



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 June 1990

Dear Charles,

CON 1/6

Mr Shevardnadze's Letter about Future European
Security Structures

Thank you for your letter of 26 May. You asked for an analysis of Mr Shevardnadze's letter to the Foreign Secretary about European architecture and the future development of the CSCE.

I enclose a copy of FCO telegram No. 974 to Moscow with our analysis. The Soviet Ambassador, who called on John Weston on 30 May, was able to add little to the letter and the thinking behind it. He did, however, maintain that the "troika" suggested by Shevardnadze would not be a "directorate" and that any action would have to be decided by the 35 CSCE states collectively. (This is not how the letter reads.) He also explained that Shevardnadze was proposing only two centres, one to pursue implementation of CSBM/verification agreements, the other a crisis management centre.

Yours ever,

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELNO 974

OF 291800Z MAY 90

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MY TEL NOS 960 AND 961: MESSAGE FROM SHEVARDNADZE ON EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE

1. SHEVARDNADZE'S LETTER, WHICH HAS BEEN AWAITED SINCE HE FLAGGED IT AT THE MINISTERIAL 2 PLUS 4 MEETING ON 5 MAY, IS ON THE WHOLE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE CURRENT DEBATE ON FUTURE EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE AND WHERE THE CSCE SHOULD FIGURE IN IT. AS SHEVARDNADZE HIMSELF POINTS OUT, HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS. HMG'S APPROACH WAS SET OUT BY MRS THATCHER IN HER KONIGSWINTER SPEECH AT CAMBRIDGE ON 30 MARCH. THE SOVIET SUGGESTIONS SHOULD NOT THEREFORE BE TAKEN AS DEFINING THE AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION EITHER IN THE CSCE SUMMIT PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OR IN OTHER MEETINGS, BUT AS ONE AMONG A NUMBER OF USEFUL INPUTS TO THE DEBATE.

2. THE LETTER CONTAINS SEVERAL IDEAS WE EITHER AGREE WITH OR COULD CONTEMPLATE WITHOUT TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY RECOMMENDING TO MINISTERS:

I. THE BROAD UNDERLYING APPROACH OF THE FIRST FOUR PARAGRAPHS

II. CSCE SUMMIT MEETINGS EVERY TWO YEARS

III. REGULAR PREPARATORY MEETINGS OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

IV. A CSCE CAPITAL AND MINIMAL SECRETARIAT

V. A BODY FOR THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TROOP MOVEMENTS AND EXERCISES (ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THIS IS NO MORE THAN AN INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETINGS FORESEEN IN THE CSBM NEGOTIATIONS. A COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK WOULD ALSO GIVE US NO PROBLEM.)

VI. MAXIMUM USE OF EXISTING ORGANISATIONS

VII. NEED FOR A CFE AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED AT A CSCE MEETING

VIII. CSCE SUMMIT (LINKED WITH CFE SIGNATURE) TO BE HELD IN PARIS)

3. OTHER SUGGESTIONS ARE MORE PROBLEMATIC AT FIRST GLANCE:

I. A 'TROIKA' MANDATED TO ADOPT COLLECTIVE ACTION:

II. A CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE (SOMETHING WE MIGHT EVENTUALLY ACCEPT PROVIDED IT WAS OPEN TO ALL 35 CSCE STATES, HAD A GENUINELY USEFUL FUNCTION AND ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE WERE CAREFULLY FRAMED). SHEVARDNADZE'S PROPOSAL OF TWO BODIES, ONE POLITICAL AND ONE MILITARY, IS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT.

III. THE CONCEPT, EVEN LONG TERM, OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY COUNCIL IF THIS WERE TO HAVE RESTRICTIVE MEMBERSHIP

IV. THE CREATION OF NEW ORGANISATIONS FOR ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (WHICH CONFLICTS WITH THE IDEA OF PARAGRAPH 2 (VI) ABOVE)

V. A MINISTERIAL MEETING IN VIENNA TO INITIAL DOCUMENTS EMERGING FROM THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (AND ALSO APPARENTLY TO INITIAL THE CFE AGREEMENT): THIS SEEMS UNNECESSARY.

4. ON ONE READING SHEVARDNADZE'S MESSAGE IS A SANDWICH WHICH STILL CONTAINS SOME UNPALATABLE FILLINGS EG ITS REFERENCE TO TRANSFORMING MILITARY AND POLITICAL ALLIANCES INTO MAINLY POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR SUBSEQUENT DISSOLUTION: AND THE LINKAGE OF THE CSCE SUMMIT PREPARATORY ^{MEETINGS} ~~SUMMIT~~ WITH THE 2 PLUS 4 PROCESS. BUT THE MAIN IMPRESSION THAT COMES THROUGH IS THE INSISTENT AND ALMOST DESPERATE SOVIET WISH TO SECURE THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF CSCE, ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD NOT LEAVE IT ISOLATED FROM DEVELOPMENTS ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE: AND WHICH PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK OF STABILITY AND REASSURANCE IN WHICH THERE IS SEEN TO BE A FIRM SOVIET STAKE. IT IS NOT IN THE WESTERN INTEREST TO DISCOURAGE OR REBUFF THIS. WE SHOULD THEREFORE DRAW THE RUSSIANS INTO A BROAD DISCUSSION OF HOW BEST THE CSCE

PROCESS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO MAKING FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW SECURE AND PERMANENT THROUGHOUT EUROPE. BUT WE NEED NOT FLINCH FROM EXPOSING THEIR WEAK POINTS. FOR EXAMPLE, SHEVARDNADZE STATES THAT THE SOVIET UNION WISHES TO HAVE A CFE AGREEMENT SIGNED AT THE CSCE SUMMIT: IS THIS CONSISTENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION'S POSITION AT THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS? AND IS HIS MESSAGE AS A WHOLE CONSISTENT WITH CURRENT SOVIET POLICY ON LITHUANIA? WESTON WILL SEEK TO DRAW OUT ZAMYATIN ON THESE AND OTHER POINTS WHEN HE CALLS ON 30 MAY TO OBTAIN FIRST UK REACTIONS TO THE LETTER.

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SOVIET UNION: CSCE/ Human Rights Pt. 21