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SECRET

DEDIP BURNING BUSH

FM UKDEL NATO

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 476

OF 081722Z DECEMBER 88

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

SUMMARY

1. SHULTZ REPORTS ON GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, DISCUSSION ON THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE AND CST. FAREWELL TO SHULTZ.

DETAIL

GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO NEW YORK

2. SHULTZ SAID THE LUNCHTIME MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV HAD BEEN AS GOOD A DISCUSSION AS HE COULD REMEMBER: CORDIAL AND FREE-FLOWING WITH A LOT OF EXPERT EXCHANGES BETWEEN GORBACHEV AND REAGAN ON THE BREEDING AND TRAINING OF THOROUGHBRED HORSES. BAKER HAD NOT BEEN PRESENT (HE MUST NOT APPAR TO PREEMPT THE SENATE CONFIRMATION HEARINGS). BUSH HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO SAY THAT HE WOULD WISH TO REVIEW ALL THE ISSUES FOR HIMSELF WHEN HE TOOK OFFICE BUT WANTED TO SEE CONTINUED POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN U S/SOVIET RELATIONS.

3. ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, GORBACHEV HAD CONFIRMED TO SHULTZ THAT THE REFERENCE IN HIS SPEECH TO DISMANTLING KRASNOYARSK HAD BEEN MEANT SERIOUSLY. SHULTZ NOTED THAT A DECISION HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN TO PLACE THE RADAR UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. HE (SHULTZ) TOLD HIS QUAD COLLEAGUES HE THOUGHT HE COULD 'SEE A WAY TO WRESTLE THAT PROBLEM' BUT HE DID NOT ELABORATE. THERE HAD BEEN NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF GORBACHEV'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS, THOUGH GORBACHEV HAD CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS A DECISION NOT AN OFFER. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT THERE WOULD STILL BE VERY LARGE ASYMMETRIES BETWEEN WARSAW PACT AND NATO FORCES BUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS SIGNIFICANT AS A SYMPTOM OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION.

ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN

4. GORBACHEV HAD SAID IT WAS NONSENSE TO ATTRIBUTE CURRENT UNREST TO ETHNIC TENSIONS. THE UNREST AROSE FROM RESISTANCE TO CHANGE ON THE PART OF ALL THOSE PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN ON THE FIDDLE AND WERE AFRAID OF REFORM. THEY WERE USING ETHNIC ISSUES AS A PRETEXT FOR TRYING TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO.

MOSCOW CONFERENCE

5. THIS HAD NOT COME UP WITH GORBACHEV, THOUGH SHULTZ HAD DISCUSSED IT WITH SHEVARDNADZE WHO HAD REFERRED HIM IN ADVANCE TO GORBACHEV'S SPEECH AS BEING THE ANSWER TO THE AMERICAN CONDITIONS. THE SOVIET LINE ON THE CONFERENCE OF 'MAYBE IT WILL HAPPEN, MAYBE IT WON'T' DID NOT MEAN THE USSR WAS LESS KEEN BUT SIMPLY THAT THEY WANTED TO REDUCE WESTERN LEVERAGE. SHULTZ THOUGHT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOW DEVELOPING A RATIONALE (TAKING UP POINTS THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PUT TO THEM SOME TIME AGO) THAT FOR PERESTROIKA TO SUCCEED, THERE HAD TO BE A QUITE DIFFERENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE PEOPLE. HENCE GORBACHEV'S REFERENCE TO THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ETC. SHULTZ HIMSELF THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE A GREAT THING

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FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IF THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE COULD TAKE PLACE. THE CONDITIONS THE AMERICANS HAD SET OUT MUST BE SATISFIED AND THE RUSSIANS WERE GETTING ALONG PRETTY WELL TOWARDS SATISFYING THEM.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE SEEKING TO GET THEMSELVES INTO A POSITION WHERE THEY APPEARED TO FULFIL OUR CONDITIONS UNDER THEIR OWN STEAM RATHER THAN UNDER OUR PRESSURE. HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER WE WERE YET IN A POSITION TO REACH A CONCLUSION ON THE HOLDING OF THE CONFERENCE. SHULTZ SAID THAT GORBACHEV APPEARED COMMITTED TO INSTITUTIONALISING IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS. THE AMERICANS WOULD FOLLOW UP ON THIS NEXT WEEK (EARTHQUAKE PERMITTING). THE U S STILL HAD 21 FAMILY CASES. THE RUSSIANS SAID ALL DUAL NATIONAL CASES WOULD BE RESOLVED. GORBACHEV HAD SAID IN HIS SPEECH THAT THERE WERE NO LONGER ANY POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE AMERICANS BELIEVED THERE WERE ABOUT 150. THERE WAS ROOM FOR A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON DEFINITIONS. SHULTZ HAD SAID TO SHEVARDNAZDE (WHO APPEARED TO AGREE) THAT WE WOULD NEED A MECHANISM TO GO THROUGH THE NAMES OF THE 150 ONE AT A TIME. SHULTZ NOTED THAT JAMMING HAD STOPPED, AND GORBACHEV HAD SAID IN HIS SPEECH THAT THIS WAS PART OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS, THEREBY IMPLYING THAT THE DECISION WAS MEANT TO LAST.

7. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE NEXT STEP WAS TO SATISFY OURSELVES THAT THE CHANGES THE SOVIET UNION WAS PROMISING REALLY WERE IN PLACE. WE DID NOT HAVE TO COMMIT OURSELVES TO GOING TO MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY, BUT THE POINT OF DECISION COULD COME WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS. WE HAD TO BEAR IN MIND THAT IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE NOW TO TURN ROUND AND SAY THAT THEY WERE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN HOSTING A CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY WOULD ACCUSE THE WEST OF BLOWING A GREAT OPPORTUNITY. THE U S THOUGHT OUR APPROACH SHOULD BE TO SAY THAT WE WERE WORKING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WE WOULD GO TO MOSCOW BUT WOULD MAKE A FINAL ASSESSMENT AT THE INTENDED COPENHAGEN HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE THOUGHT OUR CURRENT POSITION WAS THE RIGHT ONE, HE NOTING THE PROGRESS BEING MADE WITHOUT REACHING A FINAL CONCLUSION. BUT BOTH DUMAS AND GENSCHER INDICATED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE SHULTZ APPROACH. THERE WAS NO CLEAR CONCLUSION BUT THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT THE SHULTZ LINE WOULD WIN GENERAL SUPPORT.

CST MANDATE

8. ALL FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS AGREED THAT THE 35/23 ISSUE HAD BEEN RESOLVED. THE ONLY REMAINING MANDATE PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE DESIGNATION OF THE ZONES (IN PARTICULAR IN RELATION TO THE U S BASE AT INCHELIK) AND STORED TANKS. THESE SHOULD BE WORKED OUT AT TECHNICAL LEVEL. ALL AGREED THAT IT WAS VITAL THAT NATO SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE A CLEAR STATEMENT OF ITS POSITION AT THE OPENING OF THE CST TALKS.

9. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE TIMING OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS AGREED THAT A POSSIBLE DATE FOR A MINISTERIAL CLOSING SESSION WOULD BE ON OR AROUND 6 JANUARY. DUMAS ENVISAGED THAT THIS WOULD RUN IN PARALLEL WITH THE PARIS CW MEETING, WITH DIFFERENT MINISTERS ATTENDING THE CSCE MEETING ONE DAY AND THE CW CONFERENCE ANOTHER. SHULTZ AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA IF THE OPENING OF THE CST CONFERENCE TOOK PLACE AFTER BUSH'S INAUGURATION, NOT LEAST BECAUSE THIS WOULD GIVE BAKER A CHANCE TO TAKE PART AND TO ESTABLISH HIMSELF.

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FAREWELL

FAREWELL TO SHULTZ

10. GENSCHER, DUMAS AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALL PAID TRIBUTE TO SHULTZ AS A COLLEAGUE AND FRIEND. GENSCHER SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT THE PROBLEMS OF BERLIN WERE THE BASIS OF QUAD MEETINGS: SHULTZ HAD GIVEN STRONG SUPPORT ON BERLIN ISSUES. DUMAS SAID THAT IN HIS SHORT TIME AS FOREIGN MINISTER HE HAD LEARNT A LOT FROM SHULTZ, IN PARTICULAR FROM THE STRENGTH OF HIS CONVICTIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE MOST REMARKABLE ENDORSEMENT OF SHULTZ' SUCCESS HAD BEEN THE TRIBUTE PAID TO HIM IN THE UN BY GORBACHEV, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTHINKABLE EVEN A YEAR AGO.

NATO SUMMIT

11. AS THE MEETING BROKE UP, GENSCHER BEARDED THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE TIMING OF THE NATO SUMMIT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO KOHL'S DESIRE TO HAVE THE MEETING BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN. GENSCHER SAID THE SECOND HALF OF MAY WAS NO GOOD BECAUSE THE GERMANS WOULD BE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE CELEBRATIONS OF THEIR 40TH ANNIVERSARY. WHAT ABOUT JULY? DUMAS AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THIS WAS NO GOOD BECAUSE OF THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT ON 14 JULY. HE THEN TRIED SEPTEMBER, BUT AGAIN DUMAS AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THIS WOULD BE FAR TOO LATE. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GO FOR LATE APRIL/EARLY MAY.

ALEXANDER

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PS —
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 PS / Mrs Chalker
 PS / PUS
 PS / Sir J. Fretwell
 Mr Boyd
 Mr Gillmore
 Mr Ratford
 Mr Goulden