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OF 110550Z DECEMBER 87  
INFO DESKBY 110800Z MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO  
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, MODUK  
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MIPT: WASHINGTON SUMMIT: INITIAL COMMENT  
SUMMARY

1. USEFUL PROGRESS ON START, BUT NO BREAKTHROUGHS, AND LITTLE MOVEMENT IN OTHER AREAS. IF CONCRETE RESULTS ARE MODEST, ATMOSPHERE HAS BEEN POSITIVE THROUGHOUT AND GORBACHEV HAS SCORED A MAJOR PUBLIC RELATIONS SUCCESS. MOSCOW SUMMIT EXPECTED IN FIRST HALF OF 1988.

DETAIL

2. SHULTZ'S BRIEFING TO THE NAC ON 11 DECEMBER WILL OF COURSE BE THE AUTHORITATIVE US ACCOUNT OF THIS WEEK'S EVENTS. BUT IN THE LIGHT OF A ROUND OF OUR CONTACTS HERE, WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON THE OUTCOME AS RECORDED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT.

ARMS CONTROL

3. THE AMERICANS HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SECURING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO INSTRUCTIONS TO START NEGOTIATORS DESIGNED TO GIVE THE START NEGOTIATIONS FOCUS AND IMPETUS. THESE CONFIRM THE POINTS AGREED AT REYKJAVIK AND ADD SOME MORE NEW ONES.

4. THE MOST IMPORTANT NEW POINT OF AGREEMENT APPEARS TO BE THE SUB-LIMIT OF 4900 FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS. THE ABSENCE FROM THE JOINT STATEMENT OF ANY REFERENCE TO SEPARATE SUB-LIMITS ON ICBM (OR SLBM) RVS IS ALMOST CERTAINLY THE PRELUDE (THOUGH NOT YET FORMALLY AGREED) TO DROPPING IDEAS FOR SUCH SUB-LIMITS ALTOGETHER ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE 4900 AND 1540 SUB-LIMITS NOW AGREED ARE ADEQUATE ON THEIR OWN. ANOTHER VERY IMPORTANT NEW POINT IS THE AGREEMENT ON A COUNTING RULE FOR RVS ON EXISTING BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS AND THE DECLARATION BY BOTH SIDES IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OF THE NUMBER OF RVS CARRIED BY EACH SUCH SYSTEM. THIS RULE WILL BE COUPLED WITH APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS. IF SUCCESSFULLY FLESHED OUT (PARTICULARLY ON THE VERIFICATION SIDE) THIS ARRANGEMENT WILL OF COURSE OVERTAKE THE SALT II COUNTING RULE.

5. THE AGREED LANGUAGE ON START VERIFICATION (MOSTLY DERIVED FROM THE INF TREATY) IS CLEARLY USEFUL WHILE LEAVING ALL THE

DETAILED DIFFICULTIES STILL TO BE TACKLED. SOVIET AGREEMENT THAT THE THROW-WEIGHT LIMIT RESULTING FROM THE 50 PER CENT CUT IN AGGREGATE SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT SHOULD NOT SUBSEQUENTLY BE EXCEEDED IS ALSO A STEP FORWARD ALTHOUGH OUR CONTACTS SAY THAT THE RUSSIANS CONTINUED TO RESIST INCORPORATION OF THROW-WEIGHT PROVISIONS INTO THE TREATY ITSELF. GIVING TECHNICAL DEFINITION TO THIS PRINCIPLE WILL NO DOUBT ALSO REMAIN A VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM. ON SLCMS, THE RUSSIANS HAVE DROPPED THEIR PROPOSAL FOR CONFINING SUCH WEAPONS TO 400 DEPLOYED ON TWO IDENTIFIED CLASSES OF SUBMARINE, WHILE THE AMERICANS APPEAR TO HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO A MORE ACTIVE ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY AND VERIFY SLCM LIMITS. THE AGREEMENT TO WORK OUT COUNTING RULES FOR ALCM LOADING AMOUNTS TO LITTLE ON ITS OWN. AND THERE IS NO SIGN OF PROGRESS ON MOBILE ISSUES.

6. OUR ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS ARE REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH THIS PACKAGE OF START POINTS ALTHOUGH SOME HAVE MADE CLEAR TO US PRIVATELY THAT THEY HAD BEEN HOPING FOR SOMEWHAT MORE.

7. ON DEFENCE AND SPACE, THE AGREEMENT IS TO WORK OUT A COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY FOR A FIXED (BUT UNSPECIFIED) PERIOD AND TO OBSERVE THE TREATY QUOTE AS SIGNED IN 1972 UNQUOTE DURING THAT PERIOD WHILE PERMITTED RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING PROCEEDS. ALL OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT IT IS CLEAR FROM THIS WEEK'S EVENTS THAT REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY WILL BE EASY AND MAY BE ACHIEVED SOON. IT WILL PRESUMABLY BE IN THE 7-10 YEAR TIME-FRAME. THE AGREEMENT TO OBSERVE, DURING THIS PERIOD, THE ABM TREATY QUOTE AS SIGNED IN 1972 UNQUOTE SEEMS TO AMOUNT TO SETTING ASIDE THE ISSUE OF TREATY INTERPRETATION AND WHAT THE RULES OF THE ROAD WILL BE DURING THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE ISSUE HAS BEEN SET ASIDE FOR NOW, AND FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS SUMMIT, OR WHETHER IT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE FOR GOOD. MOST OF OUR ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT THE FORMER IS THE CASE: THE RUSSIANS SHOWED LITTLE SIGN DURING THE SUMMIT THAT THEY WERE READY TO ABANDON THEIR POSITION ON THIS POINT ALTOGETHER. ON WHAT HAPPENS AT THE END OF THE ABMT NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD, THE AMERICANS HAVE SECURED FREEDOM TO DEPLOY STRATEGIC DEFENCES IF THERE IS NO AGREEMENT TO THE CONTRARY DURING A PRECEDING DISCUSSION PERIOD OF THREE OR MORE YEARS.

8. ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, THERE IS AGREEMENT TO ACCELERATE WORK ON A MANDATE FOR THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS. OUR CONTACTS SAY THAT GORBACHEV AND HIS TEAM WERE PARTICULARLY INSISTENT ON THE NEED TO STEP UP THE PACE IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL (AND, AS IN THE PAST, TO INCLUDE SNF IN THE NEGOTIATIONS). WE MAY THEREFORE FIND AN INCREASED LEVEL OF

US PRESSURE ON THE ALLIES TO FINALISE A WESTERN PROPOSAL. ON CW, THE JOINT STATEMENT AVOIDS ANY REFERENCE TO A GLOBAL BAN. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE RUSSIANS PRESSED HARD BUT UNSUCCESSFULLY, AS EXPECTED, FOR A US COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE A CONVENTION IN 1988. ON NUCLEAR TESTING, A JOINT SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE STATEMENT (TEXT TO FOLLOW) RECORDS USEFUL PROGRESS TOWARDS A JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN IMPROVED VERIFICATION REGIME FOR THE TTBT AND PNET.

#### REGIONAL ISSUES

9. AS FAR AS OUR CONTACTS KNOW, THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV CONCENTRATED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE GULF. NO REAL PROGRESS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MADE ON EITHER. ON AFGHANISTAN, GORBACHEV REPEATED THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW SOVIET FORCES WITHIN A TWELVE MONTH TIME FRAME. BUT HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY ON LINKAGE TO AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, OR ON WHEN A WITHDRAWAL WOULD BEGIN. THE NSC TELL US THAT HE TRIED TO SOUND AS CO-OPERATIVE AS POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF AN OBVIOUSLY UNCO-OPERATIVE BRIEF. BUT OUR CONTACTS REMAIN PUZZLED AS TO WHY THE RUSSIANS RAISED EXPECTATIONS IN ADVANCE OF THE SUMMIT WITH HINTS (EG, VORONTSOV/ ARMACOST) OF GREATER FLEXIBILITY.

10. ON THE GULF, GORBACHEV WAS APPARENTLY EVASIVE WHEN PRESSED ON WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOW WILLING TO MOVE ON TO THE SECOND RESOLUTION. HE MAINTAINED THAT HE STILL SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS, BUT THAT NOW WAS NOT THE MOMENT FOR AN ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION, AND THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL NEEDED MORE TIME. OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED ON FAMILIAR LINES IN A WORKING GROUP LED BY PRIMAKOV AND SOLOMON.

#### HUMAN RIGHTS

11. WE ARE TOLD THAT GORBACHEV REACTED IN A PREDICTABLY DEFENSIVE AND PRICKLY WAY TO DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. SOME FURTHER PROGRESS NEVERTHELESS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MADE ON INDIVIDUAL CASES (EG, THE SOVIET TEAM ANNOUNCED THAT 14 FURTHER PEOPLE WERE BEING RELEASED FROM PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS). GORBACHEV HIMSELF DID NOT PRESS THE ISSUE OF THE MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE, BUT IN THE WORKING GROUP THE RUSSIANS LEFT NO DOUBT THAT THEY CONTINUED TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO IT. SEVERAL CONTACTS HAVE TOLD US THAT THE ADMINISTRATION STUCK FIRMLY TO THEIR POSITION, DESPITE SOVIET THREATS THAT THIS COULD JEOPARDISE PROGRESS ON OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

#### CONCLUSION

12. IT IS TOO SOON TO FORM A CONSIDERED VIEW OF HOW SUCCESSFUL THIS SUMMIT HAS BEEN. THE MEDIA (TAKING THEIR CUE FROM THE RATHER DOWNBEAT TERMS OF THE DEPARTURE STATEMENTS) INITIALLY PORTRAYED THE OUTCOME AS DISAPPOINTING. THE VICE PRESIDENT WHOM

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I SAW THIS EVENING AFTER HE HAD ACCOMPANIED GORBACHEV TO THE AIRPORT, EXPECTED RATHER NEGATIVE COMMENT IN THE WEEKEND PRESS, BUT THOUGHT HIMSELF THAT THE VISIT HAD BEEN BUSINESSLIKE AND WORTHWHILE. EVEN BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS THIS EVENING, THE WHITE HOUSE WERE WORKING HARD TO PUT THINGS IN A MORE POSITIVE LIGHT, AND THE SUBSEQUENT APPEARANCE OF THE JOINT STATEMENT MAY HELP. THE OUTCOME IS NOT FAR OFF WHAT US BRIEFERS WERE PREDICTING LAST WEEK: ALTHOUGH IT INEVITABLY LOOKS MODEST WHEN SET AGAINST THE EUPHORIA WHICH SURROUNDED THE SIGNING OF THE INF TREATY ON THE FIRST DAY.

13. WHATEVER THE CONCRETE RESULTS, IN TERMS OF PUBLIC RELATIONS THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE MAN OF THE MATCH WAS GORBACHEV. THIS WAS THE AMERICAN PEOPLE'S FIRST PROLONGED EXPOSURE TO THE NEW STYLE OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP. AND GORBACHEV EXPLOITED THE OPPORTUNITY BRILLIANTLY. HE TOOK A CONSCIOUSLY HIGH PUBLIC PROFILE, ANSWERING QUESTIONS FROM JOURNALISTS AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY AND INTERSPERSING FORMAL SUMMIT EVENTS WITH UNSCRIPTED TELEVISED ADDRESSES TO GROUPS OF AMERICANS. HIS IMPASSIONED ORATORY HAS DOMINATED THE TV NETWORKS ALL WEEK: BY CONTRAST THE PRESIDENT REMAINED OUT OF THE PUBLIC EYE BETWEEN SUMMIT EVENTS, AND SHUNNED UNSCRIPTED EXCHANGES WITH THE PRESS. BUT THE GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS COME THROUGH A GRUELLING WEEK WELL, AND INITIAL POLLS SUGGEST CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FOR THE HANDLING OF THE SUMMIT. HIS TELEVISED ADDRESS WILL ALSO HAVE HELPED. IT SHOWED A LOT OF THE OLD REAGAN SKILL AND WAS A PROFESSIONAL APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE TO SUPPORT HIM OVER RATIFICATION OF THE INF TREATY.

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FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ANKARA ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN  
THE HAGUE LISBON LUXEMBOURG MADRID OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK  
ROME UKDEL VIENNA UKDEL STOCKHOLM BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST  
EAST BERLIN PRAGUE SOFIA WARSAW  
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