

CONFIDENTIAL

117156  
MDHIAN 8812

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM MOSCOW  
TO DESKBY 231700Z FCO  
TELNO 365  
OF 231510Z FEBRUARY 88  
INFO DESKBY 231700Z UKDEL NATO  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN  
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL CSCE VIENNA

*mb*

PART ONE OF TWO

MY TELNO 363: SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, 21-23 FEBRUARY.

SUMMARY

1. BRIEFING ON SHULTZ'S VISIT BY US AMBASSADOR, WHOSE CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE CLOSELY PROTECTED. AGREEMENT TO BRING FORWARD SERIOUS NEGOTIATION IN VERIFICATION, AND DATA EXCHANGE, IN START: BUT LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS IN ALCMS, MOBILE ICBMS OR SLCMS. CONTINUING DIFFERENCES ON ABMT LINKAGE. REASONABLY CONSTRUCTIVE EXCHANGES ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND CW. SOVIET PROPOSALS ON STRUCTURE OF CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATION. LENGTHY BUT STANDARD EXCHANGES ON AFGHANISTAN. CONTINUATION SOVIET EQUIVOCATION ON A FOLLOW-UP RESOLUTION TO SCR 598. SOME INTEREST IN DISCUSSION OF ANGOLA/NAMIBIA. RELATIVELY GOOD-TEMPERED EXCHANGES ON HUMAN RIGHTS. OVERALL, SOME USEFUL PROGRESS IN A NOTABLY GOOD ATMOSPHERE: BUT NO SURPRISES OR BREAKTHROUGHS.

DETAIL

2. MY US COLLEAGUE, WHOSE CONFIDENCE SHOULD PLEASE BE CLOSELY PROTECTED, HAS GIVEN MY FRENCH AND FRG COLLEAGUES AND ME THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF SHULTZ'S VISIT, THE FIRST IN THE SERIES OF PRE-SUMMIT CONSULTATIONS AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. ALTHOUGH MATLOCK'S BRIEFING MAY LARGELY OVERLAP WITH SHULTZ'S OWN BRIEFING OF THE ALLIANCE IN BRUSSELS TODAY, I REPORT IT IN FULL IN CASE IT ADDS ANYTHING NEW.

3. DURING THE COURSE OF A 48 HOUR VISIT, SHULTZ SPENT NINE HOURS WITH SHEVARDNADZE, THREE AND A HALF HOURS WITH GORBACHEV AND ONE WITH RYZHKOV. THE DISCUSSIONS COVERED THE USUAL FOUR-POINT AGENDA OF ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS

CONFIDENTIAL

117156  
MDHIAN 8812

AND BILATERAL MATTERS. SHULTZ'S VERDICT ON DEPARTURE WAS THAT USEFUL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN SEVERAL AREAS ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO SURPRISES OR BREAKTHROUGHS.

#### ARMS CONTROL

#### START

4. SHULTZ'S MAIN OBJECTIVE ON THIS VISIT WAS TO PERSUADE THE RUSSIANS TO INSTRUCT THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN GENEVA TO ENGAGE IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS OF A STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY STRAIGHT AWAY, RATHER THAN LEAVING THIS MOST COMPLEX DIMENSION OF THE AGREEMENT UNTIL THE END OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS AS THEY ARE AT PRESENT INCLINED TO DO. SHULTZ ARGUED STRONGLY THAT IF THE DRAFT PROTOCOL ON VERIFICATION WERE TO BE LEFT UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT, IT WOULD GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF HAVING BEEN COBBLED TOGETHER IN A HURRY AND THAT THIS WOULD NOT HELP THE RATIFICATION PROCESS. SHULTZ THEREFORE PROPOSED THAT THIS PROTOCOL, ALONG WITH THE OTHERS, SHOULD BE READY IN DRAFT IN TIME TO BE CONSIDERED BY HIM AND SHEVARDNADZE AT THEIR MEETING IN WASHINGTON NEXT MONTH. SHEVARDNADZE EVENTUALLY AGREED TO THIS TARGET: IT IS TACITLY RECOGNISED ON THE US SIDE THAT THE DEADLINE MAY BE OVER-AMBITIOUS, BUT AT LEAST THE RUSSIANS ARE NOW COMMITTED TO IMPARTING GREATER MOMENTUM TO THIS CRUCIAL AREA OF THE NEGOTIATION. SHULTZ REGARDS THIS AS THE MAIN ACHIEVEMENT OF HIS VISIT.

5. IN THE SAME CONTEXT SHULTZ WON SOVIET AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO THE EXCHANGE OF DATA AT A MUCH EARLIER STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATION THAN WAS THE CASE WITH THE INF TREATY: IN THE LATTER CASE, PROBLEMS WERE CREATED FOR THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS BY THE FACT THAT KEY ITEMS OF SOVIET DATA WERE HANDED OVER ONLY VERY LATE IN THE DAY.

6. PROBLEMS REMAIN OVER ALCMS. NO AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE QUESTION OF THE NUMBER OF ALCMS WHICH, FOR COUNTING PURPOSES, SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO EACH LONG-RANGE BOMBER OF EACH TYPE: NOR OVER THE DEFINITION OF "STRATEGIC" IN TERMS OF RANGE - THE AMERICAN PREFERENCE IS FOR 1500 KM, THE SOVIET FOR A MUCH LESSER DISTANCE. THE WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS ON THESE POINTS NEVERTHELESS USEFULLY CLEARED AWAY SOME OF THE BRUSHWOOD WHICH COULD SAVE TIME AT GENEVA.

7. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER MOBILE ICBMS SHOULD BE ELIMINATED

(AS THE AMERICANS WISH) OR SIMPLY LIMITED (THE SOVIET PREFERENCE SINCE THEY ARE ALREADY DEPLOYING) ALSO REMAINS UNRESOLVED. THE AMERICANS NEVERTHELESS SIGNALLED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MIGHT PRODUCE NEW IDEAS ON THE VERIFICATION OF A MOBILE ICBM CEILING WHICH, IF VIABLE, MIGHT ENABLE THEM TO DROP THEIR PRESENT INSISTENCE ON A TOTAL BAN. THE AMERICANS DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL BUT LEFT THE RUSSIANS WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS PROBLEM MIGHT IN THE END BE SOLUBLE.

8. NO PROGRESS WAS REGISTERED ON SLCMS. THE SOVIET SIDE ACCEPTS THAT SLCMS WILL NOT BE COUNTED INTO A STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS TREATY BUT INSIST THAT THEY MUST NEVERTHELESS BE CONSTRAINED. THE AMERICANS HAVE NO OBJECTIONS OF PRINCIPLE TO THIS BUT CAN STILL SEE NO WAY IN WHICH SLCM NUMBERS COULD BE VERIFIED: THE RUSSIANS FAILED TO ENLARGE UPON OR SUBSTANTIATE THEIR CLAIMS TO HAVE RESOLVED THIS TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEM.

9. ON THE ABM TREATY, SHULTZ AGAIN EMPHASISED US INSISTENCE THAT PROVISIONS FOR NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABMT SHOULD BE ENSHRINED IN A SEPARATE TREATY RATHER THAN IN A PROTOCOL TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THE PERIOD OF COMMITMENT TO NON-WITHDRAWAL IS PROBABLY, IN MATLOCK'S VIEW, NEGOTIABLE AS BETWEEN THE SOVIET BID FOR TEN YEARS AND US OFFER OF SEVEN. THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM IS STILL THAT OF WHAT LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF ABM SYSTEMS SHOULD BE PERMITTED DURING WHATEVER PERIOD IS AGREED. ON THIS THE TWO SIDES STILL HAVE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF WHAT WAS AGREED AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: BUT THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THEY DETECTED SOME HINT OF MOVEMENT ON THE SOVIET SIDE DURING SHULTZ'S VISIT. THEY DO NOT REGARD THE DIFFERENCE AS UNBRIDGEABLE.

#### NUCLEAR TESTING

10. THE AMERICAN ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY NOW BE DISPOSED TO ACCEPT PROTOCOLS TO THE 1974 AND 1976 TREATIES ON VERIFICATION WHICH WOULD ENABLE THESE TREATIES TO BE RATIFIED. THE AMERICANS WILL INSIST ON SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE USE OF CORTEX TECHNOLOGY FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF YIELD ON THE SOVIET TESTING SITE AND EXPECT EVENTUALLY TO WIN THIS POINT.

#### CW

11. GORBACHEV ACCUSED THE US OF FOLLOWING THE BRITISH EXAMPLE IN LOSING ENTHUSIASM FOR A CW BAN. SHEVARDNADZE TOOK A STRONG

CONFIDENTIAL

117156  
MDHIAN 8812

LINE ON US BINARY WEAPONS PRODUCTION BUT SHULTZ COUNTERATTACKED WITH EQUAL FORCE, MAINTAINING THAT IF AND WHEN THE TOTAL CW BAN WHICH BOTH THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION DESIRED WERE TO BE ACHIEVED, AMERICAN BINARIES WOULD AT ONCE BE DESTROYED. SHULTZ WAS CRITICAL OF SOVIET DATA PROVISION, URGING THAT THIS SHOULD INCLUDE MORE DETAIL AS TO THE TYPES AND LOCATIONS OF EXISTING SOVIET CW. SOVIET EXPERTS PROPOSED, DURING THE VISIT, THAT THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA SHOULD INVITE EACH PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENT TO DESIGNATE A COMMERCIAL CHEMICAL PLANT TO ACT AS A TEST BED FOR VERIFICATION PROCEDURES: THE AMERICANS UNDERTOOK TO CONSIDER THIS IDEA. (BILATERAL US/SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON CW ARE TO TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA BETWEEN 15 MARCH AND 5 APRIL).

#### CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS

12. SHEVARDNADZE REHEARSED AT LENGTH THE SOVIET POSITION ON DUAL-CAPABLES BUT, IN THE FACE OF SHULTZ'S ADAMANT DISMISSAL, DID NOT PRESS HIS CASE FOR A SEPARATE NEGOTIATION ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE RUSSIANS PROPOSED THAT, ONCE THE MANDATE HAD BEEN AGREED AND ADOPTED, THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS SHOULD EMBRACE THE FOUR ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT, NAMELY: DATA EXCHANGE, THE SCALE OF OVERALL REDUCTIONS, THE QUESTION OF SPECIAL CORRIDORS AND ZONES OF REDUCED FORCE CONCENTRATION AND, FINALLY, VERIFICATION AND CBMS. THE AMERICANS UNDERTOOK TO CONSIDER.

#### REGIONAL ISSUES

##### AFGHANISTAN

13. THE EXCHANGES ON AFGHANISTAN CONVINCED SHULTZ THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS TAKEN AN IRREVOCABLE DECISION TO WITHDRAW SOVIET FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN WHILE CONTINUING TO HAGGLE OVER DETAILS AND CONDITIONS. BOTH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV WERE AS SCATHING ABOUT ZIA'S POSITION AS THEY WERE DURING YOUR OWN VISIT. SHULTZ, DEFENDING PAKISTANI CONCERNS, ARGUED THAT POLITICAL CONDITIONS HAD TO BE CREATED WITHIN AFGHANISTAN WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE THE REFUGEES TO RETURN. SHULTZ ALSO PRESSED SHEVARDNADZE ON THE QUESTION OF CONTINUING SOVIET ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE KABUL REGIME ARGUING THAT THEY SHOULD CEASE AT THE SAME TIME AS US ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE RESISTANCE. VORONTSOV SAID THAT IN THAT CASE THE AMERICANS SHOULD ALSO UNDERTAKE TO CEASE ARMS SUPPLIES TO PAKISTAN. OVERALL THE EXCHANGES ON AFGHANISTAN, ?

CONFIDENTIAL

117156  
MDHIAN 8812

THOUGH LENGTHY, PRODUCED NO NOVELTIES.

END OF PART ONE OF TWO

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 161

MAIN 146

ARMS CONTROL: NUCLEAR  
LIMITED  
SEC POL D  
ACDD  
DEFENCE  
NED  
SOVIET  
CSCE UNIT  
EED  
NAD  
WED  
SED  
PLANNERS  
ESSD

NEWS  
INFO  
PUSD  
RESEARCH  
LEGAL ADVISERS  
PS  
PS/LORD GLENARTHUR  
PS/MR MELLOR  
PS/PUS  
SIR J FRETWELL  
MR BOYD  
MR GOULDEN  
MR RATFORD

ADDITIONAL 15

DUS (P) MOD  
CDI MOD  
AUS POL MOD  
ACSA (N)  
DGSDIPO MOD  
DACU MOD  
NUC POL (SY) MOD

D DEF POL MOD  
MR HALL CAB OFFICE  
MR NICHOLLS CAB OFFICE  
MR BURKE CAB OFFICE  
PS TO PM 3 COPIES  
~~SIR P CRADOCK NO10.~~

NNNN