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EAST/WEST: SHEVARDNADZE'S INTERVIEW IN IZVESTIA, 19 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. SHEVARDNADZE GIVES A WIDE-RANGING INTERVIEW TO SOVIET JOURNALISTS. MIFTS (NOT TO ALL) RECORD HIS COMMENTS ON INTERNAL ASPECTS, SOVIET UNION/ISRAEL AND CENTRAL AMERICA. THIS TELEGRAM REPORTS ON EAST/WEST, GERMANY AND THE WARSAW PACT.

2. SATISFACTION WITH IMPROVED SOVIET IMAGE ABORAD. DELIBERATE SOVIET SILENCE ABOUT GERMANY DURING "OPEN SKIES" CONFERENCE. SHEVARDNADZE ARGUES FOR A LONG PROCESS. WEDGE DRIVING NO LONGER SOVIET POLICY. THE MISTAKES OF EASTERN EUROPE'S OLD GUARD. THE WARSAW PACT IS LIKELY TO SURVIVE BUT THE SOVIET UNION IS READY TO WITHDRAW ALL TROOPS FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY AND POLAND.

DETAIL

3. RETURNING FROM WYOMING LAST SEPTEMBER, SHEVARDNADZE GAVE SOVIET JOURNALISTS AN IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW ON BOARD HIS PLANE. HE REPEATED THIS ON THE WAY BACK FROM OTTAWA.

4. ASKED IF HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE VISIT TO CANADA, SHEVARDNADZE RECALLED HIS FIRST VISIT IN 1986 WHEN THE SOVIET EMBASSY HAD BEEN PICKETED BY REFUSENIK SUPPORTERS. 41 MONTHS LATER THE ATMOSPHERE WAS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT. "WE WERE RECEIVED WARMLY AND OPENLY. PEOPLE TRUST US MORE AND HAVE STOPPED BEING FRIGHTENED OF US."

GERMANY

5. SHEVARDNADZE EXPECTED THAT THE JOURNALISTS WOULD HAVE NOTICED THE ABSENCE OF THE EUROPEAN ASPECT IN HIS SPEECH AT THE OPEN SKIES CONFERENCE. THIS WAS BECAUSE ALL THE WESTERN POLITICIANS (HIS "COLLEAGUES") HAD EXHAUSTED THE THEME BEFORE THE CONFERENCE, AND ALL HAD FAVOURED GERMANY REMAINING IN NATO. SHEVARDNADZE COULD NOT AGREE TO THIS: BUT IF HE HAD ADVANCED HIS VIEW, IT WOULD HAVE DISTRACTED THE CONFERENCE FROM ITS MAIN THEME.

6. SHEVARDNADZE SUGGESTED THAT THE MEANS OF RESOLVING THE GERMAN QUESTION REMAINED OPEN. THE MODROW CONCEPT HAD ATTRACTIONS. HE CONDEMNED THOSE WHO SAW UNIFICATION AS AN ELECTORAL ISSUE. HE HAD REMINDED GENSCHER THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT SPOKEN THEIR FINAL WORD. MOSCOW WOULD NOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO A UNITED GERMANY JOINING NATO. THEY HAD OTHER IDEAS UP THEIR SLEEVES.

7. LOOKED AT FROM THE ECONOMIC ANGLE, THE SOVIET UNION STOOD TO GAIN FROM UNIFICATION. THEY WOULD EXPECT TO BE PAID AT WORLD PRICES IN HARD CURRENCY FOR THEIR OIL. ALSO, HE IMPLIED PLANTS IN THE GDR WOULD FIND IT HARD TO FIND A NON-SOVIET MARKET FOR THEIR OUTPUT.

8. AS TO THE TIME PERIOD, SHEVARDNADZE PREDICTED THAT UNIFICATION WOULD TAKE SEVERAL YEARS.

US-SOVIET UNION

9. SHEVARDNADZE CLAIMED THAT SOVIET "EUROPEAN STRATEGY" HAD CHANGED RADICALLY. SOME TIME AGO, ITS MAIN PURPOSE HAD BEEN TO DRIVE THE AMERICANS OUT OF EUROPE. NOW, AS GORBACHEV SAID AT MALTA, THE RUSSIANS NO LONGER LOOKED ON THE UNITED STATES AS AN OPPONENT. "THESE WERE VERY BRAVE WORDS, AND WERE VERY DIFFICULT TO SAY." PREVIOUSLY, THE RUSSIAN REACTION TO ANY AMERICAN INITIATIVE HAD BEEN TO REJECT IT OUT OF HAND. NOW, THEY LOOK FOR THE RATIONAL GRAIN AT THE HEART OF THE IDEA. THAT WAS HOW THEY HAD REACHED AGREEMENT ON FORCE LEVELS.

EASTERN EUROPE.

10. SHEVARDNADZE DENIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN CAUGHT NAPPING BY EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE RUSSIANS HAD RECOGNISED THE NEED FOR REFORM IN EAST GERMANY TWO YEARS AGO. BUT HAVING ESPOUSED "NEW THINKING", THEY COULD NOT IMPOSE CHANGE ON HONECKER. VOROTNIKOV (LIKE SHCHERBITSKY BEFORE HIM) HAD COMPLAINED OF HAVING TO STAND AND APPLAUD CEAUCESCU DOZENS OF TIMES.

WARSAW PACT

11. A JOURNALIST ASKED IF THE WARSAW PACT WAS LIKELY TO FALL APART. SHEVARDNADZE THOUGHT NOT. "UNTIL THE GERMAN QUESTION IS SETTLED, THE CZECHS, AND THE POLES MORE SO, HAVE AN INTEREST IN STABILITY GUARANTEES". THE QUESTION OF SOVIET STATIONED TROOPS WAS A DIFFERENT MATTER. THE RUSSIANS HAD ALREADY INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY. IF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WISHED, THE RUSSIANS WERE CONTENT TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS. SKUBISZEWSKI HAD SAID THIS WAS NOT AN ISSUE, BUT THERE WERE UNOFFICIAL DEMANDS.

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WORKING PAPER - DRAFT

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THE EMERGING SOVIET VISION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

by

Phillip A. Petersen

The emerging Soviet revolutionary vision of future European security is directly related to the life and ideas of Yuri Andropov. As Raisa Gorbachev was reported to have said to Mrs. Averell Harriman, "We owe everything to him." A protege of the Finnish-born communist, Otto Kuusinen, Andropov's early career was intertwined with the history of Russo-Finnish relations until his 1951 transfer to the Central Committee apparatus of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). During these years in Karelia, Andropov learned to speak Finnish and made an intellectual effort to understand the Finns that allowed him to demonstrate an impressive grasp of Finnish society in his 1983 meeting with Finnish President Mauno Koivisto. In 1953, Andropov was transferred to the Foreign Ministry and, after a brief time as head of the Fourth European Countries Department (responsible for Poland and Czechoslovakia), was subsequently posted to the Soviet embassy in Budapest. It is fair to assume that Andropov drew some conclusions from his experiences which could be expected to have left him, at the very least, sympathetic to views articulated by the policy "consultants" Kuusinen had assembled at the Kremlin secretariat and inherited by Andropov when he served in the secretariat from 1962 until his appointment as chief of the Committee for State Security (*KGB*) in 1967. Kuusinen's "consultants," names like Fedor Burlatsky, Georgi Arbatov, Alexander Bovin, and Oleg Bogomolov, would figure prominently in the *glasnost* and *perestroika* of the future struggle to free the Soviet state from "the stagnation of the Brezhnev years."¹

Having observed the rot and decay of Soviet society for 15 years as head of the *KGB*, his disillusionment with the CPSU leadership led Andropov to gather about himself the best and the brightest for what would become a

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"revolution from above." They would be called to visit during his holidays in the Northern Caucasus to discuss the true situation both inside and outside the Soviet Union. Conversations during leisurely walks through the woods with the local CPSU first secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, undoubtedly became progressively more searching and candid.² It was probably during these discussions that a revolutionary pragmatism was forged by the appreciation that Soviet security would increasingly be dependent upon economic power and the mounting evidence of the magnitude of Soviet economic failure. What seems to have emerged was a nonzero-sum model of security emphasizing threat-reduction, unilateral restraint, and collaboration with adversaries. Georgi Arbatov, who is described as having been "a close friend of Andropov's,"³ would ultimately describe the new strategy as one of depriving the West of its "enemy."

The communist system imposed by Stalin on Central Europe as a means of insuring Soviet security was perceived as having been a counter-productive policy choice. Andropov revealed in a 1978 speech the essence of what subsequently would emerge as a new security model for Europe: "Our position is clear, Europe must become a continent of peace and good-neighbourly cooperation. Here, in Karelia, we have to emphasise the significance of the Soviet Union's good-neighbourly...cooperation with Finland. Soviet-Finnish relations today...represent the very kind of *detente* which makes for a more lasting peace..."⁴ Already by 1981 Andropov had concluded both that without change the Soviet economy would eventually come to the same fate as the Polish economy, and that Soviet-Finnish relations were on a more sound footing to withstand the rising economic crisis than were Soviet relations with its non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) allies.

Studies such as the so-called *Novosibirsk Report* by the sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya made clear "that the social mechanism of economic development as it functions at present in the USSR does not ensure satisfactory results. The social type of worker formed by it fails to correspond not only to the strategic aims of a developed socialist society, but also to the technological requirements of contemporary production."⁵ When this paper was presented at an April 1983 restricted seminar organized by economic departments of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the State Planning Commission, Zaslavskaya's professional affiliation was with the Institute of the

Economics and Organization of Industrial Production. This institute in Novosibirsk was headed by Abel Aganbegyan, who would later surface as Mikhail Gorbachev's economic mentor.

The revolutionary transformation of Soviet political leadership is directly related to economic conditions so adverse as to risk party control over the country.⁶ According to Oleg Bogomolov, a widening gap between the Soviet Union and the West in technological progress, productivity of labor, and living standards of the population, coupled with inflation and ecological disasters, permanent shortages of many essential goods, non-competitiveness of the majority of manufactures, and a falling economic growth rate are indicative of the very depth and pressing nature of the economic crisis facing the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Faced with "no choice other than a radical change of the existing social system," Bogomolov has argued that "a form of political pluralism, appropriate for the particular conditions and historic traditions of the country, has become an indispensable prerequisite" for successful economic recovery. This change in politics and the mechanisms of social organization is expected by Bogomolov to require "10 to 15 years and will be accompanied by an acute struggle of opinions and by conflicts between the old and new modes of action."⁷ It was already understood in the mid-1980s, however, that only cautious changes and experimentation could adequately prepare the ground for "radical" steps in the 1990s.⁸

The process of revolutionary transformation of Soviet society initiated by the decisions of the March and April 1985 Plenary Meetings of the CPSU Central Committee ultimately led, after nearly two years of discussions in the Soviet Defense Council,⁹ to the adoption of a military doctrine consistent with the assessment that security would be increasingly a political task. Although Soviet military scientists do appreciate that political methods of guaranteeing security (i.e., negotiations, agreements, treaties) can have great utility, civilian critics of the military point to an excessive tendency in the past for Soviet foreign policy to rely on military force. Aleksandr Bovin, for example, has written that "the deployment of SS-20 missiles and the introduction of troops in Afghanistan were...typical examples of subjective decisions oriented at the use of military force in foreign policy." His conclusion was that "in both cases we clearly overestimated our possibilities and underestimated what could be called the resistance of the environment."¹⁰

At least since 1985, therefore, Soviet theoreticians have been struggling with the development and implementation of a new approach to security that would reshape relations between the USSR and the rest of the world. Although the Soviets probably don't have a specific plan for an alternative security structure, there exists what may be properly called an evolving Soviet vision for the future structure of European security. Using Northern Europe as the "model," it was initially thought by the Soviets that a two-tier neutral zone comprised of "West-leaning" (i.e., Sweden) states and independent states that could confidently be depended upon to defend their territorial integrity (i.e., Finland) might be established throughout the rest of Europe. Such a zone might provide the Soviets with greater confidence in the determination of Poles, Czechoslovaks, and Hungarians to defend their respective states. Essentially, it was hoped by Soviet security theorists that they might be able to "Finlandize" states they could no longer control at an acceptable cost. For the Germans it meant the possibility of eventual unification, but at the price of neutrality.

By 1989, the transformation in the character of relations between the USSR and the socialist countries of Central Europe was said to be "already underway, and we understand and accept this *de facto*." It is explained that "where Soviet foreign policy interests are not challenged, and an attempt is made to set up a market economy and a pluralistic system, the processes taking place in these countries can be correctly understood by the Soviet Union."¹¹ Arguing that Soviet diplomacy toward the states of eastern Central Europe "should undergo profound restructuring in essence, methods and style," Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze explained to the Supreme Soviet that "new alternative forces are emerging on the political arena in some of these countries for the reason that this is what the people want."¹² Lest anyone misread Soviet commitment to "the principle of noninterference," senior Soviet parliamentarians noted that the Soviet Union would explicitly respect the decisions of its allies even with regard to withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.¹³ As the president of the new Hungarian Socialist Party summarized the new environment, "certainly, in Eastern Europe one cannot conduct policy that is openly anti-Soviet," but "the Soviet Union has ceased to be an ideological power; it no longer regards itself as the avant-garde of world revolution."¹⁴

That at least some Soviets believe that "Eastern Europe is much less important as a buffer zone than it was" is probably less important in this regard than the recognition that the NSWP states have common security concerns they share with the Soviet Union. This same Soviet participant in the 1989 meeting of the International Institute for East-West Security Studies expressed the belief, for example, that "Poland has an interest in being in an alliance with a great power in a time of rapid and uncertain change."¹⁵ Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev came to the conclusion that even with a coalition government in Poland headed by a non-Communist, the Polish interest in "the stability of the territory and state boundaries" have "remained the same, to a significant degree."¹⁶ Thus, despite the "historic" changes sweeping through the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states, Shevardnadze declared that "all these countries remain the Soviet Union's neighbors, allies, and friends."¹⁷

The remarkable march of events, however, built to a crescendo that would alter the basic planning assumption about Germany's future. A mass exodus of tens of thousands of East Germans first swept Erich Honecker from power, and then began to undermine the very existence of the Democratic Republic. Once the Berlin Wall was opened, the people of East Germany began to ask for what reason should they continue to sacrifice in the face of their own leaders' corruption. The easy solution was simply seen in the streets to be unification with the "successful" Germany, and neither the communists nor the government were perceived to have either the credible arguments or the power to prevent it. If eastern Germany is not soon united with the Federal Republic, the territory will simply become depopulated. The people have been so "deformed" by the system and have become so desperate that even with unification, an expensive colonization program will be required to repopulate the territory of eastern Germany. To even suggest that the Federal Republic overtly try to stop the 2,000-3,000 person daily exodus from East Germany risks precipitating a panic that would depopulate eastern Germany in a fortnight and, thereby, provoke a socio-economic crisis that could destabilize all of Europe.

NEW THINKING ON THE "GERMAN QUESTION"

Contrary to the assertions of those who argue that "the order of the day is the reform process in Eastern Europe and the GDR--that is, the improvement of the economic and political situation of the people who paid the most for the stability of sorts which the division of Europe has provided,"¹⁸ the "German Question" clearly looms larger over the evolving structure of Europe. In October 1989, West German President Richard von Weizsacker was reported to have said privately that he foresaw a confederation of the two Germanys within a decade.¹⁹ According to an opinion poll conducted among West Germans, 68% agreed with him.²⁰ That the Soviets and their allies foresaw the same probability was reflected in the October 27, 1989, Warsaw Pact declaration that "a common European home...rests with the unconditional respect for the inviolability of existing frontiers, territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of states."²¹ If this was not clear enough, the Polish President Jaruzelski argued that "Poland is the only European Country with a questioned border."²² Although newspaper headlines suggest the Soviets oppose unification of East and West Germany, closer examination reveals that most Soviet arguments are simply directed against either a reunification of the territories of the pre-war *Reich* or a unification of the German Democratic Republic with the Federal Republic *before* a new all-European security structure can be constructed. The Soviet historian Vyacheslav Dashichev, a German specialist and "advisor" to Gorbachev, admits that "we have had implanted in us rather firmly the opinion that the splitting of Germany into two German states best serves Soviet interests and the maintenance of European security." By the spring of 1989 he was arguing, however, that "it would seem that this view bears the seal of one-sidedness and conservatism, and the fear of making a sober appraisal of the German problem in all its dynamics and its close link with the other facts of international life and with the national needs of the Soviet Union."²³ The Soviet Ambassador to the United States has also argued that the fear of a single German state "is a kind of obsolete analysis. The world...has passed through this kind of spirit before. But now in the era of *perestroika*, we must learn to work together in a new way that will not repeat the past."²⁴

During the Bush-Gorbachev summit in Malta, according to US Secretary of State James A. Baker, the Soviet president told the American leader that "reunification gave the Soviet Union some problems that could push it too

hard, too fast, could create some real tension."²⁵ Clearly, noted one senior CPSU official, "the development of the German question played no small role in our decision to call for a new Helsinki conference."²⁶ From the Soviet perspective, the "Helsinki process" would prevent the debate on German unification from being dominated by the Germans. Furthermore, the Soviets don't want to take the heat alone for insisting the unification issue address the "European equilibrium." Although the Soviets are without a doubt themselves very wary of German unification, some Soviets are convinced that "the United States, Britain, and France do not want reunification of Germany and hope the Soviet Union would prevent such a development."²⁷ In fact, "few in Britain, France, or Italy expect a unified Germany to pose a military threat to their country." More people in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States favor unification of Germany than oppose it, so long as Germany remains in NATO. Even among West Germans as many oppose as favor a single German state if it were to entail the withdrawal of the Federal Republic from NATO in favor of a neutral status.²⁸

For Soviet security theorists, resolution of the "German Question" has become the central issue for obtaining "the liberation of the [USSR] from the terrible burden of struggling against the coalition of all the Western Powers," preventing use of "the economic might of the Common Market for political purposes that run counter to the interests of the Soviet Union," and avoiding the conversion of "the Common Market into a closed grouping" or "zone to which the access of commodities from East Europe will be limited."²⁹ The combination of old assumptions by security theorists and the quickening tempo of events in the NSWP states during 1989 led to new thinking by Gorbachev on the German question. By the end of January 1990, Gorbachev would be quoted by Tass, the official Soviet press agency, as noting that when considering the issue of German unification "no one casts doubt upon it." Although admitting that "time itself is having an impact on the process and lends dynamism to it," he argued that "it is essential to act responsibly and not seek the solution to this important issue in the streets."³⁰ Conceding the impending socio-economic crisis of opposing unification of East Germany with the Federal Republic, the East German communist party leader has also concluded that "this process cannot be stopped any more. But it is irresponsible to do things in such a way as if it were possible tomorrow. What is going on now appears to be to be too quick, too chaotic."³¹

The speed with which the German Question has come to dominate European security issues has led both the American and French Presidents to strongly endorse the 35-nation Conference on Stability and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a forum to discuss German unification.³² While the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher clearly would like to defer the German Question for at least another decade,³³ the U.S. ambassador to the Federal Republic has stated that reunification is inevitable and likely to occur within five years.³⁴ Even this estimate by Ambassador Walters, however, may be optimistic with regard to the time available to address the concerns of Germany's neighbors. One observer in East Berlin notes how the timetable is already being dictated in the streets: "The popular demands emerge at the Monday night demonstrations in Leipzig, and the rest of the week the government runs like hell to catch up."³⁵ As described by the head of an East German think tank, "We are stuck on fast-forward."³⁶ The rapid disintegration of the political structure of the German Democratic Republic has become a quasi-autonomous process. Czechoslovakia's new foreign minister predicts that "very soon there will be an 80 million-strong colossus in the form of a confederation of the two states."³⁷

SUBSTITUTING NEW STRUCTURES FOR THE WARSAW PACT

The nonzero-sum model of security that may be traced back to Andropov and his appreciation for the superiority of Soviet-Finnish relations over the relationship between the Soviet Union and its NSWP allies has evolved to a vision of European security that would both overcome the division of Europe and bridge the Atlantic to maintain the European link with Canada and the United States. This emerging vision seeks new missions for NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organizations, expands the European Community (EC) to include both greater political integration in the West and greater economic integration with the East, and injects new dynamism into the Helsinki process. Although the evolution of this vision can be traced back to Andropov, it is now consistent with the emerging Bush Administration vision of future European security.³⁸

The idea of a "common European home" goes far beyond DeGaulle's "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," and quickly dismisses Gorbachev's expression of concern over "an onslaught of 'mass culture' from across the Atlantic." It has developed into an inclusive concept allowing peripheral

states of both the East and West to reclaim their historic heritage. Despite his earlier mischievous message about American culture, Gorbachev has come to appreciate that Canada and the United States are already part of an existing "common home" of European political culture running from the Elbe to the Pacific. He hopes to eventually expand the boundaries of this "common home" to run from Pacific to Pacific. Beyond this, Gorbachev has also come to appreciate the contribution the North American states make to European stability. The vice rector of the diplomatic academy of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, for example, has argued that since "some circles in Western Europe feel their security is greater with American troops" present in Europe, "let them have it."³⁹ In fact, even a substantial majority of Poles would prefer to see the American forces stationed in Europe remain at the same level or be increased because it is perceived to offset the power of Germany.⁴⁰ Given the reassessment by Soviet theorists that "a certain presence of American troops--a limited presence--poses no danger"⁴¹ to Soviet security, evolving Soviet thoughts on the future security structure in Europe include a reassessment of the future role of the Warsaw and North Atlantic Treaty Organizations.

Despite having argued over time for a dissolution of the two security organizations, at least some Soviet theorists have concluded that "the idea of neutralizing the GDR and the FRG on the basis of their 'earliest possible withdrawal' from the military blocs has, on closer examination, proven to be a utopian idea."⁴² They, therefore, now argue that the alliances will have utility for the foreseeable future. Beyond the reassurance American troops provide to the West Europeans, such a presence is perceived to restrain the Federal Republic's autonomous foreign policy actions to the extent that it reinforces NATO as an institution. It is presently assessed, for example, that "more than 90 percent of the [West German Chancellor's] decisions have to be taken within the multilateral framework of NATO, the 'Common Market,' the European Parliament, and other organizations."⁴³ Thus, as Andrei Kokoshin stated during the summit at Malta, "we have no master plan, no desire to drive America out of Europe. In calling for a new Helsinki mechanism, we have chosen a framework that gives the United States and Canada legitimate roles in Europe."⁴⁴

While the Soviets talk of the maintenance of both the North Atlantic and Warsaw Treaty Organizations, for all intents and purposes the Warsaw Pact has already ceased to exist as an integrated military command. Other than in the

context of a mutual assistance treaty directed toward deterrence of any possible future German efforts to redraw the post-war territorial frontiers, the fiction of the Warsaw Treaty Organization will most likely be maintained for purposes of symmetry. In the opinion of some Soviet civilian security theoreticians, "there are common interests that justify the existence and development of WTO, chief among which are its member countries' common social and economic problems. All of them (the Soviet Union included) have fallen too far behind in their development to be accepted on an equal footing with the West in the process of the world's economic and political integration."⁴⁵ Thus, while the Warsaw Pact could continue to provide reassurance to the previous victims of German hegemony, it might also be transformed into an economic organization to provide the Soviet Union with a broad economic and political bridge to the West. Increasingly, Soviet theoreticians now "recognize that it is time to transform the Warsaw Pact from a military-political organization into a political-military one."⁴⁶

Beyond the Soviet desire to retain NATO as an instrument for the restraint of a unified Germany, the Soviets expect West European integration to dilute German political influence in Central Europe. The Soviets, French, and even the West Germans agree that burying the unified Germany within a supra-national "West European Confederation" based on several members of the European Community would resolve concerns over the maintenance of present borders. Under such a "mechanism" all "foreign" troops could be withdrawn from Central Europe. This would require only that American and British forces withdraw from western Germany as Soviet forces withdraw from eastern Germany. The *Bundeswehr* would cease to exist and, at least initially, the new supra-national army could be headed by a non-German commander. The continued presence of Belgian, Dutch, and French soldiers in Germany would further reinforce Polish and Soviet confidence on the territorial question. As noted by a former British Defense Minister, "it would not be impossible for NATO to accept that United States forces would not be deployed in a united Germany. The skill will come, however, in keeping American forces in Western Europe and in keeping a united Germany within the Western European security framework."⁴⁷

Less formal regional groupings are also expected to facilitate economic integration while contributing to the stabilization of the larger European-wide political system. The Italians, for example, are reported to be seeking to

organizing a regional grouping in the south to serve as "a balancing force to the German sphere of influence that many expect to emerge in the north."⁴⁸ For the other states participating in this regional grouping, membership in the EC is the goal. With eyes on membership in the EC, Austria and Hungary believe the road to Brussels runs through Rome. Furthermore, since the prosperous and westward-looking Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia are particularly attracted to the resurrection of what was once the *Mitteleuropa* of the Emperor Franz Josef, the less than enthusiastic Yugoslav federal government has found itself drawn into the process of economic integration and multi-party democratization to avoid disintegration of the federation.⁴⁹ Both Slovenia and Croatia have come to accept that "there can be no democratic socialism without political pluralism based on the right of political association and the competition of equal political subjects and programs."⁵⁰ Although politics initially limited the new regional grouping, "Czechoslovakia is an obvious future partner" since it too is a "successor state" of the defunct Hapsburg Empire.⁵¹

An additional instrument for restraining German nationalism is recognized in the resurgence of the old Austro-Hungarian ties. *Anschluss* could create a Germany that would stretch from the Baltic to almost the Adriatic. Such a "Greater Germany" would generate sufficient concerns to divide Europe once again. An Austria tied to a neutral Hungary by some form of economic union, however, would constitute an effective barrier to German political expansion to the south. Such a confederation would both appeal to Austrian pride as well as to Hungarian fears about becoming a "museum of the industrial revolution." As for the Soviet attitude, Fyodor Burlatsky, chairman of the human rights panel of the Supreme Soviet committee on foreign relations, has argued that "if Austria can be neutral, then why not Hungary."⁵² In fact, the Hungarians have already indicated that their armed forces are to be redirected toward the preparation for resistance to "any foreign intervention or aggression."⁵³

Where the Soviets see centripetal forces at action in the West, they are forced to contend with growing centrifugal forces in the East. Burlatsky has observed that "there is an asymmetry between the disintegration of Eastern Europe and the growing integration of Western Europe." As a result, he fears that Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union could become "an economic appendage of the West, a supplier of raw materials." The only alternative,

Burlatsky argues, is the creation of "a common market on the entire European continent."⁵⁴ The states of Western Europe, however, question whether Russia is too big, and too Asian, to fit in as a full member of the EC. Yet, as with Turkey, the potential political cost of exclusion is simply perceived as too high. The price of associate membership the Soviets will probably have to pay, on the other hand, will likely be the independence of the Baltic republics, since the Balts are determined to regain the independence *illegally* taken from them and West European politicians have *no* flexibility with regard to supporting Baltic self-determination. In fact, already "some [Soviet] officials have begun to say in private that the Baltic republics *might* be allowed to slip away,"⁵⁵ and Gorbachev assured Bush at their Malta summit that he has no intention of using force to resolve the issue.⁵⁶

Given the views expressed in the Soviet security policy community today, when the future structure of Europe is projected out to the year 2000 it appears something like what is depicted in the accompanying map. Although the map reflects essentially economic relationships, it is understood by most Soviet and other European strategic theoreticians that international security will increasingly depend upon economic relationships. As noted earlier, this is not a Soviet plan and, to the author's knowledge, there is no single source reflecting such a "Soviet view." This map reflects the compilation of "views" articulated in the Soviet security literature and in the discussions the author and other members of the OSD Policy Support Research Team have had with Soviet and NSWP security specialists both in and out of uniform. Although it represents a "still photo" view of a dynamic environment, it may be considered a guide or frame of reference for "pre-Helsinki" process discussions on the future European security structure.

Whatever future security constellation is produced by the Helsinki process, it must address the failure to create a stable and just conclusion to the chaos unleashed by the First World War. Despite the great differences between liberal-capitalist and Marxist-Leninist critiques of the European security environment produced by the First World War, the two ideologies have come to critically and objectively perceive this environment as a historical experience emerging from a particular set of political and economic institutions. Resolution of these differences requires an accommodation of the Leninist revolutionary perspective on national self-determination with the avoidance of a peace that would breed what Woodrow Wilson would call "a constantly

recurring sense of injustice."⁵⁷ The difficulties of achieving such an accomodation should not be underestimated.

MANAGING THE TRANSITION

Obviously, the transition to a new security structure will involve a series of stages. As noted earlier, the foundation of the new structure must consist of an economic integration that meets a fundamental sense of social justice. Towards this goal, the twelve nation European Community and the six nation European Free Trade Association (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) began the process of forging an expanded free trade area and customs union in December 1989.⁵⁸ The economic integration of Eastern Europe, however, will be more difficult. An East European Development Bank for assisting Yugoslavia and the Warsaw Pact states will probably be the initial step in creating all-European economic integration. For the mid-term, some form of Reconstruction Finance Corporation will have to be created by the West and Japan. The West will buy in for peace and stability in Europe; the Japanese will buy in to obtain the return of its Kurile Islands.

The social cost of the economic adjustment necessary to integrate the Warsaw Pact states clearly worries the politicians of the East. "The real challenge is to change people's mind-set" notes Mieczyslaw Rokowski, who argues that "Poles would like to work in socialism but live in capitalism."⁵⁹ While the new non-communist politicians of the East acknowledge the need to protect society's most vulnerable during the transition to market economics, it may also be that communists like Rokowski ignore the extent of poverty already existing in the socio-economic system. The Solidarity spokesman Janusz Onyszkiewicz notes, for example, that "for 40 years we claimed we had no homelessness, no illiteracy. Now we find that the homeless are numbered in the thousands, and one out of every three Army recruits can't read."⁶⁰ Thus, despite the 31% devaluation of the zloty, scrapping of price controls while maintaining wage controls, and ending of many subsidies for goods and services, the Solidarity-led government retains the support of 80% of the Polish people.⁶¹ This would suggest, therefore, that the public deprivation is already so great that as long as the people are convinced of the government's sincerity and integrity they will endure.

The deprivation of the Poles and the other non-German members of the Warsaw Pact is clearly easier to contain than is that of the East Germans because the former have no where to escape. The most pressing problem of the economic reconstruction of the Warsaw Pact states, therefore, is to stem the mass migration of East Germans to the Federal Republic. In order "to provide the East German people with an immediate and convincing hope for the future," the Federal Republic's Finance Minister has proposed "the introduction of the Deutsche mark as the official currency in East Germany."⁶² Despite the presumptive nature of such a drastic step, both East and West German politicians agree that such a currency reform is the only chance to avoid collapse of the Democratic Republic. Although both East and West German bankers agree that "it would be premature to consider such a far-reaching step at this stage," they also understand that they "do not have much time."⁶³ The actual value of the East mark aside, merging the two German currencies remains a political question on at least two counts: first, it is the price of stability; and second, it is the price for unification.

The rush of events since the breaching of the Berlin Wall has also altered the urgency of changing the posture of Soviet forces stationed in the forward area as an initial step in the transition to a new security structure. In the wake of the widespread creation of coalition governments in the NSWP states, Gorbachev elicited the assistance of the American President in meeting his requirement to accelerate reductions of general purpose forces beyond any proposed Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.⁶⁴ With the reductions Gorbachev announced in his December 1988 speech at the United Nations, the Soviets would still have 15 divisions in East Germany, two divisions in Poland, four divisions in Czechoslovakia, and three divisions in Hungary by January 1991. Since residual forces would be sufficiently dense that many cities and villages in these states would continue to be garrisoned by Soviet forces, Gorbachev and his NSWP allies are obviously anxious to reduce the profile of these forces.

Not surprisingly, it has been reported that grumbling in the Soviet Armed Forces over the force reductions announced in December 1988 made it difficult for Gorbachev to make additional troop cuts.⁶⁵ Former Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev, who is now an adviser to Gorbachev at the Supreme Soviet and a member of the Supreme Soviet's Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security, said on a 9 October 1989 television broadcast that

"there can be no further reductions on a unilateral basis" of Soviet conventional forces. He said the same thing before Gorbachev's December 1988 unilateral reductions, however, and Soviet civilian theorists continue to argue that military stability is so high that additional unilateral force reduction is a valid instrument for sharply accelerating the disarmament process.⁶⁶ They note that "even after the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan and the reduction of our forces in East Europe and Mongolia we still have as many soldiers and officers abroad as the United States."⁶⁷

Suggestions by U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney that conventional force reductions could occur on two tracks--one at the negotiating table in Vienna and one by NATO consensus in response to Soviet withdrawals--would allow the Bush Administration to facilitate Gorbachev's overcoming General Staff resistance to additional force reductions.⁶⁸ In fact, based on a rough approximation of Soviet General Staff weighted combat potential values, the U.S. force reductions in Europe initially prepared for "budgetary reasons" (2 divisions, 9 squadrons beyond the 2 brigades, 4 squadrons already on the table in Vienna)⁶⁹ would allow Gorbachev to justify mutual unilateral reductions of approximately sixteen divisions. Mutual unilateral reductions to the 195,000 troops in the "central zone" proposed by Bush⁷⁰ would, therefore, leave approximately eight Soviet divisions in the forward area. Such mutual unilateral force reductions, which could be verified under procedures established in a CFE treaty, would hopefully purchase some twelve months to allow the Helsinki process time to develop agreement on a new general security structure and the development of a framework for the further reduction of forces.

Several Soviet participants at the January 1990 symposium on "Arms Control Problems and Prospects" at the Texas A & M University Mosher Institute for Defense Studies noted that there would not be a second CFE agreement since mutual, unilateral force reductions over the coming year would eliminate the need for such future treaties. This would suggest that the Soviets expect not only the mutual unilateral force reductions apparently discussed at the Malta summit, but probably further Soviet force withdrawals to be agreed as part of the Helsinki process. Since many lack confidence that a unified Germany would remain neutral and demilitarized for long, it is not surprising that a senior researcher from the Institute for System Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences argued at a January 1990 conference at

Cambridge University that German unification should only come in the context of the Federal Republic's membership in NATO. The solution to the apparent contradictory requirements of keeping the Federal Republic in NATO and the reassurance of legitimate Soviet and Polish security concerns has already been suggested by the West German Foreign Minister. While a united Germany would remain within NATO, the territory of East Germany would be maintained as a demilitarized zone so "there will not be an extension of NATO territory eastward, closer to the borders of the Soviet Union." Furthermore, this framework is perceived to be possible only within the context of the creation of a "security net for the predictable and unpredictable events in Europe." From the perspective of the Federal Republic, "the gradual unification of the Germans in an orderly European framework is as important for the stability of Europe as is a stable framework for the revolutionary developments in Eastern Europe."⁷¹

With the "Genscher Plan" being endorsed by the U.S. as consistent with what the West Europeans refer to as "the Baker Plan,"⁷² Gorbachev has been provided a mechanism by which to "manage" both the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany and retain "leverage" over NATO force posture in the new European strategic structure. As noted by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the old European security structure was "destroyed by the will of peoples no longer willing to put up with violence." Responding to conservatives in the CPSU who charge that Gorbachev's policies have "lost Eastern Europe," Shevardnadze argues that "the undermining of faith in a Socialism based on suppression and violence began in the 1940s, not in 1985." Wisely perceiving that "it is easier to change our policies than their people," the new thinking in Soviet security policy has demonstrated itself to be sufficiently flexible to meet the demands for a safe transition to a new security structure in Europe.⁷³ The question remains as to the West's flexibility. So long as Great Britain, Italy, and Portugal are willing to host limited American forces, the domestic consensus on keeping American forces in Western Europe should be possible to maintain. In fact, contrary to the statements of some American Congressional politicians, almost twice as many Americans are in favor of either maintaining U.S. forces in Europe at the same level (50%) or increasing it (10%) as are in favor of decreasing it (34%).⁷⁴

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