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PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: COMMENTS

SUMMARY

1. A HISTORIC VISIT WITH FEW CONCRET RESULTS. BOTH SIDES EMPHASISED THE CONSOLIDATION OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP. ANOTHER PUBLIC RELATIONS SUCCESS FOR GORBACHEV, PROBABLY TIMED DELIBERATELY TO PROVIDE A BOOST IN THE RUN-UP TO HIS PARTY CONFERENCE. YET TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE RELATIVE LACK OF CONTENT AND CONTINUING DISAGREEMENTS ON MAJOR ISSUES WILL TARNISH THE APPEARANCE.

DETAIL

2. I HAVE JUST SEEN OFF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FLIGHT TO LONDON. YOU MAY LIKE TO HAVE MY FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF THE OUTCOME OF HIS VISIT. COMMENTS ON THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED ON 1 JUNE (MY TELNO 937) ARE IN MIFT (NOT TO ALL). I SHALL ALSO REPORT SEPARATELY ON GORBACHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE.

3. A CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT MUST AWAIT DETAILED DEBRIEFING BY THE AMERICANS AND APPRAISAL OF THE IMPACT OF THE MEETING HERE, IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN EUROPE. IT WOULD BE TOO FACILE TO SAY THAT THE WEEK'S OUTSTANDING FEATURE HAS BEEN THE MAGNIFICENT WEATHER AND SCENIC TELEVISION BACKDROPS, THE PRESS AND PUBLIC MAY CONCLUDE THAT THE FACT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT HAS BEEN MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN ITS CONCRETE RESULTS. THEY COULD BE RIGHT. THOUGH FAR IN THE PAST, THE PRESIDENT'S 'EVIL EMPIRE' SPEECH HAS HAUNTED THE RUSSIANS. THEY REMAIN NERVOUS, PERHAPS UNDULY, OF THE EXTREME RIGHT IN THE USA (NERVES WHICH HAVE JANGLED DURING THE INF RATIFICATION DEBATES) AND NERVOUS ALSO OF ANY POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED CONFRONTATION WITH A MUCH STRONGER AND FITTER ADVERSARY. IF NOTHING ELSE, THEY WILL HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND OPPORTUNITIES TO MEET DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF LOCAL SOCIETY

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IN A SEEMINGLY RELAXED WAY WILL FINALLY HAVE INTERFERED THE IMAGE OF THE EVIL EMPIRE (GORBACHEV MORE OR LESS SAID AS MUCH IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE). THEY WILL ALSO HOPE THAT IT CEMENTS THE USSR'S STATUS AS AMERICA'S SUPERPOWER PEER (A STATUS FIRST ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE AMERICANS WHEN PRESIDENT NIXON CAME HERE IN 1973, BUT ONE WHICH THE RUSSIANS KNOW TO BE FAR FROM SECURE IN THE YEARS AHEAD).

4. CONSOLIDATION OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP HAS THEREFORE BEEN THE STRONGEST THEME TO EMERGE FROM BOTH SIDES. GORBACHEV HAS OPENLY HOPED THAT HIS VISIT HAS TAKEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE USA A LARGE STEP CLOSER TO MAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS (IN A FAVOURITE MARXIST TERM) 'IRREVERSIBLE'. BOTH LEADERS HAVE HARKED BACK TO THE WARTIME ALLIANCE, TO THE COLD WAR AND SUBSEQUENT UPS AND DOWNS. THEY HAVE GLOSSED OVER THE NIXON/BREZHNEV DETENTE AND ITS BREAKDOWN, BUT NIXON AND BREZHNEV HAVE BEEN SPECTRES AT THIS FEAST. THE NEED HAS BEEN TO SHOW THAT, THIS TIME AROUND, DETENTE WILL BE DIFFERENT AND LASTING. GORBACHEV HAS ACCORDINGLY STRESSED BOTH THE REALISM AND THE CONTINUUM OF THE PRESENT PROCESS. IN HIS WASHINGTON POST INTERVIEW, HE DESCRIBED THE PRESIDENT AS A REALIST. HE REPEATED THIS IN HIS SPEECH AT DINNER IN THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE AND IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE. GORBACHEV'S IMPLICATION WAS THAT HE HAD HELPED PRESIDENT REAGAN TO BECOME A REALIST, THAT REALISM HAD DEVELOPED DURING THEIR FOUR MEETINGS. THESE MEETINGS, AND THE SPREADING NETWORK OF CONTACTS AT FOREIGN MINISTER AND OTHER LEVELS, WERE EACH BRICKS IN AN INCREASINGLY SOLID WALL. TO USE ANOTHER FAVOURITE SOVIET TERM, FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO COME HERE WITHOUT A MAJOR AGREEMENT BEING FLOURISHED OR IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES BEING GLOSSED OVER, REPRESENTS 'NORMALISATION'.

5. THAT SAID, THE RESULTS (OR IN THE CASE OF REYKJAVIK, NEAR-RESULTS) HAVE BEEN LESS DRAMATIC THAN THOSE OF THE THREE PREVIOUS SUMMITS AND HAVE FALLEN SHORT OF THE MORE OPTIMISTIC PREDICTIONS. AS GORBACHEV SAID ON 1 JUNE, MORE COULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. SPECIFICALLY:

A. ARMS CONTROL: ON THE PUBLISHED EVIDENCE AT LEAST, THE SUMMIT HAS NOT PRODUCED A BREAKTHROUGH ON START. MUCH FURTHER WORK EVIDENTLY REMAINS TO BE DONE BEFORE THE 1974 THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY AND THE 1976 PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY CAN BE RATIFIED. ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES, THE SIDES HAVE FAILED TO FIND A COMPROMISE ON DUAL-CAPABLE SYSTEMS.

B. REGIONAL QUESTIONS: HOPES THAT COOPERATION IN REGIONAL QUESTIONS, PERHAPS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, MIGHT PROVIDE A CONSPICUOUS SUCCESS FOR THE SUMMIT HAVE NOT MATERIALISED. THIS IS NOT ALTOGETHER SURPRISING, AS BOTH SIDES ARE INHIBITED BY THE NEED NOT TO APPEAR TO SETTLE DISPUTES OVER THE HEADS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY INVOLVED. AS YET, THERE IS NO INDICATION WHETHER DISCUSSIONS BEHIND THE SCENES HAVE LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR FURTHER PROGRESS. GORBACHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE, AND PARTICULARLY HIS STERN WARNING ON AFGHANISTAN, SUGGESTS NOT.

C. HUMAN RIGHTS: IN PART BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF VISIBLE RESULTS ELSEWHERE, AND IN PART PRESUMABLY FOR DOMESTIC AMERICAN REASONS, HUMAN RIGHTS WERE MOVED CLOSE TO THE TOP OF THE AMERICAN AGENDA. THE RUSSIANS, AS I HAVE REPORTED, ALLOWED THEMSELVES TO BE NEEDLED BY THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS IN HELSINKI (AND PREVIOUSLY BY HIS SPRINGFIELD SPEECH). THE PRESIDENT CONTINUED TO NEEDLE THEM DURING THE VISIT BY THE BLUNT EMPHASIS OF HIS REMARKS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN DIFFERENT SPEECHES QUOTING, FOR EXAMPLE, FROM SOLZHENITSYN, AND BY THE HIGH PUBLICITY GIVEN TO HIS MEETING WITH DISSIDENTS AND REFUSENIKS. THOUGH I CANNOT JUDGE HOW THIS PLAYED IN THE UNITED STATES, OVERALL THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO EMERGE IN SURPRISINGLY GOOD SHAPE FROM THESE SKIRMISHES. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HANDLED HUMAN RIGHTS MORE ADROITLY THAN ON HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE SOVIET GIMMICK WITH A GROUP OF AMERICAN INDIANS WILL HAVE CUT MUCH ICE. BUT GORBACHEV AND OTHER SOVIET SPOKESMEN MADE SOME IMPACT WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT THE PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING WAS OUT OF DATE, THAT HE HAD TAKEN LITTLE ACCOUNT OF CHANGES UNDER WAY IN THIS COUNTRY, AND THAT HE WAS NOT FREE TO SEE FOR HIMSELF AND TO SAY WHAT HE WISHED. AS IF TO EMPHASISE THAT FREEDOM, THE RUSSIANS PRINTED VERBATIM MOST OF HIS EXCHANGES WITH REPORTERS AND PUBLISHED DESCRIPTIONS AND PICTURES OF HIS MEETINGS WITH DISSIDENTS. THEY ALSO CAME UP WITH THE OFFER OF A SEMINAR IN THE FRAMEWORK OF PARLIAMENTARY EXCHANGES, AND STRUCK A DIGNIFIED POSE IN SUGGESTING THAT HUMAN RIGHTS WAS A SUBJECT FOR SERIOUS TWO-WAY DISCUSSION (RATHER THAN, BY IMPLICATION, POINT SCORING). ALTHOUGH SIGNIFICANTLY WIDER COVERAGE IN THE SOVIET MEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS DEFINED BY THE AMERICANS IS A USEFUL POINT ON THE PRESIDENT'S SIDE, TO A LARGE EXTENT THE RUSSIANS SUCCEEDED IN MARGINALISING MANY OF THE ISSUES BY IDENTIFYING THEM WITH PEOPLE WHOM MOST RUSSIANS REGARD AS EXTREMISTS, IF NOT DISLOYAL CITIZENS.

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D. BILATERAL QUESTIONS: THE TWO SIDES MANAGED TO COME UPIWITH A NUMBER OF MINOR AGREEMENTS TO SIGN, BUT SEEMED TO BE SEARCHING AROUND FOR BITS OF PAPER. GORBACHEV NARROWLY FAILED TO BOUNCE THE PRESIDENT INTO A NEW STATEMENT ON PEACEFUL COEXISTANCE, TO HIS MANIFEST ANNOYANCE. CERTAIN MOOTED BILATERAL AGREEMENTS DID NOT MATERIALISE. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS NO PROGRESS ON THE OPENING OF NEW CONSULATES. GORBACHEV WAS OPENLY DISAPPOINTED OVER TRADE AND MFN. PERHAPS THE BIGGEST BILATERAL QUESTION LEFT UNANSWERED IS WHETHER REAGAN AND GORBACHEV WILL MEET FOR A FIFTH TIME. GORBACHEV TOLD REPORTERS THAT THIS WAS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE, BUT SEEMED TO BE PINNING THE ONUS ON PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PROVIDE ENOUGH MOVEMENT ON START TO MAKE IT SO. HE HAS NOT PUT HIMSELF IN THE POSITION OF RUNNING AFTER THE PRESIDENT. HE HAS MADE CLEAR THAT HE LOOKS FORWARD TO WORKING WITH THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION, OF WHATEVER STRIPE.

#### BEAUTY CONTEST

6. THE RUSSIANS HAVE GONE TO GREAT LENGTHS TO MILK THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLICITY. THEIR PRESS ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN UNPRECEDENTEDLY LIBERAL. FOR THE FIRST TIME THEY ALLOWED TELEVISION COMPANIES TO TRANSMIT SIGNALS BY SATELLITE DIRECTLY THROUGH THEIR OWN EQUIPMENT. ON INTERNAL TELEVISION, GORBACHEV HAS AGAIN SHOWN UP WELL IN CONTRAST TO REAGAN. HE REPEATEDLY UPSTAGED THE PRESIDENT IN SHORT EXCHANGES WITH THE REPORTERS BEFORE WORKING SESSIONS. HE WAS IN TOTAL CONTROL OF THEIR JOINT RED SQUARE WALKABOUT. HE APPEARED NOT MERELY TO BE GUIDING BUT ALMOST PROTECTING THE PRESIDENT, AND ASSISTING HIM WITH ANSWERS. BY THIS STAGE OF THE VISIT, THE PRESIDENT WAS BEGINNING TO LOOK TIRED (UNDERSTANDABLY, AFTER AN INTENSIVE SCHEDULE). ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS ARE MORE ACCUSTOMED THAT THE WEST TO THE IMAGE OF AN AGING LEADERSHIP, GORBACHEV'S PROJECTION OF ENERGY AND DYNAMISM, AND HIS CONFIDENT DEMEANOUR, CAN ONLY HAVE DONE HIM GOOD BOTH INTERNALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY.

#### DOMESTIC IMPACT

7. GORBACHEV'S EXPLOITATION OF THE SUMMIT FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL ENDS MAY TURN OUT TO BE AS SIGNIFICANT AS ITS INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS. THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT HELPED TO SET HIM BACK ON TRACK DOMESTICALLY AFTER HIS ROCKY PERIOD IN NOVEMBER WHEN ELTSIN WAS SACKED. GIVEN THAT THIS SUMMIT WAS NOT TIED TO THE CONCLUSION OF A START AGREEMENT, GORBACHEV NEED NOT HAVE TIMED

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IT FOR ONE MONTH BEFORE THE SPECIAL PARTY CONFERENCE. LOGIC WOULD SUGGEST THAT A LATER DATE WOULD HAVE GIVEN START A BETTER CHANCE. IF, AS I ASSUME, HIS TIMING WAS DICTATED PRIMARILY BY INTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS, HE MAY WELL HAVE MADE A SMART MOVE. AS I HAVE REPORTED ELSEWHERE, HE IS ENMESHED IN INTENSIVE INTRA-PARTY POLITICS. HE HAS LOST SOME IMPORTANT BATTLES. HE NEEDS TO DOMINATE THE PARTY CONFERENCE. THE SUMMIT HAS GIVEN A POWERFUL BOOST TO HIS IMAGE AS A STRONG AND ASSERTIVE LEADER, ACCEPTED AS SUCH BY THE WORLD. ON THE OTHER HAND, INTRA-PARTY POLITICS (AND, AWKWARDLY, ELTSIN HIMSELF) WERE MUCH IN EVIDENCE DURING THE WEEK. AND GORBACHEV IS ALREADY HAVING TO DEFEND HIMSELF AGAINST CRITICISM THAT THE SUMMIT TURNED INTO A MEDIA JAMBOREE, THAT HE FAILED TO ACHIEVE HIS DISARMAMENT OBJECTIVES, AND THAT HE GAVE REAGAN A PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO CHIDE AND PATRONISE THE SOVIET UNION.

8. ON BALANCE I THINK HE WILL BE HELPED BY THE EVIDENCE OF A REAL AND VIGOROUS DIALOGUE WITH THE AMERICANS AND BY HIS UPSTAGING OF THE PRESIDENT. FOR MOST RUSSIANS, THE DAILY SPECTACLE OF THE TWO LEADERS CHATTING ON EQUAL TERMS (AND WITH GORBACHEV FREQUENTLY GETTING THE BETTER OF THE INFORMAL EXCHANGES) WILL HAVE DONE SOMETHING TO SUGAR THE BITTER PILL OF CONTINUOUS REVELATIONS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SHORTCOMINGS AND FAILURES. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT IS PROBABLY NOT BY CHANCE THAT THE SOVIET MEDIA HAVE CARRIED SO LITTLE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MASTERLY SPEECH AT MOSCOW UNIVERSITY. IN THIS, WHILE THE PRESIDENT ACKNOWLEDGED THE CHANGES NOW TAKING PLACE IN THE (REVOLUTIONARY) SOVIET UNION, HE CONTRIVED TO STRESS THAT TODAY'S REVOLUTION, IN THE FIELD OF TECHNOLOGY, WAS GOING ON ELSEWHERE AND PASSING THE RUSSIANS BY. THIS UNDERLINES THE TENUOUSNESS OF SOVIET CLAIMS TO EQUAL STATUS FOR THE UNITED STATES, FOUNDED AS THEY ARE ON THE NARROW BASE OF NUCLEAR PARITY.

9. SEE MIFT.

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MIPT: MOSCOW SUMMIT: JOINT STATEMENT

SUMMARY

1. LENGTHY BUT THIN JOINT STATEMENT. USEFUL RECORD OF THREE YEARS OF TALKS, BUT FEW NOVELTIES.

DETAIL

2. THE JOINT STATEMENT RUNS TO 16 PAGES IN THE ENGLISH TEXT, BUT IS RELATIVELY THIN ON SUBSTANCE. AS FORESEEN IN WASHINGTON TELEGRAMS 1340 AND 1341, THE TWO SIDES HAVE RECORDED THE PROGRESS MADE SINCE GENEVA. THE STATEMENT RECORDS DISAGREEMENT IN SOME AREAS. IN OTHERS PROGRESS IS LEFT FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

ARMS CONTROL: NST

3. WASHINGTON TELEGRAM 1341 AND UKDEL NATO'S 223 SET OUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S LIKELY ARMS CONTROL AGENDA AND AMBITIONS. IT APPEARS THAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN EVEN HARDER THAN THEY FEARED. NST IS ADDRESSED IN THE BODY OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, RATHER THAN SEPARATELY. THE PARAGRAPH ON DEFENCE AND SPACE IS GIVEN PROMINENCE IN THIS SECTION, PRESUMABLY AT SOVIET INSISTENCE. THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT YET PERSUADED THE RUSSIANS TO REFER TO THE AGREEMENT AS A TREATY.

4. ON SUB-LIMITS, THE STATEMENT MAKES NO REFERENCE TO THE 3300 CEILING FOR ICBM RVs: WE ASSUME THIS WAS ANOTHER AMERICAN GOAL NOT FULFILLED. MOST COUNTING RULES REMAIN FOR NEGOTIATION, BUT THE AMERICANS HAVE SECURED AGREEMENT ON GRAVITY-BOMB-CARRYING HEAVY BOMBERS COUNTING AS ONE DELIVERY VEHICLE AND ONE WARHEAD.

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5. THE STATEMENT LISTS NINE AREAS WHICH START VERIFICATION MUST COVER. THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOME MOVEMENT ON DATE EXCHANGE. THERE IS NO MENTION, HOWEVER, OF THE SPECIFIC POINTS MADE IN WASHINGTON.

6. ALTHOUGH THE TWO SIDE ACHIEVED "SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL COMMON GROUND, PARTICULARLY ON .. ALCMS AND ... THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION OF ICBMS", THIS FALLS FAR SHORT OF AMERICAN HOPES.

#### NUCLEAR TESTING

7. THE STATEMENT REFLECTS THE DIFFICULTIES IDENTIFIED ON PNET AND TTBT. MUCH WILL HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL THE JVE "HAS BEEN CONDUCTED AND ANALYSED".

#### CW

8. THE FOUR PARAGRAPHS DEVOTED TO CW ARE UNEXCEPTIONAL, PROBABLY REFLECTING STRONG AMERICAN REARGUARD ACTION AGAINST SOVIET PRESSURE.

#### CONVENTIONAL

9. THE RUSSIANS SEEM TO HAVE TRIED TO BOUNCE THE AMERICANS INTO A BILATERAL UNDERSTANDING ON A THREE-STAGE PROPOSAL FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION BEGINNING WITH DATA EXCHANGES AND LEADING TO AGREED TROOP WITHDRAWALS. THE AMERICANS RESISTED AND THE STATEMENT MERELY WELCOMES PROGRESS SO FAR. GORBACHEV AND THE PRESIDENT GAVE THE PRESS DIFFERENT ACCOUNTS OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS. GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE HAD MADE CONCRETE PROPOSALS, BUT THE PRESIDENT SAID DISCUSSION WAS MORE TENTATIVE.

#### HUMAN RIGHTS

10. HUMAN RIGHTS IS TREATED SECOND, AFTER ARMS CONTROL, IN THE STATEMENT. DESPITE THE BLUNT EXCHANGES DURING THE VISIT, THE LANGUAGE IS RESTRAINED AND MODERATE, HOPING FOR SUSTAINED, CONCRETE PROGRESS AND AN EXPANSION OF THE DIALOGUE.

#### REGIONAL ISSUES

11. GORBACHEV TOLD THE PRESS THAT, AFTER AFGHANISTAN, IRAN/IRAQ HAD BEEN THE MAIN SUBJECT OF REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID



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ANGOLA WAS DISCUSSED ''IMAGINATIVELY, SUBSTANTIALLY AND REALISTICALLY''. THE STATEMENT TALKS OF ''SERIOUS DIFFERENCES'' OVER CAUSES AND RESOLUTIONS OF SUCH PROBLEMS, BUT IT LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SIDES AGREE TO DISAGREE, AND TO CONTINUE TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS.

BILATERAL

12. THE LENGTHY SECTION IN THE JOINT STATEMENT ON BILATERAL AFFAIRS NOT ONLY RECORDS THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED DURING THE SUMMIT BUT NODS IN THE DIRECTION OF VIRTUALLY EVERY SINGLE ASPECT OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS. THE QUESTION OF CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK REMAINS UNSETTLED.

CCN: 1. USEFUL RECORD OF THREE YEARS ETC

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MY TELNO 939: MOSCOW SUMMIT

SUMMARY

1. US AMBASSADOR EMPHASISES IMPORTANCE OF MOSCOW MEETING IN BRINGING THE SUMMIT PROCESS TO MATURITY, DESPITE LIMITED CHARACTER OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS. US SUCCESS IN COMMUNICATING DIRECTLY WITH SOVIET PEOPLE AND IN LEGITIMISING THEIR FOUR-POINT AGENDA. A GOOD FOUNDATION FOR FURTHER NORMALISATION OF THE SUPER-POWER DIALOGUE.

DETAIL

2. MY US COLLEAGUE BRIEFED ME (AND MY FRENCH AND FRG COLLEAGUES) ON 3 JUNE ON THE REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT. ALTHOUGH HIS COMMENTS INEVITABLY DUPLICATED OR OVERLAPPED WITH SHULTZ'S NAC BRIEFING (UKDEL NATO TELS NOS 230-232) THE IMPRESSIONS OF A VERY EXPERIENCED OBSERVER OF THE SOVIET SCENE ARE NATURALLY OF VALUE AND I REPORT THEM AS AN ADDITIONAL GLOSS ON OTHER ACCOUNTS.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

3. MATLOCK SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE CONCRETE RESULTS OF THE REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT, IN TERMS OF AGREEMENTS, WERE "NOT TRIVIAL" THE GREATER SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEETING COULD BE SUMMARISED UNDER THREE HEADS:

(A) THE SUMMIT HAD PROVIDED THE OCCASION FOR THE MOST INTENSIVE US EFFORT TO DATE TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE SOVIET PEOPLE. IN THIS, THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THEY HAD SUCCEEDED TO AN UNEXPECTED EXTENT - REACTIONS TO THE PRESIDENT'S MOSCOW UNIVERSITY SPEECH HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING. BOTH ON THAT OCCASION AND DURING REAGAN'S VISIT TO THE WRITERS UNION, REAGAN'S ESSENTIAL HUMANITY HAD BEEN EFFECTIVELY PROJECTED AND HAD DISPELLED SOVIET PRECONCEPTIONS OF HIM AND OF HIS COUNTRY.

(B) THE MEETING HAD MARKED A FURTHER MATURING OF SUMMITRY AS A PROCESS, DEMONSTRATING THAT SUCH MEETINGS COULD BE USEFUL EVEN WITHOUT THE CENTREPIECE OF A MAJOR AGREEMENT: THIS WOULD IN ITSELF ASSIST THE FURTHER NORMALISATION AND EXPANSION FO THE US/SOVIET DIALOGUE.

(C) THE MEETING HAD MARKED FINAL SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE FOUR-POINT AGENDA (ARMS CONTRAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL ISSUES AND BILATERAL MATTERS) ON WHICH THE AMERICANS HAVE INSISTED SINCE THE GENEVA SUMMIT. THE PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN A LEAF OUT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S BOOK IN SPEAKING TO GORBACHEV WITH COMPLETE FRANKNESS BUT WITHOUT CONFRONTATION.

#### SOVIET TRY-ONS

4. GORBACHEV HAD PITCHED TWO FAST BALLS AT THE PRESIDENT BUT BOTH HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY DEFLECTED, TO GORBACHEV'S CHAGRIN. THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO INSERT A PASSAGE INTO THE JOINT STATEMENT WHICH RESURRECTED THE 'AGREED CODE OF CONDUCT' LANGUAGE OF THE 1970S HAD BEEN FIRMLY RESISTED BY SHULTZ (EVEN AFTER GORBACHEV HAD OFFERED TO REMOVE A REFERENCE TO 'PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE') ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS APPROACH TO THE SUPER-POWER RELATIONSHIP HAD ALREADY FAILED CRUCIAL TESTS, EG IN ANGOLA AND AFGHANISTAN. THE RIGHT APPROACH WAS TO SEEK SOLUTIONS TO EXISTING PROBLEMS AS THEY AROSE, RATHER THAN LAYING DOWN RULES OF BEHAVIOUR WHICH COULD ONLY ENGENDER CHARGES OF BAD FAITH. OUT OF THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL AND OTHER PROBLEMS MORE GENERAL PRINCIPLES MIGHT, IN DUE COURSE, GROW BY A NATURAL PROCESS.

5. GORBACHEV HAD ALSO TRIED TO BOUNCE THE PRESIDENT INTO ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF A NEGOTIATION LEADING TO CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS OF 500,000 BY EACH ALLIANCE: THIS ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE THE AMERICANS IN BILATERAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE SUBSTANCE OF MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN FIRMLY REJECTED.

#### JOINT STATEMENT

6. MATLOCK ATTRIBUTED THE DESCRIPTIVE, RATHER THAN NORMATIVE, CHARACTER OF THE JOINT STATEMENT TO US CONCERN TO AVOID ANY LANGUAGE WHICH MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS A 'FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT' WHICH WOULD BE ANATHEMA BOTH TO CONGRESS AND TO INFLUENTIAL FIGURES OUTSIDE IT (EG BRZEZINSKI). THE NEED TO AVOID ANYTHING RESEMBLING A VLADIVOSTOK - TYPE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF STRONG RESPRESENTATIONS TO THE WHITE HOUSE

IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT.

#### ARMS CONTROL

7. MATLOCK DESCRIBED PROGRESS ON ALCM COUNTING AND MOBILE ICBM VERIFICATION ALONG THE LINES OF PARS 4 AND 5 OF UKDEL NATO TELNO 232. THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS WHATSOEVER EITHER ON SLCMS OR ON SPACE DEFENCE. ON THE FORMER, MATLOCK SAW NO PROSPECT OF FORWARD MOVEMENT UNLESS THE RUSSIANS SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED THEIR POSITION: US DISBELIEF IN THE POSSIBILITY OF VERIFYING NUCLEAR SLCMS INCLINED THEM TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE OF A DECLARATORY SOLUTION, UNDER WHICH EACH SIDE WOULD SIMPLY ANNOUNCE ITS SLCM DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT PLANS IN ADVANCE FOR A STATED PERIOD. THE AMERICANS SAW LITTLE DANGER OF AN SLCM ARMS RACE SINCE THEIR LIMITED RANGE MADE THEM AN INADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR ICBMS, ALTHOUGH FOR GEOGRAPHICAL REASONS THIS ARGUMENT CUT LESS ICE WITH THE RUSSIANS. ON SPACE DEFENCE, THE RUSSIANS WERE STANDING PAT ON THE SACROSANCTITY OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE WASHINGTON DECLARATION, DENYING THE NEED TO REMOVE ITS AMBIGUITIES (ALTHOUGH THIS WAS ESSENTIAL IF THE SENATE WAS TO APPROVE AN EVENTUAL START AGREEMENT).

#### HUMAN RIGHTS

8. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY INDICATIONS OF GENUINE MOVEMENT IN THE SOVIET APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS. FOR EXAMPLE, AN OFFICIAL OF THE SOVIET INSTITUTE OF STATE AND LAW HAD PROPOSED TO AMBASSADOR SHIFTER BILATERAL TALKS ON THE CREATION OF LEGAL SAFEGUARDS FOR INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES, AN AREA IN WHICH (AS HE PUT IT) THE SOVIET UNION "LACKED EXPERIENCE": THEY WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A THOROUGH STUDY OF THE LESSONS WHICH COULD BE LEARNED FROM ANGLO-SAXON LAW. SUCH A SUGGESTION, IF SERIOUSLY MEANT, WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONCEIVABLE EVEN A YEAR AGO.

#### BILATERAL

9. MATLOCK ATTACHED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE SCALE OF THE PROPOSED EXPANSION OF YOUTH EXCHANGES - FROM A FEW SCORE TO THOUSANDS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS: THIS COULD NOT FAIL TO HAVE A POSITIVE LONG TERM EFFECT ON EACH SUPER-POWER'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER. THE RUSSIANS HAD TRIED TO DEFLECT US PRESSURE FOR THE OPENING OF CULTURAL CENTRES IN

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THE TWO CAPITALS WITH HALF-HEARTED EXCUSES ABOUT THE NEED TO ACCOMMODATE SIMILAR REQUESTS FROM EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES, ABSENCE OF SUITABLE PREMISES ETC: BUT THE TWO SIDES WERE NOW COMMITTED TO NEGOTIATING AND CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT ON THE SUBJECT WITHIN THREE YEARS.

REGIONAL ISSUES

10. MATLOCK'S BRIEFING ADDED NOTHING TO THE RELATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF UKDEL NATO'S TELEGRAM 230 AND 231.

COMMENT

11. WHILE ALLOWING FOR A NATURAL DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS TO REPRESENT THE SUMMIT AS A SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS DESPITE THE PAUCITY OF TANGIBLE RESULTS FROM IT, I WOULD LARGELY ENDORSE MATLOCK'S ASSESSMENT, ESPECIALLY THE POINTS IN PARA 3 ABOVE. ALTHOUGH THE SHORT-TERM PR ADVANTAGE MAY HAVE GONE TO GORBACHEV (JUST WHEN HE NEEDED IT) PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS LEFT THE SOVIET PEOPLE WITH A GOOD DEAL OF FOOD FOR THOUGHT: AND THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY ADDED TO THE HEALTH OF THE SUPER-POWER RELATIONSHIP.

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WED  
ACDD  
SAD

CSCE UNIT  
PROTOCOL  
PS  
PS/LORD GLENARTHUR  
PS/MR MELLOR  
PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
SIR J FRETWELL  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
CHIEF CLERK  
MR BOYD  
MR MUNRO