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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 6/18/3L

19 December 1989

Prime Minister

This responds to your request to be brought up to date on military contingency planning for Berlin & our focus in the FRG. This reports to

Dear Charles,

EAST/WEST RELATIONS  
long-established plans. We do not yet

In your letter of 8th December to Stephen Wall, you set out possible scenarios for a breakdown of the system of Government in the GDR and asked inter alia about contingency plans for our forces in Berlin and in the FRG.

Contingency Plans

Plans exist (or could be modified) to cover a number of eventualities, such as assisting the West German Government and the West Berlin authorities in the face of further mass migration, protecting the Soviet CinCs Mission (SOXMIS) and their families in West Germany, and assisting the West Berlin police in maintaining law and order. There are no specific plans to reinforce the Berlin Garrison - although it would be possible to do so. However, the Allied presence in Berlin is already substantial, and reinforcement is one of the less likely requirements. Any question of the Western Allies restricting movement across the boundaries of the Western sectors of Berlin in the interests of maintaining order would raise difficult political and legal issues. We assume that there would be no question of our seeking to restrict movement across the Inner German Border (IGB).

have a response to the question: what would be the future of our troops in West Germany if there was a double migration?  
CBB  
21/12/89  
mt

While no new plans have been formulated to deal with recent events, naturally we have been monitoring developments very closely. The points raised in your letter have been further discussed with our people on the spot in Berlin and the following paragraphs summarise the up-to-date position.

Starting with the refugee question, you will recall the efforts that were made last month, following consultation in Bonn with the other Sending States, to earmark accommodation for East German (and other) resettlers in Berlin and the FRG. At the same time, air

Charles Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing Street





transport plans were reviewed against the prospect of evacuating resettlers from Berlin to the FRG. In the event the evacuation plans were not activated, but it is conceivable that continuing changes in the GDR could result in a further influx of resettlers to the FRG, leading to the Sending States being asked for further assistance. A small working group has therefore been set up to handle future requests from the FRG or the Berlin authorities. To date, assistance has been limited to bedding and other equipment; additionally, the German authorities have been offered the use of seven sites (RAF Gatow in West Berlin and the six sites in the FRG that are detailed at Annex A). The first of the six FRG sites will shortly be handed over.

We recognise that it might be appropriate in certain circumstances to raise the state of readiness of our forces. Such a move could hardly be kept covert and its political implications would therefore need careful consideration. Detailed information on readiness is at Annex B (Operations Rooms in Berlin were permanently manned for a period last month).

Future requirements for internal security in East/West Berlin have been reviewed by the British Sector in the light of recent events. Our planning assumes that incidents occurring in the Soviet Sector of Berlin or in the DDR would be the responsibility of the East German authorities, including the arrest of West German/West Berlin citizens if necessary. Should the East German authorities require assistance they would call for Soviet aid. There is no question at present of British or Allied troops becoming involved across the border. Moreover, if there were to be civil unrest or large demonstrations in West Berlin, our people in Berlin consider that the West Berlin Police (WBP) are more than capable of controlling the situation. British or Allied troops would not become actively involved in such action unless British or Allied dependents or installations were placed in jeopardy; there are plans to cover such an eventuality.

As you know, the LIVE OAK mechanism has historically been concerned with Berlin access planning, but it has recently taken on a Berlin defence planning role too. An outline of LIVE OAK responsibilities and a catalogue of LIVE OAK plans is at Annex C. The next LIVE OAK CPX (which is an access exercise, codenamed STEADFAST) is scheduled for 22nd-26th January 1990. It will involve LIVE OAK staff, the Allied Staff in Berlin, various other HQ (including BAOR and RAFG) and the MOD as a response cell.

Aside from the LIVE OAK air options which are included in Annex D, the following air plans are available:





a. The Quadripartite Berlin Airlift (QBAL) plan is designed to overcome a land blockade of Berlin. It is not the responsibility of LIVE OAK, but is coordinated by CINCUSAFE on behalf of the four allies (FR, GE, UK and US). The UK national contribution is outlined in Annex D.

b. Joint Theatre Plans and UK air plans in support of national operations are also listed in Annex D. A number could be modified to provide for the reinforcement of the Berlin Garrison if that were thought necessary. While there are no plans to evacuate the military component of the Garrison (other than SIGINT units) the non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) plan could be expanded if necessary to include Garrison personnel. While some of these plans could be adapted to accommodate the movement of refugees, civil air charter might offer a better alternative.

Not surprisingly, blockade stocks are held in Berlin. Thus the air capability described above could be supplemented by the facilities and stores listed at Annex E.

For completeness, the plan for the defence of Berlin against a conventional attack is mentioned in Annex F.

#### Possible Longer-term Implications

Work is underway, within a very small circle, on the possible implications of international change for our defence policy. The implications of early moves towards German confederation or unity for NATO force-levels and for British Forces Germany need careful analysis, but will be addressed - at least on an initial basis - in the MOD contribution to the work referred to in Stephen Wall's letter of 12th December.

That letter also referred to the question of at what level of further Allied Force reductions in Europe NATO strategy would become "unworkable". As agreed at the Chequers seminar, the priority in follow-on work in recent months has been on the implications of a CFE agreement of the kind currently under negotiation in Vienna rather than on "deep-cuts" under a "CFE 2". But exchanges and discussions on the latter have continued with US experts. The MOD paper for the seminar set out the broad issues involved. There is no single, simple cut-off point where the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Alliance would cease to be feasible, provided a less rigid concept of forward defence was acceptable. As in-place forces were reduced, military concepts would need revision within a more flexible approach trading space for time and reinforcement forces and mobilisation rates would become even more critical. New models have to be built-up to analyse options and



their implications. Developing this work is also complicated by the variety of international settings to which - in the light of recent events - it may need to be related; but its importance and priority is fully recognised.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall (FCO) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*Your sincerely*  
*Brian Hawtin*

(B R HAWTIN)  
Private Secretary



File  
10  
M10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA*From the Private Secretary*

22 December 1989

*See Simon,*

## EAST/WEST RELATIONS

Brian Hawtin wrote to me on 19 December about the contingency plans for our forces in Berlin and the FRG. The Prime Minister has read the letter and the accompanying documents and was grateful to be fully briefed. We now await the papers which you are preparing on some of the wider implications for our forces in Germany and our defence policy generally on the far reaching changes which are taking place in Eastern Europe.

*Yours sincerely,*  
  
C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence

SECRET UK EYES A  
PERSONAL



EAST GERMAN RESETTLERS IN FRG AND BERLIN

1. The MOD have received a number of requests for assistance with accommodating resettlers from GDR from both the Berlin Senat and the FRG authorities. In addition to providing quantities of bedding and other stores and providing coffee stalls and teapoints, HMG offered the temporary use of an area of RAF GATOW in Berlin on 19 October, and six sites in FRG, as follows:

- a. Balaclava Barracks, Schlangen - brick built, could accommodate 150, offered on 10 November.
- b. Woodland Camp, Sennelager - greenfield site, could accommodate 1000, offered on 10 November.
- c. Lavesum Camp, Haltern Training Area - greenfield site, could accommodate 700, offered on 10 November.
- d. Borkenberge Camp, Haltern Training Area - hutted camp, could accommodate 150, offered on 10 November.
- e. Ravelin Camp, Hamelyn - greenfield site, could accommodate 1000, offered on 14 November.
- f. Roberts Barracks, Osnabruck - brick built block, could



e

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accommodate 400, offered on 14 November.

2. Additionally, BFG has offered to bring forward the handover of Haines Barracks, Krefeld (which is no longer required by BFG) from mid January to mid December. Furthermore, as the NATO Status of Forces Agreement requires, British Forces Germany have in recent months released to the FRG authorities four barracks and 80 married quarters which are no longer required by the military.
3. The other Sending States have also offered assistance and some of their offers have been taken up. It is the intention of all Sending States to charge the FRG authorities for this assistance. The FRG authorities are expected to accept that principle.
4. Officials of the Berlin Senat inspected the RAF GATOW site shortly after the offer was made, but at time of writing the site had not been handed over.
5. As yet the FRG authorities have not made a formal response to HMG's offers, or to the suggestion that they will be expected to pay costs.



## ANNEX B

RAISING READINESS STATE OF BFG

1. Measures in the Government War Book Volume I, as amplified in the MOD and Single Service War Books, provide for a range of actions which could be taken in response to a developing crisis in the NATO area. Examples of measures which could be taken in BFG are:

- a. Enhanced manning of HQ.
- b. Enhanced communications.
- c. Intensified intelligence activity.
- d. Enhanced physical security measures.
- e. Review of plans and requirements, including dispersal of equipment or stockpiles
- f. Return of detached units and cessation of overseas exercises.

2. Most national measures related to a corresponding NATO measure and our crisis management planning envisages that the implementation of national measures would normally be in response to requests by MNCs after consultation, where appropriate, in the

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MC and DPC/NAC. However, this practice would not preclude measures being invoked on a national basis, or indeed a tripartite basis, in the case of Berlin. Naturally, Ministers could consult or inform NATO Allies as they saw fit.



LIVE OAK

1. LIVE OAK is a quadripartite (FR, GE, UK and US) staff located next to SHAPE under the command of Gen Galvin (Commander LIVE OAK). Under its (UK) Chief of Staff its role is:
  - a. To create plans to maintain Allied (FR, UK, US) rights of unrestricted access to and egress from Berlin.
  - b. To monitor defence matters pertaining to West Berlin (as defined in the 1986 Allied Command Arrangements, Berlin).
2. LIVE OAK is responsible to nations through the Washington Ambassadorial Group. Advice on day-to-day business comes from the Bonn Group which also has a specific responsibility for air access matters.
3. All LIVE OAK's plans are agreed on a quadripartite basis, the latest review, started in 1984 by Gen Rogers, is nearing completion. Plans covering ground and air access to Berlin and maritime counter-measures are listed at Appendix 1.

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Appendix:

1. LIVE OAK Access Plans.



LIVE OAK ACCESS PLANS

Serial (a)	Description (b)	Forces (c)	Authority (d)	Remarks (e)
<u>Package 1 (Actions Prior to Denial of Access)</u>				
1.	Low Key Ground Measures	In place Allied forces in Berlin and FRG	Commandant of Berlin (COBs) and CinCs in part; WAG the remainder	1. Designed to: a. Indicate Allied reaction. b. Enable LIVE OAK forces to prepare for further action.  2. Include for example: a. Increased patrolling. b. Escorting of convoys by armed vehicles. c. Activation of CPs. d. Assembly of LIVE OAK forces.

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2. Low Key Air  
Measures

Ditto with, in WAG  
UK case, sp from  
RAFSTC

1. As for 1 above
2. 8 measures incl,  
for example:
  - a. Increased mil  
flights in BCZ.
  - b. Increased air  
recce of IGB.
  - c. Fwd deployment of  
mil tpt ac.
3. Sec D Cts NATO  
file 68/3 Encl 3/1.

Package 2 (Operations Following a Denial of Access)

3. Rail Probes

Allied Trains and WAG  
personnel

1. Include: rapid and  
deliberate tripartite  
probes.
2. D Cts Staff(N)  
68/3 Encl 29d.

4. Road Probes

Allied Forces WAG  
from Berlin and  
FRG

1. Two tripartite  
probes from FRG and  
one from Berlin, and  
lesser actions by MP  
patrols and national  
convoys.



5. MATP Allied mil tpt ac WAG

2. LIVE OAK Air  
Option 1 (AO1)  
provides aerial recce  
in support of serials  
3 and 4.

1. Military Air  
Transport Probe.  
2. Serials 5 to 9  
incl and Serials  
12,13 and 15 are  
covered by CINCUSAFE  
Oplan 444 which is  
agreed by UK.  
3. See also Serials  
15.

6. MSAP Allied Civ tpt ac WAG

Air probe using  
civilian flown by  
military and certain  
categories of civil  
aircrew.

7. CAL Allied mil tpt ac WAG

Use of Allied mil tpt  
ac for the maintenance  
civ pax mov following  
the suspension of  
civil airline  
operations.

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8. CAO CINCUSAFE WAG Provides for the coord of civil and military air operations in the corridor by CINCUSAFE on behalf of Commander LIVE OAK.
9. GAL/NEO CINCUSAFE See 8e CINCUSAFE will be responsible for the coord of schedules of aircraft conducting national operations for Garrison Airlift (GAL) and NEO Non-combattant Evacuation Operations

Package 3 (The Use of Force to Re-establish Access)

10. TTF Allied force of WAG approx two coy size Formed from forces in FRG
1. Tripartite Task Force: provides for the use of military force to overcome obstacles to ground probes.



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Can be assembled and trained more rapidly than serial 11.  
2. D Cts Staff(N) 68/3 Encl 27.

A stronger force than 10.

Air Option 1 provides for the use of aerial reconnaissance in support of Allied ground access plans in packages 2 and 3.

Provides support for serials 10 and 11. Proposals in being to increase size of force, support with AEW and include SEAD ac.

11. TBG

Allied force of approx four coy size found from forces in FRG.

WAG

12. AO1

TBD

WAG

13. AO6

26 ground attack ac from Allied nations.

WAG

SECRET UK EYES A

Package 4 (Use of Greater Force to Re-establish Access)

- |     |                                   |                                     |     |
|-----|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----|
| 14. | JUNE BALL<br>OPERATIONAL<br>GROUP | Allied formation<br>of brigade size | WAG |
| 15. | Air Operations                    | Allied fighter<br>ac                | WAG |

1. Planning for the use of this force is far from complete, but the intention is to:
  - a. Seek a reinforced battalion from each nation and not from forces stationed in FRG.
  - b. Disassociate the plan from the NATO BERCONS.
2. D Cts Staff(N)  
68/3 Encl 5.

Air Options 2, 3 and 4 provide variously for the use of fighter aircraft along the IGB, in the area of the corridor exits into FRG airspace, or in the corridors themselves in support of air probe (serials 5, 6 and 7).

SECRET UK EYES A



Maritime Countermeasures

16. Under the authority of the WAG and on the recommendation of a quadripartite committee (DEEP SEA) sitting at USCINCLANT's HQ in Norfolk, Virginia, Maritime Countermeasures (MARCONS) of various types may be conducted against Soviet and GDR shipping. Operations are coordinated by their Naval Coordinating Centres (NAVCORCENTs): SEA SPRAY (US CINCLANT), LIVE OAK and DEEP SEA (USCINCPAC in Hawaii).

UK NATIONAL PLANS (AIR)

Serial (a)	Title (b)	Forces (c)	Authority (d)	Remarks/Description (e)
1.	5/85	RAF C-130	National in coord with Allies	Demonstration of Allied refusal to accept unilateral Soviet air corridor reservations. (Op MAIDSTONE)
2.	6/77 6/79	RAF VC10 and C-130	Ditto	RAFG 6/77 and STC 6/79 cover UK support to Quadripartite Airlift (QBAL) Plan. Tripartite Nations provide airlift for 8000 tonnes and 1800 pax per day by L+90; FRG provide the distribution system and the freight itself.
3.	13/84	RAF C-130	National	RAFG plan 13/84 provides for regular flights by RAF tpt ac in the BCZ in exercise of our rights and for training purposes.



SECRET UK EYES A

- |    |                |                                |                                     |   |
|----|----------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|
| 4. | JTP 321        | Civil/Military Aircraft        | National                            | Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (6240 persons). Assuming Gatow handles 72 sorties per day, complete in 1 day.  |
| 5. | Garrison       | RAF C-130 Airlift              | National                            | Over and above QBAL if logistic support of garrison deemed necessary.   |
| 6. | 5/77           | Various RAFG and RAFSTC assets | National in support of WAG decision | RAFG Opo 5/77 (Op KOFF) provides national transport ac and related assets in support of CINCUSAFE Oplan 444 (See Annex C Serial 5).                           |
| 7. | 17/78<br>28/78 | Ditto                          | Ditto                               | RAFG Opo 17/78 (Op LANIER) and HQSTC Op 028/78 provide the national OS and AD ac and related assets in support of CINCUSAFE Oplan 444 (See Annex C Serial 5). |
| 8. | JTP 438        | RAF C-130                      | National                            | Emergency Return of a Berlin based infantry battalion temporarily deployed to West Germany for training.  |

SECRET UK EYES A

9.

JTP 423 UK civil  
aircraft

National

Evacuation of 26SU and 13  
Sig Regt (550 persons).

- 3 -

SECRET UK EYES A

(ROSS\UK)



ANNEX E

BERLIN: LOGISTICS ASPECTS

1. Whilst there are no plans to reinforce the Berlin Garrison, a number of Allied and national contingency plans exist. These are summarized at Annexes C and D. Most could be modified to reflect the situation at the time.

2. Additional logistics data is as follows:

a. Food. The Berlin Garrison (including BMG and dependents) is self sufficient in rations for up to 150 days. Mobile kitchen facilities are scaled to support the regular forces. (The Berlin Senat has food stockpiles to sustain the civilian population).

b. POL. Stocks of POL (including stocks held by SHELL in dispersed civilian depots) would provide up to 180 days of supply. (Aviation fuel stock figures are not yet known).

c. Ammunition. 10 days' stock at General War rates is held - principally small arms, some anti-tank and MBT ammuni

d. Medical. An 82 bed hospital is available; overflow would be directed to civilian hospitals. Medical stores provide up to 210 days of supply, and a small number (27) of Ambulances are available. (Additionally, 29 commercial motor coaches are available).

e. Internal Security Packs. Three coys worth of IS Packs are held in Battalion lines; further packs would need to be moved from the reserve stocks held in the Regional Depot at Thatcham. The IS Packs are considered to be very basic, reflecting the decreasing likelihood over the years that troops would be deployed on IS duties.

f. Military Trains. The British Military Train runs 364 days/year between Brunswick and Berlin for the carriage of passengers.

Brunswick		Berlin
1530	-----	1945
1246	-----	0835

28 x ambulance coaches are held at the Rly Sqn in Monchengladbach. Each coach provides for 37 stretchers and is self-contained in fuel and water. Freight trains are also run to and from Berlin though much less frequently than the passenger train.



g. Logistics Orbat. The logistics orbat consists of 1 x Supply Coy, 1 x Fd Wksp, 1 x Tpt Sqn; all heavily civilianised. There is also 1 x RE Sqn and a very small EOD capability. A small Supply Sqn and Air Movements Unit are located at RAF Gatow.

h. Vehicles. A basic vehicles pack is held in the Vehicles Depot in Berlin should a unit training in FRG have to return by air without its own vehicles. Maintenance stocks are limited.

CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE

1. The Berlin Allies have approved a plan, prepared by Allied Staff Berlin (ASB) and known as EPIC EAGLE, for the deliberate defence of the city against a conventional attack by WP ground and air forces. The plan would only be executed on the instructions of the 3 governments (other than in exceptional circumstances such as threat of imminent attack or lack of communications).
2. The US Commandant (USCOB) takes operational control of the Allied Forces under EPIC EAGLE and reports to Commander LIVE OAK.
3. There are also two plans which cover Allied actions in the face of an attack with less than the 48 hours warning and preparation time envisaged in Oplan EPIC EAGLE.