



PRIME MINISTER

HETMAN

1. Since we discussed the issues arising from HETMAN's defection on 2 August, officials have continued to work on the Options for action with the Russians. I attach as a basis for discussion at your meeting on 4 September a Memorandum, and Annex analysing the Options, prepared following discussion by the FCO, Home Office, Security Service and our Friends under the Chairmanship of Sir Robert Armstrong.

2. While all this immensely helpful analysis has been going on, I have of course been reflecting a good deal myself about the crucially important decisions that we have to take. So no doubt, have you. My own present instinct is that the official analysis somehow leads to a seemingly inevitable conclusion which does not at the end of the day make political sense. Let me try to explain why my own mind takes me in a different direction.

3. I have no doubt that the three objectives set out in the paper, on national security, foreign policy, and HETMAN's family, are the right ones. The first operational question we have to decide is whether the third objective is attainable, and whether we should proceed any further in the attempt to secure the release of the family. This is clearly a very important factor in the future handling of HETMAN. Looking at the situation objectively, I find it inconceivable that the Russians will release the family. All our experience shows that, in a vindictive and patient spirit, they will see the family as their only card with which eventually to lure HETMAN back to the Soviet Union. They cannot allow HETMAN to serve as an example of treachery rewarded in this

.../way.





way. No temporary gain in terms of expulsions or ceilings will weigh in the balance against this.

4. Again, looking objectively at the situation, I believe we have done what we should do for HETMAN. We owe him a great debt, and it was surely right to honour it by an attempt to get the family out. That attempt has been made, and on a straightforward reading of the Soviet answer it has failed. I see no realistic chance that the Russians will change their minds. This still leaves us with the difficult problem of handling HETMAN in the future. I am not convinced that it is right for us to offer the prospect, which I do not believe is practical, that we can achieve the return of his family. Without under-estimating the problems, I believe that we must now convince HETMAN that we have discharged our moral obligation, to the extent possible in reality.

5. Against this realistic background, we need to take a fresh look at the balance between the other two factors. It seems to me fundamental that we should retain the decisions in our own hands. I question whether the Memorandum prepared by officials strikes the right balance. The central question relates to the number of Soviet officials to be expelled from this country. On the basis that I have described I am very doubtful about the political judgement underlying the official paper that 25 Russian Intelligence Officers must leave the country as a minimum.

6. The numbers matter to the Russians. I question whether action on this scale, even with the incentive of raising the diplomatic ceiling (which I agree should be an essential part of our conclusion) could be taken without a very serious overall effect on our central policy objectives over the life of this Parliament. The judgement of the Memorandum is that with action of this order, the Russians would be likely to

.../freeze





freeze the Anglo/Soviet dialogue probably for as much as two or three years. This would effectively prevent us from playing a wider role of influence in the development of East/West relations - a role in which you and the Government have invested so much effort, and which is important not least in terms of our relations with the Americans. Moreover, I believe the domestic political consequences - except in the very short term - would be equally damaging. If these are the likely consequences of enforcing 25 departures, we should look at other Options.

7. I believe that the expulsion of the 9 Russians who top the list, as in the first stage of Option C, is and could be presented as a valid response in its own right to HETMAN's revelations. We would of course lower the overall ceiling correspondingly. Nine expulsions, on top of the 5 earlier this year, would be a substantial blow against the Soviet capability in this country. In addition, we should of course make it clear to the Russians that the remainder of the 25 were "busted". Their value as intelligence officers would be effectively neutralised. Finally, the revelation of HETMAN's defection would, in itself, be a substantial intelligence coup, which will greatly and rightly redound to the credit of our Agencies: we must see that it does.

8. This is of course essentially a matter of judgement on two separate questions. There is the political question about the importance of our not over-playing a dramatic security coup at the cost of jeopardising our key longer term objectives. I have no doubt about the political importance of that. It is much more difficult to judge the difference in impact on the Russians of expelling 25 rather than 9 of their Intelligence Officers. But my instinctive judgement is that that difference could be decisive.

.../9.





9. I think it essential, as Sir Bryan Cartledge has advised, to hold on to the proposal to raise the diplomatic ceiling in whatever approach we make to the Russians. The suggestion floated in the Memorandum that the free travel area for Soviet officials in London should be reduced is a largely extraneous measure to add to the package, as well as likely to damage our own interests in Moscow. I believe it should be set aside.

---

10. We should and will continue to deal firmly with Soviet intelligence activities in this country. In these terms I believe that the enforced departure of another 9 intelligence officers and the neutralisation of a further 16 would meet our security objectives. And for the reason I have given, I believe we should think very hard indeed before going further than that at the risk of damaging a central political objective.

11. I am copying this minute to the Home Secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Antony Duff and Colin McColl (for 'C').

*Approved by the Foreign Secretary  
and signed in his absence.*

*LVA,*

3 September 1985

G H



## M E M O R A N D U M

HETMAN

1. Officials have examined, in the light of the Prime Minister's meeting of 2 August with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the possibilities for action with the Russians as a result of HETMAN's defection. This paper sets out recommendations and points for decision by Ministers following discussion between representatives of the FCO, Home Office, Security Service and our Friends.

2. The following are annexed as background:

- A. Analysis of the available Options for action
- B. List of Russian Intelligence Service (RIS) Officers identified by HETMAN
- C. Speaking Note used on the unofficial channel, 16 August
- D. Soviet reply on the unofficial channel
- E. Draft FCO Memorandum on Ceilings: Expulsions Policy.
- F. Analysis of Soviet Reply of 28 August based on discussion with HETMAN
- G. Analysis by HM Ambassador Moscow of the Foreign Policy Implications.

Numbers and Definitions

3. The following is a brief guide to terms and numbers used.

Soviet Officials in London

Overall (global) Ceiling, on all Soviet officials and press/trade etc representatives: currently 234.

Diplomatic Ceiling, on Embassy staff with diplomatic cover; currently 39.

British Embassy in Moscow

No formal ceiling. 43 Diplomatic staff at present, with three vacant slots following April expulsions.



RIS Officers (list at Annex B)

The 25: 25 identified agent-running operatives. They include 7 diplomats.

The 25 divide into a "top Nine" including 4 diplomats, and a further 16.

The 20: this is the reserve list of 20 RIS coopted workers GRU Service Attaches, less important intelligence officers, and others (mainly cypher staff).

#### Introduction

4. We have three main objectives, relating to national security and intelligence, foreign policy, and to HETMAN's family:

##### (i) National Security

To use HETMAN's defection and information to inflict the maximum damage on the Russian Intelligence Services; to gain credit for the considerable intelligence coup and the work of our security and intelligence services;

##### (ii) Foreign Policy

To preserve our ability to develop a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union and thus to contribute to the East/West dialogue. This means acting in such a way as to minimise the likelihood of Soviet retaliation which would cripple the effective functioning of the British Embassy in Moscow;

##### (iii) Family

To do what we can to secure the release of HETMAN's wife and children.

.../ 5.



THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

6. At first sight this looks like a crude rejection. But HETMAN's own view (see Annex F) is that the message does not categorically rule out the release of the family under any circumstances, and may indeed indicate that the Russians, behind their initial bluster, are prepared to negotiate. HETMAN's interpretation, as he freely admits, is bound to be coloured by his personal involvement. Even if it is correct, and the Russians would be prepared to consider the release of the family, we have no means of knowing whether they would agree to it on the sort of terms that Ministers would have to insist on. They would be tempted to exploit the family to beat down the UK's terms - a tactic that we would have to resist by laying down a firm deadline and refusing to enter into a process of negotiation. The strongest argument in favour of making an attempt relates to the future management of HETMAN: it would show that we had done everything possible to secure the release of his family, and this in turn would reduce the risk that he might ultimately become disaffected. It remains our judgement that we are very unlikely indeed to be able to secure the release of the family. Nevertheless, however slender, this possibility should not be ignored. We have therefore included in Annex A an Option incorporating a further attempt to secure the release of the wife and children through action on the official channel.

.../7.



7. The Russians have created a further uncertainty in telling Sir Bryan Cartledge to stand by for a summons to call on Mr Gorbachev, which could come at any time. They have indicated that the subject is bilateral. This development could be coincidental, but we think this unlikely. A call by a British Ambassador on the General Secretary is virtually unprecedented. Given the timing, it seems probable that it is at least indirectly related to HETMAN. It could be that Gorbachev will offer a carrot in the form of an account of how productive the Anglo/Soviet dialogue could be in the absence of the temporary upsets which have plagued Anglo/Soviet relations. It could also be a way of buying time, since the Russians may calculate the British would be reluctant to take action against their intelligence officers while a call on Gorbachev is in the pipeline. As our Ambassador has argued, we should not allow ourselves to be put in baulk by this Soviet device, given the strong reasons for taking early action.

#### Access to HETMAN

8. It is probable that, following the Soviet demand to see HETMAN, we will receive an early official approach from the Soviet Embassy demanding consular access to him. HETMAN has said that he wants to see representatives of the Embassy. He believes that this is the best way of conveying the message to his family that he is alive and well, and that his arguments with Embassy representatives, whom he knows well, might have an influence on the outcome as regards his family. We do not believe that he would be susceptible to an attempt at such a meeting to turn him round. Given also our legal obligation (UK/Soviet Consular Convention) we are in any event bound to facilitate such a meeting, which should be arranged under Home Office auspices. It would be best for this to take place after Ministers have decided how to handle the issues raised by his defection. It would be possible for the FCO to play for time if an approach is made, but only for a limited period. FCO officials should therefore respond to any approach at this stage by saying that they are not in a position to give any information about HETMAN and his whereabouts, but that they will make enquiries and arrange to pass the Embassy's request to him.



The Options

9. The rest of this paper is written on the broad assumption that 25 RIS officers must leave the country but with minimum damage to our ability to maintain a political dialogue with the Soviet Union.

10. The problem lies in reconciling our national security objective of a vigorous action inflicting serious damage on the RIS, with our foreign policy objective of sustaining an ability to contribute to the East/West dialogue, and with the objective of being seen to respond adequately in terms of public opinion to the revelations of a major defector. A vigorous response would be appropriate on security grounds, both in order to inflict damage on the RIS and to secure credit for the success of the Agencies. Soviet counter-action is certain to follow. But the stronger our action, the more likely it will be that the Soviet reaction will be sharp and longlasting. Their reaction is likely to include retaliation against our Embassy in Moscow, and a freeze in Anglo/Soviet relations which will affect the timing of high level visits and events, eg Mr Shevardnadze to London (we are aiming for later this year); Mr Younger at the Head of a Scottish Trade Council delegation to Moscow on 15 September; and the Anglo/Soviet Joint Commission chaired by Mr Channon in London on 31 October-1 November. With action of the order of 25 enforced Soviet departures, the Russians would be likely to want to freeze the Anglo/Soviet dialogue for a substantial period, perhaps as much as two or three years. Britain could also be denied a fair share of the major export opportunities arising at the outset of the 1986-90 Soviet Five Year Plan. On the other hand, action on a scale less than say 25, would be more difficult to present publicly as an adequate response to HETMAN's disclosures.

11. The best hope of mitigating the Soviet response lies in offering the Russians an incentive, in the form of an increase in the ceiling for diplomatic staff at the Soviet Embassy in London. We know they attach great importance to securing

.../such an



such an increase which would be an earnest of our wish for a stable long-term relationship with them. But we have to recognise that even with such an incentive, the Russians would be bound to react to enforced withdrawals and the publicity that would go with them.

12. The various Options available, and supporting arguments, are set out in a Note at Annex A. Our approach will depend on whether Ministers decide that a further attempt should be made to secure the release of the family. If they decide against this, the choice will lie between Options A and B at paragraph 8 of Annex A, depending on a judgement about the likely severity of the Soviet reaction, and the public presentation of the package. If Ministers decide on a further attempt to secure the family, then an approach in two stages to the Russians will be appropriate, as set out at Option C in paragraphs 12-15. In the first stage we would tell the Russians officially that our reaction to HETMAN's disclosures would be mitigated, both as regards scale and arrangements for ceilings, if the family were released by a specified date; and we would tell them precisely what these arrangements would be, adding that if the family were not released much more severe consequences would automatically follow, involving the ceilings. In the second stage, following the expiry of the deadline, we would take more or less severe action depending on whether the Russians had released the family or not.

13. Under all these Options we should have to defend the decision to increase the diplomatic ceiling. This could readily be done by emphasising the disruption caused to the Soviet intelligence effort by the removal of RIS operatives, the lasting benefit of the reductions in the overall ceiling, and our ability (thanks to HETMAN) to identify and exclude any Soviet intelligence officers put forward as candidates to fill the vacant slots in the Soviet establishment (see paragraph 7 of Annex A).

.../14.



Publicity

14. The handling of publicity will be an important element in securing our objectives over national security, foreign policy and HETMAN's family, and is indeed an integral part of the political decisions to be made. We believe that the fact of HETMAN's defection must be made public, and that the expulsions/enforced withdrawals will in any case become public. They should therefore be made the subject of an announcement immediately after they are notified to the Soviet Embassy rather than limiting ourselves to defensive reaction. Beyond this, the publicity will require different handling depending on whether we pursue the Option of trying to secure the release of the family. If we were to succeed in this, our public exploitation of HETMAN's defection would to some extent be inhibited. (The Russians were told on the unofficial channel that if the family were released no publicity would be given to this. We cannot guarantee to prevent publicity, but should be ready to handle this aspect of the defection in low key.) If we do not attempt, or attempt and fail, to secure the family, we shall not be subject to the same constraint. It will be open to us, by exploitation of the information revealed by HETMAN, to increase the discomfiture of the RIS and to secure credit for the Agencies' intelligence achievement. But there is a timing point, and a question of balance, in that massive and public humiliation of the RIS could influence the Soviet reaction. We suggest that the main publicity themes should follow from our objective of preserving the national security while maintaining a productive Anglo/Soviet dialogue. We recommend that officials should work further on guidelines for publicity according to the Option which Ministers decide on.

15. As regards the machinery for handling publicity, the division of Ministerial responsibility imposes a joint effort by the Home Office (questions relating to HETMAN's request for asylum, removal of certain non-diplomatic Soviet personnel, and Security Service aspects) and the Foreign

.../Office



Office (effect on relations with the Soviet Union, expulsion of diplomatic, Soviet Trade Delegation, and certain other categories of personnel). Effective coordination is essential and would be assisted if for this purpose the two spokesmen were, with the agreement of the Home Secretary, to work jointly under the general direction of the Foreign Secretary.

16. All aspects of publicity about our action consequent on HETMAN's defection (viz, expulsions, ceilings, etc) should be handled in London. But Sir Bryan Cartledge has pointed out that difficulties have arisen in the past over publicity about Soviet retaliation against British personnel in Moscow. He recommends that the initial press briefing about this specific matter should be by our Embassy there, with local British press correspondents, to ensure that personnel concerned (and their families) are all informed before the story breaks. Once the Embassy has made the initial disclosure of any expulsions from Moscow, all further questions about these should be answered by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The closest liaison with the Embassy on content and timing would be necessary.

.../MODALITIES



## MODALITIES

17. We offer the following recommendations on the modalities of whatever official approach it is decided to make to the Russians.

Timing

18. The approach should be made as soon as possible after Ministers take the necessary decisions consistent with the need to be prepared and where necessary translate the necessary papers (speaking notes, instructions to Moscow, etc).

Level

19. Action should be taken in London either at Junior Ministerial or senior official level at the discretion of the Foreign Secretary. In the absence of Ambassador Popov on home leave until late September, the Charge d'Affaires at the Soviet Embassy is Mr Parchine, the Counsellor representing the International Department of the CPSU. We believe that he can be expected to transmit a message accurately to Moscow.

Supporting Action in Moscow

20. In the event of a decision by Ministers to move straight to Option A or B, without making a further attempt to secure the release of the family, we see advantage in supporting action being taken in Moscow by Sir Bryan Cartledge with Mr Suslov, Head of the Second European Department of the MFA, immediately after the action in London. Sir Bryan agrees. This would ensure that everything possible had been done to avert any distortion in the transmission of the message to the Soviet authorities (it is evident that the message transmitted to Moscow about the April expulsions was distorted). Suslov is an influential figure in the Soviet foreign policy establishment.

.../High



High Level Message

21. The case for or against a high level political message to the Soviet leadership depends in the first instance on which Option is adopted. It would be a mistake to involve Ministers directly in transactions concerning the family. We, therefore, recommend against such a message if Option C is followed. In case of Option A or B, a message, setting out the importance we attach to the continuing development of our dialogue with the Soviet Union, might help to tip the balance in Soviet consideration of counter-action. What Gorbachev says to our Ambassador may also have a bearing on this. We therefore, believe that the possibility of a message either from the Prime Minister to Gorbachev or from the Secretary of State to Mr Shevardnadze (whom he will be meeting in New York on 23 September) should be kept under review for possible use at the point at which our decisions concerning enforced withdrawals/ceilings are communicated to the Russians.

## OTHER POSSIBLE MEASURES

The Free Travel Area

22. Travel restrictions on the official Soviet community in the UK were introduced in 1954 as a reciprocal measure for the restrictions on UK citizens in the USSR. Foreigners in the Soviet Union are able to travel freely, without notification, only within a radius of 40 km (25 miles) of central Moscow, but this area is much reduced by restrictions on access to particular areas. Until 1982, the Free Travel Area permitted to the Russians was a 35 mile radius from Hyde Park Corner. Following the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981, the FTA was reduced in February 1982 to a 25 mile radius.

23. We know that the RIS carry out many intelligence activities on the fringes of the FTA, where the country lends itself to such operations and surveillance is particularly difficult. A reduction of the area to a 20 mile radius (ie by about 36%

.../including



including a wide swathe of green belt territory) would seriously inhibit the clandestine activities of the RIS, and would reduce the FTA to about the same size as its equivalent in Moscow.

24. There is a strong security case for taking this opportunity to make such a reduction. This would materially increase the chances of the Security Service detecting and thus limiting future activity by the RIS. It would also help presentationally in explaining publicly a response to HETMAN's revelations which in respect of the Ceilings might seem lenient. On the other hand, the addition of this measure would increase the risk of a strong Soviet reaction. Our Ambassador is strongly opposed because the probable Soviet counter-measures would inhibit our own intelligence gathering activities on the periphery of Moscow as well as adversely affecting the morale of the British diplomatic, business and journalists community.

The East Europeans: GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria

25. HETMAN has identified the Residents of the GDR, Czechoslovak and Bulgarian Intelligence Services in London. We believe that they should not be left to carry on their intelligence functions undisturbed. It is arguable that they should pay the penalty for identified intelligence activity against the UK, and for their close links with the RIS. On the other hand, we have no interest in a major row with these countries, with which we have been trying to establish a better relationship based on a differentiation between them and the Soviet Union and an appeal to their specific national interests and historical experience. Moreover, we have to weigh carefully the possibility of retaliation against our own Embassies. This will require consultation with our Ambassadors in East Berlin, Prague and Sofia after which separate advice will be submitted.

Need to Know: Widening the Circle

26. The circle of those who know about HETMAN should be widened

.../not



not less than 24 hours before action is taken with the Russians, so as to include those Ministers and officials who will need to know, viz:

Ministers

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry  
Secretary of State for Defence  
Ministers of State, FCO

Officials

Spokesmen at No 10, FCO, Home Office  
FCO Chief Clerk  
Heads of FCO Eastern European Department,  
Personnel Operations Department and  
Personnel Services Department  
Deputy Head of PUSD, FCO  
(responsible for liaison with the  
Security Service)  
Assistant Head of Soviet Department

It would also be essential for the FCO to have discretion, strictly within the need to know principle, to brief those others, (eg secretarial staff and translator) who will need to be operationally involved. Sir Bryan Cartledge has argued strongly that, if we are to avoid hiccups in handling the expulsions, the FCO Chief Clerk and Heads of News Department and the Personnel Departments should be briefed at the earliest possible stage.

.../RECOMMENDATIONS



## RECOMMENDATIONS AND POINTS FOR DECISION

1. Soviet request for access to HETMAN:

FCO to play for time, offering to pass on any message to HETMAN. Aim to delay a meeting between HETMAN and Soviet representatives.

2. Options for approach to the Russians.

Should a further attempt be made to secure release of wife and children ?

If not, then choice between

- A. (the less severe): Expel 9; reduce overall ceiling correspondingly; require withdrawal of further 16 in easier time, without effect on ceiling; raise diplomatic ceiling to 46.
- B. (the more severe): Expel 25; reduce overall ceiling correspondingly; raise diplomatic ceiling to 46.

If further attempt is to be made, then two-staged approach:

- C. Stage One : Offer, if family released by specified date, to require only withdrawal of 9, with no effect on ceilings; and to raise diplomatic ceiling to 46.  
Stage Two : If Russians release family, implement our offer. If they do not, move to Option A or B.

3. Publicity

Officials to work out guidelines according to the Option chosen. FCO and Home Office spokesmen to work in close coordination under general direction of Foreign Secretary.

4. Modalities

- (a) Action in London by FCO is recommended, with
- (b) Supporting action by HM Ambassador in Moscow (in case of Option A or B)

.../(c)



(c) High level message (Prime Minister to Gorbachev or Secretary of State to Shevardnadze) is for consideration also in case of Option A or B.

5. Reduction of Free Travel Area

For decision whether to include in the package of measures.

6. GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria - Residents

Consultation with our Ambassadors, followed by advice to Ministers.

7. Widening the Circle

Brief Ministers and officials who need to know, not less than 24 hours before taking action with Russians.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
LONDON

3 September 1985



HETMAN

## ANALYSIS OF THE AVAILABLE OPTIONS

1. The main problem in judging the appropriate response to HETMAN's presence and disclosures is the conflict between the requirements of national security, of public presentation and of foreign policy. The need to respond to the Soviet approach of 4 June about the Ceilings on Soviet Embassy staff is a further complicating factor.
2. There are three requirements which lead in different directions. The first is the protection of national security, which means firm action against the RIS. The second is to be seen to respond adequately to a major defection. The third, predating HETMAN's defection, is to preserve our ability to contribute to the East/West dialogue, which means reaching a satisfactory arrangement with the Russians governing the size of our respective Embassies in Moscow and London. Only such an arrangement will allow the effective conduct of bilateral business and the promotion of our East/West policy objectives.
3. Sir Bryan Cartledge has argued strongly that 46 diplomatic staff is his minimum requirement in Moscow for an effective Embassy. It is unlikely that we shall secure this unless we allow the Russians a similar number. We therefore judge that the right response to the Russians' approach of 4 June, which will preserve the effective functioning of our Embassy, is one which permits the Russians a limited increase in the diplomatic ceiling, to 46.
4. The need to react vigorously to HETMAN's revelations conflicts with this requirement. Such a reaction would entail large-scale expulsions or withdrawals, including both diplomatic and non-diplomatic staff and amounting to 25 people (of whom 7 are diplomats). Such expulsions would normally, under our existing ceilings policy, which is publicly known, entail a reduction in the diplomatic as well as the overall ceiling - rather than a rise in the diplomatic ceiling as required by our attempt to resolve the ceilings problem.
5. This suggests that there are in theory two alternative approaches:
  - (1) We attempt to combine our response to the two problems of dealing with the expulsions and reviewing the Ceilings Policy. The advantage of this approach is that by pitching our "offer" of a new diplomatic ceiling at the right level, we would have a reasonable chance of limiting Soviet retaliation and preserving the essentials of our working relationship with the Russians and our ability to contribute to the East/West dialogue. Although this might be portrayed as a weak and contradictory response, in allowing the Russians to introduce more Soviet intelligence officers under diplomatic cover than previously, we should be able to point to the major disruption inflicted on the RIS by the removal of their key intelligence officers and by the reduction of the Overall Ceiling.

/(2)



Page 2 of 5

(2) We set on one side for the time being our attempts to reach satisfactory arrangements over diplomatic ceilings, and deal separately with HETMAN's revelations and their consequences, making clear to the Russians that we would subsequently be reverting to the ceilings issue. The advantage of this approach is that our response to the HETMAN revelations would be consistent with our well tried Ceilings Policy and easy to defend in those terms (although there would come a point at which the undermining of the functioning of the British Embassy could itself incur criticism of the Government). The drawback of the approach is that by ratcheting down the diplomatic ceiling appropriately as a result of expulsions of Soviet intelligence officers, we risk inflicting severe damage on our working relationship with the Russians and more broadly on our ability to contribute to the development of the East/West dialogue.

6. Under this second approach, we would be obliged to reduce the diplomatic ceiling to a level at which the Russians would be bound to retaliate strongly. For example, even if we were to expel only 9, of whom 4 are diplomats, the diplomatic ceiling would be reduced from its present level of 39 to 35. The Russians would allege that this was intolerable and would probably reduce our numbers in Moscow to a level at which we could no longer function effectively. We therefore believe that there is no realistic alternative to the first approach, whereby we would combine action over expulsions with an offer of new arrangements for the ceilings.

7. A question for decision by Ministers is how to defend this approach in public. Such a defence would have to rest on the following points:

(1) At an important time in East/West relations, the UK has a role in developing the East/West dialogue. A productive Anglo/Soviet relationship is a necessary condition for playing this role. In developing a relationship capable of furthering such a dialogue, it is essential to have the necessary "diplomatic infrastructure" in the shape of effective Embassies in Moscow and London.

(2) We are therefore allowing a controlled increase in the ceiling on Soviet diplomatic staff subject to future good behaviour. But we will continue rigorously to exclude known intelligence officers (HETMAN's own information will be of enormous help in this) and expel those who are detected engaging in unacceptable activities.

(3) The overall numbers of Soviet officials in London will still be limited by a global ceiling which will continue to be reduced as appropriate if and when expulsions of Soviet intelligence officers make this necessary. This weapon of reduction in the global ceiling, together with the disruption caused by the expulsions/withdrawals which we are demanding as a result of HETMAN's revelations, will cause considerable

/organisational



organisational ~~organisational~~ problems for the Soviet authorities and will bite hard enough to ensure that any threat to our security is minimised.

THE OPTIONS

8. We have identified options under this first approach to cater for two possibilities:

- (i) that the Soviet reply to the message they received about the family on the unofficial channel is taken as a firm negative, ruling out any further attempt;
- (ii) that Ministers decide to make a further attempt to secure the family's release.

No further attempt to secure release of family

In this case there are two broad options:

A The less severe

We would expel the top 9 of the 25. The Russians would be told to withdraw the other 16. We would reduce the overall ceiling appropriately by 8 to 226 (one of the 9, being a member of an international organisation, does not fall under the ceilings).

We would raise the diplomatic ceiling to 46. If the Russians retaliated, we would have the options, depending on the scale of retaliation, of reducing the overall ceiling further, and/or expelling some of the reserve list of 20, or (in the event of a minimal reaction) of calling it a day. Our aim would be to respond in a measured way which would enable the Russians to draw a line under the expulsions without further counter-retaliation.

B The more severe

We would expel 25 and reduce the overall ceiling to 211. Raise the diplomatic ceiling to 46.

In the event of retaliation, we would, depending on the scale, be able to expel some of the remaining 20.

We could also consider combining with either option the reduction of the Free Travel Area.

9. It is possible to construct variants of greater or lesser severity. It would also be possible to threaten to reduce the newly established diplomatic ceiling of 46 in the event of retaliation, putting it back for example to its starting point of 39. The problem with this is that if we were forced to implement the threat, the ceilings 'problem' and its potential effects on our Embassy in Moscow would remain unsolved. But there would be advantage in leaving the Russians in uncertainty by telling them that in the event of retaliation the new ceilings would need to be reconsidered.



10. Further attempt to secure release of family

This option has advantages from the point of view of managing HETMAN, but would limit our freedom of manoeuvre in the probable event of the Russians refusing to release the family. We should first need to make a clear and attractive offer to the Russians, combined with the threat of what would follow if they rejected it. We would need to be clear in our own minds what these consequences would be. They would have to be substantially more severe than under the first offer. Otherwise, once they were made known to the Russians, in the likely event of their refusal to release the family, we would lose credibility. It would be essential to set an absolutely firm deadline by which, if the family had not arrived in the UK, the worse consequences would automatically follow.

11. If this further attempt is to be made, we suggest the following two staged approach:

Option C

In the first stage, the Soviet Charge would be summoned and officially told that HETMAN was in the UK and very ready to meet representatives of the Soviet Embassy. The Charge would be told that HETMAN's revelations of the scale of Soviet intelligence activity could not be passed over. The withdrawal of Soviet intelligence officers, and public announcement of HETMAN's presence and the withdrawals, would be unavoidable. The only chance of mitigating our action would be the release of the family.

12. The Charge would be told that if HETMAN's wife and children were released and reached the UK by a specified date (say one week later) we would require only the withdrawal of 9 RIS officers over a specified period of time (say three months). We would be prepared to leave the overall ceiling at 234 (subject to good behaviour on the Soviet side) and to allow the diplomatic ceiling to rise to 46. The Charge would be told that if the family were not in the UK by the specified date, we would be obliged immediately to take much more severe action (unspecified).

13. If by the deadline the family were released, we would faithfully implement the offer we had made. If they had not been released, the Charge would be told that the consequences which we had indicated would now follow. These would be as in Option A or B above.

14. In adopting this approach we should be doing, and be seen by HETMAN to be doing, all we possibly could for his family. This could have important implications later in the handling of HETMAN himself, in that he would see that the offer made on the unofficial channel had been specifically followed through officially. There are however potential disadvantages in this approach. If it succeeded, against expectation, there would be national security disadvantage in that we should be committed to minimal action only

/over



Page 5 of 5

over withdrawals and we should cramp our freedom of manoeuvre over public presentation. Moreover, we should be giving the Russians time to prepare their response, which would almost certainly include a clear threat of retaliation. Once made, it would be more difficult for them to back down from this. Finally, the Russians might take our approach as an opportunity, by returning a further ambiguous answer, to persuade us to negotiate further. In these ways Option C would complicate our approach in a way which could mean we ended up with a more damaging effect on our bilateral relations than Options A or B.

## CONCLUSION

15. There are clear advantages in foreign policy terms in combining the necessary expulsions with the offer of new arrangements for ceilings, provided Ministers are satisfied that action on these lines can be convincingly presented. Both Options A and B, by disposing of 25 RIS officers, advance the main national security interest. If it is decided not to pursue further the release of the family, Ministers are invited to choose between A and B according to their judgement of the probable severity of the Soviet reaction and the ease of public presentation in this country. We judge that there is only an outside chance of securing the release of the family. The main reason for making such an attempt would be to demonstrate to HETMAN that we have done all we can on his behalf. This is an important consideration; but there are some potential disadvantages on other grounds in pursuing this Option (C). If Ministers decide to do so, Option C provides an appropriate two stage approach.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

3 September 1985



DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1647</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>Annex B to Howe to PM dated 3 September 1985</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>14/7/2014</i> <i>G. Gray</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



**Instructions for completion of Dummy Card**

Use **Black Pen** to complete form

Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Department, Series and Piece/Item references clearly  
e.g.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES	.....	GRA 168	.....
PIECE/ITEM	.....	49	.....
(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)			

Please Sign and Date in the box adjacent to the description that applies to the document being replaced by the Dummy Card

If the document is Closed under a FOI exemption, enter the number of years closed. See the TNA guidance *Preparation of records for transfer to The National Archives*, section 18.2

The box described as 'Missing' is for TNA use only (it will apply to a document that is not in its proper place after it has been transferred to TNA)



BOUT DE PAPIER (PAMIETNIK)

1. The message that I wish to convey is that the Soviet citizen, Mr Oleg Antonovich GORDIYEVSKIY, until recently the KGB Resident in London, officially Counsellor of the Embassy of the USSR in the UK, is now in our country and has asked for asylum. The fact of his presence in Britain is as yet known to very few people, although they include the highest political and administrative authorities. The authorities had been appalled to learn from Mr GORDIYEVSKIY the full scale of KGB and GRU activities against our country, and in other countries in Western Europe and certain English-speaking countries, and of the numbers and organisation of the intelligence officers involved. Remembering the 1971 expulsions, HMG's immediate reaction was to think in terms of large scale and public expulsions and to advise the Scandinavian and other Governments concerned that they should do the same.

2. However, there is one way in which the consequences of Mr GORDIYEVSKIY's revelations might be mitigated. If his wife and children, who remain in the USSR, were able quietly to join him in the UK, the British Government, who attach great importance to humanitarian issues, would be prepared to handle the situation in a different way. It would be acceptable for Soviet intelligence staff gradually to be withdrawn over a period of time, rather than expelling them, and the British attitude to the current problem of ceilings would be accommodatory, enabling the Soviet Embassy to operate normally. We would also request the Scandinavian and other countries to do likewise.

3. If the Soviet side agreed, we would undertake that no publicity would ever be given to the release of the family. It was in any event essential for the Soviet side to understand that any attempt to use the family to put pressure on Mr GORDIYEVSKIY would merely harden the resolve of the British authorities and exacerbate the situation.

4. If we were to be able to mitigate the effects of Mr

0 /.....



GORDIYEVSKIY's revelations in the way that we suggested, we would require an answer on, or before, August 30th. I would come to Paris to meet Mr RUBINSKI, or another delegated representative, on that day, but the Soviet side could call me to Paris at any time before that if they wished, by passing a message through Mr Wright's successor in Paris.



DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1647</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>Annex D to Howe to PM dated 3 September 1985</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>14/7/2014</i> <i>S. Gray</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use **Black Pen** to complete form

Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Department, Series and Piece/Item references clearly  
e.g.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES	.....	GRA 168	.....
PIECE/ITEM	.....	49	.....
(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)			

Please Sign and Date in the box adjacent to the description that applies to the document being replaced by the Dummy Card

If the document is Closed under a FOI exemption, enter the number of years closed. See the TNA guidance *Preparation of records for transfer to The National Archives*, section 18.2

The box described as 'Missing' is for TNA use only (it will apply to a document that is not in its proper place after it has been transferred to TNA)



DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1647</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>Annex E to Move to PM dated 3 September  1985</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>14/7/2014</i> <i>S. Gray</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use **Black Pen** to complete form

Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Department, Series and Piece/Item references clearly  
e.g.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES

..... *GRA 168* .....

PIECE/ITEM ..... *49* .....

(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)

Please Sign and Date in the box adjacent to the description that applies to the document being replaced by the Dummy Card

If the document is Closed under a FOI exemption, enter the number of years closed. See the TNA guidance *Preparation of records for transfer to The National Archives*, section 18.2

The box described as 'Missing' is for TNA use only (it will apply to a document that is not in its proper place after it has been transferred to TNA)



<p>DEPARTMENT/SERIES .....</p> <p>PIECE/ITEM ..... (one piece/item number)</p>	<p>Date and sign</p>
<p>Extract/Item details:</p> <p>Annex F to Howe to PM dated 3 September 1985</p>	
<p>CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION</p>	
<p>RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958</p>	<p>14/7/2014 S. Gray</p>
<p>TEMPORARILY RETAINED</p>	
<p>MISSING AT TRANSFER</p>	
<p>MISSING</p>	
<p>NUMBER NOT USED</p>	



Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use **Black Pen** to complete form

Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Department, Series and Piece/Item references clearly  
e.g.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES

..... *GRA 168* .....

PIECE/ITEM ..... *49* .....

(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)

Please Sign and Date in the box adjacent to the description that applies to the document being replaced by the Dummy Card

If the document is Closed under a FOI exemption, enter the number of years closed. See the TNA guidance *Preparation of records for transfer to The National Archives*, section 18.2

The box described as 'Missing' is for TNA use only (it will apply to a document that is not in its proper place after it has been transferred to TNA)