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SIC
MODUK FOR DUS(P)
PROSPECTS FOR US/SOVIET SUMMIT
SUMMARY

1. US HOPES FOR SUMMIT MINGLED WITH WORRIES. SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS IN PROSPECT ON START, CW AND NUCLEAR TESTING. US PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS HAVE DIMINISHED OVER THE PAST COUPLE OF MONTHS. SOME PROGRESS ON CFE A PRIORITY: QUESTIONS AS TO WHY THE RUSSIANS ARE GOING SLOW. SOVIET INTENTIONS OVER REGIONAL ISSUES WILL ALSO BE ON US MINDS.

DETAIL

2. THE AMERICANS ARE POISED SOMEWHERE BETWEEN HOPE AND ANXIETY AS THEY FOCUS ON WHAT THEY MAY GET OUT OF GORBACHEV'S VISIT (30 MAY - 3 JUNE) AND HIS TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT. SCOWCROFT CONFIRMED TO ME YESTERDAY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE DELIBERATELY BEEN TALKING PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS DOWN SINCE THE LAST ROUND OF BAKER/SHEVARDNAZDE TALKS IN MOSCOW.

3. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL COME AWAY WITH SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS ON START, CW AND NUCLEAR TESTING. SCOWCROFT TOLD ME ON 24 MAY THAT IT WAS LIKELY ALL THE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON START WOULD BE RESOLVED BY THE END OF THE SUMMIT. THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT ITSELF RAN TO MORE THAN 450 PAGES. HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER THERE WOULD BE A SYMBOLIC INITIALLING OF THE AGREEMENT (WE KNOW FROM STATE DEPARTMENT THAT A JOINT PUBLIC STATEMENT ITEMISING THE MAIN AGREED PRINCIPLES IS BEING PREPARED AS A FALL BACK).

4. PROGRESS OF THIS NATURE MAY BE ENOUGH FOR A SUMMIT WHICH WILL SEEM REASONABLY SATISFACTORY TO MOST AMERICANS. THERE HAS BEEN SOME RIGHT-WING SNIPING AT BAKER FOLLOWING HIS MOSCOW VISIT, WHICH HE HAS REJECTED WITH SOME VIGOUR, FOR GIVING AWAY TOO MUCH FOR MODEST GAINS AT A TIME WHEN THE RUSSIANS ARE HELD TO BE TOO WEAK TO INSIST ON THEIR DEMANDS. BUT SUCH CRITICISM MAY NOT PROSPER AGAINST THE DIMINISHED PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS OF THE USSR WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED OVER THE PAST COUPLE OF MONTHS, LARGELY BECAUSE OF LITHUANIA. THE PRESIDENT HAS ATTRACTED A WIDE DEGREE OF PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT IN MAKING IT

CLEAR ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT SOVIET POLICIES TOWARDS LITHUANIA WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. HE EXTENDED THIS AT A RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE TO THE MORE GENERAL PROPOSITION THAT OTHER ADVERSE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ALSO HAVE SIMILAR RESULTS. HE HAS TAKEN PAINS TO MAKE HIMSELF LESS VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM FOR PLACING TOO MANY OF HIS BETS ON GORBACHEV PERSONALLY. THE AMERICANS ARE NOW, IN EFFECT, OPERATING A DISGUISED FORM OF SANCTIONS OVER LITHUANIA. SOVIET POSTPONEMENT OF CONSIDERATION OF A NEW EMIGRATION LAW UNTIL AFTER THE SUMMIT HAS BEEN INTERPRETED HERE AS A SIGN THE RUSSIANS UNDERSTAND THE AMERICANS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO EXTEND MFN TREATMENT OR TO IMPLEMENT THEIR RECENTLY CONCLUDED TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION UNTIL THERE ARE FIRMER AND BETTER PROSPECTS FOR LITHUANIA.

5. THE AMERICANS (BOTH IN THE ADMINISTRATION AND AMONG THE PUBLIC AT LARGE) HAD NEVERTHELESS EARLIER HOPED BY NOW TO HAVE MADE MORE PROGRESS TOWARDS A CFE AGREEMENT, AND THEIR CONCERNS ON THIS SCORE FOLLOWING BAKER'S FAILURE IN MOSCOW TO MAKE ANY HEADWAY FEED ON THEIR MORE GENERAL ANXIETIES ABOUT WHERE THE RUSSIANS MAY BE HEADING AS THE USSR APPROACHES THE CPSU CONGRESS IN JULY. THEY HOPE GENSCHER WILL HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET SOME MOVEMENT INTO CFE THROUGH HIS TALK IN GENEVA ON 23 MAY WITH SHEVARDNADZE. INITIAL AMERICAN REPORTS (MY TELNO. 1224) SUGGEST THAT HE WILL HAVE MADE SOME SORT OF AN INITIATIVE TO THIS END. A SOVIET TEAM WILL NOW BE ARRIVING FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS, INCLUDING CFE, WITH SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS BEGINNING ON 27 MAY. THE PRESIDENT SAID AT HIS 24 MAY PRESS CONFERENCE, REFERRING TO THE GENSCHER/SHEVARDNADZE TALKS:

QUOTE: MAYBE WE CAN FIND SOME WAY AT THE SUMMIT OR BEFORE THE SUMMIT TO MOVE CFE FORWARD. IT IS IMPORTANT AND I THINK IT DOES SEND A BAD SIGNAL IF THE SOVIETS LOOK LIKE THEY ARE REFUSING TO GO FORWARD AND DON'T WANT TO, SAY, PULL FORCES OUT OF COUNTRIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVIOUS DEALS. UNQUOTE

6. SCOWCROFT TOLD ME ON 24 MAY HE THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS WERE GOING SLOW ON CFE BECAUSE OF THEIR DIFFICULTIES OVER GERMANY. IT WAS A WAY OF SLOWING DOWN THE PROCESS OF UNIFICATION. HE WAS NOT SURE THAT THE RUSSIANS PUT AS MUCH FAITH IN CSCE AS WE TENDED TO ASSUME. THEIR PROBLEM AT PRESENT WAS THAT THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN GERMANY BUT HAD NO ALTERNATIVE TO OFFER. THEY HAD TOLD THE ADMINISTRATION PRIVATELY THAT A NEUTRAL GERMANY WAS A BAD IDEA AND WERE ALSO SYMPATHETIC TO US TROOPS REMAINING IN EUROPE. OTHER OBSERVERS FAVOUR VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF FACTORS IN EXPLAINING SOVIET POLICIES, INCLUDING

THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE TAKING A TOUGH LINE FOR TACTICAL REASONS, THAT THEY MAY BE SO PREOCCUPIED WITH THEIR INTERNAL AGENDA THAT THEY HAVE NEITHER THE TIME NOR THE ENERGY PROPERLY TO ADDRESS CFE, THAT THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE WARSAW PACT HAS CHANGED THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE FOR THE RUSSIANS OR THAT THE VOICE OF THE MILITARY IN SOVIET POLICY-MAKING HAS INCREASED IN AUTHORITY. BUT WHATEVER THE EXPLANATION, THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CENTRAL US AIM OF ENSURING A UNITED GERMANY IS A FULLY INTEGRATED MEMBER OF NATO ARE TROUBLING, MAKING SOME DEGREE OF PROGRESS ON CFE AT THE SUMMIT A US PRIORITY.

7. SIMILAR QUESTIONS AS TO SOVIET INTENTIONS OVER REGIONAL ISSUES WILL ALSO BE ON US MINDS DURING THE SUMMIT. MY TELNO. 1221 RECORDED SCOWCROFT'S DOUBTS AS TO WHAT LAY BEHIND SOVIET POLICIES IN RELATION TO KASHMIR. IN BACKGROUND BRIEFING FOR THE PRESS AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON 24 MAY ON REGIONAL ISSUES LIKELY TO BE ADDRESSED AT THE SUMMIT (FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG) A SENIOR OFFICIAL POINTED TO SPECIFIC ISSUES THE AMERICANS WANTED TO PROBE WITH THE RUSSIANS, INCLUDING KASHMIR. THE OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOVIET POLICIES TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST HAD EVOLVED IN A MODERATE DIRECTION BUT WARNED THAT THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TEMPTED TO PANDER TO EXTREME EMOTIONS INSTEAD OF TRYING TO CHANNEL ENERGY INTO A NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IT WAS NOT CLEAR IF THE RUSSIANS WERE GIVING THE PLO THE RIGHT KIND OF ADVICE QUOTE WHEN WE WERE PROMOTING THE BAKER PLAN UNQUOTE. THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS ON AFGHANISTAN WAS RUSSIAN UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A TRANSFER OF POWER FROM NAJIBULLAH TO A CARETAKER AUTHORITY. THE AMERICAN EXPRESSED CONCERN AT SOVIET ARMS DEALS WITH IRAN.

8. THE BRIEFER ALSO REFERRED TO AN INTENTION TO PRESS THE SOVIET UNION ON CUBAN ARMS SUPPLIES TO SALVADORAN GUERILLAS. THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE THEM TAKE A MORE POSITIVE APPROACH TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN CRISTIANI AND THE FMLN. (NSC TELL US MIG 29S IN CUBA WILL BE RAISED TOO.) OTHER ISSUES INCLUDED THE INVOLVEMENT OF SOVIET ADVISERS IN THE RECENT MPLA OFFENSIVE AGAINST UNITA: A GREATER SOVIET ROLE IN THE RELIEF EFFORT IN ETHIOPIA: AND USING THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT TO COUNTER THE LATTER'S OBSTRUCTIONISM. THE AMERICANS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT CONTINUED VIETNAMESE AND SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT FOR HUN SEN IN CAMBODIA. TNEY WOULD, ONCE AGAIN, URGE THE RUSSIANS TO PRESS THE NORTH KOREANS TO SIGN AN IAEA AGREEMENT. FINALLY, THE US WOULD REITERATE ITS SUPPORT OF THE JAPANESE POSITION ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES.

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