JD3BPI SECRET

Please pass following message to President Reagan from Prime Minister Thatcher.

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PRIME MINISTER'S

Dear Ron,

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL NO. 7160A/88 Sulverb CC:

We face a very important decision on how to deal with the Soviet proposal for a CSCE human rights meeting in Moscow.

Our consistent pressure for an improvement in human rights in the Soviet Union is achieving results, thanks in particular to the way in which you took the argument to the heart of the Soviet system during your own visit to Moscow. We need to keep up our pressure: not polemically, but persistently to ensure that the improvement is sustained.

I worry that the suggestion that we should now agree to a human rights meeting in Moscow will be taken by the Soviet leadership as a sign that we think that the Russians have done enough and will be used by them for propaganda purposes.

Moreover, our support and advocacy has hitherto sustained those individuals in the Soviet Union who have shown such courage in campaigning for human rights in their own country. All their hopes and faith will crumble if they think we have been hoodwinked into agreeing to a Moscow human rights conference. There is still a very long way to go before the Soviet Union truly accepts that human rights are God-given and cannot be taken away by the State.

A year ago, the United States Government set out the sort of human rights criteria it would expect the Soviet Union to meet. What I propose now is that we should aim to agree clear, specific criteria which would have to be met, and be seen to be met, if the West was to consider attending a conference in Moscow. If the two of us can do this, we should be able to persuade our other Allies to rally to that position. Without such clear criteria, the Soviet Union would have every opportunity to backslide on their commitments, and we who have been so true to our commitment would be thought to have forsaken it.

SECRET

- 2 -

I am asking Geoffrey Howe to be in touch separately with George Shultz about the details of the criteria we should seek to establish. I hope you can agree that we should work together in this way. We have come this far, we can't falter now.

Warm regards,

MARGARET

CDC 20/x.



SA-C

## 10 DOWNING STREET LONDON SWIA 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 October 1988

## MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE

I enclose a copy of the Prime Minister's message to President Reagan on the subject of a Human Rights Conference in Moscow, in the form in which it has been despatched to the White House on the direct link.

CHARLES POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq., Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

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PUCKET

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Warm regards,

MARGARET

Attached to lowell /larker 20/10/88

SECRET JD3BPH 4 (A-C) PRIME MINISTER CSCE: MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE You agreed that we should try to get the Americans to join us in setting firm criteria for human rights' performance which the Soviet Union would have to meet before the West would agree to attend a meeting in Moscow. You also agreed to send a message to President Reagan to try to enlist his support. I attach a draft message to the President for your approval. The intention is that the Foreign Secretary and George Shultz should discuss the detailed criteria to be set; and when there is US/UK agreement, we should try to enlist the support of our other Allies. This may require further messages from you. Agree to send the message to the President? CDP. CDP 19 October, 1988.

JD3BPI SECRET

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Dear Ron,

We face a very important decision on how to deal with the Soviet proposals for a CSCE human rights meeting in Moscow.

Our consistent pressure for an improvement in human rights in the Soviet Union is achieving results, thanks in particular to the way in which you took the argument to the heart of the Soviet system during your own visit to Moscow. We need to keep up our pressure: not polemically, but persistently to ensure that the improvement is sustained.

I worry that the suggestion that we should now agree to a human rights meeting in Moscow will be taken by the Soviet leadership as a sign that we think that the Russians have done enough and will be used by them for propaganda purposes.

Those individuals in the Soviet Union who have shown such courage in campaigning for human rights have been heartened by your powerful advocacy of their cause. It is very important that they should not feel let down by our scampering to agree of the Soviet proposal without further ado, as some of our Allies seem to chvisage. Moreover, I really do feel that further, more radical improvements in Soviet human rights performance are obtainable if we bargain hard right down to the line.

A year ago, the United States Government set out the sort of human rights criteria it would expect the Soviet Union to meet. What I propose now is that we should aim to agree count for meet, specific criteria which would have to be met if the West was to be willing to attend a conference in Moscow. If the two of us can do this, we should be able to persuade our other Allies to rally to that position. Without such clear criteria, the Soviet Union would have every opportunity to backslide on their commitments, and we who have been so that the our commitment would be have produced.

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one of the finest achievements of your Presidency.

We have come this Jay we can't falle now.

Warm regards,

MARGARET

Allochment to lovell/PM

SECRET Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1A 2AH 19 October 1988 CDP 19/x aluder **CSCE Moscow Conference** Thank you for your letter of 16 October about the Soviet proposal for a Moscow Human Rights Conference. I enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan. The Foreign Secretary's view is that we should aim to reach agreement with the Americans, following up his own correspondence with George Shultz, before bringing the rest of the Allies on board. Once we know that the Americans will stand with us in insisting on tough pre-conditions we shall want to bring along the Canadians and Portuguese, whose position has been the closest to ours, and then to tackle the French and Germans, whose views will carry weight with the remainder. We would not say anything in Vienna until we have dealt with the Twelve in capitals or through discussion in the Politicial Committee. It will be important to concert with the Americans exactly how and when we tackle the Russians in Vienna in order to ensure that our pre-conditions are accepted and our other requirements for the conclusions of the Vienna meeting are met. At some point it may be necessary to suggest that the Prime Minister send further messages to some of her colleagues in order to stiffen them but we would prefer to keep this possibility in reserve for the moment. (R N Peirce) Private Secretary C D Powell Esq 10 Downing Street SECRET