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~~PRIME MINISTER~~

VISIT TO TURKEY: MESSAGES TO PRESIDENT
VASSILIOU AND MR. PAPANDREOU

I think it would be helpful if you were to send both President Vassiliou and Mr. Papandreou messages about your discussions in Turkey on the Cyprus issue. It will help to keep up the momentum and to make the most of the current opportunity for progress. In particular, it will encourage President Vassiliou to keep in close touch with us following your successful first meeting with him.

Agree to sign the attached messages?

C. D. P.

(C. D. POWELL)

14 April 1988

between them, and I have encouraged President Vassiliou to respond positively by agreeing to meet Mr Denktash under the United Nations Secretary-General's auspices without preconditions. ~~That is the only way to get the necessary forward movement.~~ But the parties directly concerned will ^{also} need some outside help.

~~I have been encouraged by the progress you and Mr Ozal have made in Davos and Brussels in establishing a new basis for relations between Greece and Turkey. I know that you and he will be seeking to build on this when you meet again in Athens in June.~~ I considered very carefully your proposal that I should persuade Mr Ozal of the need to fix a timetable for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Cyprus, ~~which I understand you will want to revert to in June.~~ But frankly, I do not see that such an advance commitment before the two sides on the island sit down to negotiate would be helpful. In any case, I do not believe that it is reasonable or realistic to expect the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots to ~~accept that they should play one of their key cards before they are satisfied that the Greek Cypriots are sincerely intent on negotiating a settlement meeting the concerns of both sides~~ and one which will last. It would be far better to get negotiations started on a pragmatic basis, and then see what might be possible after confidence has been established. I suggested both to

President Vassiliou & to Mr. Ozal that the aim of such negotiations should be expressed as agreement on a unified Cyprus with a federal constitution, in which the presence of foreign troops would eventually be unnecessary.

11 I noted also what you said about the need for Mr Ozal to meet President Vassiliou. I accept that such a meeting ^{would} ~~is likely to be~~ ^{helpful} ~~necessary~~ in due course. But I entirely agree with Mr Ozal's view that the ^{first} ~~top~~ priority ^{must be} ~~is~~ to get President Vassilou and Mr Denktash to begin negotiations under UN auspices as soon as possible. Once this has been achieved, ~~all the parties concerned will want to see what other steps it might be useful to take.~~ I see considerable merit in ^{Mr Ozal's} ~~the~~ idea Mr Ozal raised with me in Ankara that it might be ^{of merit} ~~possible to~~ move on to a quadripartite meeting involving Greece and Turkey, as well as the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus. It ^{is for you to} ~~do not wish to pre-judge~~ the desirability and potential usefulness of such a meeting, ~~But it seems to me that it might be worth considering when the time comes.~~ ^{but} And I urge you not to rule it ~~entirely out of hand now.~~ I should of course be most interested to learn your ^{our} ~~your~~ further thoughts on the way ahead over Cyprus.

I know that you will wish to keep the content of this message confidential between us, ^{although} ~~but~~ I have no objection to your making it known that I had sent you a personal message to brief you on my talks with the Cypriot and Turkish leaders. I have also written to President Vassiliou to inform him of my talks with Mr Ozal in Ankara. ^h

SECRET?

~~DR444A~~

PO8AAX

H.E. Mr. George Vassiliou

αγαπητός.

~~SECRET~~ MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT VASSILIOU

I much valued the opportunity to meet you in London on 31 March. Our discussion of the Cyprus problem ^{during your visit to London} was most useful ~~before my visit to Turkey last week.~~ I know you ^{you might find it helpful to have a brief} will wish to have an account of my meeting with Mr Ozal in Ankara on 7 April.

I ^{told} briefed Mr Ozal ^{about} our talks here, stressing, as you had asked me to do, your willingness to negotiate with the Turkish Cypriots and the importance you attached to the improvement in relations between Turkey and Greece as they affected Cyprus. I reaffirmed my own view that it would be a mistake for either side in Cyprus to erect road blocks in the way of a negotiated settlement by setting conditions for progress, for example, through insistence on an advance commitment to withdrawal of Turkish troops from the north and demilitarisation of the Island; that, since progress could only come about as a result of negotiations between the two communities, you

should be prepared to meet Mr Denktash; and that a meeting between you and Mr Ozal could come only after that. I said that goodwill gestures by both sides would make a resumption of negotiations easier.

Mr Ozal agreed that the first step must be a meeting between you and Mr Denktash. ~~But~~ He believed it might be possible to move later on to a quadripartite meeting involving Turkey and Greece as well. Mr Ozal ~~say~~ ^{made} Turkey's role as ~~mkaing it easier to solve the Cyprus~~ problem, rather than to make it harder. The Turkish ^{clear over the} Government did not want a partition of Cyprus and accepted that it should be a unified state with a federal structure. But they had to make absolutely sure that Turkish Cypriot security and Turkey's own strategic concerns were satisfied. Mr Ozal contended that the Turkish military presence in the north had played its part in keeping the peace on the Island, where there had been no bloodshed since 1974. He was worried about the consequences of a withdrawal. But ^{apparently he} ~~Mr Ozal~~ was determined to reach a solution to the Cyprus problem, and hoped that Mr Papandreou was too.

I found Mr Ozal's suggestion of a possible quadripartite meeting later on ~~most~~ interesting. I had myself ~~wondered~~ if he might be receptive to such an idea. I hope that none of the parties involved will ^{dismiss it} ~~take up rigid~~ rejectionist positions in advance. I have noted press reports that the Greek Government has ^{apparently} ~~already~~ rejected Mr Ozal's proposal because Mr Denktash would be present at

Mr. Byrondron

such a meeting. But I am urging ~~him~~ in a parallel message not to rule the idea out at this stage: all concerned should be ready to contemplate any step which might bring rapid progress towards achievement of a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus.

I should be grateful if you would ~~I know, Mr President, that you will wish to keep the content of this message confidential, but I have no objection to any public statement from your side that I had sent you a message to brief you on my talks in Turkey.~~ ^{although I would have no objection to your letting it be known that I have}

~~Tridly may I say that I~~

~~appreciated it~~

Tridly, I know that a difficult task you face & your recent faced last week in dealing with ~~the~~ particularly vicious hijacking, which as I write is still in progress. I am ~~most~~ more grateful to you for helping as ~~much~~ ~~as~~ ~~you~~ ~~can~~ ~~do~~ ~~in~~ ~~this~~ ~~regard~~ so closely in ~~and~~ & hope that such advice as we were able to give was helpful to you in combating this appalling act of terrorism.