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SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF GORBACHEV'S VISIT AND OF BILATERAL RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV'S ADVISER SPEAKS OF THE EMOTIONAL AND SUBSTANTIVE IMPACT OF THE LONDON VISIT ON THE SOVIET LEADER. APPRECIATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S SUPPORT FOR PERESTROIKA. COUPLED WITH A DEFENCE OF THE GUILDHALL SPEECH. SOME CONTINUING ANNOYANCE IN THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE UNITED STATES. CLARIFICATION OF THE INVITATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

DETAIL

- 2. I CALLED ON GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER. CHERNYAYEV. ON 24 APRIL TO DISCUSS THE OUTCOME OF THE VISIT TO LONDON. (CHERNYAYEV WAS FLANKED BY MRS GORBACHEVA'S PRIVATE SECRETARY, GUSENKOV. NO MFA OFFICIAL ATTENDED.)
- 3. I HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY CHERNYAYEV'S RELATIVELY FORTHCOMING ANSWERS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON NAMIBIA.
- 4. HAVING LISTENED TO MY ASSESSMENT (WHICH WAS BASED ON YOUR TELNO GUIDANCE 24 AND PICKED UP POINTS IN GORBACHEV'S MESSAGE OF 12 APRIL). CHERNYAYEV REFERRED TO THE CONSIDERABLE 'EMOTIONAL' IMPACT OF THE VISIT ON GORBACHEV. THIS HAD SHOWN IN HIS REMARKS ON THE PLANE ON THE WAY HOME. BUT GORBACHEV'S SATISFACTION WENT BEYOND EMOTION. HE THOUGHT THE VISIT HAD PRODUCED IMPORTANT RESULTS AND HAD BEEN A 'SERIOUS EVENT' INTERNATIONALLY AS WELL AS BILATERALLY. GORBACHEV HAD BEEN FAVOURABLY SURPRISED AT THE SIMPLE SINCERITY AND WARMTH OF THE REACTIONS OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE TO HIM. HE FELT THAT HE HAD A VERY STRONG MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE HIGHLY APPRECIATED HER PERSPECTIVE ON THE SOVIET UNION. SHE SINCERELY WANTED PERESTROIKA TO SUCCEED AND HAD A DEEP UNDERSTANDING AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROCESS. SHE SAW THAT IT WAS BENEFICIAL TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. AND HAD SAID AS MUCH IN PUBLIC.
- 5. CHERNYAYEV PICKED UP MY COMMENT THAT IT WAS OLD-FASHIONED TO SPEAK OF WESTERN CIRCLES WHO DID NOT WANT PERESTROIKA TO SUCCEED. WHILE HE ACCEPTED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE VIEW OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY IN BRITAIN. HE REITERATED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT MILITARY AND OTHER CIRCLES. ESPECIALLY IN AMERICA. AMBASSADORS RETURNING TO MOSCOW FOR THE LAST PLENUM HAD GIVEN WORRYING REPORTS ON FOREIGN ATTITUDES. HENCE GORBACHEV'S DECISION TO USE THE GUILDHALL PLATFORM

TO EMPHASISE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO TURNING BACK AND THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE: TO SHOW THAT HE AND HIS FELLOW LEADERS WERE FULLY IN CHARGE OF THE SITUATION: AND TO PRESENT THE SOVIET UNION AS A RELIABLE PARTNER.

6. AT THE END OF OUR MEETING. CHERNYAYEV REVERTED TO THE GUILDHALL SPEECH. ZAMYATIN HAD BROUGHT HIM A PILE OF BRITISH PRESS CUTTINGS. HE NOTED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT GORBACHEV HAD NOT ADDRESSED THE THEME OF THE ''COMMON EUROPEAN HOME''. THE REASONS WERE THAT GORBACHEV DID NOT WISH TO REPEAT HIMSELF: THAT STRASBOURG WOULD BE THE LOGICAL PLACE FOR A FURTHER SPEECH ON THIS: AND (TONGUE IN CHEEK, WITH A REFERENCE TO GORBACHEV'S SENSITIVITY OR ''DELIKATNOST'') THAT MRS THATCHER DID NOT LIKE SUPRANATIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS. CHERNYAYEV COMMENTED APPROVINGLY ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S OWN REMARKS ABOUT A

7. CHERNYAYEV CONCLUDED THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULT OF THE VISIT WAS THAT MRS THATCHER HAD TOLD THE WORLD THAT THEY COULD HAVE CONFIDENCE IN GORBACHEV. THE VISIT TO WINDSOR AND THE REACTIONS OF THE BRITISH PUBLIC HAD ALSO BEEN VERY IMPORTANT. I SAID THESE REACTIONS REFLECTED THE VIEW IN BRITAIN THAT PERESTROIKA WAS A BENEFICIAL AND HISTORIC PROCESS. AND WAS IN OUR INTERESTS AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE USSR. THE BRITISH HAD NO FEARS ABOUT THE SUCCESS OF PERESTROIKA. CHERNYAYEV REPEATED THAT SOME IN AMERICA WERE STILL AFRAID OF THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCCESS.

COMMON HOME, WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE SOVIET CONCEPT THAT EUROPE WENT

ARMS CONTROL

FAR WIDER THAN THE COMMUNITY.

- 8. CHERNYAYEV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES
 BETWEEN BRITAIN AND THE SOVIET UNION. BUT HE CONTRASTED THE PRIME
 MINISTER'S APPROACH. BASED ON A SERIOUS UNDERSTANDING OF THE
 UNDERLYING SOVIET PROCESSES, WITH THAT OF THE AMERICANS. THE
 AMERICANS WERE FAR FROM UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIANS, AND DID NOT WISH
 TO UNDERSTAND THEM PROPERLY. BY DISCUSSING THEIR DIFFERENCES
 FRANKLY. GORBACHEV AND MRS THATCHER PREEMPTED MISTRUST.
- 9. I RAISED SNF MODERNISATION. CHERNYAYEV BRUSHED THIS ASIDE.
 SAYING THE AKHROMEYEV HAD ANSWERED THE POINTS IN HIS PRAVDA ARTICLE
 OF 19 APRIL. (MOSCOW TELNO 673). AKHROMEYEV WAS THE EXPERT. HE HAD
 SHOWN THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD CARRIED OUT A DIFFERENT SORT OF
 MODERNISATION TO THAT CONTEMPLATED BY NATO. THE KEY POINT WAS THE
 RANGE OF MISSILES. THE INCREASE IN THE RANGE OF THE LANCE SUCCESSOR
 WOULD CIRCUMVENT THE INF AGREEMENT. CHERNYAYEV SEEMED DISAPPOINTED
 THAT THE WESTERN PRESS HAD NOT PICKED UP AKHROMEYEV'S ARGUMENTS.

AFGHANISTAN

10. OUR DISCUSSION OF NAMIBIA PROMPTED CHERNYAYEV TO MUTTER MISERABLY ABOUT AFGHANISTAN FOR A FEW MINUTES. HE SPOKE OF THE ASSAULT ON JALALABAD AND TALK OF A DECISIVE MILITARY ONSLAUGHT AGAINST KABUL. HE SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD FULFILLED THEIR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW HONESTLY. AND HAD DONE THEIR BIT. THEY HAD TRIED TO HELP PROGRESSIVE FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN TO EUROPEANISE A MEDIAEVAL STATE AND TO COUNTER FUNDAMENTALISM. THEY WOULD LIKE THE WEST TO TAKE THE PROBLEM MORE SERIOUSLY: BUT THE AMERICANS WERE ENCOURAGING AFGHANS TO KILL EACH OTHER.

11. I SUMMARISED VARIOUS ENCOUNTERS IN PROSPECT. CHERNYAYEV REPLIED AS FOLLOWS: A) PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO KIEV+ SO FAR AS CHERNYAYEV WAS AWARE. THIS WAS THE ONLY/ONLY MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND GORBACHEV AT PRESENT ON THE SCHEDULE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME CONFUSION HAD ARISEN AS A RESULT OF THE MESSAGES DELIVERED BY ZAMYATIN AND PETROVSKY. GORBACHEV EXPECTED TO HAVE A WORKING MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WHEN SHE CAME OUT FOR THE KIEV WEEK. (CHERNYAYEV SPOKE OF THIS MEETING TAKING PLACE IN KIEV). THE TIMING OF THE NEXT ENCOUNTER WOULD PRESUMABLY BE SETTLED THEN. RATHER THAN IN ADVANCE. B) STATE VISIT: CHERNYAYEV SAID IN A RELAXED WAY THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOW WAIT FOR US TO COME UP WITH DATES. C) RYZHKOV: HE KNEW NOTHING OF THE INVITATION TO RYZHKOV. WHICH HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE POLITBURG. D) SHEVARDNADZE: THE POLITBURO HAD GIVEN FORMAL AGREEMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO BRITAIN. E) SUPREME SOVIET: FROM THE NEW SUPREME SOVIET WOULD BE VERY USEFUL. F) BIRYUKOVA:

HE SAW NO PROBLEM. AND AGREED THAT AN AUTUMN VISIT BY A DELEGATION

HE HAD JUST HEARD OF THIS PROPOSAL FROM ZAMYATIN. HE WAS PERSONALLY IN FAVOUR. BUT COULD NOT YET SPEAK FOR GORBACHEV.

INTERNAL

GEORGIA

12. CHERNYAYEV SPOKE FRANKLY. THE TROUBLE WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENDED HAD SHEVARDNADZE BEEN IN CHARGE. HE KNEW PATIASHVILI WELL. HE WAS AN INTELLIGENT AND HONEST MAN. BUT HAD RESPONDED IN AN OLD-FASHIONED WAY. IT HAD NOT BEEN NECESSARY TO SEND THE TROOPS IN. HTHERE HAD BEEN NO REAL THREAT: THERE HAD. FOR EXAMPLE. BEEN NO INTERETHNIC VIOLENCE. AS THERE HAD BEEN IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. BUT THIS WAS THE PENALTY TO BE PAID FOR DEVOLVING DECISION-MAKING. (COMMENT: MOSCOW IS DOING ALL IT CAN TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM THE TBILISI DECISION. SOME ARE QUESTIONING THE CREDIBILITY OF THIS LINE.)

SUPREME SOVIET ELECTIONS

CHERNYAYEV IS ONE OF THE HUNDRED DEPUTIES ELECTED ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE LIST. HE HAD ATTENDED A MEETING OF MOSCOW DEPUTIES ON 22 APRIL. WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS INTERESTING AND CONFUSED. HE SAID THAT NO FORMAL PROCEDURE HAD BEEN LAID DOWN ON HOW TO ELECT THE NEW

SUPREME SOVIET FROM WITHIN THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES. THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET HAD SENT A LETTER CONTAINING PROPOSALS (BUT ONLY PROPOSALS) TO REPUBLICAN SUPREME SOVIETS. REGIONAL GROUPS OF DEPUTIES WERE EXPECTED TO DISCUSS THIS AND TO PUT FORWARD THEIR OWN PROPOSALS. THE MATTER WOULD THEN BE DECIDED IN A DEMOCRATIC FASHION. BRAITHWAITE YYYY ADVANCE 2 HD/SDVIET HD/NEWS 96 MAIN LIMITED 6 SOVIET 100 NEWS 9 INFO 11 PUSD 26 RESEARCH 1 PLANNERS 3 ECD (E) 5 NAD UND 6 LEGAL ADVISERS 6 PS PS/MRS CHALKER PS/MR WALDEGRAVE PS/PUS PS/SIR J FRETWELL MR RATFORD [BRADLEY] MXHPAN 1016