



10 DOWNING STREET

Ria Minister

This is a full
set of Allegations
on the explosions,
together with the
manuscript of the
Foreign Secretary's
remarks.

C.D.P.

P.T.O.

Moscow Tel No	830	20/5/89	○
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PRIME MINISTER

25 I(a)

EXPULSIONS

You will want to see the two attached telegrams.

The first records Roderic Braithwaite's meeting with Chernayev (who is Gorbachev's Charles Powell). This was remarkably realistic and shows that your tactic of sending Gorbachev a message has paid off in the first instance. You will note that Chernayev regards it as inevitable that news will eventually leak.

The second telegram records a failed attempt by Braithwaite to see the Foreign Ministry this morning. They are clearly waiting for instructions and meanwhile avoiding him. It must be likely that the traditional Russian attitudes will predominate and we shall hear that a number of our people are to be expelled although this may not be until Monday.

I think so far this has gone as well as could be expected -
thanks to you.

C.D.P.

(C. D. POWELL)

20 May 1989

PS/PUS

SECRET
FLASH FCU
FM MOSCOW TO FCOLN
191721Z MAY
GRS 1100

PS / Mr. Wainwright
PS / PUS
PS / Sir J. Fretwell
HD / Sov D
HD / NEWS
HD / PUS
DHD / PUS
MR. RATTEN

6

SECRET
DEDIP
FM MOSCOW
TO FLASH FCU
TELNO 826
OF 191721Z MAY 89

FCU TELNO 633: EXPULSIONS

SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV'S ADVISER TAKES THE NEWS CALMLY, ENGAGES IN RATIONAL DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT, ACKNOWLEDGES THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESPONSIBLE APPROACH, AND THANKS ME FOR DELIVERING THE MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO HIM.

DETAIL

2. I SAW CHERNYAYEV AT 1700 LOCAL TIME FOR HALF AN HOUR. HE WAS RELAXED AND ALONE.
3. I EXPLAINED THAT I HAD CALLED ON CHERNYAYEV BECAUSE THE PRIME MINISTER WISHED HER PERSONAL MESSAGE TO BE CONVEYED DIRECTLY TO GORBACHEV, AND BECAUSE IT CONCERNED ORGANS OF STATE OUTSIDE THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IN HANDING OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER, I EMPHASISED THAT THIS MATTER CONCERNED ONE NARROW - BUT VERY IMPORTANT - ASPECT OF A RELATIONSHIP WHICH IN OTHER RESPECTS HAD DEVELOPED VERY WELL OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS. I DREW ATTENTION TO WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID ABOUT THE CEILING AND ABOUT NOT INITIATING PUBLICITY. CHERNYAYEV COMMENTED THAT THE STORY WOULD EVENTUALLY GET INTO THE PRESS. I AGREED THAT THE DEPARTURES WOULD BE NOTICED, BUT STRESSED THAT WE OURSELVES WERE NOT MAKING AN ANNOUNCEMENT OR GENERATING COMMENT. OUR FIRM DETERMINATIONS TO PROTECT OUR SECURITY WOULD NOT CHANGE. BUT WE WISHED THE PRESENT AFFAIR TO BE PLAYED IN THE LOWEST POLITICAL KEY POSSIBLE.
4. HAVING READ THE LETTER AND SIR J FRETWELL'S SPEAKING NOTES, CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW THE PEOPLE NAMED AND KNEW NOTHING OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER. HE WAS THEREFORE IN NO POSITION TO COMMENT. I SAID THAT I HAD NOT EXPECTED HIM TO COMMENT AT THIS STAGE. BUT, AS YOU HAD SAID TO SHEVARDNADZE DURING THE MEETINGS IN APRIL THIS SERIOUS IRRITANT IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WAS A HANDOVER FROM THE PAST AND SHOULD BE CHANGED. WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IN HER LETTER SHOULD BE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY.
5. DESPITE HIS PREVIOUS DISCLAIMER, CHERNYAYEV THEN QUESTIONED ME IN SOME DETAIL ABOUT THE EXPULSIONS. HE AGREED THAT THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WAS DEVELOPING WELL. THE FRANKNESS WITH WHICH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS NOW EXCHANGED VIEWS WAS WELCOME; IN THE PRESENT INSTANCE AS IN OTHERS. HE APPRECIATED THE MANNER IN WHICH WE HAD CHOSEN TO HANDLE IT, INCLUDING THE DECISION NOT TO REDUCE THE CEILING. THERE

THESE WERE THE BRITISH PRESS STORIES BEFORE GORBACHEV'S VISIT ABOUT

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HANDLE IT, INCLUDING THE DECISION NOT TO REDUCE THE CEILING. THERE HAD BEEN SOME BRITISH PRESS STORIES BEFORE GORBACHEV'S VISIT ABOUT SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. MRS THATCHER HAD NOT RAISED THIS QUESTION DIRECTLY WITH GORBACHEV. PERHAPS THAT WAS NATURAL, GIVEN THE SCALE OF THE MATTERS THEY WERE DISCUSSING. BUT WERE WE SURE OF OUR EVIDENCE AGAINST THOSE NAMED? WHAT, HE ASKED (LAUGHING), CONSTITUTED ESPIONAGE?

6. I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW THE DETAILS OF THE CASE AGAINST THE EXPELLEES, AS HE WOULD APPRECIATE. HOWEVER, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD NOT TAKEN HER DECISION LIGHTLY. THE MATTER HAD BEEN CONSIDERED VERY THOROUGHLY. WE HAD BEEN PLACED IN A SITUATION IN WHICH WE WERE OBLIGED TO ACT. THERE WAS AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE GATHERING OF INFORMATION OPENLY, AND ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE COVERT OR DID NOT RESPECT THE LAW. CHERNYAYEV AGREED THAT LAWS HAD TO BE OBSERVED.

7. CHERNYAYEV TOOK THIS IN GOOD PART. HE SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT THE RUSSIANS THOROUGHLY APPRECIATED THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO MATTERS OF STATE; HE WAS SURE HER APPROACH WOULD HAVE BEEN EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN THIS INSTANCE. IT WAS INDEED A QUESTION OF METHODS; AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DEVELOP TRUST. I AGREED; WE WERE TRYING TO DEVELOP CONTACTS AND RELATIONS IN DIFFERENT AREAS. WITH THE EXPANSION IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, BOTH THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LONDON HAD INCREASING ROLES TO PLAY. THAT WAS WHY WE HAD DECIDED NOT TO LOWER THE CEILING; THERE WAS MORE THAN ENOUGH LEGITIMATE WORK FOR OFFICIALS OF BOTH COUNTRIES.

8. CHERNYAYEV WONDERED WHETHER WE WERE PENALISING PEOPLE WHO HAD GOT ON TO A BLACKLIST BECAUSE OF PAST INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS - EG WORKING FOR THE KGB(SIC) - WHICH WERE NOW DISCONTINUED. I SAID THAT I COULD SEE THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT HAVE A PROBLEM HERE. CHERNYAYEV MENTIONED CHETVERIKOV (THE HEAD OF COPYRIGHT AGENCY VAAP, TO WHOM WE REFUSED A VISA IN APRIL) AS AN EXAMPLE; CHETVERIKOV HAD BEEN THROWN OUT OF FRANCE BUT THAT WAS LONG AGO AND HE WAS NOW ACCEPTED BOTH IN FRANCE AND IN THE UNITED STATES. I SAID THAT WE NEVERTHELESS HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER PEOPLE IN THIS CATEGORY HAD ABANDONED THEIR PREVIOUS AFFILIATIONS. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT WE DID NOT AT ALL APPRECIATE THE WAY IN WHICH THE RUSSIANS TRIED TO FORCE US TO GIVE VISAS TO KNOWN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS FOR POSTS IN LONDON BY WITHOLDING VISAS FOR BRITISH OFFICIALS POSTED TO MOSCOW WHOM THEY KNEW TO BE INNOCENT. THIS DID NOT AND WOULD NOT AFFECT OUR DETERMINATION TO KEEP THEIR INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE OUT. IT MERELY COMPLICATED THE CONDUCT OF LEGITIMATE BUSINESS.

9. CHERNYAYEV THEN ASKED POINT BLANK WHETHER OUR CASE AGAINST THE EXPELLEES WAS BASED ON "CONCRETE ACTIVITIES IN THE PRESENT TIME." I SAID THAT IT WAS INDEED. CHERNYAYEV REPLIED: "SO YOU ARE SURE OF THESE CASES?" I SAID THAT WE WERE.

10. CHERNYAYEV SAID THAT GORBACHEV WAS NOT IN HIS OFFICE, BUT WAS PREPARING FOR THE PLENUM ON MONDAY. HE WOULD REPORT TO GORBACHEV WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE LETTER AND WOULD TELEPHONE HIM TONIGHT. CHERNYAYEV ASKED IF I WOULD BE ACTING ALSO WITH THE MFA, AND SAID THAT I HAD BEEN RIGHT TO COME DIRECTLY TO HIM FIRST. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO HAVE OUR EXPLANATION AND TO CONVEY IT STRAIGHT TO GORBACHEV. THIS AS A "NORMAL" WAY OF DOING BUSINESS.

COMMENT

11. CHERNYAYEV'S REACTION WAS REMARKABLY RELAXED. HE UTTERED NOT A SINGLE CROSS WORD. AS THE MEETING WENT ON HE BECAME MORE AND MORE JOGULAR. FAR FROM TREATING THIS AS A SLAP IN THE FACE OR A DELIBERATE DISPLAY OF BRITISH TOUGHNESS, ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD TAKEN THE DECISION RELUCTANTLY AND THAT THERE WAS A GENUINE ISSUE AT STAKE ON WHICH OUR ATTITUDE WAS NOT SELF-EVIDENTLY UNREASONABLE. HE ALSO SEEMED GLAD TO RECEIVE THE MESSAGE WITHOUT AN MFA SPIN ON IT. HE DID NOT, OF COURSE, OFFER ANY INDICATION THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL DRAW THE RIGHT CONCLUSION FOR THE FUTURE.

12. THE DEFINITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE IS MOST UNLIKELY TO BE AS CALM AS THIS. STRONG ARGUMENTS FOR RETALIATION WILL BE MADE, AND WILL DOUBTLESS PREVAIL. NOR IS THERE ANY INDICATION HERE THAT FUNDAMENTAL SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PRACTICES AND POLICIES WILL BE AFFECTED. BUT IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT CHERNYAYEV DID NOT DRAW ANY NEGATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE WIDER POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP. HOW THE STORY EVENTUALLY PLAYS IN THE BRITISH PRESS WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON GORBACHEV AND THE RUSSIAN REACTION IN GENERAL; THE LOW KEY APPROACH IS CLEARLY RIGHT.

13. USPENSKY IS UNABLE TO SEE ME UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING AT 2090830Z HE WILL BE PREPARED AND HIS REACTION WILL BE MORE TRADITIONAL. SO FAR, HOWEVER, SO GOOD

BRAITHWAITE

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ADVANCED R.C.

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MR. RATTARD

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SECRET
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FM MOSCO TO FCOLN
200738Z MAY
GRS 340

SECRET
DEDIP
FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 20800Z FCO
TELNO 829
OF 200738Z MAY 89

MY TELEGRAM B26: EXPULSIONS
WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE MFA FOR MY MEETING WITH USPENSKY THIS MORNING,
I WAS MET BY MURADYAN OF THE SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT, WHO SAID THAT
THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING. USPENSKY WAS IN HIS
OFFICE, BUT HE WAS IN A MEETING WHICH WOULD LAST UNTIL LUNCH.
HOWEVER HE HAD ALREADY HAD REPORTS FROM ZAMYATIN AND CHERNYAYEV, AND
DID NOT THINK A FURTHER MEETING ON THAT SUBJECT WOULD ADD TO WHAT HE
ALREADY KNEW.

2. I SAID TO MURADYAN THAT I HAD NOT WISHED TO SEEM DISCOURTEOUS TO
USPENSKY BY NOT SPEAKING TO HIM AS I HAD TO CHERNYAYEV. IN ADDITION
I WANTED TO MAKE TWO POINTS TO USPENSKY, WHICH I ASKED HIM TO CONVEY:
A) I WANTED TO APOLOGISE FOR HAVING HAD AT THE LAST MINUTE, TO DUCK
OUT OF THE SEMINAR WHICH USPENSKY HAD ORGANISED FOR ME AND THE
CHANCERY IN THE MFA'S COUNTRY HOUSE YESTERDAY. HE WOULD NOW
UNDERSTAND WHY: I HAD BEEN BUSY ALL DAY WITH TELEGRAMS. BUT I
UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SEMINAR HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL. WE REGARDED IT AS A
VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE CONTINUING BUSINESSLIKE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE MFA AND THE EMBASSY.

B) I HAD ALSO WANTED TO EMPHASISE THE POINTS IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S
LETTER AND IN SIR J FRETWELL'S SPEAKING NOTE:

I) WE INTENDED TO PLAY THIS AFFAIR IN A LOW KEY:

II) WE BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SCOPE FOR THE FURTHER
EXPANSION OF LEGITIMATE BILATERAL BUSINESS; HENCE THE DECISION OVER
THE CEILING:

III) WE WOULD TAKE VERY UNKINDLY TO RETALIATION. I SAID THAT I WOULD
OF COURSE BE AVAILABLE TO USPENSKY SHOULD HE DECIDE A MEETING WAS
USEFUL.

3. USPENSKY WAS ALREADY SHOWING SIGNS OF GOING TO GROUND LAST NIGHT;
HE HAD ORIGINALLY OFFERED ME A MEETING AT 19193DLOCAL. I WOULD HAVE
LIKED THE OPORTUNITY TO GET AN IMPRESSION OF HOW ZAMYATIN HAD
REPORTED, AND TO TRY TO CORRECT ANY BIAS. I GUESS USPENSKY WILL NOT
NOW SEE ME ON THIS MATTER UNTIL HE DELIVERS THE CONSIDERED SOVIET
RESPONSE. I DOUBT IF WE LOSE MUCH THEREBY.

File
attached to
Moscow
telno 830

PRIME MINISTER

The text of this telegram has been relayed to Charles who agrees with Braithwaite that the journalists will be told tomorrow morning. He is in contact with Bernard Ingham and has a contingency press line prepared. However, he emphasised that we would not initiate publicity at this end.

Diana Smith

Diana Smith
DUTY CLERK

20 May 1989

Const Union
Rels.

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 832
OF 202138Z MAY 89

ms

MY 2 IPTS: MEETING WITH KOVALEV

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE FULL ACCOUNT OF MY MEETING WITH KOVALEV, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY USPENSKY (HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT).
2. KOVALEV READ THE SPEAKING NOTE IN MIPT. I SAID I WOULD NOT COMMENT ON HIS ASSERTION THAT WE DID NOT HAVE FACTS TO SUPPORT OUR ACTION. HE KNEW BETTER THAN I THAT OUR ACTION WAS JUSTIFIED. SIR J FRETWELL HAD TOLD ZAMYATIN THAT WE WOULD VIEW ANY SOVIET RETALIATION MOST SERIOUSLY. I QUOTED THE PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH OF FRETWELL'S SPEAKING NOTE. I SAID THAT I WOULD NOT EXPAND ON THIS POINT, BUT WOULD ADD SOME PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS.
3. I AGREED WITH KOVALEV THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS A CAPITAL WHICH SHOULD BE PRESERVED. HE WOULD KNOW FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER TO MR GORBACHEV THAT SHE AND THE GOVERNMENT SHARED THIS VIEW. ALTHOUGH THE MATTER IN QUESTION WAS A NARROW ASPECT OF OUR RELATIONS, IT HAD BEEN AND REMAINED A CONSIDERABLE BURDEN ON THE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WE WERE SEEKING TO DEVELOP. WE HAD SPOKEN TO THE RUSSIANS ON MANY OCCASIONS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF DOING SOMETHING ABOUT THIS. WE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT AND COULD NOT CHANGE ITS POLICY OF PRESERVING NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE FACE OF A CONTINUING CAMPAIGN TO INTRODUCE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS INTO BRITAIN. BUT WE HAD BEEN FACED WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH, TO QUOTE THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER, THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES HAD STEP BY STEP RECONSTRUCTED THEIR STAFF IN LONDON. WE HAD HAD NO ALTERNATIVE OTHER THAN TO DO WHAT WE HAD DONE.
4. I SAID THAT THE ONLY WAY OF REMOVING THIS BURDEN WOULD BE A CHANGE IN THE POLICY OF THOSE AGENCIES. THE CONTINUATION OF THEIR POLICY PRESEVED PRECISELY THAT 'ENEMY IMAGE' OF THE SOVIET UNION WHICH IN SO MANY OTHER WAYS WAS BEING DISSOLVED. OUR ACTION SHOULD HAVE COME AS NO SURPRISE, AS OUR POLICY HAD BEEN CONSTANTLY REITERATED.
5. I COMMENTED THAT THE VERY WIDE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES STEMMING FROM THE EXPANDING RELATIONSHIP REQUIRED THE PRESENCE IN BOTH COUNTRIES OF OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES ENGAGED IN LEGITIMATE BUSINESS. I REJECTED THE DESCRIPTION IN KOVALEV'S DEMARCH OF THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES NAMED. THESE WERE INNOCENT PEOPLE. BY RETALIATING AGAINST THEM THE SOVIET UNION GAVE FURTHER SIGN THAT IT

HAD NOT YET TAKEN ALL THE STEPS NECESSARY TO REMOVE ITS NEGATIVE IMAGE. THIS WAS NOT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR, ANY MORE THAN OF THE UK.

6. I NOTED THAT KOVALEV HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT INTEND TO PUBLICISE THE EXCHANGE. PUBLICITY WAS INEVITABLE AS PEOPLE PREPARED TO LEAVE, ESPECIALLY AS SOME WERE JOURNALISTS. BUT WE WOULD SEEK TO AVOID GENERATING COMMENT. I CONCLUDED THAT I WOULD REPORT TO YOU. I HAD TO RESERVE YOUR POSITION ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION. YOU WOULD OF COURSE MAKE UP YOUR OWN MIND ON WHAT HAD BEEN SAID TO ME.

7. KOVALEV REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET SPEAKING NOTE HAD ESSENTIALLY COVERED ALL THE POINTS I HAD MADE. HE REJECTED MY REFERENCE TO THE GUILT OF THE SOVIET EXPELLEES, AND WHAT I HAD SAID ABOUT REINFORCING THE 'ENEMY IMAGE.' WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL ABOUT SPEAKING IN SUCH TERMS. HE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING CONFIDENCE.

8. I CONCLUDED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE FRUITLESS FOR US TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF EVIDENCE ANY FURTHER. WE MUST LEAVE THIS TO THOSE WHO WERE IN A POSITION TO JUDGE.

BRAITHWAITE

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MR RATFORD

ADDITIONAL 15

CABINET OFFICE

NO 10 DOWNING ST

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MOSCOW
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 831
OF 201958Z MAY 89

MY IPT EXPULSIONS: FOR RESIDENT CLERK
FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF KOVALEV'S SPEAKING NOTE
BEGINS
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROTESTS STRONGLY AT THE UNFRIENDLY AND
PROVOCATIVE ACTION TAKEN BY THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES AGAINST A NUMBER
OF OFFICIALS OF SOVIET ORGANISATIONS (UCHREZH DENIA) IN LONDON. THE
SOVIET AUTHORITIES CATEGORICALLY REJECT THE GROUNDLESS ACCUSATIONS
AGAINST THE SOVIET OFFICIALS, WHOSE ACTIVITIES FULLY ACCORD WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, AND WITH
THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR. THE BRITISH
AUTHORITIES HAVE ADDUCED NO FACTS TO THE CONTRARY.
THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE STEP TAKEN BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
CONTRADICTS THE CHARACTER AND LEVEL OF OUR RELATIONS. MUCH HAS BEEN
DONE IN THE RECENT PERIOD TO STRENGTHEN THE COMMON MOVEMENT OF OUR
TWO COUNTRIES TOWARDS COOPERATION AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. THIS IS
A MOST VALUABLE POLITICAL CAPITAL FOR BOTH STATES. THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP (RUKOVODSTVO) CONSIDERS THAT THE HIGH LEVEL OF
ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED SHOULD BE
PRESERVED. UNFORTUNATELY THE ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE
BRITISH SIDE CLEARLY ACTS IN THE OPPOSITE SENSE.
WHEREAS THE ACCUSATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE AGAINST A NUMBER OF
SOVIET OFFICIALS IN LONDON ARE ENTIRELY INVENTED, THE SOVIET
AUTHORITIES HAVE FIRM EVIDENCE THAT CERTAIN OFFICIALS (SOTRUDNIKI) OF
BRITISH ORGANISATIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS (UCHREZH DENIA I
PREDSTAVITELSTVA) IN MOSCOW WHO HAVE BEEN WORKING ILLEGALLY IN THE
INTERESTS OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.
FOR THESE REASONS, 11 BRITISH OFFICIALS ARE TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION
WITHIN 2 WEEKS IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR PARTICIPATION IN
IMPERMISSIBLE ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF OUR COUNTRY. AT THE
SAME TIME, THREE BRITISH CITIZENS FORMERLY WORKING IN MOSCOW ARE
DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA (SEE THE ATTACHED LIST). IN ADDITION,
HENCEFORWARD, ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY, A QUOTA IS ESTABLISHED FOR
THE PERSONNEL OF THE BRITISH ORGANISATIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS IN
MOSCOW, INCLUDING THE SOVIET CITIZENS WORKING THERE, EQUAL TO THE
PRESENT NUMERICAL QUOTA OF PERSONNEL IN SOVIET INSTITUTIONS IN
BRITAIN - IE 205 (TWO HUNDRED AND FIVE).
IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE

CONFIDENTIAL

112513
MDHIAN 530

BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.
ENDS
RUSSIAN TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

BRAITHWAITE

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PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/PUS
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MR RATFORD

ADDITIONAL 15


CABINET OFFICE

NO 10 DOWNING ST

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PAGE 2
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 201959Z
FM MOSCOW
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 830
OF 201942Z MAY 89



EXPULSIONS: FOR RESIDENT CLERK

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER KOVALEV AT 1015 PM LOCAL ON SATURDAY 20 MAY.
2. HE INFORMED ME THAT THE FOLLOWING EIGHT MEMBERS OF THIS EMBASSY AND THREE BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION WITHIN TWO WEEKS:
MICHAEL ANDERSON, SECOND SECRETARY
CAPT CHRISTOPHER MEYER, NAVAL ATTACHE
ADAM NOBLE, SECOND SECRETARY
HELEN PICKERING, VICE CONSUL
WARRANT OFFICER LAING PURFITT, JUNIOR MEMBER OF DEFENCE STAFF
LT CDR CHRISTOPHER WATSON, ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE
PAUL SHARP, THIRD SECRETARY
MAJOR NIGEL SHAKESPEAR, ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE
IAN GLOVER-JAMES, ITN
ANGUS ROXBURGH, SUNDAY TIMES
JEREMY HARRIS, BBC
3. THE FOLLOWING EX-MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY WERE DECLARED PNG
- CAPTAIN JOHN DYKES, FORMER NAVAL ATTACHE
- ''RICHARD'' TURNER, FORMER ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE (PRESUMABLY MEANS ROGER TURNER, ANA UNTIL 1988)
- DEREK HARE, FORMER MEMBER OF TECHNICAL STAFF
4. WE ARE INFORMING THOSE CONCERNED IMMEDIATELY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE THREE JOURNALISTS. EMBASSY STAFF WILL BE TOLD TO KEEP THE NEWS TO THEMSELVES FOR THE TIME BEING.
5. I PROPOSE NOT/NOT TO WAKE THE JOURNALISTS WITH THIS UNPLEASANT NEWS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT, WHICH WOULD IN ANY CASE CAUSE THE STORY TO BREAK BEFORE YOU HAD TIME FOR PREPARATION OR THE FULL FACTS TO HAND. BUT I DO NOT CONSIDER THAT I CAN DELAY INFORMING THEM BEYOND 0800 LOCAL TOMORROW MORNING (210400Z). GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION BY FLASH TELEGRAM THAT YOU AGREE TO THIS.
6. MIFT CONTAINS TEXT OF KAVELEV'S SPEAKING NOTE. FURTHER REPORT AND COMMENT WILL FOLLOW

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

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ADDITIONAL 16

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CONFIDENTIAL

FFFF PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING FLASH ADVANCE TO NO 10
FFFF AND FLASH FOR CABINET OFFICE

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FM MOSCO TO FCOLN

201942Z MAY

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 830

OF 201942Z MAY 89

EXPULSIONS: FOR RESIDENT CLERK

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2. HE INFORMED ME THAT THE FOLLOWING EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY
AND THREE BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION
WITHIN TWO WEEKS:

MICHAEL ANDERSON, SECOND SECRETARY

CAPT CHRISTOPHER MEYER, NAVAL ATTACHE

ADAM NOBLE, SECOND SECRETARY

HELEN PICKERING, VICE CONSUL

WARRANT OFFICER LAING PURFITT, JUNIOR MEMBER OF DEFENCE STAFF

LT CDR CHRISTOPHER WATSON, ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE

PAUL SHARP, THIRD SECRETARY

MAJOR NIGEL SHAKESPEAR, ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE

IAN CLOVER-JAMES, ITN

ANGUS ROXBURGH, SUNDAY TIMES

JEREMY HARRIS, BBC

3. THE FOLLOWING EX-MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY WERE DECLARED PNC

- CAPTAIN JOHN LYKES, FORMER NAVAL ATTACHE

- "RICHARD" TURNER, FORMER ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE (PRESUMABLY
MEANS ROGER TURNER, AKA UNTIL 1988)

- DEREK HARE, FORMER MEMBER OF TECHNICAL STAFF

4. WE ARE INFORMING THOSE CONCERNED IMMEDIATELY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF
THE THREE JOURNALISTS. EMBASSY STAFF WILL BE TOLD TO KEEP THE
NEWS TO THEMSELVES FOR THE TIME BEING.

5. I PROPOSE NOT/NOT TO WAKE THE JOURNALISTS WITH THIS UNPLEASANT
NEWS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT, WHICH WOULD IN ANY CASE CAUSE THE
STORY TO BREAK BEFORE YOU HAD TIME FOR PREPARATION OF THE FULL FACTS
TO HAND. BUT I DO NOT CONSIDER THAT I CAN DELAY INFORMING THEM
BEYOND 0800 LOCAL TOMORROW MORNING (210400Z). GRATEFUL FOR
CONFIRMATION BY FLASH TELEGRAM THAT YOU AGREE TO THIS.

6. MIFT CONTAINS TEXT OF KAVELEV'S SPEAKING NOTE. FURTHER REPORT
AND COMMENT WILL FOLLOW

BRAITHWAITE

YYYY

SVLNAN 2405

SECRET
FM MOSCOW
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 834
OF 202321Z MAY 89

MY TELS 830, 831, 832: EXPULSIONS: COMMENTS AND FURTHER ACTION

1. THE MOST IMMEDIATE ISSUE CONCERNS THE PRESS HANDLING ON WHICH I SHALL NEED YOUR COMMENTS OR ASSENT BY 210400Z IF POSSIBLE (EG BY A SHORT TELEPHONE CALL TO H OF C ON 202-3724): SEE PARAS 5-6 BELOW. AS FOR MORE GENERAL PRELIMINARY COMMENT, I ASSUME THAT THE REFERENCE TO THE 'LEADERSHIP' (RUKOVODSTVO) IN KOVALEV'S SPEAKING NOTE IS THE NEAREST WE SHALL GET TO A REPLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE: BUT THAT IT IS AN INDICATION THAT, OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, THE RUSSIANS INTEND TO PERMIT NORMAL BUSINESS TO CONTINUE WITHOUT FURTHER GESTURES SUCH AS THE CANCELLATION OF PLANNED VISITS. BEYOND THAT, THE RUSSIANS HAVE GONE FOR SOMETHING CLOSE TO A MIRROR IMAGE, EXCEPT ON THE CEILING WHERE THEY HAVE ACTED TO REPAIR WHAT THEY HAVE ALWAYS SEEN AS AN ANOMALY. AS IN THE PAST, THEY HAVE PICKED ON SOME PEOPLE WITH AN ESPECIALLY CLOSE INTEREST IN AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOVIET UNION: ADAM NOBLE (AN INTERNAL AFFAIRS SPECIALIST FROM RESEARCH DEPARTMENT) ANGUS ROXBURGH OF THE SUNDAY TIMES, (A SOVIET EXPERT BEFORE HE BECAME A JOURNALIST) AND TO SOME EXTENT HELEN PICKERING AND NIGEL SHAKESPEAR (BOTH OF WHOM HAVE A NUMBER OF SOVIET FIRENDS AND A GENUINE INTEREST IN THE PLACE).

2. IN SOME RESPECTS THE LIST IS MARGINALLY LESS DAMAGING THAN IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN. ALL 3 JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN HERE A FAIRLY LONG TIME. WO PURFIT IS DUE TO LEAVE IN AUGUST. NO GREAT DAMAGE IS INFLICTED BY THE LIST OF THREE STAFF BARRED FROM RETURNING (HARE HAS INDEED RESIGNED FROM TSD). MOST CONSPICUOUSLY, MY DEFENCE AND AIR ATTACHE IS NOT NAMED, ALTHOUGH HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART WAS EXPELLED.

3. THIS DOES NOT DIMINISH THE FACT THAT THE EXPULSIONS ARE A SEVERE PERSONAL BLOW TO THE INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR FAMILIES (WHOSE INTERESTS WE MUST TREAT WITH THE MAXIMUM OF SYMPATHY) AND TO THE EMBASSY AS A WHOLE. WE SHALL CONSIDER THE STAFFING IMPLICATIONS IN DUE COURSE.

CEILING

4. WE RECENTLY SENT YOU FIGURES FOR BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES AND SOVIET EMPLOYEES IN MOSCOW, AGAINST THIS EVENTUALITY. IMPOSITION OF A SOVIET CEILING IS WHAT WE FEARED. THE CRUX IS HOW IT WILL WORK.

IF TAKEN LITERALLY, A CEILING OF 205 FOR ALL BRITISH RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES AND THEIR LOCAL STAFF WOULD INFLICT GRAVE DAMAGE (THE EMBASSY ALONE WOULD COME CLOSE TO THIS NUMBER). BUT IT SEEMS IMPROBABLE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL WISH TO EXPEL LARGE NUMBERS OF COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVES AND JOURNALISTS, OR REMOVE THEIR STAFF. WE SHALL HAVE TO FEEL OUR WAY (WITHOUT OF COURSE ASKING DIRECT QUESTIONS) AND REPORT FURTHER.

ACTION WITH THE PRESS

5. I RECOMMEND THAT WE MAINTAIN OUR STRATEGY OF KEEPING OFFICIAL STATEMENTS TO THE ESSENTIAL MINIMUM AND OF NOT HEAPING FUEL ON THE FLAMES. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LINE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE. IT WILL IMPROVE OUR - PERHAPS SLIM - CHANCES OF PERSUADING GORBAHCEV TO IMPOSE A DIFFERENT LINE IN THE FUTURE. WE CAN ASSUME THAT THE CORRESPONDENTS AND THEIR EDITORS WILL MAKE THE RIGHT POINTS WITHOUT TOO MUCH OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE, SO LONG AS IT IS MADE CLEAR TO THEM THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE ACTED PURELY IN RETALIATION AGAINST A NECESSARY AND JUSTIFIED ACTION BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

6. BUT THE STORY WILL BREAK AS SOON AS I BRIEF ROXBURGH, HARRIS AND GLOVER-JAMES (IF HE IS HERE: HE MAY BE IN BUDAPEST). I PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING:

A) AT 210400Z (IE 0800 LOCAL) WE INVITE THE THREE JOURNALISTS TO CALL AT THE EMBASSY AN HOUR LATER.

B) 210500Z: I TELL THE THREE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS REQUESTED THEIR DEPARTURE: THAT CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY ARE ALSO LEAVING. THIS IS AN ACT OF STRAIGHT RETALIAITON AGAINST INNOCENT PEOPLE. I CANNOT GIVE DETAILS OF THE EMBASSY STAFF AT THIS STAGE BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT YET HAD A CHANCE TO INFORM THEIR RELATIVES. THEY MUST ADDRESS ANY ENQUIRIES ABOUT WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN LONDON TO NEWS DEPARTMENT.

C) THIS MEANS THAT THE STORY WILL BEGIN TO BREAK ON THE BBC ETC BY 0700Z. IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE TO EMBARGO THE INFORMATION. AND FOR CREDIBILITY AND GOOD ORDER TO BOTH YOU AND I WILL NEED TO SAY SOMETHING FURTHER DURING THE DAY.

D) AT 1100Z YOU DEPLOY SUCH FURTHER DETAILS AS YOU ARE GOING TO GIVE. I SHOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY CONVENE ALL THE BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS IN MOSCOW, AND GIVE THEM THE COMPLETE LIST OF NAMES. I SHALL EMPHASISE THAT THIS IS RETALIATION AND REFER ALL FURTHER ENQUIRIES TO YOU. (THEY WILL GET THE NAMES ANYWAY, SO THERE IS NO SENSE IN NOT VOLUNTERING THEM).

NAVAL VISIT

7. HMS BRISTOL IS DUE IN LENINGRAD ON 26 MAY. ALTHOUGH RUSSIANS

HAVE YET TO GRANT DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE, THIS IS NOT UNUSUAL AND NOTHING HAS BEEN SAID TO SUGGEST THAT THEY ARE CANCELLING THE VISIT.

8. TWO OF MY THREE NAVAL ATTACHES ARE BEING EXPELLED. HOWEVER, THE VISIT WILL HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE 14 DAYS. I SHALL DISCUSS THIS FURTHER WITH MY DEFENCE STAFF IN THE MORNING, AND WILL THEN TELEGRAPH AGAIN.

PNG LIST

9. YOU WILL OBVIOUSLY WISH TO CONTACT THE THREE PEOPLE NAMED AS BARRED FROM RETURNING. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTONS ON WHETHER I SHOULD ALSO GIVE OUT THEIR NAMES AT 1100Z TOMORROW.

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FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 210700Z FCO
TELNO 835
OF 210655Z MAY 89

YOUR TELEGRAM 651: EXPULSIONS
IN CIRCUMSTANCES OUR NEXT STEPS, INCLUDING PRESS HANDLING AND ANY
FURTHER ACTION, WE NEED TO KEEP OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS
FIRMLY IN MIND. THESE WERE CLEARLY INDICATED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S
MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV:

- A) TO DEFEND OURSELVES AGAINST UNACCEPTABLE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES:
 - B TO ENCOURAGE A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY SO THAT IN FUTURE SOVIET
OFFICIALS IN BRITAIN ENGAGE EXTENSIVELY AND OPENLY IN THE PROMOTION
OF LEGITIMATE BUSINESS
 - C) SO TO HANDLE THE PRESENT AFFAIR, AS TO FORWARD BOTH OF THOSE
OBJECTIVES. HENCE THE PERSONAL APPROACH TO GORBACHEV HIMSELF AND THE
INTENTION, STATED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, TO LIMIT PUBLICITY.
2. NOTHING THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE YET DONE WAS SURPRISING OR
UNFORESEEABLE. THERE WAS NEVER MUCH CHANCE THAT THEY WOULD NOT
RETALIATE, AND NO CHANCE THAT THEY COULD AVOID HITTING INNOCENT
PEOPLE. IT WAS ALWAYS LIKELY, AS WE KNEW, THAT THEY WOULD CORRECT
THE ANOMALY, AS THEY SAW IT, WHEREBY WE IMPOSED A CEILING AND THEY
DID NOT. THAT IS WHAT THEY DID WITH THE AMERICANS, JAPANESE AND
CANADIANS. WE KNOW AND DISCOUNTED THESE RISKS IN ESTABLISHING OUR
THREE POLICY OBJECTIVES AND IN TAKING THE ACTION WE HAD TO TAKE.
3. CHERNYAYEV'S INITIAL REACTION TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE MAY
INDICATE THAT GORBACHEV'S CLOSE ADVISERS, AT ANY RATE, ARE OPEN TO
NEW THINKING. IT MAY BE THAT GORBACHEV HIMSELF WILL NOW FEEL THAT HE
HAS SO FAR DEVOTED INSUFFICIENT PERSONAL ATTENTION TO AN ISSUE, THE
FULL IMPLICATIONS OF WHICH FOR THE ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND FOR
THE SOVIET IMAGE IN THE WEST HE MAY NOT HAVE APPRECIATED. BUT HE
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CHANGE QUICKLY THE INGRAINED ATTITUDES OF THE
KGB, AND IT IS CERTAINLY TOO SOON FOR US TO EXPECT TO SEE THE
RESULTS. THE LEAVEN WILL WORK SLOWLY, IF AT ALL.
4. IN GOING FOR RAPID, MIRROR-IMAGE RETALIATION, THE RUSSIANS ARE
FOLLOWING THEIR OWN RECENT PRECEDENT. THIS IS WHY THEY HAVE INCLUDED
THREE BRITISH JOURNALISTS AND SO GREATLY COMPLICATED OUR ABILITY TO
LIMIT PUBLICITY. BUT OUR POLICY REASONS FOR GOING FOR THE LOWEST
POSSIBLE LEVEL OF PUBLICITY, AND ESPECIALLY OF OFFICIAL COMMENT,
REMAIN VALID. BY THROWING OUR JOURNALISTS RATHER THAN SAY, AN
EMBASSY INFORMATION OFFICER) THEY HAVE IN FACT MADE A POLITICAL

MISTAKE.

5. WE ARE ENTITLED TO FEEL A STRONG AND NATURAL RESENTMENT AT THE RUSSIANS' BASIC INTELLIGENCE POLICIES, AND AT THEIR REACTIONS TO THE JUSTIFIED STEP WE HAVE TAKEN. BUT BOTH OUR SECURITY OBJECTIVES, AND OUR WIDER POLITICAL OBJECTIVES, ARE BEST FURTHERED IF GORBACHEV WERE TO CONCLUDE THAT SOVIET INTELLIGENCE POLICIES SHOULD BE MODIFIED. HE WILL FIND IT HARDER TO DO SO, OR TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE DESIRABILITY OF SOME CHANGE, IF BRITISH OFFICIAL COMMENT IS UNRESTRAINED, AND IF WE NOW TAKE FURTHER ACTION AGAINST SOVIET INTEREST, OR IF WE MAKE POLITICAL GESTURES, SUCH AS CANCELLING VISITS. THIS WOULD PROVOKE COUNTER-RETALIATION, AND NOT PROMOTE THE OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE.

6. I WOULD WELCOME A FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO CHERNYAYEV. BUT I WOULD NEED A GOOD REASON: EG TO DELIVER ANOTHER MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, FOR WHICH AT PRESENT I SEE NO JUSTIFICATION.

7. I WILL SEND SEPARATELY SOME IDEAS ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR US OF THE NEW CEILING. YOU WILL GATHER FROM THE FOREGOING THAT I AM NOT IN FAVOUR OF ANY FURTHER RACHETING DOWN OF THE RUSSIANS, UNLESS THEY ENGAGE IN SOME NEW PROVOCATION. A WAR OF CEILINGS OR VISAS WOULD NOT SERVE OUR OBJECTIVES. WE MUST WAIT TO SEE HOW THE SOVIET CEILING IS APPLIED. WE MAY BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH A DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY IF WE DO NOT REACT NOW ON A WORST CASE ASSUMPTION.

RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE INFORM PRIVATE SECRETARY, HEMANS (SOVIET DEPARTMENT), BURNS (NEW DEPARTMENT) AND POWELL (NO 10).

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TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 836
OF 210939Z MAY 89

YOUR TELNO 651 AND MY TELNO 835:

EXPULSIONS: PRESS BRIEFING

1. I BRIEFED THE 3 EXPELLED JOURNALISTS AT 210700Z AND 5 OTHER BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS (FINANCIAL TIMES, INDEPENDENT, OBSERVER, REUTER, LBC) AT 0800Z.

ON THE RECORD

2. I TOLD THE SECOND GROUP ON THE RECORD THAT I WAS CALLED IN AT 10.15 LAST NIGHT BY FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER KOVALEV TO BE TOLD THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE EXPELLING 11 MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY, INCLUDING 3 JOURNALISTS, AND DECLARING 3 FORMER MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY PNG. I GAVE THE NAMES AND RANK, SAVE THAT I IDENTIFIED THE PNG LIST ONLY BY RANK AND DESIGNATION. THE EXPELLEES HAD TWO WEEKS IN WHICH TO LEAVE.

3. I SAID THAT THIS WAS MIRROR-IMAGE RETALIATION WITH NO OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION. IT FOLLOWED ACTION TAKEN IN LONDON ON THE PREVIOUS DAY. THE SOVIET ACTION WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WAY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS DEVELOPING. WE HAD NO DESIRE THAT THE WIDER POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE AFFECTED.

4. I EXPLAINED THAT A GLOBAL CEILING HAD BEEN IMPOSED, ALSO AS A MIRROR IMAGE. I DECLINED TO GIVE NUMBERS OR TO SPECULATE HOW IT WOULD OPERATE.

EXPELLEES

5. I HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN OVER THE SAME GROUND WITH THE EXPELLEES, COMBINED WITH A LONG DISCUSSION OF THEIR PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. I EXPRESSED SYMPATHY AND OFFERED LOGISTICAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE. FOR THEIR PERSONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY I READ THE TERMS OF THE SOVIET ACCUSATION AGAINST BRITISH EXPELLEES IN MY TELNO 831 (NB I DID NOT/NOT READ THIS TO THE SECOND GROUP). I SAID THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE NO/NO SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ANY INDIVIDUAL.

6. THE 3 ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WHICH I REFERRBD TO YOU. I EMPHASISED THAT OUR INTENTION WAS TO TRY TO CARRY ON BUSINESS AS USUAL. THAT WAS THEIR WISH TOO, PERSONALLY OVER THE NEXT FORTNIGHT AND WITH REGARD TO THEIR OFFICES. THEY WERE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR REPLACEMENT THAN PERSONALLY TO USE THE SCOOP.

7. ROXBURGH IS IN A PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT POSITION, AS HE WAS IN

THE THROES OF RESIGNING FORM THE SUNDAY TIMES AND SEEKING ACCREDITATION FROM SEPTEMBER AS THE CORRESPONDENT OF THE NEW 'SUNDAY CORRESPONDENT.' HE TOOK THE NEWS VERY HARD, THOUGH IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES ALL THREE ACCEPTED IT AS WELL AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED.

MFA

8. I WARNED THE HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT OF THE LINE I WAS ABOUT TO TAKE WITH THE PRESS. USPENSKY AFFECTED SURPRISE, AND IMPLIED THAT I WAS NOT ACTING IN TERMS OF THE CONVERSATION WITH KOVALEV. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN LONDON HAD SAT ON THE NEWS. I REMINDED HIM THAT I HAD TOLD KOVALEV THAT THE NEWS WAS BOUND TO LEAK ONCE PEOPLE BEGAN TO MOVE, AND THAT I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO TELL THE THREE BRITISH JOURNALISTS IMMEDIATELY THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD CHOSEN TO EXPEL THEM. THERAFTER WE HAD LITTLE CONTROL OVER THE STORY, BUT WE DID NOT INTEND TO MAKE POLITICAL CAPITAL OVER THIS STORY.

9. THERE IS AN OBVIOUS CONTRAST BETWEEN USPENSKY'S OLD-FASHIONED LINE AND CHERNYAYEV'S, SENSIBLE COMMENT TO ME THAT THE STORY WOULD INEVITABLY COME OUT.

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