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WASHINGTON FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND THE GERMAN QUESTION : SPEECH BY VAN DEN BROEK

SUMMARY

1. VAN DEN BROEK DELIVERS MAJOR SPEECH SETTING OUT DUTCH VIEWS ON THE FUTURE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE. JUSTIFIES DUTCH RETINENCE TOWARDS SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR GDR OVER EC ACCESSION. SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIC UNIFICATION OF GERMANY, INTEGRATED WITHIN WESTERN EUROPE AND WITH RECOGNISED BORDERS. ENHANCED ROLES FOR COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND CSCE: THE LATTER COULD FORM THE BASIS OF A REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM. MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO EASTERN EUROPE SUPPORTED.

DETAIL

2. SPEAKING IN THE ANNUAL DEBATE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE SECOND CHAMBER OF PARLIAMENT ON 25 JANUARY, VAN DEN BROEK SAID THAT CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE HAD REACHED THE POINT OF NO RETURN. MEANWHILE, UNITY AND FREEDOM FOR THE TWO GERMANIES WAS NOW AN ATTAINABLE GOAL. A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE GERMAN QUESTION WAS OF GREAT POLITICAL URGENCY.

3. SINCE THE WAR THE NETHERLANDS HAD FACED TWO PROBLEMS: THE 'RUSSIAN PROBLEM' AND THE 'GERMAN PROBLEM'. THESE HAD BEEN ADDRESSED BY A COMBINATION OF ATLANTIC SECURITY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. DUTCH RELATIONS WITH GERMANY HAD ALWAYS BEEN OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. BUT SINCE THE WAR, THE ISSUE OF HOW TO COPE WITH A STRONG GERMANY AT THE CENTRE OF EUROPE HAD BEEN MASKED BY SOVIET DOMINATION. NOW IT HAD BECOME NECESSARY TO AVOID A SOLUTION OF THE GERMAN QUESTION (IE THE DIVISION OF GERMANY) WHICH WOULD RESURRECT THE OLD GERMAN PROBLEM (POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HOMELESSNESS).

REUNIFICATION

4. THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY QUESTION OF BEING FOR OR AGAINST REUNIFICATION. IT REMAINED ONLY TO SETTLE THE CONDITIONS AND

TIMESCALE. THE STRASBOURG SUMMIT SET OUT THE BASIC CONDITIONS. GERMAN UNIFICATION MUST NOT BE BURDENED WITH UNCERTAINTIES OVER THE POLISH BORDER. RECENT STATEMENTS FROM THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE ODER-NEISSE BORDER WAS NOT IN QUESTION, HAD BEEN HELPFUL. A CONTINUING WESTERN ORIENTATION OF GERMANY WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHEN THE CHOICE MADE FOR DEMOCRACY. A NEW GERMANY 'MUST BE A MEMBER OF THE EC AND NATO'.

EC/GDR

5. THERE WERE THREE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS: (1) THE GDR, THROUGH REUNIFICATION WITH THE FRG COULD BECOME AUTOMATICALLY PART OF THE EC, (2) THE GDR COULD JOIN THE EC AS A MEMBER STATE, (3) THE GDR DID NOT BECOME A MEMBER STATE, BUT HER RELATIONS WITH THE EC COULD BE BASED ON A COOPERATION OR ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT. IN DUBLIN, VAN DEN BROEK HAD MADE CLEAR THAT HE FULLY ACCEPTED THE FIRST OPTION. BUT HE HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT HANDLING THE SECOND OPTION IN THE WAY PROPOSED BY DELORS. IF THE POPULATION OF THE GDR PREFERRED THEIR OWN STATE, THEN THERE WAS NO REASON TO GIVE THIS STATE PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT AHEAD OF ANY OTHER APPLICANTS FOR MEMBERSHIP.

NATO

6. A GERMANY SECURELY ANCHORED IN WESTERN COOPERATION WOULD BE THE BEST GUARANTEE AGAINST THE RETURN OF THE GERMAN 'PROBLEM'. EVEN IF NEUTRALITY WAS AN OPTION, NO-ONE COULD EVER GUARANTEE THAT SUCH A LARGE STATE WOULD STAY NEUTRAL AND DISARMED. WAYS COULD BE FOUND TO ACCOMODATE SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS OVER THE WESTERN ORIENTATION OF A GREATER GERMANY, FOR EXAMPLE THE DEMILITARISATION OF THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER GDR AS PART OF A CFE AGREEMENT.

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

7. THE CORNERSTONES OF THE FUTURE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE WOULD BE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP. ONLY THE EC HAD THE COMBINATION OF EMOTIONAL APPEAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MEANS TO RECONCILE OLD ENEMIES. WEAKENING THE EC BY OVER-RAPID EXPANSION, OR A RETURN TO A EUROPE OF NATION STATES, WOULD ENDANGER THE INTERNAL COHESION OF THE EC AND THUS ITS BINDING AND CONCILIATING ROLE. THE SUCCESS OF INTEGRATION WAS THE MAIN ATTRACTION OF THE EC TO EASTERN EUROPE.

8. NO-ONE (NOT LEAST THE GDR) WOULD BE SERVED BY OVERRAPID ACCESSION TO THE EC. ALREADY A FIRST PHASE OF TRADE AND COOPERATION AGREEMENTS HAD BEGUN. THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE THE CONCLUSION OF SPECIAL ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS WITH NEWLY DEMOCRATISED COUNTRIES. THESE AGREEMENTS COULD BE DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN COUNTRIES AND SHOULD BE

NOT ONLY ECONOMIC, BUT INCLUDE POLITICAL, PARLIAMENTARY, ENVIROMENTAL AND OTHER FORMS OF COOPERATION.

TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

9. NATO, PERHAPS IN A MORE POLITICAL THAN MILITARY FORM, WOULD REMAIN A NECESSARY COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE SOVIET UNION, EVEN IF THE WARSAW PACT EVENTUALLY DISAPPEARED. COLLECTIVE DEFENCE WAS THE ONLY BASIS FOR COLLECIVE SECURITY. WESTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY COOPERATION AND A SECURITY POLICY DIMENSION TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION WERE TO BE EXPECTED . THE EUROPEAN/AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP COULD NOT BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED. THE EUROPEAN REPLY TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S CALL FOR GLOBAL POLITICAL COOPERATION SHOULD PROPOSE A COMMON ''EUROAMERICAN ACTION PLAN'', POSSIBLY INCLUDING NEW INSTITUTIONS.

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

10. WE SHOULD TAKE A POSITIVE VIEW OF APPLICATIONS BY EASTERN COUNTRIES TO JOIN THE COUNCIL. THE PROCESS SHOULD BE GRADUAL, STARTING WITH ACCESSION WITHIN DEFINED AREAS, AND COULD LEAD TO FULL MEMBERSHIP AND IN PARTICULAR TO ACCESSION TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION.

CSCE

11. THE CSCE WAS A VALUABLE INSTRUMENT, BEING BROADLY BASED, FLEXIBLE, AND PAN-EUROPEAN (INCLUDING NORTH AMERICA). IT COULD BE STRENGTHENED BY MORE FREQUENT MEETINGS AT A POLITICAL LEVEL: THREE YEAR GAPS BETWEEN SUMMITS WERE TOO LONG. FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD MEET ONCE OR TWICE A YEAR AND THEIR MEETINGS SHOULD BE WELL PREPARED. A PARLIAMENTARY COMPONENT TO CSCE SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED.

12. THE DUTCH SUPPORTED IDEAS UNDER DISCUSSION FOR A CSCE SUMMIT IN 1990 WHICH WOULD NEED THE MOST CAREFUL PREPARATION. IN THE LONGER TERM, WE SHOULD NOT EXCLUDE THE CSCE BECOMING THE BASIS FOR AN ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM, BUT THIS WAS SOME YEARS AWAY. THE IMMEDIATE TASK WAS TO PUT TOGETHER A NEXUS OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

13. MEANWHILE THE WARSAW PACT WOULD HAVE TO ADAPT TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES AND BECOME MORE OF AN ALLIANCE OF POLITICAL EQUALS. NEW GOVERNMENTS IN THE EAST WERE SHOWING STRATEGIC REALISM AS FAR AS THE WP WAS CONCERNED. BUT IF ANY WISHED TO LEAVE, THE WEST WOULD FACE AN UNCOMFORTABLE DILEMNA OVER THE BALANCE BETWEEN SELF DETERMINATION AND STABILITY.

AID

14. REGENERATION WAS MAINLY A MATTER FOR THE PEOPLE OF EASTERN EUROPE THEMSELVES. BUT WE SHOULD SUPPORT THIS PROCESS, BY AID AND BY TRADING CONCESSIONS. THE WEALTH OF EXPERIENCE AND CONTACTS DEVELOPED BY NGOS SHOULD NOT BE NEGLECTED. THE DUTCH CULTURAL EFFORT WOULD BE INCREASED, AND EXTRA STAFF SENT TO EMBASSIES IN EASTERN EUROPE. VISA POLICY, AND OTHER OBSTACLES TO INCREASED CONTACT WERE BEING EXAMINED WITH PARTNER COUNTRIES.

UK

15. REPLYING TO POINTS MADE IN THE DEBATE, VAN DEN BROEK SAID THAT AT DUBLIN, THE UK, BELGIUM AND FRANCE WERE ALSO CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE MANNER IN WHICH POSSIBLE GDR ACCESSION TO THE EC SHOULD BE APPROACHED. DOUBTS WHICH HAD BEEN EXPRESSED ABOUT THE UK'S COMMITMENT TO EUROPE WERE UNFOUNDED. THE UK WAS INTENSELY COMMITTED TO EUROPE. HE WAS CERTAIN THAT THE UK HAD AN IMPORTANT STABILISING ROLE TO PLAY IN EUROPE AND WOULD PLAY IT.

16. SEE MIFT

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