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SHULTZ BRIEFING OF NAC: 13 MAY: NON NUCLEAR ISSUES

SUMMARY

1. SHULTZ SPEAKS OF CHALLENGE OF MANAGING A MORE PROMISING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. FURTHER EXCHANGES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND REGIONAL ISSUES. ON CSCE, SHEVARDNADZE SHOWS FLEXIBILITY SHULTZ URGES HIM TO SEND FRESH INSTRUCTIONS TO VIENNA. ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SHULTZ STRESSES NEED TO TURN PROGRESS IN PRINCIPLE INTO PRACTICAL AGREEMENTS.

DETAIL

2. OPENING HIS REPORT ON HIS 11-12 MAY MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE IN GENEVA, SHULTZ SPOKE OF THE CHALLENGE OF MANAGING AN EMERGING RELATIONSHIP WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION WHICH HELD OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF GREATER STABILITY. THE WEST SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES WHILE MAINTAINING THE NECESSARY STRENGTH AND REALISM.

3. ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND CSCE, SHULTZ RECALLED THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD AGREED AT THEIR MOSCOW MEETING ON THE NEED FOR A BALANCED OUTCOME. THE US SIDE HAD PRESSED HIM AGAIN ON THIS, INVITING HIM TO SEND FRESH INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS VIENNA TEAM. THE RUSSIANS IN MOSCOW HAD SUGGESTED THAT PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN DEFENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THAT RELIGIOUS GROUPS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO ORGANISE: THAT PRIVATE RELIGIOUS TEACHING BE PERMITTED: THAT DENONIMATIONS SHOULD BE ABLE TO PUBLISH BOOKS: THAT RELIGIOUS VISITS AND PILGRIMAGES, EVEN ABROAD, SHOULD BE PERMITTED: AND THAT RELIGIOUS BODIES SHOULD HAVE ACCESS TO THE MEDIA. THE US WANTED THIS ATTITUDE EXPRESSED IN VIENNA. ON THE CST MANDATE, THE RUSSIANS HAD FLOATED SOME INTERESTING LANGUAGE ON DUAL CAPABLE SYSTEMS: ONCE AGAIN, THE US INVITED THEM TO TABLE IT IN VIENNA.

4. ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SHULTZ SAID THAT A LOT OF PROGRESS IN PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN MADE: IT WAS NOW NECESSARY TO TRANSFORM THIS INTO PRACTICAL OPERATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

5. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE HAD ALSO REGISTERED WITH SHEVARDNADZE US CONCERN AT THE PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. IT WAS IRONIC THAT AT A TIME WHEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT WERE ELIMINATING CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF MISSILES, OTHER NATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE CHINESE, WERE DEVELOPING THESE.

6. SHULTZ SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN LIMITED TIME FOR DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES, AND ON SEVERAL SUBJECTS FAMILIAR POSITIONS WERE REHEARSED. ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, HE PAID TRIBUTE TO THE HELPFUL UK ROLE IN THE MEETINGS IN LONDON WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS, ANGOLANS AND CUBANS. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS SUPPORTING THIS PROCESS. CROCKER AND ADAMISHIN WOULD MEET BEFORE THE SUMMIT, WITH A VIEW TO POSSIBLE SUMMIT DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE.

7. ON AFGHANISTAN, THE US ASKED THE RUSSIANS TO REMOVE MINEFILEDS WHICH COULD IMPEDE THE RETURN OF REFUGEES, SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT THERE WERE NO MINES ON ROADS OR WELL USED ROUTES: AND SOVIET MINES WERE DESIGNED TO SELF-DESTRUCT AFTER A SET PERIOD. THE RUSSIANS UNDERTOOK TO CONSIDER A US REQUEST THAT THEY PROVIDE MAPS OF MINEFIELDS TO THE UN MONITORS.

8. ON ETHIOPIA, SHULTZ EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT MENGISTU WAS HOLDING UP THE FLOW OF FOOD TO FAMINE STRICKEN AREAS. SHEVARDNADZE DENIED THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM. THE US DID NOT ACCEPT THIS ANSWER, AND WOULD PURSUE THE SUBJECT.

9. SHULTZ SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE TRIED TO ENGAGE HIM IN DISCUSSION OF CYPRUS. THE US POSITION WAS THAT THIS WAS NOT A BILATERAL, OR EVEN AN EAST/WEST, ISSUE.

10. ON BILATERAL MATTERS, SHULTZ SAID THAT A NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS WERE IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT. THESE COVERED SUBJECTS SUCH AS CO-OPERATION ON BASIC SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: TRANSPORTATION: CULTURAL EXCHANGES: FISHERIES: SEARCH AND RESCUE: POLLUTION CONTROL: AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE US COASTGUARD AND THE SOVIET MARITIME AUTHORITIES.

11. IN CONCLUSION, SHULTZ SAID THAT AT THE SUMMIT A DOCUMENT WOULD BE PUBLISHED REVIEWING THE COURSE OF EVENTS SINCE THE FIRST SUMMIT

AT GENEVA IN 1985, AND SETTING OUT THE CURRENT POSITION ON KEY ISSUES. THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT WERE GOOD. SHULTZ PROPOSED TO COME TO BRUSSELS ON 2 JUNE TO BRIEF THE NAC ON THE OUTCOME. THE PRESIDENT WOULD TRAVEL DIRECT TO LONDON AND MAKE A MAJOR SPEECH ON 3 JUNE. HE WOULD ALSO MAKE SPEECHES IN THE FINLANDIA HALL IN HELSINKI BEFORE GOING TO MOSCOW, AND IN MOSCOW AT THE STATE UNIVERSITY.

12. ANDREOTTI (ITALY) WELCOMED SIGNS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY, INCLUDING IN CSCE: RECENT EVENTS IN POLAND SHOW THAT EUROPEAN STABILITY WAS STILL PRECARIOUS.

13. GENSCHER (FRG) SAID THAT THE TIMING OF THE SUMMIT ALLAYED DOUBTS ABOUT THE CONTINUING ABILITY TO FUNCTION OF THE OUTGOING US ADMINISTRATION. HE HOPED THAT THE SUMMIT WOULD LEAD TO A BALANCED OUTCOME AT VIENNA IN ORDER THAT THE CST COULD BEGIN: THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE CENTRAL TO EUROPEAN SECURITY, SINCE THEY RELATED TO THE AREA IN WHICH NATO HAD THE MOST TO DEMAND FROM THE EAST, IN VIEW OF THE LATTER'S OVERWHELMING OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY. THE SUMMIT SHOULD ALSO GIVE AN IMPULSE TO THE CW NEGOTIATIONS. GENSCHER ARGUED THAT IT WAS VITAL TO ACHIEVE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS QUOTE WHILE THE SUN SHINES UNQUOTE. IT WAS WRONG TO ARGUE THAT PROGRESS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS WOULD UNDERMINE ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY. IN RECENT MONTHS, WHEN SUCH PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE, ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY HAD BEEN REINFORCED, NOT ONLY IN RESPECT OF EAST/WEST CONTACTS, BUT ALSO IN ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENCE COLLABORATION.

14. ORDONEZ (SPAIN) SPOKE OF THE NEED FOR PROGRESS AT THE SUMMIT ON THE MIDDLE EAST: PERES HAD RECENTLY TOLD HIM THAT FAILING THIS, THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION COULD BECOME DANGEROUS.

15. FOR THE UK, MR MELLOR RECALLED THAT HE HAD TOLD THE VIENNA CSCE MEETING OF THE NEED FOR A BALANCED OUTCOME, SINCE THE POLITICAL WILL IN THE WEST TO ACHIEVE ARMS CONTROL DEPENDED IN LARGE MEASURE ON OUR PERCEPTIONS OF EASTERN SOCIETIES. FAILURE TO HONOUR HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS AFFECTED OTHER AREAS. MANY EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, UNDER PRESSURE FROM THEIR PEOPLES, WERE AT A CROSSROADS. SOME (CZECHOSLOVAKIA) WERE TEMPTED TO EMPLOY STALINIST REMEDIES: OTHERS (HUNGARY) WERE DEVELOPING THEIR PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS. NEITHER TREND SHOULD BE EXAGGERATED, BUT THE WEST SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE POSITIVE.

16. ON REGIONAL ISSUES, MR MELLOR ASSURED SHULTZ OF UK SUPPORT IN

HIS MIDDLE EAST EFFORTS: THE RUSSIANS APPEARED MORE READY TO ENGAGE IN A NON-DOCTRINAIRE MANNER. HE SHARED US CONCERN AT MISSILE PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE MAIN BRITISH CONCERN WAS OVER CRUDE MISSILES ARMED WITH CW. MR MELLOR CONCLUDED BY OFFERING GOOD WISHES FOR THE SUMMIT AND SAYING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO REGRET IF IT WERE NOT MARKED BY A DRAMATIC NEW AGREEMENT. IT WAS BETTER FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS THAT SUMMITS SHOULD NOT APPEAR AS EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS.

17. TINDEMANS (BELGIUM) ASKED ABOUT SOVIET ATTITUDES TO THE CUBAN ELEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: WHETHER THE THIRD ZERO OPTION HAD BEEN MENTIONED: ABOUT SOVIET IDEAS ON DUAL CAPABLE WEAPONS FOR CWT: AND ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE PROGRESS MADE IN EXCHANGES ON A CW BAN.

18. ZAFIROPOULOS (GREECE) EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE IMPROVED EAST/WEST CLIMATE WOULD ASSIST PROGRESS ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE.

19. OLCAY (TURKEY) NOTED THE SOVIET WISH TO INTERNATIONALISE THE CYPRUS QUESTION, AND SPECULATED THAT THE REASON WAS THAT THE NEW LEADER IN QUOTE SOUTHERN CYPRUS UNQUOTE WAS THEIR CRONY.

20. RESPONDING TO THE QUESTIONS, SHULTZ SAID THAT HIS EXCHANGES ON REGIONAL ISSUES HAD A SPECIAL FEEL. WHEN THE SUBJECT WAS FIRST ADDRESSED, THREE YEARS AGO, THE RUSSIANS WERE VERY TOUCHY. NOW SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WAS POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH ITS INTENSITY VARIED. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, FOR EXAMPLE, MORE EXCHANGES WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS COULD BE MADE. SOME SOVIET OFFICIALS HAD REAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE DETAILS OF THE PROBLEM, BUT THIS HAD NOT YET REACHED HIGHER LEVELS, WHICH WERE STILL ADOPTING A POLITICAL POSTURE IN FAVOUR OF AN AUTHORITATIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THE RUSSIANS WERE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING THE INTRACTABLE ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION. SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS WOULD SUGGEST AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINE STATE, YET EVEN THOSE ARABS WHO ADVOCATED THIS IN PUBLIC BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE AN UNWORKABLE CATASTROPHE. OVERALL, THE MIDDLE EAST PROCESS HAD DETERIORATED IN THE LAST MONTH, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THE APPROACH OF THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS. BUT SHULTZ WOULD RETURN TO THE AREA AFTER THE SUMMIT.

21. ON ANGOLA, SHULTZ RECALLED THAT THE US POSITION HAD LONG BEEN THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD NOT TALK WITHOUT A WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS. SOME MONTHS AGO ANGOLA HAD PROMISED CUBAN WITHDRAWAL - THIS CONSTITUTED A BREAK-THROUGH WHICH WAS CONFIRMED IN LONDON. THE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE WAS NOT YET SATISFACTORY, BUT A CREDIBLE PROPOSAL

HAD BEEN MADE TO WHICH SOUTH AFRICA WOULD REPLY. PRESUMABLY THE RUSSIANS AGREED WITH THE ANGOLAN/CUBAN LINE.

22. ON DUAL CAPABILITY IN CST, SHULZ RECALLED THAT THE NATO POSITION FORESAW NO MENTION OF DUAL CAPABILITY IN THE MANDATE: ALTHOUGH THE FACT THAT A PIECE OF EQUIPMENT WAS DUAL CAPABLE DID NOT MAKE IT INELIGIBLE FOR INCLUSION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE GOING TO ACCEPT THIS POSITION: SHULTZ AHD URGED THEM TO TABLE LANGUAGE IN VIENNA.

23. ON CW, SHULTZ HAD AN INCREASING SENSE THAT THOSE INVOLVED SAW THE NEED TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE DETAIL, RATHER THAN JUST TO MAKE STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE. THE RUSSIANS HAD VOICED SOME INTERESTING IDEAS: SHULTZ HAD URGED THAT THEY PROPOSE THEM IN GENEVA. THESE INCLUDED THE SUGGESTION THAT INTERESTED STATES SHOULD DESIGNATE ONE CHEMICAL PLANT FOR SUDDEN EXPERIMENTAL INSPECTION, IN ORDER BETTER TO UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED.

24. SHULTZ ADMITTED THAT HE HAD NO CLEAR IDEAS ON HOW A BALLISTIC MISSILE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME WOULD WORK, ALTHOUGH STATES COULD AGREE NOT TO EXPORT MISSILES OR TECHNOLOGY. IF SUFFICIENT NATIONS ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF A PROBLEM, A SOLUTION COULD BE SOUGHT. THE US HAD RAISED IT WITH THE CHINESE, SUGGESTING THAT THEIR EXPORTS WERE DESTABILISING, BUT HAD RECEIVED NO SUBSTANTIVE REPLY.

25. FOR NUCLEAR ISSUES SEE MIFT..

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