

CONFIDENTIAL

U27746
MDLIAN 5977

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 817

OF 282230Z MARCH 88
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL MBFR VIENNA, UKDIS GENEVA, MODUK

MY TELNO 784: SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: ARMS CONTROL
SUMMARY

1. LITTLE NEW ON START BUT SOME DISCUSSION OF NEW IDEAS ON
DEFENCE AND SPACE INCLUDING A QUOTE PREDICTABILITY PROTOCOL
UNQUOTE TO THE DEFENCE AND SPACE TREATY. A STEP BACKWARDS ON
NUCLEAR TESTING. NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS
CONTROL. STALE DISCUSSION OF CW.

DETAIL

2. OUR CONTACTS HAVE GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION ABOUT DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES DURING
SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT.

START

3. THE US TEAM HINTED STRONGLY THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO
ACCEPT AN ALCM RANGE LIMIT BELOW 1500 KILOMETRES AND AN
ATTRIBUTION RULE OF MORE THAN 10 ALCMS PER BOMBER IF (AND ONLY
IF) THE RUSSIANS AGREED THAT CONVENTIONAL ALCMS WERE EXCLUDED
FROM THE TREATY. THE RUSSIANS CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR A LIMIT
OF 1100 ON ALCMS, WHICH THE US REJECTED.

4. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A SUB-LIMIT OF 800 MOBILE MISSILES
WAS ENTIRELY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US BUT OF INTEREST BECAUSE IT
SUGGESTED THAT SOVIET FORCE PLANNING FOR THE SS24 AND SS25 WAS
IN LINE WITH US INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (WHICH ARE OF A LIKELY
TOTAL PROCUREMENT OF ABOUT 500 SS25S AND 300 SS24S). THE
RUSSIANS PRESSED IDEAS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE QUOTE CRADLE TO
GRAVE UNQUOTE VERIFICATION REGIME FOR MOBILE MISSILES, BUILDING
ON SOVIET PROPOSALS ALREADY MADE IN GENEVA. THIS HAD INCLUDED
PROPOSALS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION, PERIMETER AND PORTAL
MONITORING, REMOTE SENSING, AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES. THE US
HAD MAINTAINED THEIR POSITION THAT EVEN SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE
REGIME AS THIS WOULD NOT GENERATE A SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE THAT
LIMITS WERE BEING OBSERVED. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT THEY
HAD BEEN HOPING THAT SHULTZ WOULD BE AUTHORISED AT THIS MEETING
TO MAKE A NEW US PROPOSAL FOR LIMITS ON MOBILE MISSILES. IN
THE EVENT, THIS HAD NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT, BUT
SHULTZ HAD BEEN ABLE TO MAKE SOME NEW US PROPOSALS FOR THE

VERIFICATION OF MOBILE MISSILE LIMITS, WHICH OF COURSE STRONGLY IMPLIED THAT THE US WAS DEFINITELY NOW PREPARED TO DROP THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A COMPLETE BAN. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HOPE THAT THIS CAN FORMALLY BE DONE AT THE NEXT SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN APRIL. WE UNDERSTAND THAT ANY SUCH NEW PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO PERMIT BOTH RAIL-MOBILE AND ROAD-MOBILE MISSILES UNDER AN OVERALL RV LIMIT OF BETWEEN 500 AND 1000. DEFENCE AND SPACE

5. THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD BE CONTENT TO SIGN A DEFENCE AND SPACE TREATY BASED CLOSELY ON THE DECEMBER SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT LANGUAGE AND HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE ONLY PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF A COMPLEMENTARY PREDICTABILITY PACKAGE AFTER SUCH A TREATY HAD BEEN AGREED. THE US SIDE HAD ARGUED THAT THE DECEMBER LANGUAGE NEEDED TO BE CLARIFIED AND HAD PROPOSED A PROTOCOL TO THE DEFENCE AND SPACE TREATY THAT WOULD CODIFY A VOLUNTARY QUOTE PREDICTABILITY PACKAGE UNQUOTE. ELEMENTS IN THE PACKAGE MIGHT INCLUDE AN ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF DATA ABOUT TESTING ACTIVITIES THAT LOOKED 18 MONTHS AHEAD: BRIEFINGS BY BOTH SIDES ON THEIR TESTING PROGRAMMES: AND OTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY THE AMERICANS, SUCH AS OPEN LABORATORIES AND OBSERVERS AT THE OTHER SIDE'S TESTS. THE AMERICANS HAD PROPOSED, IN ADDITION, THAT SPACE-BASED SENSORS WITH AN ABM CAPABILITY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RUN FREE (AN IDEA DISCUSSED BETWEEN CARLUCCI AND YASOV IN BERNE LAST WEEK). THE AMERICANS ARGUED THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE STABILISING AND IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. THE RUSSIANS HAD GIVEN NO SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE.

6. WE UNDERSTAND THAT, CONTRARY TO PRESS REPORTS, IT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN AGREED WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION THAT NO PROPOSAL WOULD BE PUT TO THE RUSSIANS FOR DESIGNATED TEST RANGES IN SPACE. THIS IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF IDEAS FOR FUNCTIONAL TESTING PARAMETERS PRESENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION (BAND'S LETTER OF 23 MARCH) BUT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD DECIDED THAT THE IDEA REQUIRED MORE STUDY BEFORE IT COULD BE PUT TO THE RUSSIANS. THIS ALSO APPLIED TO OTHER IDEAS IN THIS CATEGORY PRESENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION HERE, WHICH WOULD BE DESIGNED TO MAKE CLEAR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT. THE EXPECTATION HERE IS THAT AN AGREED ADMINISTRATION APPROACH MAY WELL BE FORTHCOMING IN TIME FOR SHULTZ TO PUT IDEAS TO SHEVARDNADZE WHEN THEY MEET AGAIN IN MOSCOW NEXT MONTH.

7. SEE MIFT FOR NUCLEAR TESTING, CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND CW.

CONFIDENTIAL

027700
MDLIAN 5966

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 818

OF 282230Z MARCH 88
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA,
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL MBFR VIENNA, UKDIS GENEVA, MODUK

MODUK FOR DACU

MIPT: SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: ARMS CONTROL
NUCLEAR TESTING

1. THE GENERAL VERDICT HERE IS THAT THE VISIT CONFIRMED THE QUOTE STEP BACKWARDS UNQUOTE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE TAKEN SINCE THE MOSCOW MINISTERIAL IN FEBRUARY. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOW SWITCHED EMPHASIS BACK TO THE JVE, HAVING FAILED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THE VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS IN THE INTERIM IN GENEVA, AND THE AIM IS NOW TO REACH TECHNICAL AGREEMENT ON A JVE BEFORE THE NEXT MINISTERIAL IN MOSCOW IN APRIL. EVEN IF THIS IS ACHIEVED, CONDUCTING AND EVALUATING THE JVE WILL TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME THEREAFTER. THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OF THE PNET AND TTBT (OR EVEN SIGNING THE PROPOSED VERIFICATION PROTOCOL) AT THE SUMMIT IS THEREFORE NOW VIRTUALLY OUT OF THE QUESTION.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

2. IN CONTRAST TO THE OTHER ISSUES ON THE ARMS CONTROL AGENDA, THE RUSSIANS CAME TO WASHINGTON WITH NEW IDEAS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. THEY OPENED BY REHASHING THE DUAL CAPABILITY QUESTION, WHICH THE AMERICANS DEALT WITH RAPIDLY WITH THOMAS TAKING THE OPPORTUNITY TO REBUT EARLIER SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT SOME FORM OF COMPROMISE HAD BEEN REACHED IN MOSCOW IN FEBRUARY, AND THEREBY TO CLOSE THE GAP THAT HAD OPENED UP BETWEEN OSD AND STATE. BUT THE RUSSIANS WENT ON TO PROPOSE A TWO-PHASE DATA EXCHANGE WITH A WARSAW PACT/NATO MEETING IN MID-APRIL TO AGREE UPON CATEGORIES, AND A FOLLOW-UP SESSION IN MAY TO FILL IN THE BLANKS. THE INITIAL US REACTION WAS NON-COMMITAL BUT SUBSEQUENTLY HARDENED AS THE AGENCIES UNITED IN OPPOSITION TO WHAT OSD TERMED A QUOTE BROCHURE WAR UNQUOTE. ASIDE FROM THE LIKELY PROPAGANDA BATTLE THAT MIGHT ENSUE FROM SUCH AN EXCHANGE (AND A COMPONENT OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS A FILLING IN OF THE OTHER SIDE'S BLANKS, AS PROPOSED BY TARASOV IN MBFR IN THE EARLY 1980S), THE AMERICANS SAW THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AS AN ATTEMPT TO EXTRACT THE STABILITY TALKS FROM THE VIENNA FOLLOW UP MEETING AND THUS DIMINISH WESTERN LEVERAGE TIME. A DATA EXCHANGE ON

PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL

THE LINES PROPOSED COULD WELL BE PRESENTED AS THE START OF THE NEGOTIATIONS PROPER, OR AT THE VERY LEAST A FIRM COMMITMENT TO AN EARLY BEGINNING (AND SHOULD THEREFORE, IN THE US VIEW, AWAIT CONSIDERATION UNTIL THE NEGOTIATIONS GET UNDERWAY).

3. THE RUSSIANS ALSO CAME UP WITH A PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON NAVAL FORCES OUTSIDE THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS. SHEVARDNADZE AND GRINEVSKY BOTH MADE A PITCH FOR A QUOTE CONFERENCE OF MAJOR MARITIME POWERS UNQUOTE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE US, UK, FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND WHICH WOULD LOOK AT THE NAVAL BALANCE OF POWER. THE US REACTION WAS SHARPLY NEGATIVE.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

4. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THIS MINISTERIAL MIMICRED THEIR APPROACH AT THE PREVIOUS SESSION IN MOSCOW. THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE APPEARED TO BE TO GET THE AMERICANS TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE AND THAT WORK SHOULD BE ACCELERATED. THE PROPOSALS FOR DATA EXCHANGE, MOCK INSPECTION, AND BILATERAL MEETINGS GOING INTO CONTINUOUS SESSION AGAIN RESURFACED. THE AMERICANS, LED BY HOLMES (STATE), AGAIN REPEATED THEIR STANDARD LINE ON THESE ISSUES. WHILE THIS SATISFIED THE PENTAGON, HOLMES CAME AWAY WITH THE FEELING THAT THE US WAS IN DANGER OF BEING PERMANENTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE ON CW IN THE BILATERAL MINISTERIALS. HENCE THE DOWNPLAYING OF CW AT THE ALLIED BRIEFINGS AND AT SHULTZ'S PRESS CONFERENCE. HOLMES IS APPARENTLY LOOKING TO HAVE SOME NEW US IDEAS TO PUT TO THE RUSSIANS AT THE NEXT MINISTERIAL IN APRIL, AND TO IMPRESS UPON THE RUSSIANS THE NEED TO INTRODUCE THEIR BILATERAL PROPOSALS INTO THE CD. THE FRONT-RUNNER FOR A US BILATERAL PROPOSAL APPEARS TO BE JOINT MOCK INSPECTIONS OF CW PLANTS. BUT THE US CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION (AND THE PENTAGON) ARE LIKELY TO RESIST THIS.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

176

MAIN

172

EAST WEST US/SOVIET RELATIONS
LIMITED
SOVIET

CSCE UNIT
PROTOCOL
PS