

ADVANCED R.C.

H/1/10/10/10
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PS
PS/for Wambleshove
PS/PS
PS/for J FRETWELL
MR RATTARD

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SECRET
DESKBY 200800Z F C O
FM MOSCO TO FCOLN
200738Z MAY
GRS 340

SECRET
DEDIP
FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 20800Z FCO
TELNO 829
OF 200738Z MAY 89

MY TELEGRAM B26: EXPULSIONS
WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE MFA FOR MY MEETING WITH USPENSKY THIS MORNING,
I WAS MET BY MURADYAN OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT, WHO SAID THAT
THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING. USPENSKY WAS IN HIS
OFFICE, BUT HE WAS IN A MEETING WHICH WOULD LAST UNTIL LUNCH.
HOWEVER HE HAD ALREADY HAD REPORTS FROM ZAMYATIN AND CHERNYAYEV, AND
DID NOT THINK A FURTHER MEETING ON THAT SUBJECT WOULD ADD TO WHAT HE
ALREADY KNEW.

2. I SAID TO MURADYAN THAT I HAD NOT WISHED TO SEEM DISCOURTEOUS TO
USPENSKY BY NOT SPEAKING TO HIM AS I HAD TO CHERNYAYEV. IN ADDITION
I WANTED TO MAKE TWO POINTS TO USPENSKY, WHICH I ASKED HIM TO CONVEY:
A) I WANTED TO APOLOGISE FOR HAVING HAD AT THE LAST MINUTE, TO DUCK
OUT OF THE SEMINAR WHICH USPENSKY HAD ORGANISED FOR ME AND THE
CHANCERY IN THE MFA'S COUNTRY HOUSE YESTERDAY. HE WOULD NOW
UNDERSTAND WHY: I HAD BEEN BUSY ALL DAY WITH TELEGRAMS. BUT I
UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SEMINAR HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL. WE REGARDED IT AS A
VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTINUING BUSINESSLIKE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE MFA AND THE EMBASSY.

B) I HAD ALSO WANTED TO EMPHASISE THE POINTS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S
LETTER AND IN SIR J FRETWELL'S SPEAKING NOTE:

I) WE INTENDED TO PLAY THIS AFFAIR IN A LOW KEY:

II) WE BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SCOPE FOR THE FURTHER
EXPANSION OF LEGITIMATE BILATERAL BUSINESS; HENCE THE DECISION OVER
THE CEILING:

III) WE WOULD TAKE VERY UNKINDLY TO RETALIATION. I SAID THAT I WOULD
OF COURSE BE AVAILABLE TO USPENSKY SHOULD HE DECIDE A MEETING WAS
USEFUL.

3. USPENSKY WAS ALREADY SHOWING SIGNS OF GOING TO GROUND LAST NIGHT;
HE HAD ORIGINALLY OFFERED ME A MEETING AT 19193DLOCAL. I WOULD HAVE
LIKED THE OPORTUNITY TO GET AN IMPRESSION OF HOW ZAMYATIN HAD
REPORTED, AND TO TRY TO CORRECT ANY BIAS. I GUESS USPENSKY WILL NOT
NOW SEE ME ON THIS MATTER UNTIL HE DELIVERS THE CONSIDERED SOVIET
RESPONSE. I DOUBT IF WE LOSE MUCH THEREBY.

ADVANCED R.C.

HD/SOVIET
HD/POSD
DEL HD/POSD
HD/NEWS

PS
PS/MR WANDERGRAVE
PS/PO3
PS/SIR J FRETWELL
MR RATFORD

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MY TELEGRAM 826: EXPULSIONS

WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE MFA FOR MY MEETING WITH USPENSKY THIS MORNING,
I

WAS MET BY MURADYAN OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT, WHO SAID THAT THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING. USPENSKY WAS IN HIS OFFICE. BUT HE WAS IN A MEETING WHICH WOULD LAST UNTIL LUNCH. HOWEVER HE HAD ALREADY HAD REPORTS FROM ZAMYATIN AND CHERNYAYEV, AND DID NOT THINK A FURTHER MEETING ON THAT SUBJECT WOULD ADD TO WHAT HE ALREADY KNEW.

2. I SAID TO MURADYAN THAT I HAD NOT WISHED TO SEEM DISCOURTEOUS TO USPENSKY BY NOT SPEAKING TO HIM AS I HAD TO CHERNYAYEV. IN ADDITION I WANTED TO MAKE TWO POINTS TO USPENSKY, WHICH I ASKED HIM TO CONVEY:
A) I WANTED TO APOLOGISE FOR HAVING HAD AT THE LAST MINUTE, TO DUCK OUT OF THE SEMINAR WHICH USPENSKY HAD ORGANISED FOR ME AND THE CHANCERY IN THE MFA'S COUNTRY HOUSE YESTERDAY. HE WOULD NOW UNDERSTAND WHY: I HAD BEEN BUSY ALL DAY WITH TELEGRAMS. BUT I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SEMINAR HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL. WE REGARDED IT AS A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTINUING BUSINESSLIKE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MFA AND THE EMBASSY.

B) I HAD ALSO WANTED TO EMPHASISE THE POINTS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER AND IN SIR J FRETWELL'S SPEAKING NOTE:

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- II) WE BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SCOPE FOR THE FURTHER EXPANSION OF LEGITIMATE BILATERAL BUSINESS: HENCE THE DECISION OVER THE CEILING:
- III) WE WOULD TAKE VERY UNKINDLY TO RETALIATION. I SAID THAT I WOULD OF COURSE BE AVAILABLE TO USPENSKY SHOULD HE DECIDE A MEETING WAS USEFUL.

3. USPENSKY WAS ALREADY SHOWING SIGNS OF GOING TO GROUND LAST NIGHT: HE HAD ORIGINALLY OFFERED ME A MEETING AT 191930LOCAL. I WOULD HAVE LIKED THE OPORTUNITY TO GET AN IMPRESSION OF HOW ZAMYATIN HAD REPORTED, AND TO TRY TO CORRECT ANY BIAS. I GUESS USPENSKY WILL NOT NOW SEE ME ON THIS MATTER UNTIL HE DELIVERS THE CONSIDERED SOVIET RESPONSE. I DOUBT IF WE LOSE MUCH THEREBY.