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TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND BAKER.

SUMMARY

1. BAKER DESCRIBES WHAT WAS OBVIOUSLY A DIFFICULT MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE, ESPECIALLY ON ARMS CONTROL. BAKER REFERS TO WARNINGS GIVEN TO THE SOVIET UNION OVER LITHUANIA BUT JUDGES THAT DOMESTIC, NOT FOREIGN POLICY, REQUIREMENTS WILL DICTATE WHAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES. BAKER REASONABLY CONFIDENT OF PROGRESS ON 2+4 BUT OBVIOUSLY STRUCK BY SHEVARDNADZE'S WARNING THAT GERMAN UNIFICATION 'CANNOT TAKE PLACE WITHOUT US'.
2. MIFT (TO FCO AND WASHINGTON ONLY) COVERS HUMAN RIGHTS CASES. OTHER DETAIL BELOW.

DETAIL.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED BAKER JUST BEFORE LEAVING FOR MOSCOW. BAKER SAID THAT HE AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD HAD A LESS THAN SATISFACTORY MEETING ON ARMS CONTROL. THERE WAS A DISTINCT DIFFERENCE IN THE SOVIET POSITION, ESPECIALLY ON CRUISE MISSILES, COMPARED WITH THE DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW. HE FELT THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF INTERNAL SOVIET POLITICS. SOME ON THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NOT BEEN PLEASED WITH WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED IN MOSCOW AND WERE TRYING TO CHANGE IT. THE UNITED STATES HAD REMAINED CLEAR AND FIRM.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER THE RUSSIANS HAD TRIED TO CHANGE ANY OF THE MANPOWER TOTALS IN CFE. BAKER SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO SIGN OF THAT AT HIS LEVEL BUT SOME LOWER DOWN THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME RUSSIAN SHAKINESS.
5. BAKER SAID IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS UNDER GREAT PRESSURE AT HOME. HE AND BUSH HAD STRESSED THE NEED FOR A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES AND THE LITHUANIANS. OTHERWISE, THERE WOULD BE PROBLEMS WHICH COULD SPILL OVER INTO OTHER AREAS. THEY HAD BEEN VERY FRANK ON THE SUBJECT. BAKER SAID THAT THEY HAD NONETHELESS SETTLED SUMMIT DATES : THESE HAD EFFECTIVELY BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION AT WINDHOEK. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT

SETTING THE SUMMIT DATES MIGHT ACT AS A DISCIPLINE ON SOVIET BEHAVIOUR ON LITHUANIA. BAKER WAS NOT SO SURE. HE THOUGHT THAT INTERNAL REQUIREMENTS WERE MUCH MORE IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAN EXTERNAL PRESSURES. THEY WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY LETTING THE REPUBLICS GO. THEY WERE HUNG UP ON THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE LITHUANIANS REVOKE THEIR MEASURES AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR TALKS. BAKER AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT THE HURDLES IN THE NEW SOVIET LAW ON SECESSION HAD BEEN SET VERY HIGH. HE REPEATED THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS UNDER SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE. HE HOPED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD TELL SHEVARDNADZE THAT, IF THE LITHUANIANS INDICATED THEY WERE WILLING TO TALK, THEN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SHOULD TALK. THE ISSUE WAS BECOMING MORE DIFFICULT DOMESTICALLY IN THE UNITED STATES. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY JOURNALISTS AND DIPLOMATS WERE BEING ASKED TO LEAVE.

6. BAKER SAID HE HAD TALKED TO GENSCHER BY PHONE OVER THE WEEKEND. HE HAD TOLD GENSCHER THAT THE RUSSIANS APPEARED TO BE SLOWING DOWN SOMEWHAT ON THE 2+4, THOUGH THEY WERE NOT ACTING IN BAD FAITH. ON THE QUESTION OF A PEACE TREATY, BAKER HAD TOLD SHEVARDNADZE OF THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN A COMPOSITE TREATY. AT ONE POINT SHEVARDNADZE HAD PUT DOWN A CLEAR MARKER : 'GERMAN UNIFICATION CANNOT TAKE PLACE WITHOUT US. DON'T FORGET THAT.' THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED, AND BAKER AGREED, THAT THAT WAS NOT IN FACT A TRUE STATEMENT OF AFFAIRS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IT WAS ACTUALLY IN THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN INTEREST TO GET ON WITH THE 2+4 PROCESS. IT WOULD NOT IMPROVE WITH KEEPING. BAKER AGREED. THE RUSSIANS WERE ANXIOUS TO ENGAGE, EVEN IF THEN THERE WERE A RISK THEY WOULD SPIN THINGS OUT. GENSCHER HAD SPOKEN OF A POSSIBLE MINISTERIAL MEETING ON 26/27 APRIL. THAT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR BAKER BUT HE COULD MANAGE THE FIRST WEEK IN MAY.

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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

MF

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CONVERSATION WITH BAKER : GORDIEVSKY/LYNE.

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TELEPHONED BAKER BEFORE LEAVING FOR MOSCOW. HE THANKED BAKER FOR RAISING OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH SHEVARDNADZE. BAKER SAID THAT ONLY TWO OF THE NAMES HE HAD RAISED IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONTEXT, ONE OF WHICH WAS GORDIEVSKY (HE DID NOT GIVE THE OTHER) HAD PROVOKED A LITTLE BIT OF A FLARE UP BY SHEVARDNADZE.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT THIS SHOWED THE EXTENT TO WHICH THERE WERE TENSIONS WITH THE KGB. HE WOULD HAVE TO TREAD ON EGGSHELLS IN MOSCOW.

3. NEITHER BAKER NOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED LYNE'S NAME IN THE CONVERSATION.

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