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SIC EMA/EME  
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US PRE-SUMMIT BRIEFING OF NAC, 27 MAY

#### SUMMARY

1. US WISH FOR FORWARD LOOKING, NOT RETROSPECTIVE SUMMIT. HOPES FOR WORTHWHILE IF UNSPECTACULAR PROGRESS ACROSS THE FOUR-PART AGENDA.

#### DETAIL

2. AMBASSADOR NITZE AND DEPUTY ASSISTANCE SECRETARY THOMAS TODAY (27 MAY) BRIEFED THE NAC ON PROSPECTS FOR THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. NST ISSUES ARE COVERED IN MIFT.

3. THOMAS GAVE A BROAD OVERVIEW OF THE FOUR-PART AGENDA, WHICH TALLIED CLOSELY WITH THE ACCOUNT IN WASHINGTON TELNO 1340. MUCH WORK HAD GONE AHEAD ON ALL SECTIONS OF THE AGENDA SINCE THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT. THERE HAD BEEN SOME PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL, BUT NOT AS MUCH AS HOPED FOR ON NST ISSUES. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE U S SIDE WOULD BE ENCOURAGING THE RUSSIANS TO GO FURTHER. ON THE BILATERAL SIDE, SEVERAL CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS WOULD BE SIGNED. GORBACHEV WOULD HAVE AN INTEREST IN CONDUCTING SUBSTANTIVE BUSINESS AT THE SUMMIT: WHILE HE APPEARED TO RETAIN THE INITIATIVE AT HOME, AND AUTHORITY IN FOREIGN POLICY, A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT WOULD HELP BOLSTER HIS DOMESTIC AUTHORITY.

#### SCHEDULE

4. PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD HAVE FOUR MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV. OUTSIDE THESE THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO REACH SOVIET CITIZENS: HE WOULD MEET MEMBERS OF THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY, CULTURAL FIGURES, DISSIDENTS AND REFUSENIKS. THESE PLANS WERE CAUSING SOME FRICTION.

ARMS CONTROL  
NUCLEAR TESTING

5. THOMAS SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN A GOOD DEAL OF PROGRESS SINCE NOVEMBER. THE TWO SIDES HAD INITIALLED A PLAN FOR A JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT (JVE) AT SEMIPALATINSK AND NEVADA AND EXPECTED TO SIGN A FINAL AGREEMENT AT THE SUMMIT, WITH A VIEW TO CONDUCTING A LIVE JVE IN THE SUMMER. SUCCESS THEN WOULD HELP IN MOVEMENT TOWARDS RATIFICATION OF THE TTBT.

#### CHEMICAL WEAPONS

6. THERE WOULD BE THOROUGH DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW. PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE TOWARDS A BAN, BUT THE U S SIDE WOULD STRESS THAT MUCH WORK REMAINED TO BE DONE, PARTICULARLY IN VERIFICATION AND IN INVOLVING OTHER STATES.

#### CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

7. THE U S WOULD TELL THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO BRING THE CST MANDATE AND CSCE TALKS TO A CLOSE IN THIS CURRENT ROUND. BUT THIS DEPENDED ON A BALANCED OUTCOME AT CSCE AND ON EXCLUSION OF NUCLEAR AND DUAL CAPABLE WEAPONS FROM CST, TOGETHER WITH CST AUTONOMY FROM NNA REVIEW AND CSCE OVERSIGHT. IN CST THE U S WOULD STRESS THAT THE WEST'S AIM WAS 'EQUALITY OF OUTCOME', FOCUSING ON WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES CAPABLE OF SURPRISE ATTACK. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR NAVAL CONSTRAINTS OR DATA EXCHANGE OUTSIDE THE NEGOTIATION, IF MADE, WOULD BE REJECTED.

#### HUMAN RIGHTS

8. AT THE MAY MEETING BETWEEN SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE THE RUSSIANS HAD CLAIMED THAT THEY WOULD SHORTLY BE MAKING IMPORTANT PROPOSALS AT VIENNA. THE U S WOULD URGE THEM TO DELIVER. THE RUSSIANS REMAINED TOUCHY ON HUMAN RIGHTS BUT ACCEPTED THAT IT WAS A LEGITIMATE PART OF THE BILATERAL DIALOGUE. SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE HAD IMPROVED, BUT MUCH REMAINED TO BE DONE. REALISTIC GOALS INCLUDED THE FREEING OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND RELIGION.

#### REGIONAL ISSUES

9. THOMAS SAID THE U S WOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF FULL SOVIET IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS ON AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING RESTRAINT ON ARMS SUPPLIES. THERE WERE SOME PROMISING SIGNS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE RECENT QUADRIPARTITE MEETING HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE: THERE WERE SIGNS THAT THE PARTIES MIGHT BE READY TO MOVE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. ON OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES (MIDDLE EAST, IRAN/IRAQ, CAMBODIA AND CENTRAL AMERICA) PROGRESS WAS DOUBTFUL. SOVIET IDEAS ON A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WERE NOT WORKABLE. THE RUSSIANS WERE STALLING ON A FOLLOW UP RESOLUTION ON IRAN/IRAQ. THE TWO SIDES CONTINUED TO DISAGREE ON ARMS SUPPLIES TO CENTRAL AMERICA.

## BILATERAL ISSUES

10. THOMAS CONFIRMED THAT AROUND 6 BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WOULD BE SIGNED (HE CITED TRANSPORT, CULTURE, MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE, AND RADIO NAVIGATION). AN EXCHANGE OF CONSULATES (KIEV AND NEW YORK) WAS UNDER DISCUSSION BUT TALKS WERE UNLIKELY TO CONCLUDE AT THE SUMMIT. THE U S REMAINED COMMITTED TO EXPANSION OF CO-OPERATION WHERE THIS WAS OF PRACTICAL BENEFIT TO BOTH SIDES.

11. IN ANSWER TO SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS FROM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES THOMAS SAID THAT FIFTH SUMMIT WAS NOT RULED OUT: THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROPRIATE IF AN AGREEMENT ON START COULD BE REACHED.

12. ON AFGHANISTAN, HANSEN (FRG) ASKED WHETHER THE RUSSIANS HAD RESPONDED TO THE U S REQUEST FOR MARKED MAPS OF MINED AREAS. THOMAS SAID THAT THE SOVIET REPLY HAD BEEN THAT SOVIET MINES THERE WERE OF A TYPE WHICH SELF-DESTRUCTED AFTER 3 TO 4 DAYS. THIS WAS 'NOT FULLY PLAUSIBLE': DIALOGUE CONTINUED. ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, THOMAS SAID THAT THERE WAS SO FAR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ASSESS HOW FAR THE RUSSIANS WERE HONOURING THEIR COMMITMENTS BOTH ON THE OUTFLOW OF SOVIET TROOPS AND THE INFLOW OF SUPPLIES.

13. I ASKED WHETHER THE PACE OF PROGRESS ON PNET AND TTBT HAD DIVERGED. THOMAS AGREED THAT IT HAD. IN PART THIS WAS BECAUSE THE LATTER WAS PROVING ENORMOUSLY COMPLEX. THE U S SIMPLY DID NOT HAVE THE MANPOWER TO KEEP THE TWO RUNNING IN PARALLEL.

14. ON CST AND DUAL CAPABLE WEAPONS I AND GODECHOT (FRANCE) NOTED THERE HAD APPARENTLY BEEN A RECENT COORDINATION PROBLEM IN VIENNA. THOMAS ACCEPTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A PROBLEM BUT ASSERTED THAT THIS WAS OF SOVIET ORIGIN: THE RUSSIANS HAD TOLD NATO AND WARSAW PACT ALLIES (MISLEADINGLY) THAT SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD STRUCK A DEAL. IN FACT DUAL CAPABILITY HAD NOT EVEN BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE TWO MINISTERS, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD DISCUSSED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CST AND CSCE PROCESSES. BUT THOMAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE U S FAILURE TO BRIEF ALLIES EARLY ENOUGH. ON KASHLEV'S CONTACTS WITH LEDOGAR, AND UNDERTOOK THAT THE U S WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE OVER THE HEADS OF THE ALLIES.

15. I ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET OFFER ON UNILATERAL TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THOMAS SAID THERE WAS NO INTELLIGENCE OR OFFICIAL SOVIET INDICATION TO SUPPORT THE CURRENT RUMOURS. THE MOST PREVALENT STORY SPOKE OF REMOVAL OF 150,000 TROOPS AND 7,000 TANKS. THIS WAS PLAUSIBLE: IT WOULD BE EASY TO EXECUTE AND FIT INTO

SOVIET RESTRUCTURING PLANS. IT WOULD BE HARD FOR THE ALLIES TO DEAL WITH, ESPECIALLY IF SERVED UP WITH A VERIFICATION COMPONENT. U S INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS THOUGHT SUCH AN IDEA MIGHT BE CIRCULATING IN MOSCOW BUT THAT THERE WAS A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE FOREIGN POLICY ESTABLISHMENT, WHO SOUGHT A PROPAGANDA COUP, AND THE MILITARY, WHO DID NOT WISH TO GIVE AWAY POTENTIAL LEVERAGE.

ALEXANDER

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MIPT: U S PRE-SUMMIT BRIEFING ON NAC, 27 MAY: NST ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY

1. MAIN U S AIM AT SUMMIT IS TO ADD TO ELEMENTS OF THE AGREEMENT IN NST NEGOTIATIONS. PRINCIPAL FOCUS TO BE ON ALCM AND MOBILE MISSILES. LITTLE NEW INFORMATION EMERGES FROM NITZE'S BRIEFING.

DETAIL

2. NITZE, WHO WAS CLEARLY TIRED AND NOT ON TOP FORM, HAD LITTLE TO ADD TO (AND IN MANY AREAS PROVIDED LESS DETAIL THAN) THAT CONTAINED IN WASHINGTON TELNO 1341. IN MOSCOW THE U S WOULD ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP THE JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT AS FAR AS POSSIBLE AS THE BEST WAY OF RECORDING THE DETAL OF AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. A SUMMIT STATEMENT COULD BE EXPECTED TO SUMMARISE THE MAIN ISSUES. U S EFFORTS WOULD FOCUS ON ALCM AND MOBILE MISSILES BUT PROGRESS WOULD BE MADE IN OTHER AREAS WHEREVER POSSIBLE.

3. ON ALCM, THE U S WOULD SEEK TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE DETAILED MEANS OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND COVENTIONAL MISSILES AND HEAVY BOMBERS. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR FUNCTIONALLY RELATED EXTERNAL OBSERVABLE DIFFERENCE WERE NOT IN THEMSELVES SUFFICIENT AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY. TOGETHER WITH RESTRICTIONS ON THE LOCATION OF BOMBERS AND ALCMS, THESE COULD PROVIDE A GOOD FOUNDATION FOR ACCEPTABLE METHODS OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THE U S WOULD ALSO SEEK TO REACH AGREEMENT ON ALCM COUNTING RULES AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE A COUNTING RULE OF LESS THAN 10 FOR SOVIET MISSILES PROVIDING OTHER ELEMENTS COULD BE AGREED. THE U S WOULD NOT ACCEPT SEPARATE CONSTRAINTS ON THEIR ALCM INVENTORY BEYOND THOSE IMPOSED BY THE COUNTING RULE AND SOVIET PROPOSALS THAT BOMBERS

ARMED IN FUTURE WITH CONVENTIONAL ALCM SHOULD BE COUNTED AS ONE WARHEAD UNDER A START TREATY WERE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. IF COUNTING RULES WERE AGREED, THE U S WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A REDUCTION IN THE ALCM RANGE THRESHOLD BELOW THEIR EXISTING PROPOSAL OF 1500KM.

4. ON MOBILE MISSILES, NITZE SKETCHED OUT BUT DID NOT ELABORATE ON THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED VERIFICATION PACKAGE WHICH THE U S HOPED TO DISCUSS FURTHER IN MOSCOW. THIS INCLUDED THE FAMILIAR CONCEPTS OF TAGGING, CONTINUOUS INVENTORY, LIMITED DEPLOYMENT AREAS, LIMITATIONS ON UNIQUE MISSILE-ASSOCIATED STRUCTURES WITHIN THESE AREAS, ON-SITE INSPECTION AND ENHANCED NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THE U S WAS YET APPROACHING THE STAGE WHERE IT WOULD DROP ITS FORMAL PROPOSAL TO BAN MOBILE MISSILES.

5. ON OTHER START ISSUES, NITZE SAID THAT THE U S WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS ITS CASE FOR A 3300 SUB-LIMIT ON ICBM WARHEADS AND FOR A DECLARATORY APPROACH TO THE SLCM ISSUE. THEY WOULD ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES OVER THE NATURE OF CONSTRAINTS ON FUTURE HEAVY ICBMS IN ORDER TO ENSURE AN OUTCOME WHICH BORE EQUALLY ON BOTH SIDES. THEY WOULD ALSO HOPE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF FURTHER DATA.

6. TURNING TO DEFENCE AND SPACE, NITZE SAID THAT THE U S HOPED TO FOCUS ON FOUR ASPECTS. THEY WISHED TO GET SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE SEPARATE DEFENCE AND SPACE AGREEMENT BEING CONSIDERED AS A FORMAL TREATY. THEY WISHED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AGREEMENT FOR REASONS OF SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST. THEY HOPED TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR ON A LEGALLY BINDING STATEMENT (POSSIBLY A PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT) GOVERNING EACH PARTY'S RIGHTS AFTER THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. AND FINALLY THEY HOPED TO NARROW DIFFERENCES OVER WHAT COULD BE DONE DURING THE NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. IN PARTICULAR THEY WOULD SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT THAT SPACE-BASED SENSORS SHOULD BE UNCONSTRAINED.

7. AS FORESHADOWED IN WASHINGTON TELNO 1341 NITZE CONFIRMED THAT THE ISSUE OF THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR WOULD BE RAISED IN MOSCOW AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD EMPHASISE THAT THE U S COULD NOT SIGN NEW ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS UNTIL THE RADAR HAD BEEN DISMANTLED. THE SOVIET UNION HAD ALREADY SAID THAT CONSTRUCTION WORK WAS BEING STOPPED BUT THIS DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH.

ALEXANDER