

PRIME MINISTER

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VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION

I attach some further important papers, relevant to your meeting with Mr Gorbachev, which you will want to look at overnight.

They comprise:

- the full State Department briefing on the talks. This is generally in line with the account which you received from President Bush, while giving somewhat more detail;
- a telegram recording a conversation with Mr Blackwill of the National Security Council. This takes rather a 'counter-cyclical' view, saying in effect that Gorbachev was all over the shop in his talks with the President, appeared to have done very little serious preparation, and to have no clear idea what he was trying to achieve (particularly in key areas such as Germany and some aspects of arms control). This is not a view we have received from others. Personally, I would lay off a bit for Blackwill: he is a bit of a smarty boots;
- Rodric Braithwaite's telegrams from Moscow, setting the scene for your visit;
- a letter from the Foreign Office giving an initial assessment of the outcome of the summit on START and chemical warfare;
- a more detailed note on the non-circumvention problem which you will certainly need to take up with Gorbachev. It is not clear why he has changed his mind to such an extent about the British (and French) strategic nuclear deterrents. Either he wasn't focusing properly: or he is under some sort of

specific pressure from the military: or he is really serious about trying to stop US/UK nuclear co-operation, in which case we are in for some tough negotiation, with only one acceptable outcome;

- a note on the CFE negotiations. It is not clear whether the Russians are delaying these in order to try to extract concessions from us on Germany in NATO: or whether they have decided that German membership of NATO is inevitable and, in consequence, they cannot afford to reduce their conventional forces to the extent which they originally envisaged. This is an area you will need to explore in your talks with Gorbachev. The note also deals with the question of manpower reductions in CFE follow-up negotiations (as it is now called): this is relevant to our intentions over BAOR.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

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