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FM FCO

TO DESKBY 260400Z ISLAMABAD

TELNO 181

OF 251430Z FEBRUARY 88

INFO DESKBY 260100Z SEOUL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, KABUL, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA

INFO PRIORITY NEW DELHI, ROME, PARIS, BONN, PEKING, RIYADH

SEOUL FOR PS/LORD GLENARTHUR

OUR TELNO 171: AFGHANISTAN: ADVICE TO PAKISTAN

1. SINCE OUR CONVERSATIONS LAST WEEK WITH NOORANI WE HAVE BEEN GIVING CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH NO 10, TO THE ADVICE WHICH WE SHOULD GIVE TO THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT AT THIS DELICATE STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.
2. WE RECOGNISE THE DILEMMA FACING THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH A UN AGREEMENT IN GENEVA WHICH EITHER PROVES UNENFORCEABLE IN PARTS (EG OVER THE RETURN OF REFUGEES), BECAUSE THE RESISTANCE ARE NOT PREPARED TO CO-OPERATE, OR RELIES HEAVILY UPON SOVIET ASSURANCES ABOUT SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH ARE NOT ENSHRINED IN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF. NONETHELESS WE MUST BE CAREFUL THAT THE BEST DOES NOT BECOME THE ENEMY OF THE GOOD. THE CLEAR PRIORITY IS TO SEE A COMPLETE SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE NOTE FROM YOUR TELNO 298 THAT IN YOUR ASSESSMENT PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION GENERALLY IN PAKISTAN WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT A DECISION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN NOT TO SIGN. WE SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE RUSSIANS MUST NOT BE LET OFF THE HOOK OVER THE 15 MAY WITHDRAWAL DATE.
3. PINNING DOWN THE RUSSIANS TO THEIR WITHDRAWAL PLANS IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH CONTINUING TO PRESS THEM VERY HARD TO AGREE UPON A FORM OF INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD FACILITATE A PEACEFUL TRANSITION AND AN ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. WE THEREFORE SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN TO PUT TOGETHER SUCH AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT FOR AFGHANISTAN BEFORE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. IF THESE EFFORTS FAIL HOWEVER WE DO NOT (NOT) BELIEVE THAT THIS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO HOLD UP SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. WE BELIEVE THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO SIGN IN GENEVA ANYWAY, WITH SOME FORM OF DISCLAIMER ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF

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SIGNATURE FOR THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PDPA GOVERNMENT.

4. YOU WILL SEE FROM MIFT THAT THIS WAS THE GIST OF THE ADVICE WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER GAVE TO ABDUL HAQ AT THEIR MEETING ON 24 FEBRUARY. THE RESISTANCE CAN RELY ON OUR CONTINUING SUPPORT, BUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY NOW IS TO PRESS HOME THE VICTORY WHICH THEY HAVE SO NEARLY WON BY SHOWING POLITICAL SKILL TO MATCH THEIR MILITARY EFFORTS. YOU SHOULD TAKE A SIMILAR LINE WITH KHALES WHEN YOU SEE HIM ON 28 FEBRUARY (YOUR TELNO 287).

5. THIS LINE IS REFLECTED IN THE LATEST EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STATEMENT (BONN TELNOS 162 AND 163). PLEASE DRAW THE ATTENTION OF YOUR CONTACTS TO THIS STATEMENT DRAWING UPON THE TEXTUAL EXEGESIS IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF OUR TELNO 168. WE UNDERSTAND FROM BONN THAT THE ALLIANCE STATEMENT (YOUR TELNOS 289 AND 290) PROVED HELPFUL IN PERSUADING SOME OF OUR PARTNERS THAT THE PAKISTANIS AND THE RESISTANCE WERE INDEED APPROACHING THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS IN A RESPONSIBLE AND POSITIVE SPIRIT. IT DID NOT PROVE POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE A SPECIFIC REFERENCE IN THE EC STATEMENT TO WHAT THE RESISTANCE HAVE ANNOUNCED, BUT WE ARE DRAWING PRESS ATTENTION TO IT AS A WELCOME ILLUSTRATION OF THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO FORGE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN PARALLEL WITH THE WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS. WE SHALL BE INTERESTED TO LEARN WHAT USE CORDOVEZ THINKS HE MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE OF THE RESISTANCE STATEMENT AT GENEVA. (SHAH NAWAZ IS ON HIS WAY BACK TO NEW YORK IN ORDER TO TAKE THIS FORWARD WITH CORDOVEZ BEFORE THE GENEVA TALKS RESUME.)

6. THE REALLY IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL CONCESSION WHICH WE WANT FROM THE RUSSIANS IS A COMMITMENT TO CEASE ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE REGIME IN KABUL AT THE SAME TIME AS PAKISTANI AND WESTERN SUPPLIES FOR THE RESISTANCE ARE TERMINATED. IT MUST BE PRIMARILY FOR THE AMERICANS TO NEGOTIATE AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS WITH THE RUSSIANS. IT SEEMS TO US THAT IT IS ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE JOINT SOVIET AND AMERICAN DESIRE TO ENSURE THAT SOVIET WITHDRAWAL BEGINS BEFORE THE MOSCOW SUMMIT THAT RELIABLE BILATERAL ASSURANCES CAN BE OBTAINED TO BACK UP THE AGREEMENT IN GENEVA. WHILE WE NOTE THE APPARENT AMERICAN DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE BILATERALLY THE REQUIREMENTS DESCRIBED TO US BY OAKLEY, AND SET OUT IN WASHINGTON TELNO 464, WE ALSO NOTE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT YET EXPLICITLY AGREED. THIS NATURALLY LEADS US TO WONDER HOW US AND SOVIET GUARANTEES WILL BE SYNCHRONISED WITH PROGRESS AT THE GENEVA TALKS STARTING ON 2 MARCH. THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SAY THAT ARMACOST WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PASS THROUGH LONDON ON HIS

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RETURN FROM PAKISTAN AND INDIA, BUT THAT HE HAS PROMISED TO GIVE SIR ANTONY ACLAND A BRIEFING ON THE DEVELOPMENTS THIS WEEK ON HIS RETURN. THIS WILL BE MOST VALUABLE IN ADVANCE OF THE DISCUSSIONS ON AFGHANISTAN WHICH WE HOPE TO HAVE WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR SHULTZ IN THE MARGINS OF THE NATO SUMMIT.

7. THE PAKISTAN AMBASSADOR HERE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO RETURN TO ISLAMABAD FOR CONSULTATIONS OVER THE WEEKEND AND ASKED TO BE TOLD OUR ADVICE BEFORE HE DEPARTS. HE HAS BEEN SEEN BY MCLAREN AND BURNS TODAY AND BRIEFED ON THE ABOVE LINES. SHAHARYAR KHAN, WHO SAID THAT THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN ACTIVELY THINKING ABOUT A DISCLAIMER, WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS ADVICE. GIVEN THE DIFFICULTIES IN GETTING THE RESISTANCE TO FOCUS ON THE NEED FOR COMPROMISE AND THE FACT THAT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WAS ONLY A STAGING POST ON THE WAY TO SELF-DETERMINATION, HE WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES OF REACHING A DEAL IN MARCH ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT.

8. YOU SHOULD SPEAK SIMILARLY TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY OR HIS DEPUTY AT YOUR PROPOSED MEETING ON 29 FEBRUARY. NOORANI WILL APPARENTLY STAGE THROUGH LONDON ON THE MORNING OF 1 MARCH ON HIS WAY TO GENEVA.

9. SEOUL PLEASE PASS TO PS/LORD GLENARTHUR AND GILLMORE.

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