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INFO IMMEDIATE NATO POSTS, MOSCOW, WARSAW, BM BERLIN

PART ONE OF TWO

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH GENSCHER: 28 MAY  
SUMMARY

1. GENSCHER GIVES ACCOUNT OF LATEST MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE. BELIEVES RUSSIANS ARE COMING TO TERMS WITH GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF NATO AND THAT THEIR DESIRE FOR CSCE SUMMIT THIS YEAR GIVES THE WEST LEVERAGE. GENSCHER SAYS RUSSIANS ARE LOOKING FOR FINANCIAL HELP BUT THIS HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE RUSSIANS IN DETAIL. DESCRIBES SOVIET CONCERN AT TROOP LEVELS IN CENTRAL ZONE. DENIES THAT ANY GERMAN PROPOSAL HAS BEEN PUT TO THE RUSSIANS ON MANPOWER LIMITS IN THE ENLARGED CENTRAL ZONE BUT THINKS THIS IS THE KEY AREA IN WHICH A NEGOTIATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE AS PART OF CFE1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSES NEED FOR CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANCE, TACTICS AND TIMING. GENSCHER AGREES TO DISCUSSION AT COPENHAGEN ON 5 JUNE.

DETAIL

2. GENSCHER FLEW TO OXFORDSHIRE ON 28 MAY FOR JUST OVER AN HOUR'S TALK WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE. THE PURPOSE WAS TO BRIEF THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON HIS TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE. HE HAD FOUND SHEVARDNADZE IN GOOD SHAPE, LESS ANXIOUS THAN WHEN THEY HAD MET JUST BEFORE THE FIRST MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE 2+4. SHEVARDNADZE HAD SHOWN HIMSELF VERY INTERESTED IN RELATIONS BETWEEN A UNITED GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE RUSSIANS WERE ANXIOUS TO PRESERVE AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH THE GDR, EG THE 1989 DECLARATION, AND TO WORK THROUGH THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP, EG THE FACT THAT ENERGY SUPPLIES FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO THE GDR WOULD START TO BE PAID FOR THE DEUTSCHMARKS RATHER THAN ROUBLE CURRENCY UNITS. GENSCHER CLEARLY THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE MORE RELAXED THAN HITHERTO ABOUT GEMU, THOUGH SHEVARDNADZE HAD RAISED ONE PARTICULAR CONCERN, NAMELY THE NEED FOR A GUARANTEE OF THE PROTECTION OF RUSSIAN MONUMENTS AND CEMETERIES. THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THINGS THAT HAD HAPPENED IN HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA (THOUGH SHEVARDNADZE DID NOT SPECIFY). GENSCHER



SAID HE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY HEARD FROM THE AMERICANS ABOUT ACTION AGAINST SOVIET MONUMENTS IN BULGARIA. SHEVARDNADZE HAD ALSO SEEMED TO WANT COMPENSATION PAID FOR THE RETURN OF PROPERTIES WHICH HAD BEEN CONFISCATED BY THE RUSSIANS IN THE GDR AFTER WW2. GENSCHER HAD NOT GIVEN HIM MUCH JOY ON THIS.

3. ON THE SPEED OF GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS, SHEVARDNADZE HAD NOTED GERMAN PROBLEMS OVER THE INTERNAL ASPECTS AND HAD SURMISED THAT IT MIGHT POSSIBLE TO SOLVE THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS SOONER. HE HAD APPEARED SATISFIED WITH WHAT THE FRG PROPOSED IN RESPECT OF POLISH BORDERS. GENSCHER HAD EXPLAINED THAT THE UNITED GERMANY WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT IT HAD NO CLAIM TO THE TERRITORY OF ANY EUROPEAN COUNTRY. SHEVARDNADZE HAD EXPLAINED RUSSIA'S PROPOSALS FOR DEEPENING THE CSCE, ALONG THE LINES OF SHEVARDNADZE'S RECENT LETTER AND GENSCHER HAD INDICATED THAT THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL WITH WHICH GERMANY COULD GO ALONG.

4. GENSCHER SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE'S REQUIREMENTS ON THE ALLIANCE WERE LESS CLEAR. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTED A GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MILITARY ACTIVITIES EITHER BY THE GERMANS OR THIRD PARTIES CONDUCTED FROM GERMAN SOIL. IT HAD BECOME CLEARER DURING THE CONVERSATION THAT SHEVARDNADZE WAS REFERRING TO AGGRESSIVE ACTION. GENSCHER HAD REITERATED THAT IT WAS GERMANY'S RIGHT, LAID DOWN IN THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT, TO CHOOSE ITS OWN ALLIANCE. IF IT WOULD HELP THE RUSSIANS, HE WAS PREPARED TO SEE THE 1982 NATO SUMMIT DECLARATION ON SELF-DEFENCE REPEATED BY ALL CONCERNED.

5. ON GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF THE ALLIANCE, SHEVARDNADZE HAD PUT FORWARD FOUR POSSIBILITIES. THE FIRST TWO HE HAD IMMEDIATELY ACKNOWLEDGED WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE FRG. THE OPTIONS WERE:

- 1 - BOTH GERMAN STATES TO LEAVE THEIR EXISTING ALLIANCES. ✕
- 2 - A NEUTRAL UNITED GERMANY. ✕
- 3 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE. ? ✕
- 4 - THE SIMULTANEOUS DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING ALLIANCES. ✕

HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALL THESE WERE HYPOTHETICAL AND SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT. HE SPECULATED ABOUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT INVOLVING ASSOCIATION OR COOPERATION OR SOMETHING SIMILAR. ALL THIS HAD CONFIRMED GENSCHER IN HIS VIEW THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE TRYING TO DE-DEMONISE NATO. THEY PERHAPS WANTED A STATEMENT OF THE KIND WHICH THE TWO PRESIDENTS HAD MADE AT MALTA WHEN THEY HAD SAID THAT THEY DID NOT SEE THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIANCES AS A THREAT TO EACH OTHER.

6. IN REPLY, GENSCHER HAD FIRMLY RESTATED GERMANY'S COMMITMENT TO MEMBERSHIP OF NATO, MAKING CLEAR THAT THIS POSITION WAS



AGREED WITH THE PRESENT GDR GOVERNMENT. HE HAD SPOKEN ON THE ISSUE OF GERMANY AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE AND ON BW AND CW DRAWING ON SPEAKING NOTES WHICH BAKER HAD USED IN MOSCOW. HE HAD CONFIRMED THAT NATO TROOPS WOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED IN FORMER GDR TERRITORY AND HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WOULD BE A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FOR SOVIET TROOPS IN THE GDR BUT HAD SAID THAT THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD SHOULD NOT BE LINKED IN ANY WAY WITH THE PRESENCE OF ALLIED TROOPS IN THE FRG. HE MADE CLEAR GERMANY'S WILLINGNESS TO SEE PRACTICAL COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND TO DISCUSS COOPERATION IN CSCE. THESE WERE MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE TO SHEVARDNADZE. GENSCHER HAD EXPLAINED TO SHEVARDNADZE THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING THE SINGULARISATION OF GERMANY. THIS WAS THE ONE THING WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE RESURGENCE OF THE FAR RIGHT, WHICH HAD OTHERWISE TAKEN A BATTERING. DRAWING AN ANALOGY WITH ORWELL'S ANIMAL FARM, GENSCHER HAD SAID THAT YOU COULD NOT HAVE A SITUATION IN WHICH ALL ANIMALS WERE EQUAL BUT ONE ANIMAL WAS LESS EQUAL THAN THE OTHERS. SHEVARDNADZE HAD SMILED AT THIS AND APPEARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE ITS VALIDITY.

7. QUOTING FROM WHAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID IN PUBLIC AFTER THEIR MEETING, GENSCHER SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION NOW APPEARED TO ACCEPT THAT THE SIZE OF THE BUNDESWEHR WAS SOMETHING THAT COULD ONLY BE DEALT WITH IN THE CFE DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA. THE ISSUE REMAINED A CONSIDERABLE PREOCCUPATION BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS FEARED FOR THEIR POSITION ONCE THEY HAD WITHDRAWN FROM HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND AFTER A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, (SHEVARDNADZE HAD MENTIONED 21 MONTHS) FROM THE GDR AS WELL. AT SEVERAL POINTS SHEVARDNADZE HAD MENTIONED SOVIET INTEREST IN THE SUCCESS OF THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE NEED TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS BEFORE THE CSCE SUMMIT. GENSCHER HIMSELF HAD REFERRED SHEVARDNADZE TO THE SPEECH WHICH HE HAD MADE TO THE BUNDESTAG, MAKING CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT WANT A UNITED GERMANY TO BE BURDENED BY ANY OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS. ALL ISSUES SHOULD BE RESOLVED BEFORE UNIFICATION. SHEVARDNADZE HAD READ THE SPEECH AND GENSCHER THOUGHT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ALL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION WOULD HAVE TO BE CONCLUDED BEFORE THE CSCE SUMMIT. GENSCHER WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE THOUGHT THE SIZE OF THE BUNDESWEHR AND OTHER WESTERN FORCES WAS A LEGITIMATE QUESTION TO BE RAISED IN VIENNA AND HE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THE RUSSIANS RAISED IT SOONER OR LATER. IF WE WERE READY TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MANDATE, THAT COULD MAKE THINGS EASIER FOR THE SOVIET UNION. IF WE WANTED THE RUSSIANS TO AGREE ON A UNITED GERMANY BEING IN NATO, THE RUSSIANS WOULD NEED SOME GUARANTEE OF THE SIZE OF TROOPS ON BOTH SIDES.



8. GENSCHER THEN TURNED TO THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN GERMANY. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED IN THE BUNDES RAT AND THAT GEMU WOULD GO AHEAD ON 1 JULY. THE DRAFT TREATY WOULD BE UNCHANGED, THOUGH THERE WOULD BE SOME EXTRA DECLARATIONS, EG ON THE ENVIRONMENT. ON THE FRG SIDE, THEY WERE TRYING TO PERSUADE THE EAST GERMAN CDU AND THE LIBERALS TO GET RID OF THEIR PARTY PROPERTY IN THE GDR, MOST OF WHICH HAD BEEN ACQUIRED BY ILLEGAL EXPROPRIATION. THE MAIN LONG-TERM CONCERN WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1 JULY AND UNIFICATION WAS NOT TOO LONG. THE LONGER IT WAS, THE GREATER THE RISK TO CONFIDENCE, IN PARTICULAR TO THE WILLINGNESS OF INVESTORS, BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY, TO INVEST. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NEW FACES IN THE GDR, MUCH OF THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION WAS STILL IN THE HANDS OF THE OLD GUARD. IT WAS NOW MORE OR LESS DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH ALL GERMAN ELECTIONS IN THE TIMESCALE ALLOWED FOR UNDER THE BASIC LAW AND CONSTITUTION. THIS MEANT THAT 13 JANUARY WOULD BE THE LATEST POSSIBLE DATE, THOUGH THE CHANCELLOR WOULD PREFER 16 DECEMBER. HISTORICALLY, THE CHRISTMAS BREAK HAD OFTEN HAD AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, THOUGH THIS BREAK HAD WORKED TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE SPD IN THE PAST. GENSCHER HAD SAID TO SHEVARDNADZE THAT 1990 WAS THE ONLY YEAR ON WHICH SOMETHING DEFINITE WOULD BE ON OFFER. THE RUSSIANS WERE INTERESTED IN A CSCE SUMMIT. THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF HAVING ONE SUMMIT IN 1990 AND ANOTHER SIX MONTHS LATER.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE HAD FOUR THINGS ON THE AGENDA:

- 1 - THE QUESTION OF GERMAN UNIFICATION, WHERE HE COULD SEE THE CASE FOR ACCELERATION.
- 2 - THE 2+4.
- 3 - CSCE.
- 4 - VIENNA.

ALL HAD TO REACH THE WINNING POST IN 1990. THE DIFFICULT ISSUE WAS THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE THE MANPOWER AGREEMENT REACHED IN OTTAWA DID NOT COVER THE POINT OF GREATEST CONCERN TO THE SOVIET UNION, NAMELY THE SIZE OF GERMAN AND OTHER ALLIED FORCES. THIS WOULD NEED CAREFUL WORK. WE HAD SEEN SOME REPORTS SUGGESTING THAT EACH COUNTRY SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO 400,000 TROOPS IN THE ENLARGED CENTRAL ZONE. WE DID KNOW HOW THE FRENCH WOULD VIEW THAT. NOR DID WE KNOW WHETHER IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO MAKE THAT PROPOSAL NOW OR WHETHER TO SUGGEST THAT THIS WAS A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION IN THE NEXT STAGE. IF WE CHANGED OUR VIEW ON THE TIMING OF DISCUSSION OF NATIONAL FORCES, WE MIGHT FIND OURSELVES HAVING TO MAKE MORE CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO GET



AN AGREEMENT. GENSCHER QUESTIONED WHETHER IT WOULD CONSTITUTE A CONCESSION TO TALK ABOUT THE CENTRAL ZONE WHEN THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE LEAVING THAT ZONE ANYWAY. THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE BUILDING UP THEIR FORCES JUST OUTSIDE IT. THE QUESTION OF THE ZONE AND THE ONE OF TIMING WERE CRUCIAL. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE ISSUE OF TIMING WAS ALSO CRUCIAL FOR THE SOVIET UNION. FOR US, THESE WERE MATTERS OF SECURITY. FOR THE RUSSIANS, THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH THEIR SOLDIERS IN TERMS OF HOUSING, BARRACKS AND JOBS. IT WAS ALSO WORTH BEARING IN MIND THAT THE RUSSIANS ONLY HAD ABOUT 400,000 TROOPS IN THE EXTENDED CENTRAL ZONE, WHICH INCLUDED THE BALTIC DISTRICT. HE HOPED THAT WE COULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER, BY INCLUDING THE ZONE IN NEGOTIATIONS, WE COULD HELP SECURE PROGRESS. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO TALK IN TERMS OF NUMBERS RATHER THAN PERCENTAGES, SO THAT ONE HAD CERTAINTY ON NUMBERS.

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PART TWO OF TWO

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH GENSCHER

10. GENSCHER SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD RAISE THIS ISSUE IN WASHINGTON. HE DOUBTED WHETHER THEY WOULD MAKE A PROPOSAL BUT EXPECTED THEM TO ARGUE THAT THEY HAD LEFT HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND WOULD BE LEAVING THE GDR WHILE, ON THE OTHER HAND, NOTHING HAD CHANGED IN THE WEST. THEY MIGHT IMPLY THAT, IF THERE WAS SOME AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE, THEN THEY WOULD AGREE TO GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF NATO.

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD THREE CARDS, NONE OF WHICH WAS PARTICULARLY STRONG. 1) WAS THEIR OCCUPATION RIGHTS, BUT THIS WAS NOT A VERY STRONG CARD IF THE OTHER WARTIME ALLIES HAD GIVEN UP THEIR RIGHTS. 2) PUBLIC OPINION IN GERMANY, WHICH THEY WOULD TRY TO INFLUENCE. 3) THE CARD WHICH THE FOURTH REPUBLIC IN FRANCE HAD OFTEN PLAYED, IE IF YOU WANT US TO SURVIVE, YOU MUST HELP US. WE NONETHELESS HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THESE RUSSIAN CARDS, AT ANY RATE THE LAST ONE, AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT HERR GENSCHER WAS INCLINED TO THINK THAT WE SHOULD TAKE STOCK OF OUR POSITION IN A POSITIVE SENSE AND CHANGE OUR NEGOTIATING STANCE IN VIENNA. GENSCHER SAID THAT WE SHOULD AT LEAST CONSIDER DOING SO. HE HAD NOT GONE INTO ANY OF THIS WITH SHEVARDNADZE, MAKING CLEAR THAT THESE WERE NOT MATTERS FOR GERMANY ALONE. WE HAD TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE US PROPOSAL ON THE CENTRAL ZONE WAS ALREADY MUCH LESS ATTRACTIVE TO THE RUSSIANS THAN IT HAD BEEN WHEN IT WAS FIRST MADE. GENSCHER WONDERED WHETHER REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE CENTRAL ZONE RATHER THAN THE EXTENDED <sup>CENTRAL</sup> CULTURAL ZONE MIGHT BE EASIER BECAUSE BRITAIN, FRANCE AND ITALY WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT WE HAD ALL MADE CLEAR OUR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS NATIONAL FORCE STRENGTHS IN VIENNA. THE QUESTION WAS WHEN. THE PEOPLE MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED SHOULD GET TOGETHER TO IDENTIFY QUITE CLEARLY OUR POLICY AND TACTICS. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE MEETING AT



COPENHAGEN ON 5 JUNE WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO.

12. SUMMING UP, GENSCHER SAID THAT THE STRATEGY WHICH HAD BEEN ADOPTED FROM THE START WAS THE RIGHT ONE, IE A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO BUT NOT EXTENDING NATO TROOPS TO EAST GERMANY. THESE THREE POINTS WERE NOT NOW IN DISPUTE. IT WAS A QUESTION OF HOW TO MAKE THEM MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION. SHEVARDNADZE WAS SERIOUS WHEN HE HAD TALKED OF FINDING A WAY OUT. IT WAS ALSO SIGNIFICANT THAT GORBACHEV HAD TALKED ABOUT GERMANY REMAINING IN NATO BUT ON THE FRENCH MODEL. SHEVARDNADZE HAD NOT SAID ANYTHING LIKE THAT. WHAT THIS MEANT WAS THAT BOTH MEN WERE FEELING FOR A WAY THROUGH THE ISSUE.

13. GENSCHER SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO DUMAS ON THE TELEPHONE THAT DAY, FOLLOWING THE MITTERRAND/DUMAS VISIT TO MOSCOW. DUMAS HAD SAID THAT HE EXPECTED GORBACHEV TO START A PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE ON GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION. IT HAD NOT BEEN CLEAR TO DUMAS EXACTLY WHAT FORM THIS WOULD TAKE BUT THAT IT WOULD HAPPEN SEEMED TO HIM A CERTAINTY.

14. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHEN THE COALITION WOULD FIX AN ELECTION DATE. GENSCHER SAID THAT THEY WERE GOVERNED BY THE 90-DAY RULE. IN TERMS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THAT DATE AND THE 2+4, HE HOPED TO SETTLE THE POLISH BORDER ISSUE IN JULY IN PARIS. HE ALSO HOPED, THOUGH HE RECOGNISED THAT THIS WAS FAR FROM BEING A CERTAINTY, THAT THE SOVIET PARTY CONVENTION IN JULY WOULD MAKE MATTERS EASIER FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. WHEN THE 2+4 MET IN MOSCOW IN SEPTEMBER, HE HOPED THAT SOME PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON CSCE AND ON OUR OWN POSITION IN THE VIENNA TALKS, IF THAT WAS OF INTEREST TO THE RUSSIANS.

15. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE GDR GOVERNMENT WAS NOT QUITE IN LINE OVER THE ISSUE OF UNIFICATION. THERE WAS SOME UNCERTAINTY OVER DE MAZIERE'S POSITION, THOUGH IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS WAS BASED ON CONVICTION OR TACTICS, THE TACTICS BEING THE NEED TO KEEP THE COALITION TOGETHER UNTIL GEMU WAS RATIFIED. THE CHANCELLOR WAS SEEING DE MAZIERE THAT DAY. WHAT WAS CERTAIN WAS THAT ONLY UNIFICATION WOULD GIVE THE CONFIDENCE NEEDED FOR INVESTMENT.

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