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From the Private Secretary

30 May 1989

*Don Stephen.*

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister met the Turkish Prime Minister before the opening of the second day of the NATO Summit this morning. Mr. Ozal was accompanied by the Turkish Foreign Minister, the Political Director of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and a note-taker.

Visas

The Prime Minister said that we simply could not cope with the influx of asylum-seekers from Turkey and would have to introduce a visa regime very shortly. This was not something we wanted to do: it had been forced on us. It is very important not to confirm this publicly, otherwise we would face a rush of people trying to beat the introduction of the visa regime. Mr. Ozal commented that similar regimes had been ineffective in the case of Germany and some other countries. The Prime Minister said firmly that she was not prepared to argue: there was simply no alternative to the introduction of a visa regime. Mr. Ozal subsided, saying only that he hoped we would contemplate multi-entry visas for officials and genuine businessmen.

Bulgaria

The Prime Minister said that she had noted Mr. Ozal's comments about Bulgaria's disgraceful treatment of its Turkish minority. The Foreign Secretary had made our concerns known to the Bulgarian Government. Mr. Yilmaz said that the latest news from the BBC was that the Bulgarians were saying that they were ready to repatriate their Turkish minority to Turkey. He hoped that the matter could be raised at the current CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension in Paris. That would be the best way to demonstrate support for Turkey.

Human Rights in Turkey

The Prime Minister said that she would be asked in Parliament if she had raised human rights in Turkey with Mr. Ozal. It would help her to be able to say that any complaints were investigated and, where appropriate, disciplinary action was taken. Mr. Ozal confirmed that this was the case.

Cyprus

The Prime Minister said that she continued to urge President Vassiliou not to allow negotiations to fail. He had accepted bizonality and seemed ready to contemplate ceilings on Greek-Cypriot settlement and land ownership in the North in return for some territorial adjustment. She hoped Mr. Ozal would encourage Denktash to negotiate realistically. The eighteen year freeze on Greek-Cypriot property rights which he had proposed was not realistic.

Mr. Ozceri said that there had to be an order of priorities. It did not make sense to put these freedoms before the constitutional arrangements. If Denktash was satisfied on the equal sharing of power, the rest would fall into place. The eighteen year period was negotiable and this had been made clear. In practice there was a lot of movement in the negotiations.

The Prime Minister said that it was very important to get a settlement while Perez de Cuellar was Secretary-General, given his long involvement with the problem. She had told President Vassiliou that a Cypriot application to the EC was not feasible in advance of a political settlement. Mr. Ozal said that this was very helpful. He himself had seen Papandreou, who had conveyed the message that President Vassiliou accepted the principles of bizonality and political equality, although he had not mentioned bicomunality. A key question was to impose some sort of numerical limit on the Greek-Cypriot population in the North, for instance thirty per cent. He understood that Vassiliou might be ready to contemplate this.

Turkey's EC Application

Mr. Ozal said that he wanted to raise Turkey's application to the European Community. This had to be looked at politically. Turkey's destiny was European. Over the last few years, she had followed liberal economic policies, and was now running a \$1.5 billion surplus on account, a figure which would probably rise this year. Trade with the European Community was approximately in balance. Inflation was far too high, but now falling.

Mr. Ozal continued that it was very important that the EC should enter negotiations with Turkey on membership. There would be no deadline for these and no guarantee of membership by a particular date. But the fact of the negotiations would represent long-term assurance for Turkey, and greatly increase confidence and investment, with the result that when Turkey eventually joined she would not be an economic burden on the Community. It would not be necessary to agree on free circulation of workers, provided Turkey could move towards the other aspects of Customs Union. This point could be reached much earlier than previously thought. But above all, it was the political message of the fact of negotiations which was important and would bring foreign capital to Turkey.

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By fortunate chance, the discussion had to finish at this point, with the Prime Minister commenting only that this was all food for thought.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (H.M. Treasury), Neil Thornton (Department of Trade and Industry), Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence), Colin Walters (Home Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

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