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FOUR AMBASSADORS MEETING IN BERLIN

SUMMARY

1. THE THREE WESTERN AMBASSADORS PRESENTED THE ELEMENTS OF THEIR BERLIN INITIATIVE. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR STRESSED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FOUR POWERS FOR ENSURING STABILITY, RESPONDED FAVOURABLY TO THE ALLIED INITIATIVE AND PROPOSED REGULAR MEETINGS OF THE FOUR AMBASSADORS WITH PREPARATORY WORK BY A NEW STANDING WORKING GROUP. AGREED PRESS STATEMENT IN MIFT.

DETAIL

- 2. THE US AMBASSADOR (WALTERS) SAID IN A PREPARED STATEMENT AGREED IN THE BONN GROUP THAT A STABLE AND CALM SITUATION IN AND AROUND BERLIN IN THE FUTURE WOULD DEPEND IN PART ON THE ABILITY OF BERLIN TO SHARE IN EAST-WEST AND EUROPEAN PROGRESS. THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES SOUGHT AGREEMENT ON PRACTICAL IMPROVEMENTS FOR BERLINERS WHICH WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR FOR ENHANCING STABILITY IN THE REGION. UNDER THEIR BERLIN INITIATIVE OF 1987, THE THREE ALLIES PROPOSED TALKS ON THE AREAS OF AVIATION, YOUTH EXCHANGES, INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS AND SPORTS EVENTS IN BERLIN BUT WOULD ALSO BE WILLING TO DISCUSS OTHER AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST WHICH COULD LEAD TO IMPROVEMENTS FOR BERLIN. ON AVIATION, THE ALLIES SOUGHT A RESOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF AIR SPACE RESERVATIONS, AND THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW AIR ROUTES TO BERLIN WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EXPANSION OF INNER-GERMAN AIR SERVICES.
- 3. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR (KOCHEMASOV) GAVE A LENGTHY INTRODUCTION ON CHANGES IN EUROPE (FULL RUSSIAN TEXT SENT BY FAX TO FCO). HE SAID THAT EUROPEAN PEOPLES COULD NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME, TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, PUT THEIR RELATIONS ON TO A NEW BASIS. THE PREVOUS SYSTEM BASED ON FORCE AND DETERRENCE WAS BEING REPLACED BY ONE OF CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION. THE SOVIET UNION WISHED TO STRENGTHEN THIS PROCESS TOWARDS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A COMMON EUROPEAN HOUSE. ONE OF THE FIRST SIGNS OF THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER HAD BEEN THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 1971. HE EXPRESSED

PAGE 1 CONFIDENTIAL GRATITUDE TO THE QA PARTIES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF ORDER DURING THE RECENT OPENING OF THE BORDERS TO WEST BERLIN. THE GDR'S COURAGEOUS DECISION IN THIS RESPECT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION. IT DEMONSTRATED THE STRENGTH OF RENEWAL IN EASTERN EUROPE AND IN PARTICULAR THE GDR. THIS WAS AN IRREVERSIBLE PROCESS BUT NOT EASY.

- 4. THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT AGAINST SUGGESTIONS WHICH SUPPORTED THESE CHANGES AND WELCOMED THE READINESS OF OTHERS TO LEND ECONOMIC SUPPORT. BUT IT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO ATTACH PRE-CONDITIONS TO SUCH SUPPORT OR TO SEEK TO IMPOSE ONE'S WILL ON OTHERS. PRESSURE TO GO A PARTICULAR WAY AMOUNTED TO INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IT WAS NECESSARY TO ALLOW PEOPLE UNLIMITED POSSIBILITIES TO REALISE THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. ONLY THUS COULD STABILITY IN EUROPE BE ASSURED. THE SOVIET UNION NOTED THAT SOME IN THE WEST COULD NOT REFRAIN FROM THE TEMPTATION TO INFLUENCE CHANGES IN THE GDR.
- 5. QUOTING GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON 9 DECEMBER, KOCHEMASOV STRESSED THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT TO GIVE OFFENCE TO THE GDR, WHICH WAS A STRATEGIC ALLY AND MEMBER OF THE WARSAW PACT. ONE MUST PROCEED FROM THE POST WAR REALITIES OF THE TWO GERMAN STATES. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID DESTABILISATION. THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND GDR COULD NOT CHANGE. PEACEFUL COOPERATION BETWEEN THESE TWO STATES SHOULD AND COULD BE DEVELOPED.
- 6. AS FOR THE FUTURE, THE FOUR POWERS, WHICH HAD WON THE WAR WITH SO MUCH SACRIFICE, HAD A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY IN EUROPE. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO ALLOW WAR AGAIN. SUSPICION AND AGGRESSION MUST BE PUT ASIDE. TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL REALITIES SHOULD BE RESPECTED. MAXIMUM CARE SHOULD BE DEMONSTRATED AND THE PRINCIPLES OF HELSINKI FOLLOWED. KOCHEMASOV CITED STATEMENTS FROM PRESIDENT BUSH, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND THE PRIME MINISTER TO INDICATE THAT THEY HELD VIEWS SIMILAR TO SOVIET ONES.
- 7. THE SOVIET UNION, SAID KOCHEMASOV, REAFFIRMED ITS DEDICATION TO QUADRIPARTITE RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS. IT WAS READY TO DISCUSS WITH THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES STEPS WHICH WOULD NORMALISE AND IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN SPHERES COVERED BY QUADRIPARTITE COMPETENCE. THIS MEANT FIRST OF ALL WEST BERLIN WHICH SHOULD SHARE IN THE FRUITS OF DETENTE. LIFE ITSELF HAD ALREADY GIVEN ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE QUESTIONS PUT BY THE INITIATIVE (SUCH AS INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS AND SPORTS EVENTS). THE AREA OF AVIATION WAS PARTICULARLY COMPLEX. BUT THE SOVIET UNION VIEWED FAVOURABLY THE INTENTIONS OF

PAGE 2 CONFIDENTIAL THE THREE POWERS AND APPROACHED THE INITIATIVE IN THAT SPIRIT. AS THE SITUATION IN THE GDR BECAME MORE MORMAL, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE READY FOR FURTHER CONTACTS FOR CONCRETE DISCUSSION AND WOULD LISTEN TO FURTHER CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS OF THE THREE POWERS.

- 8. KOCHEMASOV PROPOSED REGULAR MEETINGS OF THE FOUR AMBASSADORS. HE ALSO PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTILATERAL WORKING GROUP WHICH COULD DEFINE COMMON POSITIONS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF FOUR POWER RESPONSIBILITIES BEFORE MEETINGS OF AMBASSADORS. (KOCHEMASOV DID NOT MAKE CLEAR AT FIRST THE SCOPE OF THIS WORKING GROUP BUT SAID LATER IT WOULD DEAL WITH BERLIN AND SHOULD BE A STANDING WORKING GROUP)
- 9. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR (BOIDEVAIX) SUPPORTED WALTERS'
 PRESENTATION. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUADRIPARTITE
 AGREEMENT. HE WOULD REPORT KOCHEMASOV'S SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER
 AMBASSADORIAL MEETINGS AND A WORKING GROUP.
- 10. I ASSOCIATED HMG WITH WALTERS' PRESENTATION ON THE INITIATIVE. I NOTED WITH SATISFACTION KOCHEMASOV'S WILLINGNESS TO PURSUE TALKS ON THE INITIATIVE. AS FOR HIS WIDER REMARKS, I WOULD REPORT THESE WITH CARE. I NOTED IN PARTICULAR HIS REFERENCES TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND STABILITY. I DREW ATTENTION TO THE STRASBOURG DECLARATION OF 9 DECEMBER, MENTIONING THE REFERENCES THERE TO GORBACHEV'S POLICY OF OPENNESS AND REFORM, SELF DETERMINATION IN GERMANY THROUGH A PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND IN FULL RESPECT OF RELEVANT TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS, THE NEED FOR RESPONSIBILITY ON ALL SIDES, THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN STABILITY AND THE POINT ABOUT NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES. I SAID I WOULD REPORT KOCHEMASOV'S SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE PROCEDURE. THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS WILLING TO HAVE FURTHER TALKS AT APPROPRIATE LEVELS AND WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS THE INITIATIVE.
- 11. WALTERS ALSO STRESSED THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN STABILITY AND ASSOCIATED HIMSELF WITH MY REMARKS BASED ON THE STRASBOURG DECLARATION. HE QUOTED FROM BUSH'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV OF 17 NOVEMBER, SAYING IN PARTICULAR THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NO INTENTION OF SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM THE CURRENT PROCESS OF CHANGE IN THE GDR AND OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES.
- 12. THE RUSSIANS PROPOSED A PRESS STATEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE CAUSED US PROBLEMS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. IT IMPLIED, FOR INSTANCE, THAT QUADRIPARTITE RESPONSIBILITIES EXTENDED TO CENTRAL EUROPE AS A WHOLE AND SAID THAT THE AMBASSADORS WOULD MEET REGULARLY. THE AGREED

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STATEMENT IN MIFT WAS BASED MOSTLY ON A WESTERN DRAFT.

13. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IS INFORMING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE MEETING.

COMMENT.

14. THL SOVIET PURPOSE IN PROPOSING THIS MEETING WAS OBVIOUSLY TO REMIND THE GERMANS OF THE RIGHTS AND THE INTEREST OF THE FOUR POWERS IN THE GERMAN QUESTION. THE FACT OF THE MEETING WILL HAVE ACHIEVED THAT AIM. THIS IS ALSO IN OUR INTERESTS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE TAKEN CARE NOT TO ALIENATE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

15. KOCHEMASOV SAID TO ME AFTERWARDS THAT HE HOPED VERY MUCH THAT YOU WOULD AGREE TO FURTHER MEETINGS OF AMBASSADORS. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT LIKE THAT. BUT IT IS MORE THE THREE ALLIES' BUSINESS. SUBJECT TO THE MEETINGS ON BERLIN IN BRUSSELS ON 13 DECEMBER, I THINK WE MIGHT HOLD A FURTHER METING AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL AFTER CHRISTMAS AND MEETINGS AT LOWER LEVELS WHEN WE ARE READY ABOUT DETAILED ASPECTS OF THE ALLIED INITIATIVE. A NEW WORKING GROUP ON ALLIED RESPONSIBILITIES SEEMS, ON THE LITTLE THAT KOCHEMASOV SAID, TO BE UNNECESSARY.

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