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BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING: 8/9 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING ON ISSUES TO BE RAISED AT THE BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING. EMPHASIS ON ARMS CONTROL, AND ON THE NEED NOT TO LET REGIONAL ISSUES LAG BEHIND. NO SURPRISES.

DETAIL

2. ON 2 FEBRUARY STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFED ALLIES (NATO PLUS KOREA, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA) ON THE FORTHCOMING BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING. KIMMITT SAID THAT THERE WAS IMPORTANT GROUND TO BE COVERED ON ARMS CONTROL TO PREPARE THE AGREEMENTS WHICH IT HAD BEEN DECIDED IN MALTA WOULD BE READY FOR JUNE. BUT HE ALSO STRESSED THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT REGIONAL ISSUES DID NOT LAG BEHIND.

3. REGIONAL ISSUES

(I) CENTRAL AMERICA

THE US DID NOT WANT THE SOVIET UNION TO DRAW THE WRONG CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE US INTERVENTION IN PANAMA, AND WOULD REASSURE THEM BY EXPLAINING THE REASONS BEHIND IT. THEY WOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF A FREE AND FAIR ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN NICARAGUA, AND HIGHLIGHT CONCERN ABOUT INTIMIDATION AND THE SANDINISTAS' REFUSAL TO ISSUE VISAS TO CERTAIN OBSERVERS. THEY WOULD RAISE RECENT SOVIET MI17 SHIPMENTS TO NICARAGUA, AND MIG29 SHIPMENTS TO CUBA.

(II) AFGHANISTAN

THE US WOULD EXPLAIN THEIR THREE-PHASED APPROACH IN DETAIL. THEY WANTED TO DISCUSS WHAT ROLE THE UN COULD PLAY.

(III) FAR EAST

THE US WERE CONCERNED THAT THE CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE WERE NOT REFLECTED IN THE FAR EAST. THEY HOPED FOR PROGRESS IN SOVIET/JAPAN RELATIONS (THE KEY WAS THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES), AND WOULD URGE SHEVARDNADZE TO PRESS NORTH KOREA ON IAEA SAFEGUARDS. THEY WOULD ENCOURAGE THE SOVIET UNION TO DEVELOP TIES WITH SOUTH KOREA. ON CAMBODIA THEY WANTED

SHEVARDNADZE TO URGE HUN SEN TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY.

(IV) OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES

THEY WOULD TRY TO GET SOVIET SUPPORT FOR US EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND WOULD ENCOURAGE THE SOVIET UNION TO SEND THE RIGHT MESSAGES TO ITS CLIENTS AND TO PURSUE THE RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. ON ANGOLA, THEY WANTED THE RUSSIANS TO INTERCEDE WITH DOS SANTOS AND THE MPLA HARDLINERS TO PROMOTE A CEASEFIRE. THEY WANTED TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMON US/SOVIET ACTION TO RESPOND TO FAMINE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA.

4. ARMS CONTROL

BARTHOLOMEW SAID BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE WOULD HAVE A FULL AGENDA ON ARMS CONTROL. THE US WERE HOPING TO GET REAL BUSINESS DONE. THEY WOULD COVER START, CW, NUCLEAR TESTS, CFE, OPEN SKIES.

(I) START

THEY WANTED TO RESOLVE THE THREE ISSUES OF ALCMS, NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES AND TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION. ON ALCMS THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS. THE US HOPED TO RETAIN FLEXIBILITY OVER THEIR OWN DEPLOYMENTS WHILE ADDRESSING SOVIET CONCERNS. ON NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES THE POSITION REMAINED THAT THE US REQUIRED NUMERICAL LIMITS, ON SPECIFIC TYPES (NOT SLBMS), AND THE SOVIET UNION PREFERRED NO LIMITS BUT GEOGRAPHIC/DATA CONDITIONS INSTEAD. THERE HAD BEEN SOME PROGRESS LAST WEEK IN GENEVA ON TELEMETRY. THE ISSUE REMAINED DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX. THE US WOULD FLESH OUT THEIR REQUIREMENTS ON THE FOLLOWING: VERIFICATION OF MOBILE MISSILES, PHASING OF REDUCTIONS AND DURATION OF THE TREATY (LONG AND FIXED, RATHER THAN OPEN-ENDED). THERE WOULD BE NO GIVE ON SDI.

(II) SLCMS

THEY EXPECTED THE RUSSIANS TO PRESS FOR THESE TO BE DEALT WITH SEPARATELY FROM START. THE US WOULD ELABORATE THEIR PREFERRED POLICY OF NON-BINDING DECLARATIONS.

(III) CW

THEY WOULD PRESS THE PACKAGE BUSH PRESENTED AT MALTA IE A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD COMMIT BOTH SIDES TO WORK FOR A GLOBAL CONVENTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH IMMEDIATE BILATERAL REDUCTIONS TO 8000 TONNES AND REDUCTION TO 500 OVER EIGHT YEARS. THE ONLY NEW ELEMENT WOULD BE COOPERATION ON CW DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY (WHERE THE RUSSIANS HAD PROBLEMS).

(IV) CFE

THEY WOULD PRESENT THEIR REVISED MANPOWER PROPOSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE ZONAL ASPECTS (IE WHETHER THE CENTRAL ZONE SHOULD BE ENLARGED OR NOT), THEY WOULD PRESS FOR PROGRESS ON

AIRCRAFT AND OPEN SKIES. BARTHOLOMEW INTERRUPTED THE BRIEFING TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE US ATTRIBUTED TO COMPLETING A CFE AGREEMENT RAPIDLY. THE US WERE DOING THEIR BIT. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO LEAVE THE ISSUES TO THE TECHNICIANS. THE RECENT US DECISION TO JOIN THE ALLIED CONSENSUS ON HELICOPTERS HAD BEEN TAKEN PERSONALLY BY BAKER, SCOWCROFT AND CHENEY. HE HOPED THAT THE PROPOSALS ON AIRCRAFT WOULD BE GIVEN SIMILAR POLITICAL ATTENTION BY THE ALLIES.

(V) CSCE

THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR ASKED ABOUT US ATTITUDES TO A CSCE SUMMIT IN 1990. KIMMITT REITERATED THE CONDITIONS GIVEN BY BAKER IN HIS SENATE HEARING TESTIMONY ON 1 FEBRUARY: A CFE AGREEMENT WAS A PRIORITY; THE 1990 CSCE SUMMIT SHOULD BE A PREPARATION FOR HELSINKI 1992, AND THE US WOULD SEEK PROGRESS ON ITS ELECTIONS PROPOSAL.

5. BILATERAL US/SOVIET ISSUES

(I) ECONOMIC

KAMMAN (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY) SAID THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON A TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BEGIN ON 9 FEBRUARY. NEGOTIATIONS ON AN INVESTMENT AGREEMENT WOULD BEGIN BY THE END OF FEBRUARY. THEY WERE WAITING FOR FURTHER SOVIET IDEAS ON A TAX TREATY. IN MOSCOW THEY WOULD PRESS THE RUSSIANS ON THEIR EMIGRATION LEGISLATION (NECESSARY FOR A JACKSON/VANIK WAIVER) AND EXPLORE WHAT MORE MIGHT BE DONE TO ADVISE ON MACRO ECONOMIC MATTERS. THERE WOULD ALSO BE DISCUSSION OF COOPERATION IN TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC FIELDS.

(II) TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

THEY WOULD DISCUSS COOPERATION ON ENVIRONMENT, BOTH BILATERALLY AND GLOBALLY (WHERE THE RUSSIANS WERE INTERESTED IN USING THE UN). NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN IN MARCH ON COUNTER TERRORISM. THEY WOULD ALSO TAKE STOCK OF COOPERATION ON NARCOTICS.

(III) HUMAN RIGHTS

THE US WANTED TO FINISH THE OLD AGENDA OF DIVIDED FAMILIES, AND OF REFUSENIK CASES. THERE WERE ABOUT 100 OUTSTANDING CASES. THEY HOPED THIS COULD BE REDUCED TO ZERO BY JUNE. THEY WERE ALSO HOPING TO EXPAND INTO COOPERATION ON WELFARE, CONCERN FOR THE DISABLED ETC.

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