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NAC, 21 MAY: **BAKER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW**

SUMMARY

1. **SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS ON START AND CW. NONE ON CFE (THE RUSSIANS NOT ENGAGING IN DEBATE). FIRST EXPLICIT RUSSIAN CALL FOR TWO PLUS FOUR TO AGREE LIMITS ON BUNDESWEHR. NO SOVIET MOVEMENT ON GERMANY/NATO. RUSSIANS SUGGEST PREPARATORY TALKS ON SNF NEGOTIATIONS: U S REJECT THIS. INFLUENCE OF SOVIET MILITARY AGAIN MORE PRONOUNCED, BUT NOT DECISIVE. DARKENING PICTURE INSIDE SOVIET UNION LIKELY TO AFFECT DECISIONS ON KEY EXTERNAL ISSUES, BUT GORBACHEV APPEARS UNDAUNTED. U S UPBEAT ON PROSPECT FOR WASHINGTON SUMMIT. THIS LIKELY TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT ON FOLLOW ON TO START.**

DETAIL

2. UNDER SECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SEITZ BRIEFED THE COUNCIL THIS MORNING (21 MAY) ON BAKER'S TALKS IN MOSCOW. A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT HAD BEEN CIRCULATED IN WRITING (FAX TO THE DEPARTMENT AND PARIS).

ARMS CONTROL

3. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE TALKS HAD CONCENTRATED ON ARMS CONTROL. THE OUTCOME WOULD MEAN A PRODUCTIVE WASHINGTON SUMMIT WITH SIGNATURE OF AGREEMENTS ON CW, NUCLEAR TESTING AND JOINT STATEMENTS ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND ON RESOLUTION OF THE MAJOR START ISSUES. THE USUAL DIFFICULTIES ON REACHING CLOSURE ON KEY ISSUES HAD BEEN COMPOUNDED BY THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE SOVIET UNION. THERE WAS GREATER INVOLVEMENT IN THE TALKS BY THE SOVIET MILITARY THAN PREVIOUSLY EXPERIENCED (GENERAL OMELICHEV HAD BEEN PRESENT THROUGHOUT, WITH AKHROMEYEV PRESENT DURING TALKS WITH GORBACHEV) AND THE HARDEST ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD BY THE MILITARY. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD ALSO CITED GENUINE PROBLEMS IN

SECURING RATIFICATION OF FUTURE AGREEMENTS BY THE SUPREME SOVIET. NEVERTHELESS MUCH PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. A TEAM OF SOVIET EXPERTS WOULD VISIT WASHINGTON LATER THIS WEEK TO PURSUE START AND CFE MATTERS.

START

4. THE MAIN SUCCESS WAS SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEMS ON ALCMS AND SLCMS. THE U S HAD SECURED A COUNTING RULE FOR ALCMS WHICH TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE U S NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN DEPLOYMENT AND HAD AVOIDED THE SOVIET WISH TO INVOLVE CONVENTIONAL ALCMS. THIS ALLOWED AGREEMENT ON THE SOVIET WISH TO INCLUDE ALCMS ABOVE A 600 KM RANGE IN THE START TREATY. THE MOST DIFFICULT ISSUE WAS OVER TACIT RAINBOW (A U S CONVENTIONAL ALCM WITH A 600-800 KM RANGE) WHICH THE U S DID NOT WISH CAPTURED BY START. THIS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED BY SECURING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO COUNT THIS WEAPON AS A FUTURE CONVENTIONAL ALCM. IN REACHING THIS CONCLUSION A WHOLE SERIES OF OBJECTIONS FROM THE SOVIET MILITARY HAD HAD TO BE REJECTED OR ACCOMMODATED. BUT IN THE LAST ANALYSIS THE SOVIET POLITICAL AUTHORITIES HAD TAKEN DECISIONS WHICH MET U S WISHES MORE THAN THOSE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY.

5. ON SLCMS THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED ON A POLITICALLY BINDING DECLARATION WHICH WOULD DROP THE REQUIREMENT FOR VERIFICATION AND SET THE SAME RANGE LIMIT (600 KMS), COUPLED WITH AN ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL DATA EXCHANGE ON SLCMS OF 300-600 KMS RANGE. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE START TREATY WOULD BE OF 15 YEARS DURATION WITH 5 YEAR EXTENSIONS BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT. SOME OTHER ISSUES REMAINED TO BE RESOLVED EG MOBILE ICBM WARHEADS AND BACKFIRE. THE U S ALSO EXPECTED A JOINT STATEMENT IN WASHINGTON ON START FOLLOW ON NEGOTIATIONS (IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS BARTHOLOMEW WAS NO MORE SPECIFIC, BEYOND SAYING THAT THIS WOULD COMMIT THE TWO SIDES TO FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS).

SNF

6. SHEVARDNADZE NOTED RECENT STATEMENTS AND PROBED THE IDEA OF AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON SNF NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRIOR CONSULTATION ON THE CONTENT AND PARTICIPATION FOR THESE IN AN EXPERT WORKING GROUP. BAKER REPLIED THAT THE U S WOULD BE READY TO ENGAGE ON SNF AFTER CFE SIGNATURE.

CFE.

7. BAKER HAD PUT FORWARD SOME OF THE IDEAS IN HIS RECENT LETTER TO NATO COLLEAGUES. GIVEN THE RESERVATIONS OF SOME ALLIES HE HAD NOT (NOT) PURSUED THE QUESTION OF MOVEMENT ON THE SUFFICIENCY RULE. BUT MAMPOWER WAS EXTENSIVELY DISCUSSED. THE RUSSIANS SOUGHT A SEPARATE

AGREEMENT FOR SIGNATURE IN WASHINGTON TO CODIFY THE U S/SOVIET ACCORD AT OTTAWA, LEAVING OPEN OTHER MANPOWER LIMITS IN CFE. WHEN THIS WAS REJECTED THE RUSSIANS PROPOSED INSERTING THE OTTAWA LANGUAGE INTO THE DRAFT TREATY LANGUAGE IN VIENNA, BUT WERE RELUCTANT TO AGREE THAT OTTAWA HAD EXHAUSTED THE SCOPE FOR PERSONNEL LIMITS IN CFE I. THE RUSSIANS ALSO ARGUED (FOR THE FIRST TIME) FOR LIMITATIONS ON THE FORCES OF A UNITED GERMANY TO BE AGREED IN TWO PLUS FOUR AND QUOTE EXPRESSED UNQUOTE IN CFE. ON THAT BASIS THE RUSSIANS INDICATED READINESS TO DEFER THE ISSUE OF BROADER MANPOWER LIMITS TO CFE II. IN RESPONSE BAKER STRESSED U S OPPOSITION TO THE SINGULARISATION OF GERMANY AND THAT TWO PLUS FOUR COULD NOT NEGOTIATE ON CFE. HE SAID THE U S/SOVIET LIMITATIONS AGREED AT OTTAWA MUST REMAIN THE SOLE MANPOWER LIMIT IN CFE I, BUT THAT THE U S WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER A RANGE OF ISSUES AT CFE II, INCLUDING LIMITATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE U S FLOATED THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVEMENT ON AIRCRAFT BUT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT BITE. IN RESPONSE TO AN EXPRESSION OF CONCERN FROM ROBIN (FRANCE) THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BILATERAL WORKING GROUP WOULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR NEGOTIATION AT VIENNA, BARTHOLOMEW SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF INSTITUTIONALISING THESE EFFORTS SEMICOLON THE U S AIM WAS RATHER TO PUSH THE RUSSIANS TO MOVE TO CLOSURE IN VIENNA.

CW

8. A U S/SOVIET AGREEMENT AT WASHINGTON WAS NOW IN REACH, INCORPORATING EVERY ELEMENT OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S INITIATIVE. THIS WOULD PROVIDE FOR DESTRUCTION OF U S AND SOVIET CW STOCKS DOWN TO A LEVEL OF 5,000 AGENT TONNES EACH.

NUCLEAR TESTING AND PROLIFERATION

9. THE PROTOCOLS ON THE PNET AND TTBT WERE NOW READY FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT. A JOIN STATEMENT FOR WASHINGTON WAS ALSO NEAR COMPLETION ON NON-PROLIFERATION. THIS SHOULD FACILITATE GREATER U S/SOVIET COOPERATION THAN IN THE PAST.

OPEN SKIES

9. BAKER PRESSED SHEVARDNADZE FOR ANY SIGNS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY. THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIVE REPLY.

HUMAN RIGHTS

10. SEITZ SAID THAT 8 OUT OF THE 20 CASES BUSH HAD RAISED WITH GORBACHEV IN MALTA WERE NOW RESOLVED, ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT HAD HOPED THAT ALL WOULD BE SOLVED BY THE TIME OF THE SUMMIT. BAKER MET REFUSENIKS AND PRESSED HARD ON JEWISH IMMIGRATION.

TRADE

11. A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WAS NEAR COMPLETION BUT REMAINED TIED TO THE SUPREME SOVIET'S PASSING OF A IMMIGRATION LAW. THIS HAD BEEN DUE IN DECEMBER BUT HAD BEEN POSTPONED. IN MOSCOW THE U S SIDE WERE GIVEN A DRAFT OF THE LAW WHICH WAS NOW DUE FOR ADOPTION ON 31 MAY (IE AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT). THE U S WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER AT THE SUMMIT WHETHER IT COULD THEN SIGN THE TRADE AGREEMENT. MOSCOW'S BLOCKADE OF LITHUANIA REMAINED A FURTHER OBSTACLE.

REGIONAL ISSUES

12. THESE RECEIVED LESS ATTENTION THAN IN THE PAST. THE TWO SIDES HAD DRAWN UP A LIST OF PRINCIPLES FOR A SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN BUT HAD NOT REACHED AGREEMENT. THE U S HAD SOUGHT A JOINT PUBLIC STATEMENT OF CONCERN ABOUT KASHMIR BUT MET SOVIET RELUCTANCE.

SOVIET INTERNAL

13. SEITZ SAID THAT THE TALKS HAD TAKEN PLACE AGAINST A TROUBLED BACKGROUND. IT WAS OBVIOUS THROUGHOUT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WERE FINDING DECISION-MAKING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT. THERE WAS A PERVASIVE SENSE OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT AND OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FORTHCOMING CPSU CONGRESS. THE RSFRS SUPREME SOVIET, MEETING AT THE SAME TIME, HAD BEEN TAKING DECISIONS WHICH DID NOT SQUARE WITH THE WISHES OF THE UNION LEADERSHIP. IT WAS CLEAR THAT A REVOLUTION WAS UNDERWAY IN THE COUNTRY. THE LEADERSHIP WERE CONDUCTING A WAR ON TWO FRONTS: INTERNAL (TO MAINTAIN SOCIAL ORDER) AND EXTERNAL (MANAGEMENT OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC POSITION). BOTH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV HAD SAID THAT THE COUNTRY WAS ENTERING A CRITICAL AND CRUCIAL PERIOD. SHEVARDNADZE SPOKE FRANKLY OF THE RISK OF ANARCHY AND THE SITUATION SPINNING OUT OF CONTROL IF PERESTROIKA DID NOT SUCCEED. THE LEADERSHIP HOPED FOR TWO TO THREE YEARS TO IMPLEMENT RADICAL REFORM BUT STRESSED THE NEED TO PREPARE THE PUBLIC. SHEVARDNADZE SAID QUOTE THE USSR IS NOT POLAND UNQUOTE: THERE COULD BE NO SHOCK TREATMENT. GORBACHEV (FOR THE FIRST TIME) ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR A CAPITAL INFUSION TO ASSIST IN INDUSTRIAL CONVERSION AND FOR THE IMPORT OF CONSUMER GOODS.

LITHUANIA

14. THE RUSSIANS SAID THAT THE STAKES WERE NOW EVEN HIGHER. SHEVARDNADZE REPEATED HIS CONCERN AT A CHAIN REACTION IN OTHER REPUBLICS OUTSIDE THE BALTICS, CITING MOLDAVIA AND UZBEKISTAN. HE CLAIMED THAT LITHUANIA COULD PROVOKE THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION: QUOTE A MULTI-ETHNIC COUNTRY IS A TINDER-BOX UNQUOTE.

BOTH HE AND GORBACHEV STRESSED THAT LITHUANIA MUST PROCEED WITHIN A LEGAL FRAMEWORK. GORBACHEV SAID HE WAS UNDER EXTREME PRESSURE TO ASSUME DIRECT RULE THERE AND ELSEWHERE AS NECESSARY. HE WANTED TO TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH BUT MAJOR ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS WERE AT STAKE WHICH ALL HAD TO BE ADDRESSED BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. ONCE THE LITHUANIA DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE HAD BEEN SUSPENDED (NOT NULLIFIED) WORK COULD BEGIN ON HOW TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES. IN REPLY BAKER STRESSED THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE TO BEGIN SOON.

GERMANY

15. THERE WAS NO SIGN OF SOVIET MOVEMENT BEYOND SHEVARDNADZE'S PROPOSAL FOR THE SIZE OF THE BUNDESWEHR AND OTHER FORCES IN A UNIFIED GERMANY TO BE DECIDED IN TWO PLUS FOUR. GORBACHEV CONCENTRATED ON GERMANY/NATO, SAYING THAT A UNIFIED GERMANY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WHILST QUOTE THE WARSAW PACT WAS DISINTEGRATING UNQUOTE WAS UNACCEPTABLE. IT WOULD REPRESENT A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER AND WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE. IN IMPLIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT THE VICTOR OF WORLD WAR II BUT THE VANQUISHED. THE FOUR POWERS SHOULD USE THEIR AUTHORITY TO TAKE DECISIONS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF GERMANY AND SHOULD PRESERVE SOME KIND OF OVERSIGHT AFTER UNITY. IN REPLY BAKER LISTED WESTERN IDEAS TO ADDRESS SOVIET CONCERNS (CFE II, SNF, CSCE ETC) AND STRESSED THAT GERMANY (LIKE ALL OTHER CSCE STATES) HAD THE RIGHT TO BELONG TO AN ALLIANCE. SEITZ CONCLUDED THAT THE RUSSIANS REMAINED DEEPLY UNCERTAIN AND DISTURBED ABOUT GERMANY. THEIR POSITIONS WERE SELF-EVIDENTLY CONTRADICTORY. BUT IT WAS HARD TO IMAGINE THEM SIGNING UP TO WESTERN POSITIONS IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. THE QUOTE CONCEPTUAL GAP UNQUOTE, BOTH ON SUBSTANCE AND TIMING, REMAINED ENORMOUS.

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