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NAC, 8 MAY: SECRETARY BAKER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

SUMMARY

1. U S WISHES BAKER'S VISIT TO SIGNAL RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE U S/SOVIET DIALOGUE. U S INTENDS TO FORMALISE NEW FIVE-PART AGENDA (IE ADDING QUOTE TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES UNQUOTE). ON ARMS CONTROL U S RESERVES RIGHT TO ADD NEW IDEAS IN START, WHILST OPERATING ON THE BASIS OF PROGRESS ALREADY MADE. TALKS UNLIKELY TO GET INTO MUCH DETAIL: WHILE U S POLICY REVIEW NEAR ENOUGH TO COMPLETION TO ALLOW SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE, CONSIDERATION OF SOME ELEMENTS STILL NOT COMPLETED.

DETAIL

2. DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY RIDGWAY BRIEFED THE NAC TODAY ON SECRETARY BAKER'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW (ON WHICH BAKER WILL DEBRIEF THE NAC ON 12 MAY).

3. RIDGWAY SAID THE PRIMARY AIM OF THE TALKS WAS TO PRESENT THE RESULT OF THE U S POLICY REVIEW. BAKER WOULD STRESS THE U S'S CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE REVIEW STRESSED CONTINUITY BUT THERE WOULD BE SOME DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS: REGIONAL CONFLICTS (EG CENTRAL AMERICA) AND TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES (EG ENVIRONMENT, TERRORISM) WOULD GET MORE ATTENTION THAN BEFORE.

4. RIDGWAY OUTLINED THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE U S POLICY REVIEW RELATING TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SAW THEIR OVERRIDING GOAL AS ARRESTING NATIONAL DECLINE AND MODERNISING THE SOVIET SYSTEM. THEY WISHED THE USSR TO BECOME MORE COMPETITIVE BUT FACED FORMIDABLE PROBLEMS (ECONOMY, PUBLIC UNHAPPINESS, TECHNOLOGICAL LAG, NATIONALITIES). PERESTROIKA WOULD TAKE YEARS IF NOT DECADES TO TAKE ROOT BUT THERE APPEARED CONSENSUS IN MOSCOW THAT A RETURN TO THE POLICIES OF THE PAST WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. GORBACHEV SAW INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AS A PRE-REQUISITE FOR DOMESTIC REFORMS. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS SITUATION WOULD LAST WAS

UNKNOWN. BUT THERE WERE NOW GREAT OPPORTUNITIES TO PROMOTE WESTERN POLICIES. IT WAS IN THE WEST'S INTEREST TO ENCOURAGE CHANGE. BUT THE WEST MUST ALSO BE PRUDENT: THE SOVIET SYSTEM WAS STILL UNDERGOING REFORM AND SOVIET MILITARY FORCES REMAINED FORMIDABLE AND WERE BEING MODERNISED. AN OVERALL U S OBJECTIVE WAS TO REINTEGRATE THE USSR INTO THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS. THE U S WOULD ENCOURAGE THE RUSSIANS TO INSTITUTIONALISE CHANGE, TO MAKE THE RELATIONSHIP PREDICTABLE AND LASTING, AND TO MAKE RHETORIC ON DEFENCE A REALITY. THE U S WOULD ENCOURAGE FURTHER SOVIET RETRENCHMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND CO-OPERATION ON GLOBAL ISSUES. SHEVARDNADZE HAD AGREED IN MARCH TO AN EXPANDED FIVE PART AGENDA (IE ADDING GLOBAL ISSUES TO THE TRADITIONAL MIX OF BILATERAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL ISSUES AND ARMS CONTROL).

HUMAN RIGHTS

5. THE SITUATION WAS IMPROVING BUT THERE WAS STILL A LONG WAY TO GO. OF ELEVEN HUMANITARIAN CASES RAISED IN VIENNA, THREE HAD BEEN RESOLVED. THE U S WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF ALL. THE U S WOULD ALSO URGE RESOLUTION OF THE REFUSENIK ISSUE AND STRESS INTEREST IN FURTHER INSTITUTIONALISATION OF REFORM. THE U S WOULD EXPRESS CONCERN AT THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF THE KARABAKH COMMITTEE.

REGIONAL ISSUES

6. THE U S INTENDED TO HOLD THE RUSSIANS TO THEIR WORD. THE U S AIM WAS TO END SOVIET MISCHIEF MAKING IN THE THIRD WORLD AND EXPLORE SOVIET READINESS TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS PEACEFULLY. EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND AFGHANISTAN WERE ENCOURAGING. THERE WAS SOME GROUND FOR OPTIMISM. BAKER WOULD PROPOSE RESUMPTION OF REGULAR BILATERAL MEETINGS OF REGIONAL EXPERTS. RIDGWAY SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SAW CENTRAL AMERICA AS A VITAL TOUCHSTONE. THE PRESIDENT HAD ALREADY WRITTEN TO GORBACHEV ON THIS. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE REGION WOULD AFFECT THE OVERALL U S/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THE U S WOULD ENCOURAGE THE RUSSIANS TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARDS PEACE AND WOULD REITERATE THEIR CONCERN AT THE DECISION TO SUPPLY SU24 LONG-RANGE BOMBERS TO LIBYA. ON CAMBODIA, THE AMERICAN SIDE WOULD STRESS THE NEED FOR A COMPLETE VERIFIED VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL, A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT INCLUDING POWER-SHARING AND NO RETURN TO DOMINANCE BY THE KHMER ROUGE (A CONCERN WHICH THE RUSSIANS SHARED). THE U S WERE ENCOURAGING THE RUSSIANS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH ALL THE PARTIES. THE RUSSIANS HAD INDICATED THAT THEY WISHED TO RAISE AFGHANISTAN: THE U S WOULD URGE THE RUSSIANS TO HELP REDUCE TENSION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WITH A SERIES OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES. THE U S WOULD EXPRESS CONCERN OVER RECENT DELIVERIES OF SOPHISTICATED SOVIET WEAPONRY TO

THE NORTH. IN SOUTHERN AFRICA U S/SOVIET CSO-OPERATION HAD BEEN A SUCCESS. THE NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE PROCESS WAS NOW BACK ON TRACK. THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN HELPFUL ALTHOUGH THEY HAD VACILLATED IN THE RECENT CRISIS. IN THE HORN OF AFRICA THE AMERICANS BELIEVED MENGISTU WAS UNDER HIGH LEVEL SOVIET PRESSURE TO NEGOTIATE: THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THIS.

TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

7. THE CHIEF GOAL WAS TO LAY THE BASIS FOR SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGES ON THIS NEW PART OF THE EXPANDED AGENDA. THE U S HAD IN MIND CO-OPERATION ON ENVIRONMENT, TERRORISM, DRUGS ETC. ON THE ENVIRONMENT, CO-OPERATION WAS ALREADY GOING FORWARD UNDER THE 1972 BILATERAL AND CERTAIN OTHER AGREEMENTS. IN MOSCOW BAKER WOULD SIGN AN AGREEMENT ON POLLUTION CLEARANCE IN THE BERING AND CHUKCHI SEAS. HE WOULD RESIST ANY SOVIET ATTEMPT TO CREATE NEW FORA (EG A UN SUMMIT ON THE ENVIRONMENT). ON TERRORISM THE U S ENVISAGED ENCOURAGING SOVIET PUBLIC DENUNCIATION OF PARTICULAR ACTS OF TERRORISM, RESTRICTION ON TERRORIST MOVEMENTS AND SUPPLY. ON DRUGS AN MOU ALREADY PROVIDED FOR CO-OPERATIVE ACTION WHERE APPROPRIATE. THE U S POLICY REVIEW ON NARCOTICS WAS DUE FOR COMPLETION IN JUNE: THE U S MIGHT HAVE FURTHER PROPOSALS TO PUT TO THE RUSSIANS THEN.

BILATERAL

8. RIDGWAY HAD LITTLE TO SAY. TALKS WOULD COVER EMBASSY BUILDINGS AND PERSONNEL AND THE PROSPECTIVE OPENING OF CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK. ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS THE U S REMAINED IN FAVOUR OF MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL NON-STRATEGIC TRADE. BUT THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS IN THE U S FOR A WAIVER OF JACKSON-VANIK.

ARMS CONTROL

9. BARTHOLOMEW LED ON HIS. THE U S REVIEW WAS STILL GOING ON. THE U S PLANNED TO TELL THE RUSSIANS THAT AMERICAN POLICY WOULD CONTINUE TO BE GUIDED BY CURRENT AND POTENTIAL SOVIET CAPABILITIES RATHER THAN BY STATED INTENTIONS. THE U S WOULD NOT PURSUE ARMS REDUCTIONS FOR THEIR OWN SAKE. THE AIM WAS TO ENHANCE STABILITY THROUGH REDUCTIONS AND THROUGH RESTRUCTURING OF FORCES.

NST

10. ON START, BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT U S WAS READY TO RESUME TALKS IN GENEVA AND WOULD DISCUSS SPECIFIC DATES WITH THE RUSSIANS, PRESIDENT BUSH WAS COMMITTED TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. U S EFFORTS WOULD FOCUS ON REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR BY SECURING A MORE STABLE NUCLEAR BALANCE. THE U S WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF WORK ALREADY DONE IN GENEVA BUT RESERVED THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE

NEW IDEAS. THE U S WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN SPECIFICS IN MOSCOW BUT WOULD BE READY TO GIVE A FULL PRESENTATION IN GENEVA, WHEN TALKS RESUMED. (PRESSED BY SEVERAL PERMREPS AFTERWARDS BARTHOLOMEW DECLINED TO ELABORATE ON THIS STATEMENT).

11. THE U S WAS ALSO READY TO RESUME TALKS ON DEFENCE AND SPACE. THE U S FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST WAS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR. SDI WOULD MOVE AHEAD TO ALLOW INFORMED DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS IN THE FUTURE. THE AIM REMAINED TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AND STABILITY. THE U S WOULD NOT AGREE TO LIMITATIONS WHICH WOULD THREATEN EMERGING POSSIBILITIES. THE DECEMBER 1987 U S/SOVIET SUMMIT STATEMENT REMAINED THE BASIC FRAMEWORK. THE ABM VIOLATIONS AT KRASNOYARSK HAD TO BE RECTIFIED BEFORE A START TREATY COULD BE INCLUDED. THE RADAR AT GOMEL (OF PREVIOUS CONCERN TO THE U S) WAS NO LONGER DEPLOYED IN VIOLATION OF THE ABMT BUT THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT CARRIED OUT ALL THE STEPS NECESSARY TO SATISFY THE U S. THE U S WOULD REVERT AND WOULD BE PROPOSING THAT THE SCC NEXT MEET IN JUNE.

NUCLEAR TESTING

12. THE POLICY REVIEW WAS NOT YET COMPLETE BUT THE U S WAS READY TO RESUME TALKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND WOULD BE DISCUSSING DATES IN MOSCOW. THE U S WOULD PUSH TO COMPLETE AND RATIFY THE PROTOCOLS TO THE PNET AND THE TTBT.

CW

13. PRESIDENT BUSH REMAINED COMMITTED TO A COMPREHENSIVE, GLOBAL AND VERIFIABLE BAN. THE U S WOULD EXAMINE WAYS TO EXPEDITE THE WITHDRAWAL OF U S STOCK IN EUROPE AND WOULD ENCOURAGE THE RUSSIANS TO DO THE SAME. THE U S WOULD PROPOSE A RESUMPTION OF CD BILATERALS AND EXPERT MEETINGS ON CW PROLIFERATION. THE U S REMAINED CONCERNED OVER LIBYAN CW CAPABILITIES AND WOULD ASK THE RUSSIANS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION

14. THIS WAS A SERIOUS THREAT TO STABILITY. THE U S WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK HARD WITH ITS MRC PARTNERS TO STEM THE FLOW. THE U S HAD AGREED WITH THE RUSSIANS IN VIENNA IN MARCH TO EXCHANGE ASSESSMENT AS A COMMON BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEMS AND TAKING ACTION. THIS WOULD BE PURSUED IN MOSCOW.

CFE/CSBMS

15. U S WOULD AVOID ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON A BILATERAL BASIS, BUT WOULD REITERATE THE NEED FOR A CONVENTIONAL BALANCE AT LOWER LEVELS. THE U S WOULD STRESS THE NEED TO SEE CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET

RESTRUCTURING AND WOULD PRESS FOR MORE GLASNOST ON DATA.

16. REPLYING TO SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS FROM PERMREPS RIDGWAY SAID THAT THE NATIONALITIES ISSUE, WHILE COMPLEX AND OFTEN MISUNDERSTOOD IN THE WEST, WAS NEVERTHELESS THE MOST LIKELY ISSUE ON WHICH GORBACHEV'S FUTURE WOULD BE DECIDED. IN THE ECONOMY THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO GORBACHEV'S REFORMS BUT A MISTAKE ON THE NATIONALITIES ISSUES COULD COST HIM HIS LEADERSHIP. WESTERN INTERESTS WERE TO AVOID GETTING INVOLVED BUT TO PRESERVE POLITICAL, CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

17. BIERRING (DENMARK) SOUGHT U S VIEWS ON WHETHER THE RUSSIANS REALLY WISHED TO DENUCLEARISE EUROPE. BARTHOLOMEW REPLIED THAT THEY CERTAINLY APPEARED TO BE MAKING A VIGOROUS EFFORT WHICH WOULD HAVE THAT EFFECT. IT WAS OBVIOUS HOW THAT ACHIEVEMENT WOULD IMPACT ON THE SOVIET UNION AND MORE IMPORTANTLY ON WESTERN EUROPE.

18. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ON A FUTURE U S/SOVIET SUMMIT, RIDGWAY SAID THAT TIMING WAS NOT CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION. THE PRESIDENT WANTED A WELL-PREPARED AND SUBSTANTIVE SUMMIT. IT WAS TOO EARLY TO CONSIDER THIS AT PRESENT.

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