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FM UKMIS GENEVA

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 225

OF 130844Z APRIL

AND TO PRIORITY ISLAMABAD, KABUL, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON

AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN

OUR TEL NO 223: AFGHANISTAN: PROXIMITY TALKS

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SUMMARY

1. PECK BRIEFS EC HEADS OF MISSION ON OUTCOME OF TALKS.

DETAIL

2. PECK, US OBSERVER, BRIEFED HEADS OF MISSION ON 12 APRIL. THE FOLLOWING NEW POINTS EMERGED:

(A) BOTH THE US AND PAKISTAN WOULD ENTER WRITTEN RESERVATIONS INDICATING NON-RECOGNITION OF PDPA,

(B) THE SIGNING CEROMNY WOULD BE PUBLIC, BUT WAS LIKELY TO BE LIMITED TO THE SIGNATORIES AND PRESS ONLY. PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD EMPHASISE NON-RECOGNITION OF THE KABUL REGIME,

(C) THE US DID NOT KNOW SOVIET INTENTIONS ON CONTINUED MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE CURRENT INTENSIFIED SOVIET RESUPPLY MIGHT SUGGEST THAT MILITARY ASSISTANCE THEREAFTER WOULD BE WITHHELD. THE AMERICANS WOULD ONLY RESUPPLY THE RESISTANCE IF THEY HAD EVIDENCE OF SOVIET RESUPPLY TO THE REGIME,

(D) THE SECRETARY-GENERAL INTENDED TO APPOINT CORDOVEZ AS HEAD OF THE UN IMPLEMENTATION MONITORING ASSISTANCE GROUP (UNIMAG). HE WOULD BE BASED IN NEW YORK, SUPPORTED BY MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIELD. THE US EXPECTED SOVIET AND AFGHAN ARMY FORCES TO FALL BACK AROUND KABUL AND TO COVER WITHDRAWAL THROUGH THE SALANG TUNNEL. THE CURRENT US ASSESSMENT DID NOT FORESEE THE PDPA LASTING BEYOND THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD,

(E) THE ACCORDS AND MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE MONITORING GROUP WOULD BE PUBLISHED.

3. PECK EMPHASISED THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT A PEACE SETTLEMENT. THE

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AFGHAN RESISTANCE, AS EXPECTED, HAD ALREADY REJECTED IT AND SAID THEY WOULD CONTINUE THE ARMS STRUGGLE FROM AFGHANISTAN. US ADVICE TO RESISTANCE WOULD BE NOT TO PROVOKE SOVIET FORCES DURING WITHDRAWAL.

4. AS PECK UNDERSTOOD IT, THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD LIKE A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORISING HIM TO ESTABLISH THE MONITOING GROUP. THIS WOULD BEST BE HANDLED ON AN INFORMAL BASIS THROUGH CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN MEMBERS.

5. AFGHANISTAN'S NEED FOR CONTINUED IMPORTS OF FOOD AND OTHER ESSENTIALS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE. IN THIS CONNECTION IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT SOVIET ECONOMIC SUBSIDIES CONTINUE. SOVIET UNION HAD SAID PRIVATELY THEY WOULD CONTRIBUTE THROUGH UNHCR, WHICH THE AMERICANS WELCOMED. INITIALLY, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT WELL BE TEMPTED TO CHANNEL AIDD THROUGH THE KABUL REGIME.

6. DESPITE CHANGES IN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT EG, THE APPOINTMENT OF A DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR THE NORTH, PECK THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT GORBACHEV WOULD WISH TO RISK THE DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY A DE FACTO PARTITION OF AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED A CLEAN BREAK.

COMMENT

7. PECK'S BRIEFING WAS CLEARLY INTENDED TO CONVINCHE THE COMMUNITY ON THE VALUE OF THE AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, IN GENTLE QUESTIONING, PECK LOOKED UNEASY WHENEVER IT WAS IMPLIED THERE WAS A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE OBLIGATION OF PAKISTAN TO ENSURE NON-INTERFERENCE IN AFHANISTAN ACROSS ITS BORDERS AND THE RIGHT OF THE US, FACED WITH CONTINUED SOVIET SUPPLY, TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN.

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