

Prime Minister 22(a-f)

COP 257. COPY NO: 19

SECRET BURNING BUSH

FROM : P J Weston

DATE : 25 January 1990

cc : PS/Mr Waldegrave Copy No 2
PS/Mr Maude 3
PS/PUS 4
Mr Gillmore 5
Mr Tomkys 6
Mr Goulden 7
Mr Ratford 8
Mr Tait 9
Mr Beamish 10
Mr Hemans, Soviet Dep 11
Mr Hulse, EED 12
Mr Lever, Sec Pol Dep 13
Mr Synnott, WED 14
Mr Burns, NAD 15
Mr Summerscale,
CSCE Unit 16
Mr Burns, News Dep 17

Private Secretary
Copy No 1

QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS, WASHINGTON,
23 JANUARY

1. I attended my first quadripartite meeting of Political Directors in Washington on 23 January. The meeting was chaired by Ray Seitz but Bob Kimmitt hosted lunch and gave us an authoritative run-down of the Administration's view on regional issues prior to the Baker/Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow.

2. We agreed in principle that a ministerial quad should be held in the margins of the Ottawa Open Skies Conference (11-13 February). Genscher has offered to act as host and will propose a time in due course. I conveyed the Secretary of State's invitation to his colleagues to a ministerial quad at Chevening on 6 June. This was also agreed in principle and partners will confirm acceptance of the time as soon as possible.

SECRET BURNING BUSH

QODAAF

German Question

3. Some plain speaking here. We agreed on the importance of using the quadripartite forum to keep each other informed of developments on the German question, even between meetings if necessary. Kastrup provided little new information about German thinking but passionately warned of the dangers of giving the impression that the Four Powers were a directorate deciding the future of Germany over the heads of the Germans themselves. Four Power discussions should in his view be strictly limited to Berlin. I said our commitment to free self determination on the German question was long-standing and well known and the Prime Minister was on public record to this effect with Kohl. While we had an obligation to respect German sensitivities and wished to work with them the Germans should not forget that others had sensitivities too. It was in no-one's interest that German unification be brought about at the expense of destroying the political realities of Europe. The Four Power forum could inter alia on occasion be useful in reassuring the Soviet Union. We should therefore be careful in our reply to Shevardnadze not to slam the door in the Russians' face completely.

4. The Americans and French supported me in arguing that the Four Power forum would continue to have a role and could be useful in helping to reassure the Soviet Union. It became increasingly clear that Kastrup's main complaint was that the Germans were excluded from the Four Power meetings, although he never actually brought himself formally to propose inclusion of the FRG (or GDR). He conceded in the end that the Four Power forum might have a role in reassuring the Russians. But he insisted that we must be clear that we were not adopting the Soviet approach, which smacked of establishing a directorate.

5. Kastrup put forward the formal German proposal for direct elections of Berlin's representatives to the FRG Parliament. The CDU apparently got cold feet about this proposal at the last moment but the German Cabinet decided to go ahead with it at their meeting on 22 January. We, the French and the Americans agreed to study the proposal in a positive spirit. The French pointed out possible legal problems. We agreed with them that under the Quadripartite Agreement the Russians would need to be consulted. Kastrup emphasised the political sensitivity of this question and asked that it not be left in the hands of legal experts alone. Speed would be of the essence if the legislation was

put in place in time for elections in October.

6. The Germans do not yet have concrete proposals on the reform of the Berlin aviation regime. They have promised to come up with concrete proposals in the Bonn Group soon, but it is already clear that we will have difficulties in agreeing the details.

CSCE/CFE

7. Kastrup announced that Genscher, Dumas and De Michelis would speak at the CFE plenary in Vienna on 25 January. All three would call for a major effort to complete CSBM negotiations at the same time as the CFE Treaty and for the CSCE summit to decide on follow-up negotiations on conventional disarmament. Genscher will apparently go on to appeal to participants to begin work on a mandate for new conventional force negotiations immediately after signature of CFE 1. Seitz expressed displeasure at learning so late of the three Foreign Ministers' plans. He argued that the proposals should have been discussed first in NATO. I said that, as far as we understood it, this was merely a national initiative and other members of NATO including the UK were not committed.

8. Seitz said the US Administration believed that follow-up negotiations on conventional arms control were both desirable and inevitable. But the new negotiations would not necessarily resemble CFE in terms of perspective, approach or exclusivity. We should be careful not to legitimise the Warsaw Pact nor to establish floors on Soviet force levels in Eastern Europe. The budget deficit and political pressure for a peace dividend meant the US would have to cut defence expenditure. If for example Congress was faced with a choice between cutting a base in the UK or a base in Alabama, the UK base would be cut every time.

9. We explained to the Americans the decision in principle of the 12 Foreign Ministers to agree to a CSCE summit this year. Seitz said the Administration would probably go along with a CSCE summit. But their agreement would be conditional on completion of the CFE Treaty and agreement to take into the CSCE regime proposals on democratic elections, which they will launch at the Copenhagen CDH meeting. Both the Americans and Germans are working on specific ideas for new roles for the CSCE.

Soviet Union

10. Seitz outlined the main themes for the Baker/Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow (the dates of which may now

need to be changed because of the postponement of the Central Committee Plenum). These will include :

- START, where Baker hopes to have some flexibility on ALCMs

- Regional issues including Afghanistan and Central America. The Americans still feel that regional issues are lagging behind progress on arms control and this could pose difficulties when it comes to Senate ratification of CFE and START Treaties.

- Follow-up to the American proposals on economic cooperation made at the Malta summit.

- Internal Soviet developments.

11. We agreed that the Soviet leadership faced significant problems on all sides. On balance it seemed that Gorbachev would survive but there were no obvious solutions to the problems. The Americans and French explained the difficulties they face in being even-handed on Azerbaijan because of the large Armenian communities in their countries. The United States was trying to make it clear to the Soviet Union that it would avoid fishing in troubled waters.

12. Prior to the meeting we had circulated a discussion paper on contingency planning for the Baltic Republics (and East Europe more generally). This produced a useful discussion. Our allies expect the extremes of UDI or Tiananmen Square to be avoided in the Baltic. More probable is a form of creeping separatism involving negotiations between the Popular Fronts and the central government. We believed we could deal with the Baltic republics as a special case and continue to oppose the general dismemberment of the Soviet Union. I urged our German colleague to produce a contingency paper on the GDR and our French colleague to produce a paper on Yugoslavia. It appeared to be accepted that such papers might be useful in future, and that we should continue to compare notes on how to respond to events while stopping short of formal policy coordination.

Regional Issues

13. Bob Kimmitt briefed us on the new US policy on Afghanistan. The Americans do not believe there is sufficient political or military pressure for the Russians

to agree to drop Najibullah straight away. The Americans therefore intend to flesh out the transition process referred to by the Russians at Wyoming. This would also involve the removal of Najibullah. The first stage would be to make the AIG more representative, and in particular to include Shiite representatives. The second stage would be a dialogue between the new resistance leadership and forces in Kabul and other cities inside Afghanistan with the aim of creating a new entity to replace Najibullah. The resistance could probably agree that this new body should include certain PDPA representatives, and as long as they did so the Soviet Union could probably afford to ditch Najibullah. The third stage would consist of elections or a jirgha to legitimise the new government and allow self determination and a return of refugees. During his recent visit to the region Kimmitt had found a generally positive response to this plan from the resistance, the Saudis and the Pakistanis. The only person to reject it was Hekmatyar and this might in itself prove to be an advantage. The Americans intend to put this proposal to the Soviet Union at the Moscow meeting.


14. Kimmitt said the Americans hoped to withdraw their troops from Panama before the President's visit to the Cartagena summit, and preferably before the Moscow meeting. They had just received a message from Shevardnadze saying that the Soviet Union had managed to maintain a restrained response so far but the time had come for American troops to leave.

15. Kimmitt said the Administration was concerned about the confrontation with Congress on China. If they could resist the attempt to override the President's veto on the Bill on Chinese students they should be able to resist further sanctions. But they were not certain they would be able to do so. I put in a plug for the Solarz proposals on visas for Hong Kongers.

16. Kimmitt said Baker had arranged meetings on South Africa in late February with Republican and Democrat Congressmen. This should neutralise any immediate pressure on sanctions against South Africa from people like Congressman Wolpe. He thought that sanctions would not be a major problem this year with Congress this year if present trends continued.

17. Summing up. We agreed at the outset that this quadripartite forum should increasingly approach its agenda from an operational, policy-oriented, rather than just analytical perspective. Though there will be natural limits

to formal coordination given French attitudes, this is encouraging. On the German question and on the political aspects of security issues the Quad has a particularly important role to play.



P J Weston

25 January 1990