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PART ONE OF TWO

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MIPT: WASHINGTON SUMMIT: JOINT STATEMENT

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE KEY PASSAGES FROM THE LENGTHY JOINT STATEMENT. THIS OMITS INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL AND THE LIST OF BILATERAL ISSUES. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

ARMS CONTROL

THE INF TREATY

THE TWO LEADERS SIGNED THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES. THIS TREATY IS HISTORIC BOTH FOR ITS OBJECTIVE -- THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF AN ENTIRE CLASS OF U.S. AND SOVIET NUCLEAR ARMS -- AND FOR THE INNOVATIVE CHARACTER AND SCOPE OF ITS VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. THIS MUTUAL ACCOMPLISHMENT MAKES A VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO GREATER STABILITY.

NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY DISCUSSED THE NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THEY NOTED THE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD CONCLUSION OF A TREATY IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS. THEY AGREED TO INSTRUCT THEIR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA TO WORK TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE TREATY ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND ALL INTEGRAL DOCUMENTS AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, PREFERABLY IN TIME FOR SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY DURING THE NEXT MEETING OF LEADERS OF STATE IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1988. RECOGNIZING THAT AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT ARE RECORDED IN DETAIL IN THE JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT, THEY AGREED TO INSTRUCT THEIR NEGOTIATORS TO ACCELERATE RESOLUTION OF ISSUES WITHIN THE JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT INCLUDING EARLY AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONS FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

IN SO DOING, THE NEGOTIATORS SHOULD BUILD UPON THE AGREEMENTS ON 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS ACHIEVED AT REYKJAVIK AS

SUBSEQUENTLY DEVELOPED AND NOW REFLECTED IN THE AGREED PORTIONS OF THE JOINT DRAFT START TREATY TEXT BEING DEVELOPED IN GENEVA INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON CEILINGS OF NO MORE THAN 1600 STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS, 6000 WARHEADS, 1540 WARHEADS ON 154 HEAVY MISSILES: THE AGREED RULE OF ACCOUNT FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND THEIR NUCLEAR ARMAMENT: AND AN AGREEMENT THAT AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTIONS THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S ICBMS AND SLBMS WILL BE REDUCED TO A LEVEL APPROXIMATELY 50-PERCENT BELOW THE EXISTING LEVEL, AND THIS LEVEL WILL NOT BE EXCEEDED BY EITHER SIDE. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WILL BE RECORDED IN A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY MANNER.

AS PRIORITY TASKS, THEY SHOULD FOCUS ON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

- (A) ADDITIONAL STEPS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE REDUCTIONS ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY. THIS WILL INCLUDE A CEILING OF 4900 ON THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF ICBM PLUS SLBM WARHEADS WITHIN THE 6000 TOTAL.
- (B) THE COUNTING RULES GOVERNING THE NUMBER OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR-ARMED AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (ALCMS) TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO EACH TYPE OF HEAVY BOMBER. THE DELEGATIONS SHALL DEFINE CONCRETE RULES IN THIS AREA
- (C) THE COUNTING RULES WITH RESPECT TO EXISTING BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE SIDES PROCEED FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT EXISTING TYPES OF BALLISTIC MISSILES ARE DEPLOYED WITH THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS OF WARHEADS. IN THE UNITED STATES: PEACEKEEPER (MX):10, MINUTEMAN III:3, MINUTEMAN II:1, TRIDENT I:8, TRIDENT II:8, POSEIDON:10. IN THE SOVIET UNION: SS-17:4, SS-19:6, SS-18:10, SS-24:10, SS-25:1, SS-11:1, SS-13:1, SS-N-6:1, SS-N-8:1, SS-N-17:1, SS-N-18:7, SS-N-20:10 AND SS-N-23:4. PROCEDURES WILL BE DEVELOPED THAT ENABLE VERIFICATION OF THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILES OF EACH SPECIFIC TYPE. IN THE EVENT EITHER SIDE CHANGES THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS DECLARED FOR A TYPE OF DEPLOYED BALLISTIC MISSILE, THE SIDES SHALL NOTIFY EACH OTHER IN ADVANCE. THERE SHALL ALSO BE AGREEMENT ON HOW TO ACCOUNT FOR WARHEADS ON FUTURE TYPES OF BALLISTIC MISSILES COVERED BY THE TREATY ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.
- (D) THE SIDES SHALL FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS. SUCH LIMITATIONS WILL NOT INVOLVE COUNTING LONG-RANGE, NUCLEAR-ARMED SLCMS WITHIN THE

6000 WARHEAD AND 1600 STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS LIMITS. THE SIDES COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH CEILINGS ON SUCH MISSILES, AND TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND EFFECTIVE METHODS OF VERIFICATION OF SUCH LIMITATIONS, WHICH COULD INCLUDE THE EMPLOYMENT OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, COOPERATIVE MEASURES AND ON-SITE INSPECTION.

(E) BUILDING UPON THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES, THE MEASURES BY WHICH THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CAN BE VERIFIED WILL, AT A MINIMUM, INCLUDE:

1. DATA EXCHANGES, TO INCLUDE DECLARATIONS BY EACH SIDE OF THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS LIMITED BY THE TREATY AND OF FACILITIES AT WHICH SUCH SYSTEMS ARE LOCATED AND APPROPRIATE NOTIFICATIONS. THESE FACILITIES WILL INCLUDE LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES FOR PRODUCTION AND FINAL ASSEMBLY, STORAGE, TESTING, AND DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS COVERED BY THIS TREATY. SUCH DECLARATIONS WILL BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE SIDES BEFORE THE TREATY IS SIGNED AND UPDATED PERIODICALLY AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE.
2. BASELINE INSPECTION TO VERIFY THE ACCURACY OF THESE DECLARATIONS PROMPTLY AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY.
3. ON-SITE OBSERVATION OF THE ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE AGREED LIMITS.
4. CONTINUOUS ON-SITE MONITORING OF THE PERIMETER AND PORTALS OF CRITICAL PRODUCTION AND SUPPORT FACILITIES TO CONFIRM THE OUTPUT OF THESE FACILITIES.
5. SHORT-NOTICE ON-SITE INSPECTION OF:
 - (I) DECLARED LOCATIONS DURING THE PROCESS OF REDUCING TO AGREED
 - (II) LOCATIONS WHERE SYSTEMS COVERED BY THIS TREATY REMAIN AFTER ACHIEVING THE AGREED LIMITS, AND
 - (III) LOCATIONS WHERE SUCH SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN LOCATED (FORMERLY DECLARED FACILITIES).
6. THE RIGHT TO IMPLEMENT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED-UPON PROCEDURES, SHORT-NOTICE INSPECTIONS

- AT LOCATIONS WHERE EITHER SIDE CONSIDERS COVERT DEPLOYMENT, PRODUCTION, STORAGE OR REPAIR OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS COULD BE OCCURRING.
7. PROVISIONS PROHIBITING THE USE OF CONCEALMENT OR OTHER ACTIVITIES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. SUCH PROVISIONS WOULD INCLUDE A BAN ON TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION AND WOULD ALLOW FOR FULL ACCESS TO ALL TELEMETRIC INFORMATION BROADCAST DURING MISSILE FLIGHT.
 8. MEASURES DESIGNED TO ENHANCE OBSERVATION OF ACTIVITIES RELATED TO REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THESE WOULD INCLUDE OPEN DISPLAYS OF TREATY-LIMITED ITEMS AT MISSILE BASES, BOMBER BASES, AND SUBMARINE PORTS AT LOCATIONS AND TIMES CHOSEN BY THE INSPECTING PARTY.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PREPARATION OF THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES ALSO INSTRUCTED THEIR DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD COMMIT THE SIDES TO OBSERVE THE ABM TREATY, AS SIGNED IN 1972, WHILE CONDUCTING THEIR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TESTING AS REQUIRED, WHICH ARE PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY, AND NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY, FOR A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY SHALL BEGIN NOT LATER THAN THREE YEARS BEFORE THE END OF THE SPECIFIED PERIOD. AFTER WHICH, IN THE EVENT THE SIDES HAVE NOT AGREED OTHERWISE, EACH SIDE WILL BE FREE TO DECIDE ITS COURSE OF ACTION. SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST HAVE THE SAME LEGAL STATUS AS THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE ABM TREATY, AND OTHER SIMILAR, LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS. THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE RECORDED IN A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY MANNER. THEREFORE, THEY DIRECT THEIR DELEGATIONS TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES ON A PRIORITY BASIS.

THE SIDES SHALL DISCUSS WAYS TO ENSURE PREDICTABILITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP UNDER CONDITIONS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY, TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY REVIEWED A BROAD RANGE OF OTHER ISSUES CONCERNING ARMS LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTION. THE SIDES EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON SECURITY MATTERS AND ADVANCING IN THE MAIN AREAS OF ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION THROUGH EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS THAT ENHANCE SECURITY AND STABILITY.

NUCLEAR TESTING

THE TWO LEADERS WELCOMED THE OPENING ON NOVEMBER 9, 1987, OF FULL-SCALE, STEP-BY-STEP NEGOTIATIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JOINT STATEMENT ADOPTED IN WASHINGTON ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1987, BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR:

THE U.S. AND SOVIET SIDES HAVE AGREED TO BEGIN BEFORE DECEMBER 1, 1987, FULL-SCALE STAGE-BY-STAGE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL BE CONDUCTED IN A SINGLE FORUM. IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS THE SIDES AS THE FIRST STEP WILL AGREE UPON EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO RATIFY THE U.S.-USSR THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY OF 1974 AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY OF 1976, AND PROCEED TO NEGOTIATING FURTHER INTERMEDIATE LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING LEADING TO THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING AS PART OF AN EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT PROCESS. THIS PROCESS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WOULD PURSUE, AS THE FIRST PRIORITY, THE GOAL OF THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND, ULTIMATELY, THEIR ELIMINATION. FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE ELABORATION OF IMPROVED VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR THE U.S.-USSR TREATIES OF 1974 AND 1976 THE SIDES INTEND TO DESIGN AND CONDUCT JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENTS AT EACH OTHER'S TEST SITES. THESE VERIFICATION MEASURES WILL, TO THE EXTENT APPROPRIATE, BE USED IN FURTHER NUCLEAR TEST LIMITATION AGREEMENTS WHICH MAY SUBSEQUENTLY BE REACHED.

THE LEADERS ALSO WELCOMED THE PROMPT AGREEMENT BY THE SIDES TO EXCHANGE EXPERTS VISITS TO EACH OTHER'S NUCLEAR TESTING SITES IN JANUARY 1988 AND TO DESIGN AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO CONDUCT A JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AT EACH OTHER'S TEST SITE. THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIMENT ARE SET FORTH IN THE STATEMENT ISSUED ON DECEMBER 9, 1987, BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE LEADERS NOTED THE VALUE OF THESE AGREEMENTS FOR DEVELOPING MORE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1974 THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY AND THE 1976 PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY REAFFIRMED THE CONTINUED COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND IN PARTICULAR TO STRENGTHENING THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE TWO LEADERS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE ADHERENCE SINCE THEIR LAST MEETING OF ADDITIONAL PARTIES TO THE TREATY, AND CONFIRMED THEIR INTENT TO MAKE, TOGETHER WITH OTHER STATES, ADDITIONAL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE UNIVERATAL ADHERENCE TO THE

TREATY.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR SAFETY AND FOR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, UNDER FURTHER STRENGTHENED IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND APPROPRIATE EXPORT CONTROLS FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. THE LEADERS AGREED THAT BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATIONS WERE CONSTRUCTIVE AND USEFUL, AND SHOULD CONTINUE.

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS


THE LEADERS WELCOMED THE SIGNING ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1987, IN WASHINGTON OF THE AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS IN THEIR CAPITALS. THE AGREEMENT WILL BE IMPLEMENTED PROMPTLY.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

THE LEADERS EXPRESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATION OF A VERIFIABLE, COMPREHENSIVE AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION AND DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THEY WELCOMED PROGRESS TO DATE AND REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR INTENSIFIED NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD CONCLUSION OF A TRULY GLOBAL AND VERIFIABLE CONVENTION ENCOMPASSING ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS-CAPABLE STATES. THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION ARE IN FAVOR OF GREATER OPENNESS AND INTENSIFIED CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

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