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FM BONN

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OF 141910Z DECEMBER 87

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK, UKDEL NATO BRUSSELS, WASHINGTON

AND TO PRIORITY PARIS, MOSCOW, ROME, UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA

MODUK FOR DACU

WASHINGTON SUMMIT: SOVIET BRIEFING

SUMMARY

1. KARPOV BRIEFED GENSCHER ON 12 DECEMBER. SURPRISE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN TANKS.

DETAIL

2. KARPOV VISITED BONN ON 12 DECEMBER TO BRIEF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT. HE SAW GENSCHER FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS. ACCORDING TO HOLIK, HE LAID HIS MAIN EMPHASIS ON THE DIFFICULTIES THAT LIE AHEAD, NO DOUBT IN THE HOPE OF ENCOURAGING THE GERMANS TO PRESS THE AMERICANS ON THEM. SHULTZ VISITS BONN ON 15 DECEMBER.

3. KARPOV LEFT HOLIK WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT LITTLE HAD YET BEEN ACHIEVED ON START AND ABM. KARPOV SAID THE RUSSIANS KEPT COMING UP AGAINST 'RESERVATIONS' AND 'MYSTERIOUS ELEMENTS' IN THE AMERICAN POSITION. THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL KEEN TO LIST WHAT WAS AND WHAT WAS NOT PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE ABM TREATY. THEY WERE WILLING TO REACH AGREEMENT ON WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN AFTER THE PERIOD IN WHICH IT WOULD BE AGREED THAT THE ABM TREATY SHOULD REMAIN IN FORCE. HOLIK ASSUMED THAT IF NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THIS, THE START TREATY WOULD EXPIRE.

4. KARPOV SAID THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL HAD BEEN A HIGH PRIORITY FOR GORBACHEV IN WASHINGTON. THE RUSSIANS ENVISAGED TWO PHASES. IN THE FIRST, ASYMMETRIES WOULD BE ELIMINATED. IN THE SECOND, FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED TO A LEVEL WHERE WAR WAS NO LONGER POSSIBLE. KARPOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE WARSAW PACT WAS SUPERIOR IN TANKS (THE GERMANS HAVE TOLD THE PRESS OF THIS ADMISSION). HIS FIGURES WERE 50,000 AGAINST 30,000. HE ALSO NOTED THAT WARSAW PACT FORCES WERE SUPERIOR GENERALLY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THOUGH INFERIOR (HE CLAIMED) IN THE SOUTH. HE APPEARED TO ENVISAGE REGIONAL SOLUTIONS. KARPOV ADVOCATED A CORRIDOR IN CENTRAL EUROPE FROM WHICH

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ALL WEAPONS SYSTEMS (SIC) WOULD BE REMOVED.
GENSCHER EXPLAINED WHY THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

5. KARPOV CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET AND GERMAN POSITIONS ON SNF WERE CLOSE. THE RUSSIANS CONSIDERED THESE WEAPONS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS MANDATE THOUGH THEY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY INSIST ON THIS. GENSCHER SAID THE RUSSIANS SHOULD UNILATERALLY CUT BACK THEIR SNF INVENTORY. KARPOV WOULD NOT HAVE THIS, ARGUING THAT ASYMMETRIES COULD ONLY BE DEALT WITH IN AN APPROPRIATE CONTEXT.

6. A REFERENCE BY GENSCHER TO THE SOVIET CW OVERHANG WAS ALSO REJECTED BY KARPOV, WHO CLAIMED THAT RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN STOCKS WERE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL.

7. KARPOV COMMENTED ON A 'CHANGE OF ATMOSPHERE' AT THE PENTAGON SINCE CARLUCCI'S ARRIVAL. YAZOV AND AKHROMEYEV HAD BEEN INVITED TO FURTHER TALKS. THE ICE HAD BEEN BROKEN.

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