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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH GENSCHER ON 27 JANUARY

POLITICO-MILITARY ISSUES

SUMMARY

1. GENSCHER SEEKING DELAY OF SNF MODERNISATION DECISION UNTIL 1992. DOUBTFUL THAT SNF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD EVOKE A SOVIET OFFER OF A THIRD ZERO. SUPPORTS 2 OR 3 YEAR DEADLINE FOR CW NEGOTIATIONS.

DETAIL

2. SNF: THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND GENSCHER AGREED THAT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WEST WAS ONLY REACTING TO EASTERN INITIATIVES WAS A FALSE ONE. THE REVERSE WAS TRUE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE ALMOST IRREPRESSIBLE DESIRE OF MANY IN THE WEST TO REGARD ALL OF GORBACHEV'S PRONOUNCEMENTS AS HEROIC LED TO GROSS OVER-REACTION. THE REMOVAL OF 24 OUT OF 1,400 SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILE LAUNCHERS FROM EASTERN EUROPE, FOR EXAMPLE, STILL LEFT A HUGE EASTERN ADVANTAGE. PUBLIC OPINION TENDED TO IGNORE THE 35 PER CENT REDUCTION IN NATO WARHEADS SINCE 1979.

3. FOR NATO THE MOST DIFFICULT QUESTION WAS FOLLOW ON TO LANCE (FOTL). THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD BEEN TRYING TO IDENTIFY COMMON GROUND: THE ALLIANCE AGREED THAT CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE KEPT UP-TO-DATE AS NECESSARY, AND THAT THEY DID NOT WANT A THIRD ZERO. THE SOVIET UNION HAD MODERNISED GREATLY. THE ALLIANCE NEEDED TO GET ON WITH THEIR MODERNISATION PROGRAMME, BOTH TO MAINTAIN THEIR DETERRENTS AND TO EXTEND THE RANGE OF CURRENT SYSTEMS AND THEREBY GET AWAY FROM THE IMAGE OF BATTLEFIELD USE. NATO ALSO NEEDED TO REPLACE THE FREE-FALL BOMB. THE ARGUMENT WAS ABOUT TIMING.

4. GENSCHER SAID HE HAD REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR IN PUBLIC THAT THOSE WITH MORE WEAPONS HAD FURTHER TO GO IN DISARMAMENT. ANNOUNCEMENTS OF EASTERN CUTS WERE GOOD STEPS, BUT MORE WERE NEEDED. THEY WERE ALL MOVES TOWARDS ASYMETRIC REDUCTIONS, WHICH WAS NATURAL SINCE NATO HAD MADE THEIR CUTS MUCH EARLIER. IN THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE

THAT DAY AN SPD MEMBER HAD, FOR THE FIRST TIME, CHALLENGED THE CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. THIS WAS WORRYING. AS TO MODERNISATION, THE ALLIANCE HAD AGREED ON A FORMULA AT REYKJAVIK, WHICH CLEARLY DID NOT MEAN ZERO. BUT THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS WAS ALSO CLEAR IF THE WEST WANTED TO REDUCE SOVIET SUPERIORITY. THE RUSSIANS HAD SOME 1,400 SYSTEMS AND 3,000 ODD MISSILES: WESTERN FIGURES WERE 88 AND AROUND 600.

5. PERSONALLY GENSCHER FELT THAT THE PROPER TIME TO DISCUSS FOTL WOULD BE '92, FOUR YEARS BEFORE THE NEW SYSTEM WAS NEEDED IN 1996. IN THE SAME WAY THAT NATO HAD TAKEN THEIR INF DECISION IN 1979, FOUR YEARS BEFORE DEPLOYMENT IN 1983. ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE START OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR IT WAS DIFFICULT TO TELL THE POLES THAT NATO WOULD BE DEPLOYING A NEW MISSILE WHICH COULD REACH THEIR TERRITORY. TIMING WAS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION IN THE COALITION.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT NOT REALLY BE COMMITTED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF SNF, AND MIGHT BE LIABLE TO PROPOSE A THIRD ZERO IN RESPONSE TO ANY PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATION. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE BETTER TO COMBINE A COMMITMENT TO FOTL WITH FURTHER CUTS IN WARHEAD NUMBERS BELOW THOSE AGREED AT MONTEBELLO. GENSCHER WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION RELINQUISHING SNF. IN THE RAFT OF RECENT ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT DEFENCE CUTS, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD SCARCELY MENTIONED SNF. IF THEY COULD DO WITHOUT IT, WOULD THEY NOT HAVE EMBARRASSED THE WEST BY OFFERING IT UP BEFORE NOW? HE THOUGHT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MIGHT FEAR, BECAUSE OF THE NEED FOR SOVIET DEFENCES AGAINST CHINA, A WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR GLOBAL REDUCTIONS OF SNF. HE WOULD NOT WANT TO DEFINE THE LEVEL OF A COMMON CEILING FOR SNF MISSILE SYSTEMS BUT IF IT WERE SET AT, SAY, 100, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO CUT THEIRS BY OVER 1,000.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE BELIEVED NATO SHOULD GIVE THE GREEN LIGHT IN 1989, FOR THE SAKE OF FUNDING BY CONGRESS WHICH WOULD ALLOW REPLACEMENT IN 1995/96. THE DECISION WOULD BE NO EASIER IN TWO YEARS' TIME. GENSCHER PLEADED FOR NATO NOT (NOT) TO MAKE THE MODERNISATION DECISION A TEST OF ALLIANCE RELIABILITY. OPTIONS SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT THAT THE WEST HAD RECENTLY DISCOVERED A TOOL WHICH TO SOME DEGREE CHECKED PROLIFERATION OF CW: COLLECTIVE PUBLICITY AND CONDEMNATION. IN THE CASE OF IRAQ, THE

UK HAD BEEN ALMOST THE ONLY COUNTRY TO EXPOSE THE IRAQIS, WHO ACCUSED US OF LEADING THEIR PERSECUTION. STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL, TO ESTABLISH AUTOMATIC INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED USE, WAS IMPORTANT.

9. BUT THE WEST STILL FACED THE MAJOR TASK OF NEGOTIATING A BAN ON CW WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BECAUSE GUARANTEED VERIFICATION MIGHT BE IMPOSSIBLE, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE WOULD BE MORE IMPORTANT THAN IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL FORA. BUT CW WAS JUST THE AREA WHERE SOVIET DECEITFULNESS WAS MOST WORRYING. SOVIET STOCKS OF CW WERE VERY MUCH GREATER THAN THOSE TO WHICH THEY ADMITTED AND A BRITISH INSPECTION TEAM AT SHIKANY HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY DENIED ACCESS TO THE MODERN PART OF THE PLANT AND HAD BEEN SHOWN ONLY OLD SOVIET CW WEAPONS. GORBACHEV HAD BEEN EMPHATIC THAT THE FIGURE OF 50,000 TONNES OF CW WAS THE REAL ONE. EITHER HE WAS MISLEADING US, OR BEING MISLED HIMSELF: EITHER WAY THE WEST WAS BEING MISLED.

10. GENSCHER WONDERED ABOUT SETTING A TIME LIMIT OF TWO OR THREE YEARS TO NEGOTIATE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION. IF, FOLLOWING AGREEMENT TO BAN CW, 10 YEARS WERE ALLOWED FOR DESTRUCTION, WE WOULD DEVELOP EXPERIENCE WITHIN THAT PERIOD WHICH WE COULD USE TO ESTABLISH WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIET UNION WAS CHEATING. IF THEY WERE, THE WEST COULD RETAIN STOCKS, TOO. HE THOUGHT THAT THE RISKS OF PROLIFERATION OF CW IN THE THIRD WORLD WERE ALSO A WORRY FOR THE SOVIET UNION.

11. ON LIBYAN CW, THE SECRETARY OF STATE THANKED GENSCHER FOR THE GERMAN INVESTIGATIONS: BUT WE HAD YET TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET UNION. GENSCHER SAID THE GERMANS WOULD TIGHTEN THEIR LEGISLATION. IT WAS A SCANDAL THAT THEY, OF ALL PEOPLE, SHOULD HAVE BEEN INVOLVED. HE SUPPORTED DISCUSSION OF MEASURES TO PREVENT, FOR THE SAKE OF DAMAGE LIMITATION, THE START OF CW PRODUCTION IN LIBYA.

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH GENSCHER ON 27 JANUARY

EASTERN EUROPE

SUMMARY

1. GENSCHER SURPRISED BY POLISH GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SOLIDARITY. DISMISSED FEARS IN OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT FEDERAL REPUBLIC MIGHT BE SEDUCED INTO NEUTRALISM: NATO AND EC WERE ESSENTIAL TO THE COUNTRY'S CONTINUING SUCCESS.

I'm not. It's what we were pressing it to do.

DETAIL

2. POLAND: GENSCHER TALKED ABOUT RAKOVSKY'S RECENT VISIT TO BONN. THE CHANGE IN THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO SOLIDARITY WAS REMARKABLE. TALKING TO SOLIDARITY IN PARIS IN THE AUTUMN HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THEIR OPTIMISM: BUT THEY HAD BEEN AS RIGHT AS THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER HAD BEEN WRONG IN SEPTEMBER (TALKING TO GENSCHER AT UNGA) WHEN HE REJECTED THE IDEA THAT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT SOLIDARITY.

3. THE POLISH APPROACH TO BILATERAL ISSUES HAD ALSO CHANGED. THE GERMAN MINORITY IN POLAND HAD BEEN GIVEN MORE IN THE WAY OF EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES AND CULTURAL CENTRES. THE POLES HAD DROPPED THEIR INSISTENCE ON EVEN THE GERMAN TEXTS OF GERMAN-POLISH TREATIES REFERRING TO POLISH CITIES ON FORMER GERMAN TERRITORY BY THEIR POLISH NAMES.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT REMAINED IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN AN AUSTERE STANCE ECONOMICALLY, INSISTING ON ECONOMIC REALISM FROM BOTH THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND SOLIDARITY, AS WELL AS PRESSING THE GOVERNMENT FOR POLITICAL RECONCILIATION. ON THAT BASIS, WHICH MRS THATCHER HAD EXPOUNDED ON HER RECENT VISIT, WE HOPED FOR PROGRESS THERE.

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5. GDR: GENSCHER SAID THAT THE LEVEL OF THE GDR ECONOMY SHOULD NOT BE COMPARED WITH THE ECONOMY OF POLAND AND OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THE GDR HAD INHERITED MUCH MORE INDUSTRIALISATION AND MUCH HIGHER STANDARDS OF LIVING THAN HER EASTERN NEIGHBOURS.

6. ON THE FUTURE OF THE BERLIN WALL, GENSCHER SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS FEARED THAT THE WALL WAS DAMAGING THEIR IMAGE. THEREFORE THEY POINTED TO THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN BUILT BY THE GDR AND NOT THE SOVIET UNION. SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID IN VIENNA THAT ONE HAD TO ASK FISCHER, AND GENSCHER, WHETHER THE REASONS OF 1961 WERE STILL VALID. BUT THERE WAS NO REAL CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDES TO THE GERMAN QUESTION. PLAYING THE GERMAN CARD WOULD NOT BE IN THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN INTEREST. THEY WOULD LOSE THE GDR TO THE WEST. ASKED IF THE RUSSIANS MIGHT PLAY THE GERMAN CARD ON AUSTRIAN TERMS, THAT IS ON THE BASIS OF GERMAN NEUTRALITY, GENSCHER SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT WORK. IT WAS PRECISELY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S MEMBERSHIP OF THE EC AND NATO WHICH EXPRESSED HER COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY, AND THEREFORE HER ATTRACTIVENESS. FEARS OF GERMAN NEUTRALITY WERE UNJUSTIFIED. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO SACRIFICE THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF DECADES.

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