

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM WASHINGTON  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 1340

OF 252202Z MAY 88

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, HELSINKI, MODUK,  
INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO POSTS, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS, UKDIS GENEVA,  
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL CSCE VIENNA, UKDEL MBFR VIENNA

MODUK FOR DACU  
MOSCOW SUMMIT PREVIEW  
SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT'S FOURTH (AND PROBABLY FINAL+ SUMMIT MEETING WCTH GORBACHEV. A FULL PROGRAMME MODELED LARGELY ON THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT PROGRAMME. MASSIVE US MEDIA INTEREST THOUGH NO EXAGGERATED PRESS EXPECTATIBNS. NO MAJOR NEW AGREEMENTS TO SIGN, THOUGH SOME BILATERAL DOCUMENTS (INCLUDING AT LEAST ONE ON NUCLEAR TESTING) WILL BE READY AND CEREMONIAL EXCHANGE OF INF TREATY RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS POSSIBLE.' PRESIDENT PRIMARILY APMING FOR A DEMONSTRATION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS OVERALL APPROACH TO US/SOVIET RELATIONS, BUT ALSO KEEN TO LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER PROGRESS BEFORE HE LEAVES THASWH TE HOUSE. XUSUAL FOUR-PART AGENDA. HOPES FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT, ESPECIALLY IN START.

DETAIL

2. FOLLOWING A DEPARTURE CEREMONY AT THE WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADORS FROM NATO AND OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES, PRESIDENT REAGAN LEFT WASHINGTON ON 25 MAY FOR HIS FOURTH MEETING WITH GORBACHEV IN AS MANY YEARS AND THE FIRST VISIT BY A US PRESIDENT TO THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE FORD/BREZHNEV ENCOUNTER AT VLADIVOSTOK IN 1974. AFTER FOUR NIGHTS AND A SPEECH IN HELSINKI, THE PRESIDENT ARRIVES IN MOSCOW ON 29 MAY AND LEAVES FOR LONDON ON 2 JUNE. SINCE GORBACHEV CHOSE NOT TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE WASHINGTON LAST DECEMBER, THE PRESIDENT HAS (RELUCTANTLY, WE UNDERSTAND) DECIDED TO CONFINE HIMSELF TO MOSCOW, ALTHOUGH MRS REAGAN WILL MAKE A QUICK TRIP TO LENINGRAD.

3. PRECEDENTS SET AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT WILL ALSO BE FOLLOWED IN OTHER WAYS. THE PROGRAMME IN MOSCOW REFLECTS GORBACHEV'S APPARENT WISH TO RECIPROCATE THE INTIMATE TONE SET IN WASHINGTON: THE PRESIDENT AND MRS REAGAN WILL HAVE A PRIVATE MEAL WITH THE GORBACHEVS AT THEIR DACHA, AND THERE WILL BE A VISIT TO THE BOLSHOI. THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE FOUR WORKING MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV AS WELL AS A BRIEF CEREMONIAL MEETING SOON AFTER HIS ARRIVAL (THE RUSSIANS PRESSED FOR A GOOD DEAL OF TIME FOR ONE-ON-

ONE SESSIONS BUT THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN LIMITING THE EXTENT OF THESE). IN ADDITION, THE PRESIDENT WILL DELIVER A MAJOR SPEECH AT MOSCOW UNIVERSITY, ATTEND A RECEPTION AT THE US AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE FOR A GROUP OF REFUSENIKS AND DISSIDENTS, ATTEND A MEETING WITH A CROSS-SECTION OF SOVIET CULTURAL FIGURES, AND VISIT THE DANILOV MONASTERY.

4. IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE SENATE WILL GIVE ITS CONSENT TO THE INF TREATY IN TIME FOR THERE TO BE A CEREMONIAL EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION IN MOSCOW. BUT EVEN IF THIS DOES NOT PROVE POSSIBLE, THERE WILL BE A NUMBER OF OTHER AGREEMENTS READY FOR SIGNATURE DURING THE SUMMIT AND THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO STRIKE AN UPBEAT PUBLIC TONE, TAKING PRIDE IN WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS SO FAR ON HIS WATCH, AND EXPRESSING OPTIMISM FOR THE FUTURE. THE ADMINISTRATION EXPECT THE SUMMIT TO PRODUCE A WEIGHTY JOINT STATEMENT AND (PERHAPS) A SEPARATE JOINT REPORT ON START AND (JUST POSSIBLY) OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

5. THE PRESIDENT WILL WISH TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE PHOTOGENIC SETTINGS OF MOSCOW AND THE TRAPPINGS OF A STATE VISIT, AND THERE WILL BE MASSIVE MEDIA COVERAGE BACK IN THE US. BUT AS HE SETS OUT FOR MOSCOW ON WHAT WILL PROBABLY (THOUGH NOT CERTAINLY) BE HIS LAST SUMMIT MEETING WITH GORBACHEV, THE PRESIDENT MUST BE SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTED THAT SOME OF THE HIGH HOPES EXPRESSED AT THE WASHINGTON MEETING, ESPECIALLY FOR ARMS CONTROL, HAVE NOT YET BEEN FULFILLED. NOT THAT ACHIEVEMENTS SINCE THEN HAVE BEEN NEGLIGIBLE. IN PARTICULAR, SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN (A MERE GLEAM IN THE EYE IN DECEMBER) IS NOW UNDERWAY AND THE INF TREATY SEEMS CERTAIN SOON TO BE APPROVED BY THE SENATE EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT IS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION IN MOSCOW. BUT IN START, INEVITABLY STILL THE MAIN FOCUS OF INTEREST HERE, HOPES IN SOME QUARTERS IN DECEMBER OF COMPLETING A TREATY IN TIME FOR MOSCOW RAPIDLY FADED, AND THERE ARE NOW WIDESPREAD DOUBTS THAT EITHER SIDE WILL IN PRACTICE BE ABLE TO PRESS AHEAD AT THE PACE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE A TREATY BEFORE THE PRESIDENT LEAVES OFFICE GIVEN ALL THE OBSTACLES THAT STILL LIE AHEAD (MY TELNOS 1203 AND 1204). THE PRESIDENT WILL THEREFORE BE LOOKING TO USE THE SUMMIT PRIMARILY AS A DEMONSTRATION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS OVERALL APPROACH TO US/SOVIET AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS (NEGOTIATING FROM STRENGTH, DOING BUSINESS IN A TOUGH BUT PRAGMATIC MANNER, BEING PREPARED TO BE STEADY AND PATIENT) AND AS AN ATTEMPT TO LEAVE A LEGACY THAT WILL SHAPE THE APPROACH OF HIS SUCCESSOR.

6. BUT THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE GIVEN UP HOPE OF MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS IN SOME IMPORTANT AREAS. ON THE

CONTRARY, THE NOW TRADITIONAL WORKING GROUPS ARE EXPECTED TO BE WORKING ROUND THE CLOCK AND THE PRESIDENT'S TEAM IS INTENDING TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIANS ON THE FULL AGENDA, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IN HIS DEPARTURE STATEMENT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE:

(A) ARMS CONTROL PROSPECTS ARE DEALT WITH IN DETAIL IN MIFT (NOT TO ALL). THE PRESIDENT WILL BE BRIEFED IN PARTICULAR TO TRY TO MAKE HEADWAY WITH GORBACHEV ON THE OUTSTANDING START ISSUES AND WILL BE MAKING CLEAR THAT HE IS READY TO CONTINUE WORKING AT THEM UNTIL THE END OF HIS PRESIDENCY. A FULL ACCOUNT OF PROGRESS MADE AND OF ISSUES STILL TO BE RESOLVED IS LIKELY TO EMERGE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OR, POSSIBLY, IN A SEPARATE JOINT START REPORT:

(B)# HUMAN RIGHTS WILL ONCE AGAIN BE HIGH ON THE PRESIDENT'S AGENDA, AND HE WILL PRESS FOR SOVIET MOVEMENT AT THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE. BUT HIS MAIN POINT, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, WILL BE THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE HAVE SO FAR MAINLY BEEN AT THE LEVEL OF INDIVIDUAL CASES RATHER THAN AT THE LEVEL OF PERMANENT CHANGES IN SOVIET SYSTEMS, REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES. TAKING HIS CUE FROM THE THOUSANDTH ANNIVERSARY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE SOVIET UNION (WHICH FALLS SHORTLY AFTER HIS DEPARTURE), THE PRESIDENT WILL STRESS THAT PRIORITY MUST NOW BE GIVEN TO CHANGES IN SOVIET LAW AND PRACTICE ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, POLITICAL PRISONERS AND EMIGRATION:

(C) REGIONAL ISSUES.

(I) SOUTHERN AFRICA HAS MOVED SHARPLY UP THE AGENDA AND MAY PROVE THE MAJOR ITEM OF INTEREST. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE QUADRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS (US/SOUTH AFRICA/ ANGOLA/CUBA) AND WILL PRESS FOR A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE. AT BEST, THEY WILL BE HOPING FOR TWO THINGS FROM THE RUSSIANS: AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WOULD NOT DISCOURAGE - AND MIGHT EVEN ENCOURAGE - MOVEMENT BY LUANDA AND HAVANA TOWARDS A REALISTIC TIMETABLE FOR CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL: AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WITHIN ANGOLA. IN THE US VIEW, SOVIET SIGNALLING ON THE ANGOLAN ISSUE HAS BEEN MIXED. AT THE VERY LEAST, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE LOOKING FOR AN INDICATION THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT OBSTRUCT THE NEGOTIATIONS:

(II) THE PRESIDENT WILL RAISE THE MIDDLE EAST

PEACE PROCESS, AS PROMISED TO PERES, BUT IS UNLIKELY TO PRESS THE ISSUE HARD. US HOPES HAVE FALLEN AWAY SINCE SHULTZ'S LAST DISAPPOINTING EXCHANGE WITH SHEVARDNADZE IN MOSCOW (MY TELNO 1105):

(III) ON THE GULF AND THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DO NOT EXPECT DEVELOPMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE. THERE IS A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON IMMEDIATE TACTICS, BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US HAVE SPOKEN STRONGLY TO IRAQ ABOUT THEIR CURRENT OBSTRUCTIVE AND SELF-DEFEATING RESPONSE TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL. BUT THERE IS LITTLE SCOPE FOR PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION. THE AMERICANS REMAIN FRUSTRATED BY THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON SR 598, BUT HAVE ACCEPTED THAT EARLY MOVEMENT IS UNREALISTIC:

(IV) ON AFGHANISTAN, THERE WILL DOUBTLESS BE MUTUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT. THIS IS LIKELY TO BE TINGED BY MUTUAL WARNINGS ABOUT NON-INTERFERENCE (AND PAKISTANI COMPLIANCE) AND FULL WITHDRAWAL. BOTH SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO WATCH THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS CLOSELY, AND IN PARTICULAR FOR ANY SIGN OF BREACH IN THE FRAGILE UNDERSTANDING ON AID TO CLIENTS. BUT THERE WILL BE LITTLE SUBSTANCE TO DISCUSS AT THE SUMMIT:

(V)# ETHIOPIA WILL ALSO BE RAISED BY THE AMERICANS, IN THE HOPE OF PERSUADING THE RUSSIANS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE ETHIOPIANS TO PREVENT WIDESPREAD STARVATION IN THE MONTHS AHEAD:

(D)# BILATERAL ISSUES. A NUMBER OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WILL BE READY FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT, PROBABLY INCLUDING AGREEMENTS ON SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, TRANSPORTATION, MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE ARRANGEMENTS, AND FISHERIES. THE JOINT STATEMENT IS ALSO LIKELY TO INCLUDE A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO PROMOTING YOUTH EXCHANGES.

COMMENT

7. THE PROGRAMME IS DESIGNED TO BE FULL, BUT IT LACKS SUBSTANCE. FOR ALL THE CAREFUL (AND APPARENTLY SUCCESSFUL) BRIEFING OF THE US PRESS NOT TO EXPECT TOO MUCH BEYOND THE PROCESS ITSELF, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY STILL BE HOPING FOR SOMETHING MORE. IF SO, HE MAY COME UNDER PRESSURE FROM GORBACHEV TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO LANGUAGE ON START OR OTHER NUCLEAR ISSUES WHICH WOULD GO BEYOND THE ESTABLISHED POSITIONS AGREED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. I THINK THERE REMAINS A SLIGHT RISK OF THIS, BUT I WOULD NOT OVERSTATE IT. THE PRESIDENT WILL NO DOUBT WANT THE JOINT STATEMENT (AND ANY SEPARATE START REPORT) TO BE FORWARD AS WELL AS

BACKWARD LOOKING, AND HIS INSTINCTIVE YEARNING FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD IS NEVER FAR BELOW THE SURFACE. BUT THE US TEAM IS NOW WELL SEASONED, THE US/SOVIET AGENDA IS WELL-ESTABLISHED, AND (UNLIKE AT REYKJAVIK) THERE IS A TIGHT PROGRAMME. IN ADDITION, THE ADMINISTRATION ARE WELL SEIZED OF THE FACT THAT GORBACHEV WILL NO DOUBT BE LOOKING TO EXTRACT THE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE FROM WHAT WILL (PROBABLY) BE HIS LAST MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. ON BALANCE, THEREFORE, I DO NOT FORESS ANY UNWELCOME SURPRISES. INSTEAD, I EXPECT THAT THE EMPHASIS WILL BE ON POINTING UP AND CONSOLIDATING THE REMARKABLE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS OVER THE LAST 3 YEARS. THIS MAY THUS BE A SUMMIT RELATIVELY SHORT ON NEW SUBSTANCE.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

165

MAIN

147

.ARMS CONTROL: NUCLEAR  
LIMITED  
SEC POL D  
ACDD  
DEFENCE  
NED  
SOVIET  
CSCE UNIT  
EED  
NAD  
WED  
SED  
PLANNERS  
ESSD

NEWS  
INFO  
PUSD  
RESEARCH  
LEGAL ADVISERS  
PS  
PS/LORD GLENARTHUR  
PS/MR MELLOR  
PS/PUS  
SIR J FRETWELL  
MR BOYD  
MR GOULDEN  
MR RATFORD

ADDITIONAL

18

DUS (P) MOD  
CDI MOD  
AUS POL MOD  
ACSA (N)

MR P J WESTON CAB OFF  
MR HALL CAB OFFICE  
MR NICHOLLS CAB OFFICE  
MR BURKE CAB OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

05256  
MDLIAN 015

DGSDIPO MOD  
DACU MOD  
NUC POL (SY) MOD  
D DEF POL MOD

DR PANTON CAB OFF  
PS TO PM 3 COPIES  
~~SIR P CRADOCK NOTU.~~  
MS D J SEAMMEN HM TREASURY

NNNN

PAGE 6  
CONFIDENTIAL