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OF 2110Z DECEMBER 87

INFO ROUTINE KABUL, ISLAMABAD, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA, ROMEISLAMABAD TELNO 1171: AFGHANISTAN  
SUMMARY

1. US VIEWS ON TACTICS FOR THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND AND THE LINE PAKISTAN SHOULD TAKE WITH THE RESISTANCE ON A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND A CEASEFIRE.

DETAIL

2. AS REQUESTED BY THE DEPARTMENT (TELECON EVANS/PRENTICE) WE HAVE CONSULTED STATE ABOUT THE QUESTIONS PUT TO LORD GLENARTHUR BY ABDUL SATTAR (SEE TUR).

3. STATE SAID THERE WERE WORRYING SIGNS, AS THE GENEVA PROCESS CAME TO A HEAD, OF PAKISTANI RELUCTANCE TO AGREE TO A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE WITHOUT HAVING A CLEAR IDEA IN ADVANCE OF HOW ARRANGEMENTS FOR A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WOULD WORK. IN A PRE-SUMMIT TELEPHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, PRESIDENT ZIA HAD COME CLOSE TO SAYING HE WANTED TO RE-LINK THESE TWO ISSUES.

4. THE SOVIET UNION HAD ONLY RECENTLY MOVED AWAY FROM THEIR INSISTENCE ON ACHIEVING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BEFORE A TIMETABLE COULD BE SET. THE US WOULD THEREFORE BE URGING PAKISTAN STRONGLY NOT TO BACKTRACK OR RE-INTRODUCE THE SAME LINKAGE IN ANOTHER FORM. ONLY WITH A SHORT TIMETABLE IN HAND, AND A CREDIBLE COMMITMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION TO WITHDRAW, COULD PAKISTAN HOPE TO FOCUS THE ATTENTION OF THE RESISTANCE ON THE DIFFICULT TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

NO SERIOUS APPROACH TO THE RESISTANCE WAS POSSIBLE ON A HYPOTHETICAL BASIS.

5. STATE SAID THEY WOULD THEREFORE TELL THE PAKISTANIS THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO SHARE FURTHER IDEAS WITH THEM BILATERALLY ABOUT THE POSSIBLE SHAPE OF A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. BUT THEY DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH EITHER CORDOVEZ OR THE RUSSIANS UNTIL A SUITABLE WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE HAD BEEN AGREED. COMPLETION OF THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS SHOULD BE CORDOVEZ'S FIRST PRIORITY, AND PAKISTAN'S. STATE ADDED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED AN EARLIER DATE THAN FEBRUARY FOR THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND BUT THEY RECOGNISED THAT CORDOVEZ' ARRANGEMENTS COULD NOT NOW BE UNRAVELLED.

6. STATE SAID THEY ALSO INTENDED TO ARM THE PAKISTANIS BEFORE THE

NEXT GENEVA ROUND WITH A BATTERY OF DETAILED POINTS CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL ON WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE MADE TO GIVE SATISFACTION, IF THEIR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW WAS TO BE BELIEVED. STATE HAVE PROMISED TO GIVE US A LIST OF THESE POINTS WHEN THEY HAVE FINALLY BEEN AGREED HERE. THEY WILL INCLUDE SUCH MATTERS AS FRONT-LOADING, VERIFICATION MECHANISMS, COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES, AND UNIT BY UNIT MOVEMENT SCHEDULES.

7. STATE RECOGNISE THAT THIS WILL ALL REQUIRE DIFFICULT AND PROLONGED NEGOTIATION WITH THE RUSSIANS BUT SAY IT IS ESSENTIAL TO TIE DOWN THE DETAILS, NOT LEAST TO CONVINCE RIGHT-WING OPINION IN THE US THAT A US COMMITMENT TO HALT ASSISTANCE TO THE RESISTANCE WILL ONLY BE GIVEN IN RETURN FOR A WATERTIGHT RUSSIAN COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW. (THERE HAS BEEN MUCH RIGHT-WING SKIRMISHING IN THE US PRESS ON THIS ISSUE SINCE THE SUMMIT.)

#### CEASEFIRE

8. STATE SAID THE PAKISTANIS HAD NOT YET ASKED THEM HOW THE RESISTANCE MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE. FOR THEIR PART, THE ADMINISTRATION WERE UNEASY ABOUT AIMING FOR A FORMAL CEASEFIRE, SINCE THEY DOUBTED THAT KHALIS OR ANY OF THE LEADERS WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTROL THEIR RESISTANCE FIGHTERS SUFFICIENTLY TO PREVENT VIOLATIONS. NEITHER PAKISTAN NOR THE US SHOULD FIND THEMSELVES COMMITTED TO A CEASEFIRE WHICH THEY COULD NOT ENFORCE. THE INEVITABLE INFRACTIONS WOULD ONLY PROVIDE EXCUSES FOR THE RUSSIANS TO RENEGE ON THE WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS AND BLAME THE WEST.

9. INSTEAD OF A FORMAL CEASEFIRE, STATE SUGGESTED THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO NEGOTIATE A SERIES OF DISENGAGEMENTS, SECTOR BY SECTOR. TO PROMOTE A SMOOTH WITHDRAWAL, IT WOULD OF COURSE BE DESIRABLE TO MINIMISE CONFLICT FROM DAY ONE OF THE WITHDRAWAL. THE MORE DETAILED THE WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS (AS IN PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE), THE MORE EASILY PAKISTAN AND THE US WOULD BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THE RESISTANCE THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO HARRY THE DEPARTING SOVIET AND REGIME FORCES. AND THE RESISTANCE THEMSELVES WOULD ANYWAY WANT TO CONSERVE THEIR SUPPLIES OF ARMAMENTS AND MUNITIONS. BUT AT THE VERY LEAST THE RESISTANCE WOULD WANT TO MOVE QUICKLY IN BEHIND THE DEPARTING FORCES. SOME CLASHES WOULD BE INEVITABLE. FORMAL COMMITMENTS TO A FULL CEASEFIRE WERE THEREFORE TO BE AVOIDED.

10. STATE SAID THAT SOME OF THESE ISSUES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED INFORMALLY WITH THE RUSSIANS DURING THE SUMMIT. THEY HAD ACHIEVED A MEASURE OF TACIT UNDERSTANDING THAT IN A HYPOTHETICAL WITHDRAWAL SOVIET FORCES MIGHT PROGRESSIVELY CONCENTRATE IN GARRISONS. GORBACHEV HAD SAID PUBLICLY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT

ENGAGE IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS DURING THE WITHDRAWAL. THIS WAS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE US PREFERENCE FOR PROGRESSIVE DIS-ENGAGEMENT RATHER THAN A CEASEFIRE.

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