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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 388

OF 131042Z APRIL 89

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, PARIS, MODUK  
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOWPS TO PRIME MINISTER  
NO 10 DOWNING ST

CALL ON TELTSCHIK: GORBACHEV'S VISIT AND SNF

## SUMMARY

1. PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO KOHL ABOUT GORBACHEV'S VISIT HANDED TO TELTSCHIK.

2. TELTSCHIK REVEALS CONTINUED STALEMATE IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON SNF. HOPES FOR GERMAN POSITION BY 27 APRIL. IMPLIES THAT KOHL IS INCREASINGLY ISOLATED IN HIS RESISTANCE TO GENSCHER'S WISH TO DELAY DECISIONS ON ALL ASPECTS OF MODERNISATION UNTIL 1991.

## DETAIL

## GORBACHEV IN UK

3. KOHL, WHO IS ANNOUNCING HIS GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE TODAY, COULD NOT SEE ME IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. I THEREFORE SAW TELTSCHIK THIS MORNING. I GAVE HIM THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE ABOUT GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO THE UK (YOUR TELNO 269) AND I ELABORATED ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELNO 271. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THIS EARLY AND FULL REPORT OF GORBACHEV'S VISIT. HE COMMENTED THAT THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER WAS EXACTLY RIGHT IN ITS PRESCRIPTION FOR WESTERN POLICY: SUPPORT FOR PERESTROIKA BUT FIRMNESS IN MAINTAINING NATO'S STRENGTH AND UNITY.

## GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO THE FRG

4. I ASKED ABOUT THE PREPARATIONS FOR GORBACHEV'S VISIT HERE IN JUNE. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE FEDERAL CHANCELLERY HAD COMPLETELY REDONE AN AUSWAERTIGES AMT DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED JOINT GERMAN-SOVIET DECLARATION. THE REDRAFT HAD INCLUDED, IN PARTICULAR, STRESS ON SELF-DETERMINATION IN EUROPE. THE RUSSIANS HAD ACCEPTED THE REDRAFT AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATION. THE SECTION DEALING WITH EUROPE WOULD BE BASED ON HALLOWED CSCE TEXTS ABOUT THE NEED TO GET RID OF DIVISIONS. THE DECLARATION WOULD ALSO DEAL WITH WIDER INTERNATIONAL MATTERS AND BILATERAL MATTERS.

## SNF

5. I SET FORTH AGAIN OUR POSITION FOR SNF MODERNISATION AND AGAINST A NATO INITIATIVE ON NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID THE LONG DELAY IN FORMING A GERMAN POSITION WAS WORRYING. WHY HAD TELTSCHIK'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON BEEN PUT OFF? TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR HAD NOT YET TAKEN A DECISION ON THE POSITION HE WOULD ADOPT AT THE NATO SUMMIT. HE WOULD NEED TO REACH A VIEW BY 27 APRIL, WHEN HE WOULD MAKE A MAJOR STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT POLICY IN THE BUNDESTAG. A COALITION MEETING WOULD BE NEEDED BEFORE THEN. TELTSCHIK'S HOPE WAS THAT THE CHANCELLOR'S POSITION WOULD BE:

(A) DECISIONS ON THE NATURE OF THE SYSTEM TO FOLLOW LANCE AND THE NUMBERS NEEDED SHOULD BE MADE IN 1991.

✓ (B) THE NATO SUMMIT SHOULD AGREE THAT SNF WOULD CONTINUE TO BE NEEDED, AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO THIRD ZERO.

6. ONE REASON WHY THE CHANCELLOR HAD REACHED NO DECISION WAS THE WEAKNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE NEED FOR A RESHUFFLE. ANOTHER WAS

THAT THE CHANCELLOR DID NOT WISH TO PRECIPITATE A SHOW-DOWN WITH GENSCHER WHEN IMPORTANT PEOPLE IN THE CDU ITSELF WERE AGAINST A MODERNISATION DECISION THIS YEAR. THAT INCLUDED THE KEY-FIGURE OF SCHAEUBLE, UNTIL TODAY THE GOVERNMENT'S CHIEF COORDINATOR AND NOW TO BE INTERIOR MINISTER. KOHL HAD CONSIDERED WHETHER TO FOLLOW THE MOTTO 'IF YOU CAN'T BEAT THEM, JOIN THEM', IE TO ACCEPT GENSCHER'S POSITION NOW. HE HAD DECIDED AGAINST THAT. ANOTHER OPTION MIGHT BE FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC TO ALLOW ITSELF TO BE OVERRULED BY AN ALLIANCE DECISION. THE ISSUE WAS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM IN THE COALITION. LAMBSDORFF, WHO UNDERSTOOD THE REALITIES, WAS WEAK ON THE POLICY. THE FDP WERE TRYING TO FIRE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING WILLING TO GO TO THE LIMIT AND IF NECESSARY LEAVE THE COALITION ON SNF.

7. I EXPLAINED TO TELTSCHIK THE VIEW IN YOUR RUSI SPEECH THAT THE TOTALLY OPPOSED VIEWS OF EAST AND WEST ABOUT SNF WOULD MAKE NEGOTIATIONS HOPELESS. I SAID THAT IT WAS UNHELPFUL THAT GENSCHER HAD SPOKEN OF A EMERGING WESTERN CONSENSUS ON EARLY SNF ARMS CONTROL.

## COMMENT ON SNF

8. SINCE THE SPD AND THE FDP DO NOT HAVE A MAJORITY IN THE BUNDESTAG, THE FDP, IF IT LEFT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, WOULD GO OUT

OF POWER. THAT WOULD BE HIGHLY UNCHARACTERISTIC SO IN THE LAST RESORT GENSCHER MIGHT GIVE A LITTLE GROUND. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT KOHL WILL NOT FORCE THE ISSUE IN THE COALITION AND WILL LOOK FOR SOME FORMULA WHICH HE AND GENSCHER CAN ACCEPT. ON MODERNISATION, THAT WOULD TURN ON THE CLARITY OF ANY STATEMENT THAT SNF WOULD CONTINUE TO BE ESSENTIAL AND THAT A THIRD ZERO WAS UNACCEPTABLE. GENSCHER WOULD WANT SUCH A STATEMENT NOT TO HAVE A PERMANENT RING. TELTSCHIK KNOWS THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF GETTING NATO AGREEMENT ON A MOVE TOWARDS SNF NEGOTIATIONS, THE MORE SO IF THERE IS NO MODERNISATION DECISION NOW. IT IS ON THIS THAT THE GERMANS MIGHT PREFER TO BE SEEN TO FIGHT FOR A NATO INITIATIVE AND BE OVERRULED AT THE SUMMIT, RATHER THAN GIVE UP THE IDEA IF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH IS SUPPORTED ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM HERE, BEFORE THE SUMMIT.

9. THE GERMAN PRESS HAVE REPORTED THAT KOHL HAD A LONG TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH BUSH ON 12 APRIL ABOUT THE NATO SUMMIT AND BUSH'S VISIT TO BONN. THE US EMBASSY UNDERSTAND THAT KOHL WILL WRITE TO BUSH ABOUT SNF.

10. I HAVE REPORTED BY TELELETTER MY EXCHANGES WITH TELTSCHIK ABOUT SOUTHERN AFRICA AND EUROPEAN MONETARY MATTERS.

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