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FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 250900Z FCO

TELNO 464

OF 250405Z FEBRUARY 88

INFO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA

INFO IMMEDIATE KABUL, PARIS, ROME, NEW DELHI, SEOUL

SEOUL FOR PS/LORD GLENARTHUR

FCO TELNO 336 TO WASHINGTON: **AFGHANISTAN**

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER DETAIL OF US LINE TO THE RUSSIANS. US DOUBTS ABOUT CORDOVEZ'S PROPOSALS FOR UN MONITORING.

DETAIL

2. IN THE MARGINS OF THE MEETING IN STATE DEPARTMENT ON 24 FEBRUARY WITH AMBASSADOR HELMAN TO DISCUSS AID AND RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN (SEE MIFT, NOT TO SEOUL), SOME FURTHER DETAILS EMERGED ON THE LINE WHICH SHULTZ HAD TAKEN IN MOSCOW, WHICH COMPLEMENT OAKLEY'S BRIEFING REPORTED IN TUR. THE NSC AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT BUREAUX FOR SOUTH ASIA, REFUGEE PROGRAMMES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS WERE ALL REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING.

3. THE AMERICANS CONFIRMED THAT IN MOSCOW SHULTZ HAD SET OUT A SERIES OF REQUIREMENTS WHICH HAD TO BE MET IF THE US WERE TO BE ABLE TO CARRY THROUGH THEIR ROLE AS GUARANTOR. THESE REQUIREMENTS INCLUDED:

(I) CESSATION OF SOVIET MILITARY AID TO THE KABUL REGIME FROM DAY ONE OF WITHDRAWAL (IE A RECIPROCAL COMMITMENT TO THE OBLIGATION ON THE US TO CEASE MILITARY AID TO THE RESISTANCE: THIS WAS VITAL TO PROCURE CONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCENCE).

(II) A PUBLIC RUSSIAN COMMITMENT TO A FRONT-LOADED WITHDRAWAL TO A SINGLE-DIGIT TIMETABLE, (IE MAXIMUM NINE MONTHS) WITH 50 PER CENT OF FORCES OUT AFTER 90 DAYS: THE FIRST TROOPS TO BE OUT ON DAY ONE AND SIGNS OF PREPARATIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL TO BE VISIBLE BEFORE THEN. THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THAT SHULTZ HAD PERSUADED THE RUSSIANS TO ACCEPT FRONT-LOADING ON THESE LINES.

(III) A RECOGNITION THAT US NON-MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE RESISTANCE COULD CONTINUE.

WE WERE TOLD THAT THE ABOGATION OF SOVIET-PDPA SECRET AGREEMENTS (EG ON THE WAKHAN) WAS NOT (NOT) AMONG THE AMERICAN CONDITIONS.

4. THE US HAD IN MIND THAT THESE POINTS WOULD BE COVERED IN A US-SOVIET BILATERAL DOCUMENT, SEPARATE FROM THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS (WHICH WOULD NOT BE RE-OPENED), ALTHOUGH SOME

ELEMENT OF THE FRONT-LOADING MIGHT BE COVERED IN THE GENEVA TEXTS. THERE WAS NO FIRM US DECISION ON THE MECHANICS BUT A US-SOVIET SIDE - LETTER (OR LETTERS) WAS ONE OBVIOUS POSSIBILITY. LIKE THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS IT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE PUBLISHED.

5. AS DESCRIBED TO US, THE RUSSIANS HAD AVOIDED GIVING A DIRECT RESPONSE. THEY HAD SAID THAT THE US SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE PAKISTANIS TO SIGN THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS: AFTER SIGNATURE, THE US WOULD BE PLEASANTLY SURPRISED AT WHAT COULD BE DONE TO MEET THEIR CONCERNS.

6. THE AMERICANS ALSO EXPLAINED THEIR DOUBTS ABOUT CORDOVEZ'S PROPOSALS FOR UN MONITORING OF THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, AS SET OUT IN THE DRAFT MOU:

(I) THE SIZE OF THE PROPOSED MONITORING FORCE WAS TOO SMALL TO BE CREDIBLE. THE US COULD RELY ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY NTMS, BUT ONLY PART OF THIS COULD BE SHARED WIDELY. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD HAVE OTHER CREDIBLE MEANS OF OBTAINING RELIABLE INFORMATION. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE MONITORING TEAMS SHOULD BE LARGE ENOUGH AT THE START TO FULFIL THE TASKS DEMANDED OF THEM (ABOUT WHICH THE US MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY AT A LATER DATE). THIS WOULD ALSO PROVIDE A GREATER ELEMENT OF DETERRENCE AGAINST INFRINGEMENTS BY EITHER SIDE.

(II) PROCEDURE: THE US FELT STRONGLY THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE CONSULTED, RATHER THAN MERELY INFORMED, ABOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FORCE. THIS WAS ESSENTIAL BOTH ON GROUNDS OF PRECEDENT AND TO GIVE THE COUNCIL A FIRM LOCUS STANDI, IF THINGS WENT WRONG.

(III) TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS: IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE AND POTENTIALLY DAMAGING TO THE EFFECTIVENESS AND CREDIBILITY OF THE FORCE FOR THE OBSERVERS TO BE DEPENDENT ON THE KABUL REGIME FOR THEIR TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS. THEY WOULD BE OPEN TO MANIPULATION.

7. WE SAID THAT WE WERE NOT INCLINED TO MAKE TOO MUCH OF A FUSS OVER THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF PUTTING THE MONITORING OPERATION IN PLACE. CORDOVEZ HAD ACCEPTED THAT ANYTHING LARGER THAN THE FORCE PRESENTLY PROPOSED WOULD REQUIRE THE AGREEMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AND WITH CAREFUL DRAFTING OF THE REPLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER ABOUT THE MONITORING FORCE IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE COUNCIL TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD EXPECT TO BE CONSULTED IF THE OPERATION WENT SERIOUSLY WRONG.

ACLAND