

SECRET  
FM WASHINGTON  
TO DESKBY 050830Z FCO  
TELNO 1327  
OF 041600Z JUNE 90  
AND TO DESKBY 050830Z COPENHAGEN  
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

SIC

COPENHAGEN FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY  
MODUK FOR DUSP, ACDS (POL-NUC), AND DACU  
MY TELNO 1235 : START : BRITISH INTERESTS  
SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION AT SUMMIT GOES BADLY. RUSSIANS ARGUE THAT US/UK COOPERATION SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THE CURRENT TRIDENT D5 PROGRAMME AND NOT EXTEND BEYOND IT. AMERICANS STANDING RESOLUTE ON THE POSITION AGREED PREVIOUSLY WITH US. ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO SAFEGUARD UK INTERESTS. RECOMMENDATION ON WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD RAISE THE MATTER WITH GORBACHEV IN KIEV.

DETAIL

2. IN RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST FOR AN EARLY READOUT ON HOW NON-CIRCUMVENTION FIGURED DURING THE SUMMIT, BARTHOLOMEW ASKED ME TO CALL ON 4 JUNE. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A FULL US TEAM (SEITZ, CLARKE, AND TIMBIE).

3. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD WORKED THROUGHOUT THE SUMMIT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK THAT HAD BEEN AGREED WITH US PREVIOUSLY. THEY HAD SUSTAINED THE TEXTS FOR THE TREATY ARTICLE, AGREED STATEMENT AND US SPEAKING NOTE AS GIVEN IN MY TELNOS 1167/1168, THE LANGUAGE OF WHICH REMAINED UNCHANGED. THIS STILL REPRESENTED AN ACHIEVEMENT, PARTICULARLY AS IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT A REFERENCE TO THE NON-APPLICABILITY OF THE TREATY TO EXISTING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE TREATY TEXT ITSELF, AS OPPOSED TO A SUBSIDIARY STATEMENT. THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT CHALLENGED THE LANGUAGE, NOR ATTEMPTED TO INTRODUCE SQUARE BRACKETS, BUT THEY HAD SOUGHT TO RE-INTERPRET THE MEANING OF THESE QUOTE EXISTING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION UNQUOTE IN THE RESTRICTED WAY WHICH WE HAD FEARED.

4. IN THE OPENING SESSION WITH BARTHOLOMEW, KARPOV HAD MADE A GREAT DISPLAY, FEIGNING SUDDEN DISCOVERY THAT US/UK COOPERATION DID NOT END WITH TRIDENT II AND COULD ENCOMPASS SYSTEMS OTHER THAN SLBMS. THAT SAID BARTHOLOMEW WAS CLEAR



PREVARICATION, SINCE THE NATURE OF THE COOPERATION HAD BEEN KNOWN TO THE RUSSIANS ALL ALONG (AND HAD BEEN SPELT OUT MOST RECENTLY TO NAZARKIN BY BURT IN GENEVA ONLY A FEW MONTHS AGO). BARTHOLOMEW ADDED THAT HE HAD TAKEN KARPOV ASIDE TO ASK WHAT WAS GOING ON. KARPOV HALF CONCEDED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE COMING TO THIS LATE, BUT CLAIMED THAT NAZARKIN IN GENEVA HAD NOT APPRECIATED ALL THE POLITICAL ANGLES, NOTABLY THAT UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, THE SUPREME SOVIET COULD FOCUS ON US/UK COOPERATION AS A MAJOR DEFECT. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY DIRECT AND FIRM IN MAKING IT CLEAR TO KARPOV THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT ENTER INTO A TREATY WHICH BOUNDED AND LIMITED COOPERATION WITH THE UK IN THE WAY THAT KARPOV WAS SUGGESTING. IT WOULD BE, HE HAD SAID, A TREATY BLOCKER.

5. DESPITE THIS, THE RUSSIANS HAD GONE ON TO RAISE THE SUBJECT AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. GORBACHEV REFERRED TO IT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT AS AN UNEXPECTED PROBLEM WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY UNDERSTOOD. BARTHOLOMEW HAD YET TO REVIEW THE RECORDS OF THE MEETING IN DETAIL, BUT HE RECALLED GORBACHEV AS SAYING THAT AN OPEN-ENDED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UK CHALLENGED THE NEGOTIATING LOGIC OF WHAT WAS BEING DONE IN START. SHEVARDNADZE HAD MADE A PITCH TO BAKER IN SIMILAR TERMS.

6. THROUGHOUT THE MEETINGS THE AMERICAN RESPONSE HAD BEEN CONSISTENT: THAT A REDEFINITION OF EXISTING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION TO EXCLUDE FOLLOW-ONS OR MODERNISATION WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES: THAT IT WAS CREATING A PROBLEM WHERE ESSENTIALLY NONE EXISTED (IN THE SENSE THAT THE UK DID NOT ASPIRE TO BE A SUPER POWER): AND THAT IF THE RUSSIANS PERSISTED, THERE WOULD BE NO TREATY. BARTHOLOMEW ADDED (THOUGH IT WAS NOT CLEAR THAT THESE POINTS WERE SPECIFICALLY CONVEYED BY BAKER AND BUSH) THAT IF THE RUSSIAN POSITION WAS CONCEDED, IT COULD NOT ONLY DAMAGE RELATIONS WITH OURSELVES BUT WOULD ALSO AMOUNT TO THE SUBORDINATION OF THE UNITED STATES' ENTIRE NATO RELATIONSHIP TO THAT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THAT THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN GIVEN AN UNEQUIVOCAL MESSAGE. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NO INTEREST IN PUTTING US UNDER ANY KIND OF PRESSURE ON THIS SUBJECT.

7. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD SOUGHT TO PLAY THIS LOW-KEY IN PUBLIC, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS SO FAR. HE CONCEDED THAT BAKER HAD MENTIONED COOPERATION WITH THE UK AS ONE OF THE REMAINING PROBLEMS IN START DURING HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ON 1 JUNE, BUT SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN



UNINTENTIONAL AND HAD HAPPENED ONLY BECAUSE BARTHOLOMEW HAD BEEN UNABLE TO REACH BAKER IN TIME TO WARN HIM OFF. NO FURTHER STATEMENTS WERE ENVISAGED.

8. I ASKED BARTHOLOMEW AND SEITZ FOR THEIR VIEWS ON WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD CONSIDER RAISING THIS WITH GORBACHEV IN KIEV LATER THIS WEEK. THEIR INITIAL INCLINATION, WITHOUT HAVING DISCUSSED THIS MORE WIDELY WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION WAS TO RECOMMEND AGAINST DOING SO. SEITZ SAID THAT IT COULD MAKE MORE OF A PROBLEM THAN CURRENTLY EXISTED. BARTHOLOMEW ARGUED THAT IT RAN THE RISK OF CREATING A TRIANGULAR DISCUSSION ABOUT A TREATY WHICH WAS STRICTLY BILATERAL AND THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST TO KEEP IT THAT WAY. CLARKE SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO WAIT AND SEE WHETHER GORBACHEV RAISED THIS SUBJECT HIMSELF, AS A TEST OF HOW SERIOUSLY HE REGARDED IT.

9. SUBSEQUENTLY SCOWCROFT TELEPHONED ME TO SAY THAT, ON FURTHER CONSIDERATION (NO DOUBT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH STATE DEPARTMENT) HIS OWN VIEW HAD CHANGED AND THAT ON BALANCE HE ALSO AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE AND THAT WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WHETHER THE AMERICANS COULD RESOLVE THIS WITH THE RUSSIANS, BEFORE CONSIDERING DIRECT INVOLVEMENT. THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV HAD NOT ENGAGED SUBSTANTIVELY ON THE SUBJECT THEMSELVES AND GORBACHEV HAD CONCLUDED WHAT LITTLE HE HAD SAID ON IT BY COMMENTING THAT A START TREATY SHOULD BE QUICKLY COMPLETED WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT THE ISSUE NEED NOT BE A MAJOR OBSTACLE.  
COMMENT

10. THERE IS CLEARLY A DIFFICULT QUESTION OF JUDGEMENT TO BE DECIDED HERE. ON THE ONE HAND UK INTERVENTION MIGHT COMPLICATE THE AMERICAN GAME-PLAN WHICH, AS THEY HAVE ASSURED US, IS DESIGNED TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS. IT COULD ALSO WORK TO OUR DISADVANTAGE BY ENCOURAGING THE RUSSIANS TO GO FURTHER AND ATTEMPT TO PIN US DOWN OVER SUCH ISSUES AS THE INCLUSION OF UK ASSETS IN FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF SOVIET CONCERNS DO PROVE TO BE GENUINE AND DEEPLY FELT (EG IN THE SUPREME SOVIET RATIFICATION CONTEXT) A GENERAL REASSURANCE THAT UK/US COOPERATION WILL NOT DEVELOP IN A WAY WHICH COULD AFFECT THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC BALANCE, COULD BE HELPFUL. MOREOVER SINCE THIS IS NOW IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, IT MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO SAY SIMPLY THAT WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE AMERICANS ARE FULLY PROTECTING OUR INTERESTS WITHOUT DOING ANYTHING OURSELVES.

11. MY RECOMMENDATION, ON BALANCE, IS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD NOT RAISE THE SUBJECT EARLY IN THE DISCUSSION WITH



GORBACHEV. IF HE FAILS TO DO SO HIMSELF, THAT IN ITSELF WOULD BE A USEFUL INDICATION OF THE DEGREE OF SIGNIFICANCE WHICH HE REALLY ATTACHES TO THE SUBJECT. IT MIGHT, HOWEVER, BE IMPORTANT TO SHOW SUBSEQUENTLY THAT HE HAD BEEN OFFERED EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS ANY GENUINE CONCERNS, AND IN THE EVENT THAT THERE WAS NO EARLY REFERENCE TO THE SUBJECT, THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT OFFER HIM THE OPPORTUNITY BY RAISING THE PROGRESS OF START IN GENERAL TERMS. SHOULD A REASSURANCE THEN BE REQUIRED, IT MIGHT BE GIVEN IN AS LOW A KEY AND GENERALISED A MANNER AS POSSIBLE.

12. THERE WILL BE FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE AMERICANS DURING WESTON'S TALK WITH SEITZ ON 5 JUNE (AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, WHEN BARTHOLOMEW VISITS LONDON ON 12 JUNE).

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