

PRIME MINISTER

Mr.

cc: Sir P. Cradock
Mr. Ingham

MR. GORBACHEV'S VISIT

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An important part of the relationship is your willingness to give firm and public support for what Gorbachev is doing within the Soviet union. That is a message that you will need to emphasise again during the visit - he needs the support more than ever - while balancing it with firm adherence to our principles and the needs of our defence.

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The media will certainly look for points of divergence and dispute. You do indeed plan to be quite rough with him on chemical weapons. I imagine he will put pressure on you on SNF modernisation and the human rights conference in Moscow. You will of course stand up robustly for our views and make clear that you have done so. But the overall impression from the talks ought to be of the breadth of the issues discussed, the frankness of the talks and the continuing ability of the two world leaders, who are ideologically as far apart as any, to deal with each other levelly and squarely on a basis of realism. Again the contrast should be with the other Europeans and the Opposition here who act like spaniels when confronted with the new Soviet policies.

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- Soviet approach to Western Europe. You will want to find out whether he will be launching any new ideas in his speech the next day. You will also want to counter the impression that he may well have that Europe is going soft.

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At the Guildhall, you will no doubt want to follow the pattern of President Reagan's address last year, and respond for about five minutes. We shall have to see what Mr. Gorbachev intends to say: all we know so far is that he intends an important speech on Europe, one which he had in mind to deliver to the European Parliament in Strasbourg later in the year. But I

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- greeting Mr. Gorbachev at the front door of No. 10 the next morning, the talks, the signing of the Armenian agreement and a working lunch (with Mrs. Gorbachev). We need to decide where you hold the talks - Study, Cabinet Room or White Room? and where you sign the agreement - Pillared Room or Cabinet Room? I think you should have him in the Cabinet Room at some stage;
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CHARLES POWELL

19 March 1989

CDF

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SECRET

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Seen by 17
in fax copy.
M. Job. CDD

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