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FM PARIS

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 253

OF 241943Z FEBRUARY 89

INFO PRIORITY UKREP BRUSSELS, VIENNA, ANKARA

EC ENLARGEMENT: FURTHER FRENCH VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. CONFLICTING EVIDENCE ABOUT FRENCH THINKING POINTS TO LACK OF COORDINATION AND ABSENCE OF ANY POLITICALLY AGREED LINE - OTHER THAN THAT NOTHING CAN HAPPEN THIS SIDE OF 1992. BUT SOME SENIOR OFFICIALS ARE CLEARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DOMINO EFFECT OF AN AUSTRIAN APPLICATION AND THE PARTICULAR PROBLEMS LIKELY TO BE POSED BY TURKEY. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-UP.

DETAIL

- 2. AS BACKGROUND TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE AUSTRIAN MFA'S VISIT TO LONDON NEXT WEEK AND THE FORTHCOMING EC/EFTA MEETING, WE HAVE MADE FURTHER EFFORTS DISCREETLY TO PROBE FRENCH THINKING ON ENLARGEMENT.
- 3. EARLIER APPROACHES TO THE QUAI (EG ANDREANI AND DESCOUEYTE) GAVE EVERY IMPRESSION THAT THE ISSUES HAVE NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY ADDRESSED. BUT MY OWN CONVERSATION WITH SCHEEER ON 23 FEBRUARY (RECORD BY BAG TO KERR) REVEALED THAT HE AT LEAST - PARTLY NO DOUBT BECAUSE OF HIS RRUSSELS EXPERIENCE - IS VERY ALIVE TO THE POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES AND TO THE NEED FOR THE 12 TO GET THEIR ACT TOGETHER BOTH ON TURKEY AND IN ADVANCE OF A PROBABLE AUSTRIAN APPLICATION IN 1990. AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THIS PROCEESS HE SAID THERE SHOULD BE PREPARATORY DISCUSSIONS INVOLVING A FEW OF THE PRINCIPAL MEMBER STATES. (THIS ECHOES WHAT DUMAS SAID AT CHEVENING LAST JULY). SCHEER EFFECTIVELY CONFIRMED THAT CURRENT FRENCH POLITICAL THINKING IS TO KICK THE BALL INTO TOUCH UNTIL AFTER 1993, NOT LEAST TO AVOID DAMAGE TO BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS. BUT HE WAS CLEARLY WORRIED THAT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MIGHT BE DRAWN INTO TOO WARM A REPLY AND CONCERNED ABOUT THE HOSTAGES TO FORTUNE WHICH SUCH A LINE COULD OFFER, ESPECIALLY IN RESPECT OF OTHER ASPIRANTS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS BOTH INCONCEIVABLE THAT TURKEY COULD EVER BE ADMITTED BUT POTENTIALLY VERY DAMAGING INDEED TO BE FORCED TO SAY SO. MUCH REFLECTION WAS NEEDED.

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- 4. THIS CANDOUR HAS NOT BEEN APPARENT IN OTHER RECENT CONTACTS, BUT GUEHENNO (HEAD OF THE QUAI CENTRE D'ANALYSE ET DE PREVISION, I.E. PLANNING STAFF) SHOWED SOME INTEREST DURING A RECENT DISCUSSION WITH THE MINISTER AND WE KNOW THAT A PRELIMINARY PAPER ON ENLARGEMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED ON HIS SIDE.
- 5. BASTELICA (MME CRESSON'S CABINET) ON THE OTHER HAND PLAYED A STRAIGHTER BAT TO COUNSELLOR (AGRICULTURE AND ECONOMIC) EARLIER THIS WEEK ASSERTING THAT MITTERRAND'S PUBLIC POSITION OF CLOSING THE DOOR UNTIL AFTER COMPLETION OF THE SINGLE MARKET WAS PERFECTLY SATISFACTORY IN THE SHORT TERM AND THAT NO-ONE HAD THOUGHT BEYOND IT YET. THE FRENCH STARTING POINT WAS STILL THAT EVERY DEMOCRATIC EUROPEAN COUNTRY WAS IN PRINCIPLE ENTITLED TO SEEK MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY AND THAT THERE WERE ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH SUCH APPLICATIONS AS AND WHEN THEY WERE MADE. ON THE POSSIBLE COMPLICATIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY AND NEUTRALITY QUESTIONS BASTELICA SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN INCONCLUSIVE TECHNICAL ANALYSIS BUT NO POLITICAL DECISIONS (SCHEER AND I MERELY TOUCHED ON THESE ASPECTS: HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT FOR HIM THE MAIN ISSUE WAS NOT SO MUCH WHAT WAS SPECIFIC TO AUSTRIA AS THE EFFECT THAT AUSTRIAN ACCESSION WOULD HAVE ON THE DYNAMIC PROCESS OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS A WHOLE, AND ESPECIALLY ON THE QUESTION OF TURKISH ACCESSION. I SHOULD ADD THAT THIS WAS INTERLARDED WITH SOME CAUSTIC OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE DECISION OVER GREEK ENTRY).
- 6. WE RAISED WITH BASTELICA THE SPECIFIC QUESTION OF WHAT HAD BEEN SAID TO OZAL IN DECEMBER, REFERRING TO THE READ-OUT GIVEN BY THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN ANKARA. BASTELICA SOUNDED SURPRISED AT THIS AND SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW THE LINE HAD BEEN STUDIOUSLY NON-COMMITTAL: THE TURKS THEMSELVES WOULD WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF A POSITIVE FRENCH REACTION, PARTLY TO DISPEL DOUBTS ON THE PART OF OTHER MEMBER STATES. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, GIVE ANY ENCOURAGEMENT THAT THE FRENCH WOULD DO MUCH PUBLICLY TO DAMPEN THE CLIMATE OF EXPECTATION, THOUGH HE HINTED THAT THEY WOULD BE HAPPY ENOUGH FOR SOMEONE ELSE TO TAKE ON THAT ROLE. WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE NOT VOLUNTEERING, BUT WERE SIMPLY ANXIOUS THAT THE ISSUES SHOULD BE THOUGHT THROUGH IN GOOD TIME.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION

7. THE FACT THAT WE ARE BEING TOLD DIFFERENT THINGS BY DIFFERENT PEOPLE ON THIS ISSUE SEEMS MORE SYMPTOMATIC OF LACK OF COORDINATION THAN OF ANY ATTEMPT TO DISSEMBLE. THOSE LIKE SCHEER AND GUEHENNO WHO ARE THINKING ABOUT THE PROBLEMS HAVE EITHER PARTICULAR PERSONAL OR

PAGE 2 CONFIDENTIAL FUNCTIONAL INTERESTS (IE DIRECT EXPERIENCE OF THE WORKINGS OF THE COMMUNITY OR LONG TERM PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES). YOU WILL WANT TO CONSIDER IF THERE IS ANY MILEAGE IN SOME LIMITED PARTICIPATION DISCUSSION AS HINTED AT BY SCHEER, WHILE RECOGNISING THAT THE RISK THAT IF WE GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF LEADING A CAMPAIGN SOME IN THE FRENCH ADMINISTRATION WILL BE TEMPTED TO HIDE BEHIND US WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY URGING US ON. PREVIOUS COMMUNITY DECISIONS ON ENTRY HAVE SHOWN CLEARLY HOW DIFFICULT INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES FIND IT TO BE ROBUST IF THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS MIGHT ME AFFECTED. THE RIGHT FOLLOW UP SEEMS TO ME FIRST A DISCUSSION ON THE PLANNERS NET (COOPER'S WILL HAVE TALKS WITH GUEHENNO ON 9 MARCH) AND LATER FOR YOU TO AIR THE ISSUES PERSONALLY WITH DUMAS, AT YOUR MEETING WITH THOSE CONCERNED AND I SHALL FOLLOW UP WITH SCHEER AS THINGS MOVE FORWARD.

FERGUSSON

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