

HOOVER INSTITUTION

ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

Stanford, California 94305-6010



Prime Minister (2)
A very good
note by Bob
Conquest.

March 17, 1989

CDP
20/3

Dear Prime Minister,

In the past few months the rapid change in the ideas and policies being put forward in the Soviet Union has been quite remarkable. I am attaching a note on this, together with some excerpts which you may or may not have seen illustrating the newer conceptions now appearing, both of foreign policy and of basic ideology.

You may remember that at your seminar at Chequers a couple of years ago, I caused some surprise by saying that a withdrawal from Afghanistan was now on the Soviet agenda, and so might become a fact. This was not a prediction, for agendas are not necessarily acted on. Nevertheless, the existence of an agenda implied a real possibility of action.

We can now certainly speak of sketches for a new agenda on broader matters. Though still not generally agreed to, let alone translated into action, it goes far beyond anything we could yet have expected. Our mistake was not so much that we overestimated the tenacity of the apparat and its ideology, but that we accepted the usual Western estimates of the state of the Soviet economy, which


were excessively optimistic. So we underestimated the profundity of the economic and other troubles, the extremity of the systemic crisis. This has been far and away the major factor; but the failures of Soviet foreign policy in antagonizing the West (and not only the West) while making expensive and fairly useless gains, have also been recognized, and had their effect.

Brute facts have defeated the system. It is changing because of its own necessities. I don't know if you saw a remark by Adam Michnik, the Polish poet, that what is now appearing in Eastern Europe is not "socialism with a human face" but "totalitarianism with its teeth knocked out".

As a detail, perhaps the following, from a long analysis of Stalinism by the respected historian M. Ya. Gefter published last year, will interest you if you had not seen it: "in 1939-1940 the alliance with Hitler was all the more insufferable to us when the courage and unity of the English both delighted and amazed us".

One remarkable minor development is that they are about to serialize my own book The Great Terror in the literary-political monthly Neva. (And I've just been interviewed for Moscow News). I'll be in the Soviet Union in June, with a lot of appointments at all levels, and will be in London both before and after, I hope with useful comments.

With warmest wishes, as ever,



Robert Conquest



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 March 1989

Thank you for your letter and its enclosures. The Prime Minister was equally glad to have your letter to her and the excellent paper. There is certainly a great deal of interest happening.

We look forward very much to seeing you in June and/or July.

(C.D. POWELL)

Robert Conquest, Esq., O.B.E.

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Changing Soviet Conceptions of the World

Gorbachev spoke of the 'de-ideologization' of Soviet foreign policy in his United Nations speech in December.

It is true that he felt it necessary to retreat in his talk with Soviet journalists on 7 January. He now said that:

"There is much misunderstanding about the dialectical relationship between class interests and universal human values. We must say flatly that the misunderstanding has led to accusations that we have renounced socialist fundamentals, that we have abandoned class approaches and the national-liberation movement".

He added:

) "Such proposed de-ideologization relates to inter-state relations. In no way should it be construed as meaning some sort of 'de-ideologization' of international relations".)

But this has always been the Soviet position, and Stalin himself stressed it several times, from the time in 1934 Party Congress when he rightly drew attention to the friendly state relations between the USSR and Fascist Italy. If Gorbachev had meant no more than this traditional theme, his point at the UN was hardly worth making.

It seems much more probable that he found himself to be too far ahead of Party opinion, and felt obliged to make at least a temporary withdrawal. This is in accord with his tactics on other issues, such as Stalin. New conceptions

are aired by Party and other intellectuals skirmishing far ahead, followed by lesser politicians, and Gorbachev later moves forward with as much of the establishment as he can by then carry with him.

Thus, in considering the new thinking on foreign affairs and on ideology in general, we first have to note that extraordinary though some of the developments are, the traditionalist attitude remains strong -- and thus far still defiant. (It has been put most forthrightly in the military press and by the new KGB Chief Kryuchkov).

Nevertheless, an agenda for fundamental conceptual change has been put forward.

Not all items upon an agenda are necessarily acted on. The Soviet thinking considered below is generally speaking more radical than anything so far seems at the level of political practice. Yet it represents a body of thought of which Shevardnadze's is a more moderate and reserved example. And it may, if the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze-Yakovlev initiatives prevail, indicate the conceptual basis of future Soviet political development both internal and external. As will be seen, it calls in question the whole Marxist approach, going far beyond narrowly foreign policy issues.

At the highest political level we have Yakovlev's speech in Perm in December which appeared in the local paper but was not printed in full in the Central press. I expect you saw it, but enclose a copy as printed in Le Monde, just in case not. Note, in particular, his remarks that

- (a) "Marx and Engels were mistaken about the creation of a non-market mode of production"
- (b) "Under its present form our State commerce is a catalogue of tolls levied by feudal intendants, with false entries, with thieving organized on the basis of cheating and falsified calculations"
- (c) "If we were poor, perhaps we would be better organized. If we are poor it is on account of our wealth, which has perverted us and nourished our laziness and irresponsibility"
- (d) "The state cannot conduct commerce in a rational way, for the simple reason that it always lives at the expense of society"

I also attach an article by a prominent Foreign Ministry official, Andrei Kozyrev. Some striking propositions about the Third World are in line with what has been said already -- that it suffers "not so much from capitalism as from lack of it"; that the West does not 'exploit' the former colonies; that the left-wing dictatorships in the area are full of anti-imperialist rhetoric, but are failing to tackle their countries' real problems -- and, by their disregard for freedoms are driving their oppositions to rebellion. More remarkable yet are the theses that the American ruling bourgeoisie and state are not militaristic, so that there is "no need to talk, for instance, about a military struggle for markets or raw materials, or for the division and redivision of the world"; that ideas about the world as an arena for the "international class struggle" are "anachronistic"; and that "even the class conflicts within capitalist countries largely take place through the achievement of compromise within a mutually accepted legal framework rather than in the form of

harsh confrontation".

The attitude to the Third World is, of course, not new. You will probably have seen an article by the scholar Viktor Shernin in Rabochi Klass i Sovremenny Mir, July-August 1987, which makes much the same points.

I attach, even more astonishing, excerpts from a recent set-piece, four-part essay by Dr Alexander Tsipko, in the influential Nauka i Zhizn, which calls in question all the basics of Marxism, or Marxism-Leninism.

These propositions are still the voice of a minority. And they represent not, or not yet, a political programme so much as a general critique of old policies. All the same, they are a forcible, and public, sign that the implied new policies are seriously on the table. (We have not here examined the Soviet "new thinking" in military matters, which is equally striking and interesting, but which of course derives from the new ideological and foreign policy analyses).

Soviet Policy and Western Criteria

Our criteria for the evolution of the Soviet Union into a member of a cooperable world community have always been:

- (a) The abandonment of the notion that they have an infallible doctrine applicable to the whole world, and specifically the abandonment of the thesis that all political relationships imply an unappeasable struggle. One aspect of this would be the replacement of an offensive military doctrine by a

defensive one.

- (b) As a corollary of, and evidence of, this, that a retreat from totalitarianism takes place within the Soviet Union. One aspect of this is progress towards freedom for unorthodox ideas; another is progress towards the dissolution of the command economy.

As an interim summary of how far the USSR has got we may say that:

- (a) The idea of the fallibility of Marxism-Leninism has been broached. This is a major step; but orthodox inertia remains powerful.
- (b) The idea that foreign policy should not be based on implacable hostility has been more widely canvassed; it is accepted pragmatically, at least for the present, even by some who necessarily do not accede to it in theory; and the beginnings of its practical application are to be seen.
- (c) And similarly with the idea of defensive military deployment.
- (d) An increasingly high level of comparatively free discussion and publication has been reached, (with various ups and downs).
- (e) The idea of the market, and of the failure of the command economy, has been widely accepted. (But practical progress towards it has been slow, for political and institutional reasons).

In general, then, there has been a strong shift in the direction of our criteria, though not yet a decisive one. Significant progress has been made; more in some areas than in others. And important further progress is at least now on the agenda.

Let us repeat that the Gorbachev strategy, or practice, seems to have been to allow independent thinkers on the periphery of the establishment to advance hitherto

unmentionable theses. After the initial shock, supporting articles and analyses appear, until a new policy is in a general way seen to be within the sphere of legitimate debate. Gorbachev and his high level supporters at first object to some elements of the new idea as going too far, but eventually they shift public position in that direction. Finally, it becomes part of an agenda for practical policy.

The way to look at it, from our point of view, seems to be:

- (a) words are not deeds.
- (b) deeds nevertheless need to be preceded by words, programmes, agenda.
- (c) we should welcome the new thinking on foreign policy and ideology, and
- (d) we should be ready to respond as, and when, and to the degree it is translated into deeds

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Prospects

The progress made may not be irreversible. It seems to have been easier -- both conceptually and practically -- to get the traditionalists to accept the withdrawal from Afghanistan than it has been to get them to accept proposals to reform the social and economic system. From the foreign policy point of view, taken alone, this is a fairly good sign. For it implies that even if they disagree with some of the theoretical attacks on Marxist-Leninist expansionism, they may at least have come to the point of recognizing that pragmatically the Soviet Union cannot any longer successfully

pursue such a policy.

It looks as though 1989-1990 will be the crucial period. If Gorbachev is to consolidate power he will have to do it quickly. Not only has the Soviet economy, so far, made very little progress. But other possible causes of ruin remain. A peaceful evolution, even a fairly peaceful evolution, faces many obstacles. Peaceful devolution in Eastern Europe is balanced on a narrow edge, with each step threatened by nationalist impatience on the one hand and traditionalist military imperialism on the other. And similarly within the USSR, in the Baltic States and elsewhere. And the economy is, of course, in extreme, perhaps terminal, crisis. But at the moment, the question of political power remains crucial. Gorbachev has defeated his opponents, or manoeuvred them into passivity. But the (factually based) pessimism of both Western and Soviet economists implies that he must soon carry out the radical institutional and economic reforms which have so far only been mooted. That is, his main crisis is still before him. Meanwhile, the socio-economic impasse will have deepened, and will soon present problems only soluble by measures more radical than the present perestroika programme. And there is considerable doubt in Soviet circles as to whether Gorbachev and his allies will have time to consolidate political power before the economic crisis overtakes them. (Yakovlev is quoted, off the record, as saying "If we don't improve the supply of consumer goods within the next 2 or 3 years, we

might as well stand down").

Meanwhile political opposition remains potentially strong. And the circumstances of Soviet politics are such that conspiracies, like the two against Khrushchev (one a failure, one a success) could have a decisive effect. A member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences lately told me that the promotion of Vadim Medvedev to the Politburo was as a reward for his betraying the plans of oppositionists who had approached him for support. (You have doubtless seen Boris Yel'tsin's only fairly discreet comments on some of his former colleagues, given to a group of Young Communists. I attach a copy, and also one of the more sensible summings-up of Yel'tsin's role, in the Christian Science Monitor).

If Gorbachev is overthrown, a Brezhnevvoid -- or Brezhnevvoid-cum-nationalist -- regime will have no positive economic programme, and can only lead to catastrophic breakdown. If Gorbachev is merely blocked, he will perhaps be able to regain the initiative later, in more difficult circumstances. Even a political victory is no means a complete guarantee against the emergence of new reactionary factions. There are obviously all sorts of ways in which things may go wrong. We must be prepared for various catastrophic, or at least negative, developments. Gorbachev is still walking a tightrope -- even though he has so far shown himself to be very sure-footed.

Thus, as well as hopeful possibilities, there are dangerous ones too. Until the changes are fully and

irrevocably in place, our response is clearly to be kept within practical limits. Nevertheless, there are real prospects of further progress, and it is possible, in spite of everything, to remain reasonably optimistic.

RETHINKING IDEOLOGY: AN EXAMPLE

Excerpts from a long essay by Dr Alexander Tsipko
in Nauka i Zhizn, nos 11, 12, 1988; 1, 1989.

- (1) Stalin did not differ from other Marxists over "the ultimate goals of Socialist reconstruction of the economy".
- (2) When we condemn Stalin's "barracks socialism, our criticism avoids the question -- is it possible to build not barrackss socialism but even democratic socialism on a non-market basis".
- (3) "The struggle against the market, against commodity relations always leads to authoritarianism; to the violation of the rights and dignity of individuals, and to the creation of an omnipotent administrative bureaucratic apparatus". He adds that "Marx did not see this", and Lenin only realized it at the end of his life!
- (4) He condemns the idea that "there are classes and social groups which are deserving of approval and there are classes which have no right to be considered as human beings".
- (5) He condemns the Russian Marxists, right from Plekhanov, for regarding "the interests of defending the revolution to be of higher priority than traditional ideas about law, democracy, and morality".
- (6) Marxists' conviction that "they know and understand something that others do not", and their division of people into "progressive and reactionary classes" may serve in some situations to "a basis for justifying any form of violence".

- (7) He asks how there can be any satisfactory "guarantee of the freedom of individuals or democracy if all members of society are employed by one employer -- the proletarian state".
- (8) All the Communists, both 'left' or 'right' were wrong about their aim: "when ideas about the goals of socialism are wrong ... if they contradict the laws of normal civic life, it is pointless to argue about the pace or the methods by which they are adhered. When you are dealing with an unrealistic goal, it does not matter whether you try to achieve it by cavalry methods or gradually -- the result will be the same".
- (9) It is necessary to have "a healthy doubt about some of the conclusions of Marxism. It is legitimate to ask whether the classics of Marxism were not mistaken".
- (10) (On the Party): "Doesn't the idea of the revolutionary vanguard lead to new forms of social inequality?"

P.S. I'm also attaching an interesting piece on L. Eugene Henry Loren has sent.

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Stanford, California 94305-2323



17 March 1989

Dear Charles,

So I'm enclosing a letter to the Prime Minister, with a note on Soviet 'new thinking' and an excerpt from an astonishing recent article.

Herewith are also, in case you missed them, the text of Yakovlev's remarks as given in Le Monde, and the piece by Kozyrev, as given in the International Herald Tribune: plus a extracts from a piece by Yeltsin on various Politburo members and a rather good note on Yeltsin's position from the Christian Science Monitor - not that Yeltsin is getting anywhere at present.

The Soviet Ambassador and Minister here, to whom I've spoken on different occasions, seem very second rate - which is taken by some as indicating the supposed withdrawal from a "bipolar" attitude. As to the Americans, Baker seems very much the managerial type rather than truly political: that is, keen on settlements for their own sake. But it looks as if Brent Scowcroft, prudent even if a bit of an operator, will have the weight. Gates too is a sound man.

We'll be over June 6-12 en route to the USSR, and July 2-8 en route back: adjustable, of course. It'll be good to see you.

Yours ever

Bob

« Où est le problème demande M. Iakovlev. Qu'est ce qui nous empêche, nous qui disposons, semblerait-il de tout ce qui est indispensable à une haute qualité de vie, nous qui possédons même plus que beaucoup d'autres pays, d'assurer au citoyen soviétique un niveau de vie digne de lui ? C'est avec ces questions qu'a démarré la perestroïka. C'est sur ces questions que porte votre conférence et c'est en nous-mêmes qu'il faut chercher les réponses, dans nos habitudes, dans notre conservatisme, dans notre laxisme et notre irresponsabilité. (...) Oui, beaucoup dépend de nous, mais nous sommes, nous aussi, prisonniers de conditions sociales. Si le remplacement de nombreux dirigeants ne produit pas l'effet souhaité, si, pis encore, l'on met en place des gens honnêtes et qu'ils perdent alors leurs qualités, c'est qu'il y a quelque chose de profondément erroné dans la structure même de notre vie sociale. »

Et ces erreurs consubstantielles au système soviétique, ce sont, dit-il, l'idée qu'une société puisse se développer linéairement, dans un cadre rigide, vers « l'étatisation de tout et de tous », la centralisation, la création d'un système politique reposant sur l'ordre administratif, l'éradication de l'esprit d'initiative et de la liberté d'entreprendre et l'oubli du principe de la souveraineté populaire — « sans parler des représailles et des abus de pouvoir criminels ».

Tout cela entrave jusqu'à aujourd'hui le progrès, poursuit M. Iakovlev en dressant un tableau plus que sombre de l'état d'avancée de la perestroïka. « Nous parlons, dit-il, de créer de nouveaux rapports économiques, mais cela se note dans la routine de structures anciennes. (...) L'incurie est notre fléau. Si nous étions pauvres, peut-être serions-nous mieux organisés. Si nous sommes pauvres, c'est à cause de notre richesse qui nous a pervertis et a épanoui notre paresse et notre irresponsabilité. (...) »

« Nous parlons de réformes politiques, continue-t-il, mais combien nous est-il difficile de nous démettre de l'ancien pouvoir auquel nous sommes habitués ! Nous n'arrivons pas encore à nous représenter qu'une véritable souveraineté populaire offrirait beaucoup plus de stabilité, de solidité et de responsabilité. La démocratie, la transparence, le pluralisme, nous font peur. (...) Les coûts de la démocratie, parfois bien réels, nous font peur, mais est-ce que le printemps ne libère pas la terre et sommes-nous aussi les seuls à détenir la vérité éternelle ? Une année difficile nous attend, et nous devons faire flotter dignement le drapeau du parti dans de nouvelles épreuves, dans les futures transformations sociales. »

« Le passé sur nos épaules »

Ancien ambassadeur au Canada, M. Iakovlev sait parfaitement à quel point les Américains en ont voulu à M. Carter de leur avoir expliqué le « malaise » de leur civilisation, mais rien ne l'arrête dans ce déballage accusateur. « Nous parlons de renaissance morale et de purification spirituelle, dit-il maintenant, mais nous sommes encore pleins de suspicions devant ces débats passionnés. Nous ne réalisons pas tous encore que le socialisme est une société de liberté créatrice, d'épanouissement des sciences et de la culture, d'élévation de l'homme. »

« Nous disions à une certaine époque qu'il ne fallait pas avoir peur d'un homme armé d'un fusil. Alors, camarades, s'exclame M. Iakovlev, n'ayons pas peur d'hommes armés de leur tête et de leur plume, [car] les contradictions suscitées par la perestroïka sont naturelles, inévitables dans la période de changement que nous traversons. Oui, le passé pèse encore sur nos épaules, mais, définissant la société nouvelle, nos classiques avaient avant tout recours aux notions de responsabilité, bien-être, individualité, bonheur. Pour eux, le socialisme consistait à libérer les relations sociales de tout ce qui est contraire et nuisible à l'homme et à la société, incompatible avec les

conceptions humaines normales du bien et du mal, de la morale et de la justice. »

Et comme si cette définition d'un christianisme athée n'était pas suffisamment claire, après avoir parlé de la crise de maturité du socialisme mondial, M. Iakovlev enfonce le clou : « Au bout du compte, beaucoup de nos idéaux ont été définis par l'humanité il y a mille ans. »

« La réforme patine »

Mille ans ? Oui, mille, puisqu'il y a mille ans que le christianisme a été introduit en Russie. Personne ne peut l'ignorer dans la salle, et M. Iakovlev en revient donc à cette perestroïka qui n'est « pas seulement un recours à de nouveaux slogans, [mais] l'attention prêtée à la question : que donneront-ils au travailleur, au peuple, au pays, au socialisme ? » à cette perestroïka qui est avant tout une nécessité de profonde réorganisation des rapports économiques.

Or, dit sans détours M. Iakovlev, « la réforme économique avance, elle patine, ses propulseurs grincent, et la situation ne s'améliore, pour l'instant ni sur le marché des produits de consommation ni dans la sphère financière. La société est en train de payer pour le passé, et cela se révèle très dur. »

« Le logement ? » demande-t-il ainsi avant de répondre : « Les caves et les gourbis ne deviendront pas des palais en un an ou deux, et cela est une faible consolation pour ceux qui n'ont pas d'appartement. L'alimentation ? Le problème est toujours là. (...) Tant que l'homme ne sera pas maître de la terre, il n'aura ni pain, ni viande, ni lait. Les articles de consommation courante ? Tant que la masse monétaire continuera à dépasser, et de beaucoup, la masse des articles à acheter, les étalages resteront vides. Cela signifie qu'il faut accroître de toutes nos forces la production. (...) »

Eloge du marché...

« Le temps presse, camarades, [mais] pourquoi des initiatives relevant de la plus simple évidence ne progressent qu'au milieu de tant d'incroyables difficultés ? » Réponse : parce qu'« il faut voir la réalité en face et que nous avons créé, ce dernier demi-siècle, une économie pour l'économie qui violait la nature et la raison et ruinait le peuple. Nous avons extrait 15 milliards de tonnes de minerais par an, dépassé depuis longtemps les Etats-Unis dans la production de combustibles (charbon mis à part), d'acier, de ciment, de tracteurs. Nous sommes en avance sur le Japon pour la production d'énergie électrique, et qu'est-ce que cela rapporte ? 200 roubles et quelques de salaire mensuel moyen, dont la contre-valeur en marchandises n'est, qui plus est, qu'à moitié assurée. »

« La publication dans les journaux des chiffres astronomiques du Comité d'Etat pour les statistiques a-t-elle un effet plus convaincant que les rayons vides des magasins ? », martèle alors M. Iakovlev avant d'en arriver au nouvel Eden, à la « clef permettant de formuler une perspective à court et moyen terme » — le marché, ce marché dont l'équipe au pouvoir attend le salut de la Russie. « La société est fatiguée de marcher sur la tête, dit-il, et l'on peut constater qu'on ne peut redonner à l'économie une circulation sanguine normale sans passer par le marché socialiste. (...) »

Autrement dit, si vous ne voulez pas que tout sauté et vous avec, laissez se développer le marché, car, en tout état de cause, « sous sa forme actuelle, notre commerce d'Etat est un catalogue des tares des Intendants d'Etat du féodalisme avec ses fausses écritures, son vol organisé sur la base de la tromperie et des calculs falsifiés. » « Je ne parle pas là des milliers de commerçants honnêtes, précise tout de même M. Iakovlev, mais de ce système désuet et défectueux qui organise le commerce selon des lois économiques qu'il est seul à connaître. (...) »

« Dans son acception la plus large, explique-t-il, le commerce est

le maillon essentiel, mais aujourd'hui le plus faible, de la perestroïka [en raison de] cette métastase du stalinisme que sont les sentiments anti-marché. Du stalinisme et non pas du léninisme, puisque Lénine avait pris conscience (bien que cela lui ait été « extrêmement pénible ») de ce que « Marx et Engels s'étaient trompés sur la formation d'un mode de production non marchand ». « La vie, estime M. Iakovlev, n'a pas confirmé cette hypothèse, le communisme de guerre a été une erreur, la conséquence d'une utopie coercitive. »

... et des coopératives

« En fait, affirme M. Iakovlev, si le système des réquisitions a été abandonné, cela a été grâce aux révoltes de Tambov et de Cronstadt, aux lettres de paysans qui revenaient à dire : vos slogans proclament à chacun selon son travail, mais les faits disent, eux, égalité dans la pauvreté. Il était urgent de passer à la paix civile. Comment ? Par des moyens naturels, en établissant un juste principe de rémunération du travail fondé sur le marché, en atténuant radicalement le régime de la forteresse assiégée, en instaurant le commerce et d'autres formes d'échange avec le monde extérieur, en apprenant, auprès des capita-

listes, en élaborant et assimilant une (...) nouvelle culture du travail. »

Suit une apologie, citations de Lénine à l'appui, des coopératives, puisqu'« il est temps de débarrasser une fois pour toutes les consciences du mensonge sur l'incompatibilité du socialisme et du marché » et que « l'Etat ne peut pas faire du commerce de façon rationnelle, pour la simple raison qu'il vivra toujours aux frais de la société ». »

M. Reagan n'aurait pas dit mieux, et, après un développement sans surprise sur la nécessité parallèle de la démocratisation, M. Iakovlev lance à ses auditeurs de l'Etat-parti : « Main sur le cœur, il convient d'avouer que pratiquement tout le travail est encore à faire, particulièrement en ce qui concerne l'homme, la sphère sociale et la satisfaction des revendications matérielles des gens, qui sont, pour l'heure, en général relativement modestes. »

Conclusion : « Les processus d'assainissement sont complexes, mais, si nous ne créons pas (...) cette base d'un développement sain de la société (...), alors pourra nous menacer non seulement un retour au passé, à l'époque de la stagnation [brejnévienne], mais un conservatisme agressif et revanchard, célébrant sa victoire. »

Le Monde 8-9 January 1989

from a speech by Alexander Yakovlev
at Perm c December 15 1988, with
excerpts unpublished in the central
press

MOSCOW — For many years, and especially during those known conventionally as the "era of stagnation," diplomats in the East and West carried on an endless and protracted argument about what must come first: confidence-building, as they said, or arms reductions, as we said. This discussion led to one result: inaction.

Meanwhile, the torrent of newer and more destructive weapons grew and broadened, and international problems mounted. The desire to break this vicious circle forced us to comprehend one essentially simple fact: Concurrent, practical actions are necessary for the growth of confidence, the halting of the arms race and the organization of interaction throughout the complex of international issues.

By pursuing the logic of anti-imperialist struggle, we allowed ourselves — contrary to the interests of our fatherland — to be drawn into the arms race, and helped to introduce the "enemy image" and to set up technological and cultural barriers between the Soviet Union and the United States. Matters were also complicated by "questions of principle," which must be answered once and for all. For example, there is the question whether it is possible to talk seriously about confidence in a class adversary.

Let us recall, however, that Dwight D. Eisenhower spoke about the military-industry complex as an "illegal" force — illegal from the point of view of the bourgeois state, which is, as we know, designed to serve as a committee for managing the affairs of the entire class of capitalists, rather than just one section.

If, however, one takes a look at the United States monopolist bourgeoisie as a whole, very few of its groups, and none of the main ones, are connected with militarism. There is no longer any need to talk, for instance, about a military struggle for markets or raw materials, or for the division and redivision of the world.

None of the classes or strata of Soviet society is subject to exploitation from foreign capital, and thus none of them can solve the fundamental problems facing it by means of a "struggle against imperialism." There is only one way to do this: the internal revolutionary renewal of socialism, including the elimination of anachronistic ideas about the world as an arena for the "international class battle."

It is all the more strange to talk about the irreconcilable interests of states with different social systems now that even the class conflicts

By Andrei V. Kozyrev

The writer is deputy chief of the International Organizations Administration in the Soviet foreign ministry. The following is excerpted from a featured article that appeared last summer in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn (International Affairs), a ministry publication. As such, according to U.S. experts on the Soviet Union, it carried the imprimatur of top officials, including Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. It was translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, a branch of the CIA.

within capitalist countries largely take place through the achievement of compromise within a mutually accepted legal framework rather than in the form of harsh confrontation. It follows that the Soviet workers' solidarity with their class brothers in the West far from justifies the thesis of global class confrontation.

The myth that the class interests of socialist and developing countries coincide in resisting imperialism does not hold up to criticism at all.

The majority of developing countries already adhere to or tend toward the Western model of development and they suffer not so much from capitalism as from a lack of it. They are interested not in struggling against former metropolises but in cooperating to defend their own and international stability, which is what our cooperation with the "Third World" must be aimed at.

We are not, of course, talking about disregarding our opponents' aggressive potentials,

which ultimately damaged our own interests.

At the same time, we were unwittingly nurturing an atmosphere of suspicion about our intentions in the sphere of developing countries. The authority and influence gained from our support for the national liberation movement, which swept away the colonial system of imperialism in the early and late '50s, were later to be used for the achievement of objectives that were not entirely well-considered and, most importantly, unrealistic.

At times, a primitive system was used to identify belligerence with anti-imperialism, and to identify the ultra-progressive phraseology of some individuals and movements in the developing countries with their socio-economic practices, which were distant not only from socialist transformations but also from democratic transformations as such, in both the economic and the political spheres.

Fundamental problems cannot be solved by anachronistic ideas about the world as an arena for the 'international class battle.'

underestimating the aspirations of reactionary and militaristic circles, turning a blind eye to intrigue or losing our vigilance. Yet, in the Soviet Union, the natural need to defend the state's borders against armed encroachment from outside and the concern about state stability turned into suspicion and hostility to everything foreign, into spy mania, an obsession with secrecy and ideological intolerance.

Blaming the United States military-industrial complex for everything, as usual, bureaucrats who were prepared to place departmental interests above state ones not only pursued but played along with the logic of an arms race imposed on us by the ideologists of attrition. At the peak of the stagnation period, matters reached a point where our "counter-action" began to outstrip their "action,"

In some cases we rejected the concept of a division of spheres of influence in "theory" yet pursued it in practice by supporting states that we regarded as our strongholds of global struggle against the other system. Meanwhile, while relying on foreign aid and practicing "ultra-left-wing" anti-imperialist rhetoric, some regimes in these countries were in no hurry to solve the problems of hunger and backwardness.

Their attempts to manage their economies by means of an administrative system, their reliance on military aid from abroad and their disregard for democratic freedoms inevitably led to the polarization of political forces. Virtually all of these regimes have been drawn into protracted conflicts with an opposition that in turn depends on outside support. The imperialist circles that provide this support do not, of

course, fail to mention the other side's foreign aid and frequently the immediate presence of its troops on the territory of developing countries.

The unsolved nature of key national problems within the group of "left-wing" states stands out in particular contrast to the increasing tendency in Asia and Africa to seek ways toward accelerated economic development and involvement in the international division of labor. Unfortunately, there are no data about what it costs the Soviet Union to assist these countries. Estimates published in the West give rise to grave reflections about the returns from, and expediency of, this aid.

Yet, the aid itself is only the tip of the iceberg. Our direct and indirect involvement in regional conflicts leads to colossal losses by increasing general international tension, justifying the arms race and hindering the establishment of mutually advantageous ties with the West.

Finally, stereotyped ideas about the aspiration of imperialist centers to rob the liberated countries need to be corrected. Lenin stressed that mature capitalism, unlike its early forms, is not interested in deceit but in the "honest" acquisition of profit in the course of economic trade. In addition, the developing countries are increasingly acting as the party with the greater interest in economic ties with the West, above all in the export of raw commodities.

Our interests in the developing countries must be defined above all by the real potential for setting up mutually advantageous economic and technological cooperation. From this point of view, it is not difficult to see that the West's interests of this kind are immeasurably deeper and broader. To attempt to balance this asymmetry by building up the potential of one's naval presence and strengthening one's strategic ties with individual states that might "act in opposition to Western influence" would be to construct one's relations with the developing countries on a very shaky and short-term basis.

It is not a matter of some concessions to imperialism or of withdrawing from previously prepared positions to cut one's losses and build one's strength. What is involved is realism in the evaluation of one's interests, the elimination of dogma and stereotypes from them, and genuine respect for other countries, including the nonaligned ones. In short, it is a return to Leninist policy, to which superpower behavior and rivalry in the struggle for spheres of influence are profoundly alien.

AN OPINION OF THE LEADERS

Yel'tsin on Politburo members affected by
the September 1988 changes
(from an unpublished interview with Young Communists)

| | | |
|------------------------|---|---|
| Lukyanov | - | "a jurist who had long worked with Gorbachev" |
| Biryukova | - | "only a tribute to respect for women" |
| Yakovlev | - | "one of the wisest people as an ideologist, far stronger than Medvedev" |
| Vorotnikov | - | "its hard for me to tell the truth about him" |
| Chebrikov | - | "Well understands the whole 'Kitchen'" |
| Kryuchkov | - | "A professional of the highest class" |
| Vlasov | - | "You put me in a difficult position, I can't give the truth. The MVD is not his metier" |
| He elsewhere describes | | |
| Ligachev | - | "totally dishonest" |