

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 248  
OF 230010Z FEBRUARY 89  
INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, ANKARA  
INFO PRIORITY ATHENS, WASHINGTON  
INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, ROME, CBF CYPRUS, MOSCOW

NICOSIA TELNO 89 : CYPRUS

SUMMARY

1. FIRST REACTIONS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER TO THE TWO LEADERS. PESSIMISM IN THE SECRETARIAT.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOLD ME ON 21 FEBRUARY THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR. IT HAD BEEN A DISAGREEABLE CONVERSATION IN WHICH THE AMBASSADOR HAD DISPLAYED NO FLEXIBILITY. HE WAS NOW MORE WORRIED THAN EVER ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF PROGRESS OVER CYPRUS.

3. WE ASKED THE SECRETARIAT ON 22 FEBRUARY FOR A READ-OUT OF THE INTERVIEW: IN THE EVENT WE WERE BRIEFED BY CAMILION, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

4. CAMILION SAID THAT THE CALL BY THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR AMOUNTED TO THE FIRST REACTION FROM THE TURKISH AND TURKISH-CYPRIOI SIDE TO THE LETTER SENT TO THE TWO LEADERS BY PEREZ DE CUELLAR. THE AMBASSADOR HAD EXPRESSED THREE SPECIFIC CONCERNS:

- (A) THAT THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF COORDINATED ACTIVITY BY EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AND THE U S TO APPLY PRESSURE ON THE TWO PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE, AND IN PARTICULAR ON TURKEY:
- (B) THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS PUTTING THE TWO PARTIES UNDER TOO MUCH PRESSURE THROUGH HIS LETTER AND HIS PROPOSAL TO ACCELERATE THE RHYTHM OF THE TALKS (ALTHOUGH DENKTASH HAD RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL):
- (C) THAT BEFORE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TABLED ANY LIST OF ISSUES AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS, THIS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO CONSULTATION WITH THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS.

5. CAMILION COMMENTED THAT HE REMAINED UNCERTAIN WHY THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE ANXIOUS TO PUT A BRAKE ON THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE NEGATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THEIR MOTIVES WAS THAT THEY HOPED VASSILIOU WOULD COME UNDER INTOLERABLE DOMESTIC PRESSURE, WHICH WOULD CAUSE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS TO BREAK DOWN ALTOGETHER.

6. WE ASKED ABOUT THE GREEK CYPRIOT REACTION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER. CAMILION SAID THAT VASSILIOU'S REACTION HAD BEEN GENERALLY POSITIVE, ALTHOUGH HE TOO WAS UNHAPPY ABOUT HAVING A LIST OF ISSUES PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT. CAMILION COMMENTED THAT VASSILIOU'S DEEP MISTRUST OF DENKTASH WAS ALL TOO OBVIOUS. HE WAS VISIBLY PREPARING HIMSELF FOR THE EVENTUALITY THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH DENKTASH WOULD COLLAPSE. HE TENDED TO ASSUME THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD TAKE HIS SIDE: THIS WAS A MISCONCEPTION OF WHICH HE SHOULD BE DISABUSED.

TICKELL

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