARE TREATING IT AS A FULL STATE VISIT WITH ALL THE CUSTOMARY CEREMONIAL. IN ADDITION TO SIGNING THE INF TREATY, GORBACHEV WILL HAVE FIVE MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT: A BREAKFAST SESSION WITH VICE PRESIDENT BUSH AND A GROUP OF SCIENTISTS/ACADEMICS TO DISCUSS LONG-TERM GLOBAL TRENDS: A PRIVATE MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY: AND SESSIONS ALSO ORGANISED BY THE SOVIET EMBASSY WITH BUSINESSMEN AND THE PRESS, INCLUDING A PRESS CONFERENCE. THE IDEA OF AN ADDRESS BY GORBACHEV TO A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS WAS DROPPED AFTER OPPOSITION FROM THE RIGHT (MUCH TO SOVIET IRRITATION, WE ARE TOLD, WITH THE RESULT THAT HIS CONTACT WITH CONGRESS WILL BE FAIRLY LIMITED). WORKING GROUPS WILL BE ESTABLISHED AS AT PREVIOUS SUMMITS.

3. THE AMERICANS EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE A JOINT STATEMENT AT THE END OF THE VISIT (AS AT GENEVA), ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT COMMITTED TO ONE, AND THERE HAS NOT BEEN A MAJOR EXERCISE TO PRE-NEGOTIATE A TEXT. THE RUSSIANS HAVE HOWEVER HANDED OVER SOME LANGUAGE ON ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL ISSUES, AND THERE

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HAS BEEN SOME INITIAL DISCUSSION BETWEEN MS RIDGWAY AND BESSMERTNYKH.

4. THERE IS A PALPABLE AIR OF ANTICIPATION HERE IN ADVANCE OF GORBACHEV'S ARRIVAL. THE US PRESS IS FULL OF FEATURES ON GORBACHEV: HIS PERSONALITY, POLICIES AND HIS WIFE. THE RUSSIANS ARE SKILFULLY PLAYING TO THIS NATURAL AMERICAN CURIOSITY, WITH A SERIES OF MEDIA EVENTS, INCLUDING THE HOUR LONG INTERVIEW WITH GORBACHEV SCREENED BY NBC ON 30 NOVEMBER (MOSCOW TELNO 1714).

5. FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN, THE SUMMIT IS A WELCOME CHANCE TO SCORE A FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUCCESS AFTER AN AUTUMN OF SET-BACKS ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT. THE SUMMIT SEEMS BOUND TO PLAY WELL FOR HIM IN MIDDLE AMERICA. BUT THERE ARE PITFALLS. IN THE FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT, THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF NERVOUSNESS (AS THERE WAS BEFORE GENEVA AND REYKJAVIK) THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY BE UPSTAGED BY GORBACHEV IN PUBLIC APPEARANCES OR WORSTED BY HIM AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE RIGHT ARE INCREASINGLY DISILLUSIONED

ABOUT THE TREND OF EVENTS IN ARMS CONTROL, AND ARE MAKING NO SECRET OF THEIR FEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY GIVE AWAY THE STORE, ESPECIALLY ON SDI. THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE RESPONDED WITH A SERIES OF SPEECHES BY THE PRESIDENT (IN DENVER ON 27 NOVEMBER: OUR TELNO 2594 AND TO THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION ON 30 NOVEMBER) DESIGNED TO REASSURE THE RIGHT. BUT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON THIS TRACK RISKS SETTING AN ADVERSARIAL TONE FOR THE SUMMIT. IN SHORT, THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE TO STRIKE A DIFFICULT BALANCE IN HIS PUBLIC PRESENTATION BETWEEN HIS NATURAL AFFABILITY AS HOST COUPLED WITH HIS DESIRE TO MAKE THE SUMMIT A SUCCESS, AND ON THE OTHER HAND HIS NEED TO SHOW TOUGHNESS ON THE ISSUES.

6. THE CENTREPIECE OF THE DISCUSSION SEEMS CERTAIN TO BE THE NEXT PHASE OF ARMS CONTROL. MY TWO IFTS CONTAIN AN ACCOUNT OF THE STATE OF PLAY AND THE PROSPECTS. THERE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE SOME DETAILED NEGOTIATION ON START. BUT THE CENTRAL FOCUS OF INTEREST WILL BE WHETHER A WAY CAN BE FOUND OF RECONCILING THE PRESIDENT'S INSTINCTIVE DETERMINATION TO AVOID CONSTRAINTS ON SDI WITH GORBACHEV'S REQUIREMENTS ON A GUARANTEED PERIOD OF STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE ABM TREATY. THIS IS A SUBJECT WHICH CAN ONLY BE EFFECTIVELY DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE TWO PRINCIPALS. AND NO-ONE IN THE ADMINISTRATION CAN SAY WITH CERTAINTY HOW THE PRESIDENT WILL PLAY HIS HAND, OR INDEED WHETHER THIS KEY POINT WILL BE ADDRESSED HEAD ON AT THIS SUMMIT, OR LEFT UNTIL LATER

7. THERE IS EQUAL UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHAT MIGHT COME OUT OF

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THE DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES. AFGHANISTAN WILL BE TOP OF THE LIST. THE AMERICANS WILL WANT TO PROBE THE RECENT HINTS OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO SET A FIRM TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL (WITHOUT LINKAGE TO AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT.) THEY REGARD THE BALL AS VERY MUCH IN GORBACHEV'S COURT, AND SEE THIS AS ONE SUBJECT ON WHICH HE COULD COME WITH SOMETHING NEW TO OFFER - WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF DEFUSING THE ISSUE AT THE SUMMIT AND SECURING AN AGREED REFERENCE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT. TO ACHIEVE THIS HE WOULD HAVE TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENT THAT HE HAS GENUINELY TAKEN THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW: AND OUR CONTACTS FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT GORBACHEV WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE SUCH A CONCESSION DIRECT TO THE AMERICANS RATHER THAN AT GENEVA OR TO THE PAKISTANIS. ON THE GULF, THE PRESIDENT WILL PRESS THE RUSSIANS ONCE AGAIN TO COOPERATE ON THE FOLLOW-UP TO RESOLUTION 598 AND TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE IRANIANS. ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, HE WILL BE PROBING TO SEE WHETHER THERE IS ANY NEW FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET APPROACH TO ANGOLA WHILST SOME AMERICANS PROFESS TO DETECT. THERE ARE A SERIES OF OTHER ISSUES ON THE AGENDA WHICH MAY BE TOUCHED ON IF TIME ALLOWS (ARAB/ISRAEL, CAMBODIA, BERLIN, CENTRAL AMERICA). BUT THESE ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE DEFLECTED TO A WORKING GROUP.

8. HUMAN RIGHTS WILL BE A MAJOR THEME THROUGHOUT GORBACHEV'S VISIT. ON THE EVE OF HIS ARRIVAL, AMERICAN JEWISH GROUPS ARE MOUNTING A MAJOR DEMONSTRATION (ESTIMATES RANGE UP TO HALF A MILLION) ON THE WASHINGTON MALL. THE THEME WILL NOT BE OPPOSITION TO THE SUMMIT ITSELF, BUT A WELCOME FOR THE IMPROVED RATE OF JEWISH EMIGRATION, COUPLED WITH AN APPEAL FOR A MUCH LARGER INCREASE, A LIFTING OF EMIGRATION CONTROLS AND GREATER CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE SOVIET UNION. BETTER SOVIET EMIGRATION FIGURES HAVE HAD SOME IMPACT ON THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN RECENT MONTHS, ALTHOUGH THE PRESSURE FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET PERFORMANCE REMAINS CONSIDERABLE. THE PRESIDENT WILL WANT TO HAVE A DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH GORBACHEV ON ALL THE MAIN ISSUES: INDIVIDUAL CASES: EMIGRATION AND THE REGULATIONS CONTROLLING IT: AND POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PRISONERS. FOR THEIR PART THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN EXPRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT RECENTLY AT WHAT SEEMS TO BE A LEVELLING-OFF IN THE LATEST SOVIET EMIGRATION FIGURES, AND THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN AMENDING SOVIET LAWS TO MAKE THE PROCESS OF EMIGRATION FAIRER AND MORE OPEN. THEY ARE EXPECTING GORBACHEV TO RESPOND VIGOROUSLY - AS HE DID IN HIS NBC INTERVIEW,

BUT THINK IT POSSIBLE THAT HE MAY ANNOUNCE A CLEAN SWEEP OF ALL THE INDIVIDUAL CASES OF DIRECT INTEREST TO THE US

(E.G. DIVIDED SPOUSES AND FAMILIES).

9. THE RUSSIANS ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST DURING WHITEHEAD'S VISIT IN JOINT COOPERATIVE PROJECTS IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELD (DRUG ABUSE, ALCOHOLISM, EXCHANGES OF LAWYERS, DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES AND PSYCHIATRISTS). SOME OF THESE MAY SURFACE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT.

10. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF MIXED SOVIET PERFORMANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THERE IS NO INCLINATION HERE TO GIVE ANY GROUND ON THE MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE PROPOSAL. SHULTZ CONFIRMED TO EC AMBASSADORS ON 30 NOVEMBER THAT HE DID NOT SEE HOW SUCH A CONFERENCE COULD TAKE PLACE WHILE THE SOVIET UNION REMAINED IN SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

11. BILATERAL ISSUES ARE LIKELY TO GET LITTLE IF ANY TIME IN THE REAGAN/GORBACHEV DISCUSSIONS, ALTHOUGH THE JOINT STATEMENT MAY WELL CONTAIN A BOOST FOR PEOPLE TO PEOPLE EXCHANGES, PARTICULARLY YOUTH EXCHANGES: A SUBJECT DEAR TO THE PRESIDENT'S HEART. IT MAY ALSO RECORD AGREEMENT ON A NEW BASIC SCIENCES AGREEMENT AND AN EXPANSION OF CIVIL AVIATION SERVICES. OTHER ISSUES, SUCH AS THE NEW US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW WILL BE DEALT WITH BY EXPERTS IN THE MARGINS.

COMMENT

12. THIS ADDS UP TO A SUBSTANTIAL AGENDA, MOST OF IT ON FAMILIAR LINES. APART FROM THE SIGNING OF THE INF AGREEMENT, MUCH OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VISIT WILL BE SYMBOLIC, MARKING A FURTHER STEP IN THE RETURN TO NORMAL DEALINGS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. BUT THE CRUCIAL QUESTION REMAINS WHETHER WE ARE TO BE TREATED TO ANOTHER SURPRISE OUTCOME. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE CERTAINLY ALIVE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT GORBACHEV MAY COME WITH SOME STRIKING NEW INITIATIVE. BUT THEY ADMIT PRIVATELY THAT THE LESSONS OF REYKJAVIK, WITH ITS FREE-WHEELING AND LARGELY UNPREPARED DISCUSSIONS, HAVE BEEN LEARNED. THIS TIME, THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF PREPARATION AT OFFICIAL LEVEL AND BETWEEN SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE. THE FLAVOUR SHOULD BE CLOSER TO A STATE VISIT THAN A SHIRTSLEEVES SUMMIT. AND THE PRESIDENT, EMBATTLED WITH THE RIGHT ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES INCLUDING INF RATIFICATION, WILL NOT WANT TO COURT FURTHER TROUBLE BY SIGNING UP TO SOME UNEXPECTED SUMMIT QUOTE ACHIEVEMENT UNQUOTE. THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT THERE CAN BE NO PROGRESS ON ANY ISSUE AT THIS MEETING. WE MAY WELL SEE SIGNIFICANT FORWARD MOVEMENT ON START, ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, OR POSSIBLY ON AFGHANISTAN. BUT WHILE SUMMITS CAN OF COURSE NEVER BE ENTIRELY PREDICTABLE, THE AGENDA IS NOW MUCH MORE CLEARLY DEFINED THAN IT WAS FOURTEEN

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MONTHS AGO, AND REYKJAVIK-TYPE SURPRISES ARE LESS LIKELY.
13. THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT GORBACHEV WILL BE STOPPING OVER IN THE UK FOR TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN PRIVATELY WELCOMED BY THE ADMINISTRATION. WE HAVE DETECTED NO SENSITIVITY HERE: ON THE CONTRARY, THERE IS A GENERAL FEELING THAT IT CAN DO NOTHING BUT GOOD FOR GORBACHEV TO HEAR THE SAME FIRM MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE WILL SUBSEQUENTLY HEAR FROM THE PRESIDENT.
14. SEE MY 2 IFTS (NOT TO ALL).

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MIPT: THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: ARMS CONTROL: START/DEFENCE AND SPACE

SUMMARY

1. START THE MOST LIKELY CANDIDATE FOR SIGNIFICANT ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS AT THE SUMMIT ALTHOUGH NOT CLEAR HOW SERIOUS AN OBSTACLE ABMT ISSUES MAY PROVE.

DETAIL
START

2. THE ADMINISTRATION HOPE AND EXPECT THAT START WILL BE THE MAIN FOCUS OF ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS DURING THE SUMMIT. THEY HOPE THAT THE OUTCOME WILL BE AGREEMENT ON INSTRUCTIONS TO NEGOTIATORS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE IMPETUS AND DIRECTION TO WORK IN GENEVA OVER THE COMING MONTHS. IN PRACTICE, ANY SUCH DOCUMENT COULD LOOK VERY LIKE A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT THOUGH THIS IS A TERM THE ADMINISTRATION ARE CAREFUL TO AVOID USING.

3. THE MAIN OUTSTANDING START ISSUES ARE WELL-KNOWN AND RELATIVELY CLEARLY DEFINED IN THE HEAVILY-BRACKETED JOINT DRAFT TREATY THAT IS NOW THE MAIN WORKING DOCUMENT IN GENEVA. THE MOST IMPORTANT ARE:

(A) SUB-LIMITS. UNDER THE AGGREGATE CEILING OF 6,000 WEAPONS (AND 1,600 SNDVS), THE US HAS PROPOSED SUB-LIMITS OF 4,800 FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS, 3,300 FOR ICBM RVS, AND 1,650 FOR RVS ON HEAVY, MOBILE AND HIGHLY MIRVED BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE SOVIET RESPONSE HAS BEEN TO IMPLY A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A SUB-LIMIT OF 5,100 BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS (AN INFORMAL SUGGESTION MADE TO SHULTZ BY AKHROMEYEV IN GENEVA LAST MONTH), COUNTERPROPOSE A LIMIT OF 1800-2000 SLBM

RVS, AND ACCEPT A LIMIT OF 1,540 FOR RVS ON HEAVY (THOUGH NOT MOBILE OR HIGHLY MIRVED) ICBMS. CONSIDERABLE CONVERGENCE HAS THEREFORE NOW TAKEN PLACE ALTHOUGH IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN, ESPECIALLY ON MOBILE MISSILES AND SLBMS:

- (B) SLCMS. THE REYKJAVIK AGREEMENT WAS THAT SLCMS COULD BE CONSTRAINED (A US CONCESSION) BUT OUTSIDE THE MAIN START AGGREGATES (A SOVIET CONCESSION). THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE MOVEMENT SINCE THEN. THE SOVIET POSITION REMAINS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A LIMIT OF 400 LONG-RANGE SLCMS DEPLOYED ONLY ON TWO IDENTIFIED CLASSES OF SUBMARINE ON EACH SIDE. THE US HAS REJECTED THIS POSITION BOTH ON FORCE POSTURE GROUNDS (THE US NUCLEAR SLCM FORCE WILL BE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE US SURFACE AND SUBMARINE FLEETS) AND ON VERIFICATION GROUNDS (DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SLCMS IS REGARDED HERE AS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE). THEY HAVE FLOATED INSTEAD THE IDEA OF (UNVERIFIABLE) DECLARATIONS BY BOTH SIDES OF THEIR LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR SLCM FORCES, BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO SOVIET RESPONSE. THE RUSSIANS HAVE SIGNALLED THAT THEY WANT TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE SLCM ISSUE DURING THE SUMMIT:
- (C) MOBILE MISSILES. THE US HAS SO FAR MAINTAINED ITS POSITION THAT ALL MOBILE MISSILES SHOULD BE BANNED AND HAVE SAID THAT, IF THE RUSSIANS CANNOT ACCEPT THIS, THEN THEY MUST OFFER IDEAS ON HOW LIMITS ABOVE ZERO MIGHT BE VERIFIED:
- (D) VERIFICATION. VERY LITTLE DETAILED WORK ON START VERIFICATION HAS SO FAR BEEN DONE IN GENEVA PARTLY BECAUSE THE LIMITED NUMBER OF VERIFICATION EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES HAVE BEEN FULLY ENGAGED ON INF AND PARTLY BECAUSE THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN WAITING TO SEE WHAT VERIFICATION BASELINE FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN START WOULD FINALLY EMERGE FROM THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THE GENERAL VIEW HERE IS THAT VERIFICATION OF A START TREATY (WHICH WOULD LARGELY INVOLVE MONITORING LIMITS ABOVE ZERO) WILL BE A CONSIDERABLY TOUGHER PROBLEM THAN INF VERIFICATION:
- (E) THROW-WEIGHT. THE US POSITION IS THAT THERE MUST BE A DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONSTRAINT ON THROW-WEIGHT LIMITING IT TO HALF OF THE PRESENT SOVIET LEVEL. SOME OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT ON THE SOVIET-PROPOSED LIMIT OF 1,540 HEAVY ICBM RVS WOULD EFFECTIVELY DO THE TRICK, BUT THE PENTAGON CONTINUE TO ARGUE FOR DIRECT THROW-WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS. ALL PARTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION ANYWAY BELIEVE THAT THERE MUST BE ARRANGEMENTS TO PREVENT SUBSEQUENT QUOTE THROW-WEIGHT CREEP UNQUOTE IE AN INCREASE IN THROW-WEIGHT AS A RESULT OF BUILDING LARGE NON-HEAVY ICBMS THAT WOULD NOT BE LIMITED UNDER

THE 1,540 CEILING. THIS IS AN ISSUE OF GREAT TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING WHAT THROW-WEIGHT IS:

(F) BACKFIRE. THE US HAS ARGUED THAT THE BACKFIRE BOMBER MUST BE CONSTRAINED BY A START TREATY, WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAVE REJECTED:

(G) COUNTING RULES. CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS WAS MADE AT REYKJAVIK ON A COUNTING RULE FOR BOMBER WEAPONS. BUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR CALCULATING ALCM LOADINGS AND THE WHOLE ISSUE OF COUNTING RULES FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS REMAIN LARGELY UNADDRESSED.

4. BRIEFS FOR THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT BE FINALISED BEFORE AN NSPG MEETING LATER THIS WEEK FOLLOWING CARLUCCI'S RETURN FROM EUROPE. IT IS THEREFORE NOT YET CLEAR WHAT US CONCESSIONS ON THESE POINTS THE PRESIDENT MAY BE ADVISED TO MAKE. WHILE PROGRESS COULD BE MADE DURING THE SUMMIT ACROSS THE WHOLE RANGE OF START ISSUES, THE MOST LIKELY PROSPECTS ARE PERHAPS FOR AGREEMENT ON SUB-LIMITS (WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY INVOLVE A US MOVE AWAY FROM THE PROPOSED BAN ON MOBILE MISSILES AND THE DROPPING OF SEPARATE SUB-LIMITS ON ICBM AND SLBM RVS), VERIFICATION (PERHAPS AGREEMENT ON A NUMBER OF VERIFICATION PRINCIPLES NOW ESTABLISHED IN THE INF CONTEXT), AND BACKFIRE (PERHAPS SOVIET AGREEMENT TO CONSTRAINTS BUT OUTSIDE THE 6,000/1,600 AGGREGATES).

5. BUT THE EXTENT OF PROGRESS IN START MAY OF COURSE DEPEND ON HOW GORBACHEV AND THE PRESIDENT PLAY THEIR RESPECTIVE HANDS ON LINKAGE WITH DEFENCE AND SPACE ISSUES. THE GENERAL INCLINATION HERE IS TO THINK THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE RELAXED THEIR INSISTENCE ON START/SDI LINKAGE SOMEWHAT IN RECENT WEEKS AND THAT THEY HAVE SOFTENED THEIR OVERALL APPROACH TO SDI CONSTRAINTS. IT DOES INDEED SEEM CLEAR THAT THE TONE AND LANGUAGE OF THE SOVIET APPROACH HAS EVOLVED. THE EARLIER FRONTAL ATTACK ON SDI SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DROPPED IN FAVOUR OF A MORE EXPLICIT CONCENTRATION ON THE ABMT, AND GORBACHEV HAS NOW ADMITTED PUBLICLY TO SOVIET SDI-TYPE ACTIVITIES. IN ADDITION, THERE IS LESS EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO AVOID THE MILITARISATION OF SPACE AND MORE ON THE NEED FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY, A CONCEPT QUITE CLOSE TO THAT OF PREDICTABILITY. BUT US OFFICIALS FIND IT HARDER TO POINT TO ACTUAL CHANGES IN SOVIET NEGOTIATING POSITIONS. WHILE THERE IS NO LONGER ANY SOVIET ATTEMPT TO CONFINE ALL SDI RESEARCH TO THE LABORATORY, IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THEIR INSISTENCE ON STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABMT REFLECTS ANY REAL CHANGE IN SOVIET BOTTOM LINE REQUIREMENTS.

6. THE KEY DEFENCE AND SPACE ISSUES REMAIN THE SAME:

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- (A) THE LENGTH OF ANY PERIOD OF OBSERVANCE OF THE ABM OR COMMITMENT NOT TO DEPLOY SDI SYSTEMS (PRECISELY WHICH OF THESE THE US IS OFFERING REMAINS UNCLEAR AND CONTINUES TO BE A MATTER OF DISPUTE BETWEEN AGENCIES). THE RUSSIANS HAVE PROPOSED 10 YEARS FROM ENTRY INTO FORCE OF ANY DEFENCE AND SPACE TREATY WHILE THE AMERICANS HAVE PROPOSED THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1994:
- (B) WHAT ADDITIONAL RULES OF THE ROAD THERE MIGHT BE DURING THIS PERIOD. THE RUSSIANS HAVE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN EITHER (I) A COMMITMENT TO OBSERVE THE ABMT AS IT WAS SIGNED AND RATIFIED (PRESUMABLY THE NARROW INTERPRETATION) OR (II) AGREEMENT ON A LIST OF TIGHT TECHNICAL PARAMETERS THAT WOULD LIMIT SDI DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING DURING THIS PERIOD. THE AMERICANS HAVE SO FAR DECLINED TO DISCUSS EITHER OPTION ALTHOUGH SOME OFFICIALS (NOTABLY NITZE) HAVE NOT HIDDEN THEIR BELIEF THAT (II) COULD BE A PROMISING AVENUE:
- (C) WHAT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD APPLY AT THE END OF THE ABMT OBSERVANCE/NO DEPLOYMENT PERIOD. THE SOVIET POSITION IS THAT THE ABMT (WITH ITS PROVISION FOR SIX MONTHS NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL) WOULD REMAIN IN PLACE, A POSITION VERY CLOSE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF WHAT THE US POSITION IS. BUT THE DOD BELIEVE THAT THE US POSITION IS THAT THE ABMT WOULD THEN FALL AWAY UNDER THE TERMS OF THE DEFENCE AND SPACE TREATY THAT WOULD ESTABLISH THE NO DEPLOYMENT PERIOD.

OF THE THREE ISSUES, (A) WOULD APPEAR RELATIVELY EASY TO RESOLVE AND MIGHT INDEED BE SETTLED DURING THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT. (C) WOULD APPEAR EASY TO RESOLVE IF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE US POSITION IS ACCEPTED BUT A MAJOR CONTINUING DIFFICULTY IF THE DOD INTERPRETATION IS UPHELD. (B) SEEMS CLEARLY TO BE THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE.

7. ALL OUR CONTACTS AGREE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PREFERENCE AT THE SUMMIT WILL BE TO DELINK START AND SDI ISSUES COMPLETELY AND TRY FOR SOLID PROGRESS IN START WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE DEFENCE AND SPACE DISPUTE. BUT NONE OF OUR CONTACTS IS WILLING TO HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW THE PRESIDENT MAY REACT IF GORBACHEV IS UNWILLING TO GO ALONG WITH THIS AND, IN PARTICULAR, IF HE INSISTS ON PROGRESS ON (B) ABOVE. THE PRESIDENT'S ACCEPTANCE OF A COMMITMENT TO OBSERVE THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT ((I) ABOVE) FOR A MEANINGFUL PERIOD (A SHORT, SAY TWO YEAR, PERIOD MIGHT BE EASIER) SEEMS UNLIKELY AND WOULD CERTAINLY INVOLVE CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF FACE AND A FIRESTORM OF CRITICISM FROM CONSERVATIVE QUARTERS. THE PRESIDENT'S AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING PARAMETERS CAN PERHAPS BE

ENVISAGED SOMEWHAT MORE EASILY, PARTICULARLY IF SUCH A DISCUSSION SEEMED TO BE DIRECTED TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION ABOUT PLANS AND PROGRAMMES THAT CREATED NO REAL NEW CONSTRAINTS (THE PRIME MINISTER'S IDEAS IN THIS RESPECT ARE VERY MUCH IN PEOPLE'S MINDS HERE). BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS PLENTY OF ADVISERS WHO BELIEVE THAT, IF GORBACHEV PRESSES THE LINKAGE POINT, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD - AND WILL - QUOTE JUST SAY NO UNQUOTE.

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
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MY TWO IPTS: WASHINGTON SUMMIT: ARMS CONTROL: INF/CW/CONVENTIONAL
ARMS CONTROL/NUCLEAR TESTING

SUMMARY

1. INF TREATY TO BE SIGNED. MOVEMENT ON CW AND NUCLEAR TESTING
POSSIBLE. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL CERTAIN TO BE DISCUSSED.

DETAIL

2. SIGNATURE OF THE INF TREATY ON 8 DECEMBER IS EXPECTED TO BE
THE CEREMONIAL CENTREPIECE OF THE SUMMIT. THE TREATY TEXTS ARE,
HOWEVER, STILL NOT COMPLETE IN SPITE OF FRENETIC LAST-MINUTE
EFFORTS TO FINISH DRAFTING. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN DEEPLY
FRUSTRATED IN RECENT DAYS BY THE APPARENT LACK OF INSTRUCTIONS TO
THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN GENEVA SINCE 26 NOVEMBER. GLITMAN GAVE
A CLEAN US DRAFT OF THE TREATY TO THE RUSSIANS IN GENEVA ON 2
DECEMBER, WITH A VIEW TO THE IMMEDIATE RESOLUTION OF THE LAST
REMAINING ISSUES. IF ALL GOES WELL, LAWYERS WILL CONFORM THE
ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGE TEXTS OVER THE WEEKEND.

3. THE RUSSIANS FINALLY ON 2 DECEMBER PRODUCED THE NECESSARY
OUTSTANDING DATA (ON NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES). THIS HAS MADE
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ENTIRELY CONFIDENT THAT THE OTHER
REMAINING MINOR PROBLEMS WILL NOW QUICKLY FALL AWAY, ALTHOUGH
THE WEEK-LONG IMPASSE IN GENEVA HAS TESTED THEIR NERVES AND
COMPLETION ON TIME WILL BE A CLOSE-RUN THING.

4. MEANWHILE, DETAILS OF THE VERIFICATION REGIME HAVE BEEN
WIDELY REPORTED HERE. INITIAL CONGRESSIONAL AND OTHER REACTION
HAS BEEN FAIRLY FAVOURABLE, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO THE
PERMANENT MONITORING OF THE SS-25 FINAL ASSEMBLY FACILITY AT

VOTKINSK, BUT THAT REACTION MAY OWE SOMETHING TO THE DEPRESSED EXPECTATIONS OF RECENT MONTHS. THE PRESIDENT WILL BE LOOKING TO THE SIGNATURE CEREMONY, AND TO THE FAVOURABLE REACTION OF POLITICAL FRIENDS AND ALLIES, TO GIVE THE TREATY AS GOOD A LAUNCH AS POSSIBLE.

CW.

5. THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO CW AT THE SUMMIT WILL EMPHASISE THE SECURITY ASPECTS. WHILST ANY MOVE THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A DISAVOWAL OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S LONG-STANDING OBJECTIVE OF A GLOBAL CW BAN IS UNLIKELY (THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY REVIEW IS STILL IN TRAIN), THE US TEAM WILL TRY TO FOCUS ON THE FOUR MAJOR US CONCERNS: VERIFICATION, PROLIFERATION, NOVEL AGENTS, AND MONITORING OF THE CIVILIAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY.

6. GORBACHEV IS EXPECTED TO TRY FOR A COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE A CONVENTION IN 1988, IN LINE WITH THE (REJECTED) SOVIET DRAFT LANGUAGE FOR A JOINT STATEMENT. THE ADMINISTRATION ALSO EXPECT A SOVIET PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE DURING THE SUMMIT WITH EMPHASIS ON THE IMMINENCE OF A CONVENTION AND ON THE SOVIET PRODUCTION MORATORIUM. SUCH AN OFFENSIVE SEEMS LIKELY TO BE AIMED AT CONGRESS IN PARTICULAR. FOR THEIR PART, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL SEEK TO CONCENTRATE DETAILED WORK ON BILATERAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF THE SORT DISCUSSED BY SHEVARDNADZE AND SHULTZ AT THEIR RECENT MEETINGS IN THE HOPE OF SECURING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO FURTHER BILATERAL VISITS TO SHIKHANY AND TOOELE AND EARLY EXCHANGES OF DATA DECOUPLED FROM THE SIGNATURE OF A CONVENTION. MUTUAL INSPECTION OF A LIMITED DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS IS ALSO SOMETHING ON WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HOPE THAT AGREEMENT MIGHT JUST POSSIBLY BE REACHED.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

7. THE PROFILE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL HAS BEEN RAISED SLIGHTLY HERE IN RECENT DAYS, WITH RENEWED CONGRESSIONAL (AND ADMINISTRATION) INTEREST IN THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE POST-INF, AND WITH PENTAGON IN-FIGHTING ON BUDGET CUTS PROPELLING PROVOCATIVE ARMY CONTINGENCY PLANS (FOR WITHDRAWING A US DIVISION FROM GERMANY) ONTO THE FRONT PAGES OF SPECIALIST JOURNALS. BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT PROGRESS ON DETAILED ISSUES WILL BE MADE AT THE SUMMIT: WHILE A BILATERAL COMMITMENT TO GOALS THAT MIGHT ANTICIPATE SOME ASPECTS OF THE OUTCOME OF CURRENT NATO DELIBERATIONS CANNOT BE RULED OUT, THE ADMINISTRATION FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IS A MULTILATERAL AND NOT

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A BILATERAL MATTER.

8. AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY GORBACHEV DURING THE SUMMIT OF A LIMITED UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET DIVISIONS FROM EASTERN EUROPE IS REGARDED AS A POSSIBILITY ALTHOUGH MOST US OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD HAVE MORE IMPACT IF MADE AT THE OPENING OF THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS NEXT YEAR.

NUCLEAR TESTING

9. NOW THAT US/SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS HAVE OPENED IN GENEVA (LIMITED BUT WORTHWHILE PROGRESS ON BILATERAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WAS MADE DURING THE FIRST ROUND ON 9-20 NOVEMBER - CLARKE'S TELELETTER OF 2 DECEMBER), SOME OF THE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION FOR EARLY MOVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN TAKEN OFF. AT THE SUMMIT, THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO STRESS THE NEED FOR AGREEMENT ON A VERIFICATION REGIME THAT WOULD ALLOW HIM TO SEEK SENATE CONSENT TO RATIFICATION OF THE TTBT AND PNET. PROGRESS ON THE PROPOSED JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT, WHICH WOULD REPRESENT A MAJOR STEP DOWN THAT ROAD, IS POSSIBLE. MAJOR SOVIET SURPRISES, SUCH AS THE ACCEPTANCE OF CORTEX AS A BONA FIDE MEANS OF VERIFICATION FOR ALL NUCLEAR TESTING, ARE NOT THOUGHT LIKELY, BUT CONTINUING PRESSURE FROM GORBACHEV FOR EARLY MOVEMENT TOWARDS A CTB IS EXPECTED, IN PUBLIC (WITH CONGRESS IN MIND) AS WELL AS IN PRIVATE.

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