

## ADVANCE COPY

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FM ISLAMABAD  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 323

OF 011016Z MARCH 88  
INFO IMMEDIATE KABUL, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, ROME, PARIS

MY TELNO 318: AFGHANISTAN: ADVICE TO PAKISTANIS

1. PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ TOOK ME ASIDE AT A RECEPTION TODAY TO TALK ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. THE OCCASION WAS THE OPENING OF A SEMINAR ON ROAD SAFETY WHERE THE EFFECTIVE KEYNOTE ADDRESS WAS GIVEN BY A BRITISH EXPERT FROM THE NATIONAL ROAD RESEARCH LABORATORY AND THE PRESIDENT HAD FOLLOWED WITH AN EXTREMELY COLOURFUL SPEECH IN URDU MAKING A SERIES OF JOKES WHICH HAD THE LARGE AUDIENCE IN STICHES AND PUTTING OVER POWERFULLY THE MESSAGE ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF ROAD SAFETY. SO HE IS ON GOOD FORM.

2. AT THE CROWDED RECEPTION AFTERWARDS HE TOOK THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR AND MYSELF ASIDE SEPARATELY. HE SAID TO ME THAT HE WAS AWARE OF OUR VIEWS ON THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AS CONVEYED IN LONDON AND HERE. HE APPRECIATED THAT WE HAD PRESSED THE RUSSIANS HARD ON THE QUESTION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. HE HOPED, HOWEVER, WE COULD DO SOME MORE TO GET OVER TO THE RUSSIANS THE MESSAGE THAT IT REALLY WAS ESSENTIAL IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO BE BROUGHT INTO BEING IN AFGHANISTAN IF A STATE OF ANARCHY AND CHAOS WAS TO BE AVOIDED AND THE REFUGEES TO GO HOME. HE HAD THOUGHT OF TELEPHONING THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONALLY TO GET OVER THIS MESSAGE.

3. WE COULD BE ASSURED, HE SAID, THAT PAKISTAN WAS COMMITTED TO THE GENEVA PROCESS AND WOULD GO THROUGH WITH IT, THOUGH HE HAD NO INTENTION OF SUBMITTING TO RUSSIAN THREATS ABOUT THE NEED TO SIGN BY MARCH 15 OR ELSE. THERE COULD BE SOME SLIPPAGE. HE KNEW THERE WERE PROSPECTS, ACCORDING TO THE AMERICANS, OF GETTING THE RUSSIANS TO AGREE NOT TO SUPPLY THE KABUL REGIME WITH ARMS AS A CORRESPONDING MEASURE TO THE UNDERTAKINGS NOT TO SUPPLY THE MUJAHIDEEN AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL DATE. BUT THAT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT. PAKISTAN WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO RESTRAIN THE RESISTANCE FROM ATTACKING THE RUSSIANS AS THEY WITHDREW WITHOUT SOME PROPER AUTHORITY IN KABUL. THE NAJIB GOVERNMENT MIGHT NOT LAST MORE THAN A FEW WEEKS BUT WHAT THEY WOULD LEAVE BEHIND THEM WOULD BE A SITUATION WHICH WOULD BE OF NO BENEFIT TO THE RUSSIANS, PAKISTANIS OR ANYONE ELSE. HE HAD HEARD THE

RUSSIANS HAD TOLD CORDOVEZ NOT TO PURSUE THE SECOND TRACK NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS TIME. HE WAS AWARE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE SOME OBLIQUE HINTS ABOUT POSSIBILITIES OF CHANGE IN KABUL BUT THIS WAS NOT ENOUGH. THE MESSAGE HAD TO BE GOT OVER TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY SHOULD ENSURE A STABLE GOVERNMENT AFTER THEIR DEPARTURE.

4. I SAID I WOULD CONVEY THIS MESSAGE. WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH AS THE FAST-MOVING SITUATION DEVELOPED. I HOPE YOU MIGHT CONSIDER WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER OR YOU MIGHT CALL IN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, OR WHETHER HM AMBASSADOR CAN MAKE REPRESENTATIONS IN MOSCOW, TO CONVEY ZIA'S APPEAL TO THE RUSSIANS AND ENDORSE IT.

BARRINGTON

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