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PRIME MINISTER

cc.BI

Resident Clerk, FCO.

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

I have had a talk with General Scowcroft about the Summit. His summing up was that it had gone "pretty well". The tone had been good, and there had been an excellent rapport between Gorbachev and the President.

He found Gorbachev himself remarkable. He did not appear at all tired or under pressure. On the contrary, he seemed fully in charge. Strangely, he had not dwelled on his domestic problems nearly as much as at the Malta Summit. When he had mentioned them, he had done so quietly and analytically. He was not "beleaguered, distraught, or over-burdened", rather he was "relaxed and animated".

On substance, there had been generally good progress, particularly on arms control. The agreement on CW had been squared away. There was extensive agreement on START, although some outstanding problems including non-circumvention (i.e., us). There had been a good review of regional issues, and Scowcroft said that he had been pleased with Gorbachev's "rhetoric and understanding". I asked about CFE. Scowcroft said that he was sure Gorbachev wanted an agreement, but it was heavily dependent on the German issue. Gorbachev accepted explicitly that there would have to be a CFE agreement before there could be a CSCE Summit, and it was clear that the Russians still want the latter badly.

Scowcroft said that the two main problems were with Germany and Lithuania. On the latter, there was nothing he could tell me on the open line, but privately there were signs of movement. He would let us have details. There had been a long exchange on Germany, but not much change in the Soviet position. It was essentially a political problem for Gorbachev, who had to avoid the appearance that the Soviet Union had comprehensively lost.


Scowcroft said that we had to figure out some way to give the Russians a rationale for doing what they knew they had to do.

I said that I was sure your intention was to go on being generally supportive of Gorbachev and what he was trying to achieve. Scowcroft said this was very much the President's view - especially when one compared Gorbachev to the alternatives. (Scowcroft does not think much of Yeltsin.)

Scowcroft said that the President would try to call you either later this afternoon or tomorrow.

All in all, Scowcroft clearly hoped that you would be able to give a reasonably up-beat account of the Summit in your interview.

PP CDP


3 June 1990

jd c:scowcroft

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 June 1990

Dear Resident Clerk,

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

You may find it helpful to have - and to transmit to the Foreign Secretary - the enclosed note of a conversation which I had earlier this morning with General Scowcroft in the White House about the US/Soviet Summit.

Yours,

J. Dillibi

PT C.D. POWELL

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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to