

(40)

**SUBJECT cc OPS  
MASTER****PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T227A/87.**

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO  
TO DESKBY 091630Z PARIS  
TELNO 722  
OF 091500Z DECEMBER 87  
AND TO DESKBY 091630Z BONN, ROME  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

*Messages*

WRG 0201	
RECEIVED & RECORDED	
14 DEC 1987	
DESK	PERSONAL
THE PRIME MINISTER	
BONN TO CHANCELLOR KOHL AND	

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR GORBACHEV

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TODAY IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. PARIS SHOULD DELIVER IT TO BOTH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND CHRIAC, BONN TO CHANCELLOR KOHL, AND ROME TO GORIA.

QUOTE WE HAVE BRIEFED YOUR OFFICIALS ON MY MEETING WITH MR GORBACHEV ON 7 DECEMBER. AND EVENTS HAVE OF COURSE MOVED ON WITH THE SIGNATURE IN WASHINGTON OF THE INF AGREEMENT WHICH WE HAVE ALL WELCOMED. BUT THERE ARE A FEW POINTS OF INTEREST WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW VERY BRIEFLY TO YOUR ATTENTION:

- MR GORBACHEV WAS IN VERY LIVELY AND CONFIDENT FORM AND PLAINLY DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH HIS INTERNAL REFORMS. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, OF WHICH WE HAVE ALL READ, HAVE PLACED CONSTRAINTS ON HIM.
- HE IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT A START AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED NEXT YEAR AND CLEARLY BELIEVES THE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES WHICH REMAIN, FOR INSTANCE ON VERIFICATION, CAN AND WILL BE OVERCOME.
- HE MADE NO EXPLICIT LINKAGE BETWEEN THE START NEGOTIATIONS AND SDI (ALTHOUGH SUBSEQUENT SOVIET PRESS REPORTS HAVE RESTATED THE STANDARD SOVIET LINE ON THIS). I DETECTED SOME EVIDENCE THAT HE IS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO MANAGE THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGIC DEFENCE RATHER THAN TREAT IT AS A ROADBLOCK IN THE WAY OF FURTHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. I PUT FORWARD SOME IDEAS ON THIS.
- NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE HIGH ON HIS LIST OF PRIORITIES.
- MORE GENERALLY HIS APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS STRUCK ME AS MORE PRACTICAL AND LESS PROPAGANDISTIC THAN IN THE PAST.

2831  
179  
203-10282

- I PRESSED MR GORBACHEV TO CONTINUE THE IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE OF RECENT MONTHS AND INDEED STEP IT UP: ALSO TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN IN THE COURSE OF 1988. I TOLD HIM THAT NOTHING WOULD DO MORE TO ASSURE RATIFICATION OF THE INF AGREEMENT AND CREATE THE CLIMATE OF TRUST WHICH FURTHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WILL NEED. HE SAID NOTHING NEW ON EITHER POINT.

I WOULD ONLY ADD THAT MR GORBACHEV WENT TO SOME TROUBLE TO STRESS THE SOVIET UNION'S HISTORICAL ROLE AS A EUROPEAN POWER AND HIS WISH THAT IT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE SO CONSIDERED. I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF WE WERE TO SEE STEPPED UP EFFORTS OVER THE NEXT YEAR TO DEVELOP THE SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE.  
UNQUOTE

HOWE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 102

MAIN 102

LIMITED	ECD(E)
SOVIET DEPT	PS
WED	PS/MR MELLOR
EED	PS/PUS
NEWS DEPT	SIR J FRETWELL
PUSD	MR BOYD
SEC POL DEPT	MR RATFORD
ACDD	MR FALL
SAD	

NNNN



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Agreed  
as

Agree the attached  
text as a short  
message from you  
to Kohl, Mitterrand, Chirac  
e Gorria about the  
Gorbachev visit?

No need to sign:  
we will abbreviate it.

CDP

CONFIDENTIAL

file  
-cl C  
slw



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

9 December 1987

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. GORBACHEV**

I enclose a short message which the Prime Minister would like to send to Chancellor Kohl, President Mitterrand, Prime Minister Chirac and Prime Minister Goria about her meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. Subject to any comments you may have on the text, I should be grateful if the text could be telegraphed to posts for delivery today if possible.

Bf

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

We have briefed your officials on my meeting with Mr. Gorbachev on 7 December. And events have of course moved on with the signature in Washington of the INF Agreement which we have all welcomed. But there are a few points of interest which I would like to draw very briefly to your attention:

- Mr. Gorbachev was in very lively and confident form and plainly determined to press ahead with his internal reforms. There was no evidence that recent developments in the Soviet Union, of which we have all read, have placed constraints on him;
- he is optimistic about a START Agreement to be signed next year and clearly believes the considerable difficulties which remain, for instance on verification, can and will be overcome;
- he made no explicit linkage between the START negotiations and SDI (although subsequent Soviet press reports have restated the standard Soviet line on this). I detected some evidence that he is looking for ways to manage the problem of strategic defence rather than treat it as a roadblock in the way of further arms control agreements. I put forward some ideas on this;

- negotiations on conventional force reductions and chemical weapons are high on his list of priorities;
- more generally his approach to arms control negotiations struck me as more practical and less propagandistic than in the past;
- I pressed Mr. Gorbachev to continue the improved human rights performance of recent months and indeed step it up; also to withdraw from Afghanistan in the course of 1988. I told him that nothing would do more to assure ratification of the INF Agreement and create the climate of trust which further arms control agreements will need. He said nothing new on either point.

I would only add that Mr. Gorbachev went to some trouble to stress the Soviet Union's historical role as a European power and his wish that it should continue to be so considered. I would not be surprised if we were to see stepped up efforts over the next year to develop the Soviet Union's relations with Western Europe.