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COPENHAGEN FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY
US/SOVIET SUMMIT: STATE DEPARTMENT DEBRIEF
SUMMARY

1. AN UPBEAT ACCOUNT, PARTICULARLY OF ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE TRADITIONAL AREAS OF THE US/SOVIET AGENDA, NOTABLY ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL ISSUES. BUT NO ATTEMPT TO DISGUISE THE FAILURE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON GERMAN UNIFICATION OR EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE AND A CANDID DESCRIPTION OF GORBACHEV'S UNFOCUSSED APPROACH IN THIS AREA.

DETAIL

2. A BRIEFING OF NATO-PLUS AMBASSADORS WAS PROVIDED BY KIMMITT, BARTHOLOMEW AND VERSCHBOW ON 5 JUNE.

3. KIMMITT SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN A UNIQUE SUMMIT IN SEVERAL SENSES, NOT LEAST IN TERMS OF THE EXTENT OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT BY THE TWO PRESIDENTS. THEIR DISCUSSION AT CAMP DAVID HAD BEEN CHARACTERISED BY THE EASE OF THE EXCHANGES, BREADTH OF SUBJECTS COVERED AND GENERAL INFORMALITY. THE DEGREE OF RAPPORT ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THEM HAD BEEN DEMONSTRATED CLEARLY AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE. ANOTHER HIGHLIGHT (NOT ENTIRELY POSITIVE) HAD BEEN GORBACHEV'S REMARKABLE PRESENTATION TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, NOTABLY ON LITHUANIA. BUT THERE HAD ALSO BEEN GORBACHEV'S PERFORMANCE ON EUROPE, WHICH HAD SHOWN HIS THINKING TO BE FILLED WITH CONTRADICTIONS AND AT A FORMATIVE STAGE.

THUS: HE HAD SPOKEN AGAINST THE ISOLATION OF AMERICA OR RUSSIA FROM EUROPE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ARGUING AGAINST THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS OUTSIDE HOME TERRITORY: ON GERMANY, HE ACCEPTED THAT INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION SHOULD NOT BE SEPARATED YET HAD ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A LONG TRANSITION PERIOD, WITH AGREEMENT ON CFE1, PROGRESS ON FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS AND LIMITS ON THE BUNDESWEHR BEFORE UNIFICATION COULD TAKE PLACE: EQUALLY, HE HAD MADE CLEAR HIS CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO GERMANY IN NATO, BUT HAD EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN ALLIANCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

4. BARTHOLOMEW BRIEFED ON THE ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS. HE ARGUED THAT BY ANY MEASURE AN IMPRESSIVE ARRAY OF AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. ALTHOUGH MUCH OF THE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE PREVIOUSLY, IT HAD BEEN THE PROSPECT OF THIS SUMMIT WHICH HAD GALVANISED BOTH SIDES INTO ACTION.

5. ON START, THE SUMMIT HAD BROUGHT TO AN END THE 8-YEAR STRUGGLE OVER CRUISE MISSILES. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN SOME NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES OVER BACKFIRE BOMBERS, WHERE THE RUSSIANS HAD ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF GIVING A POLITICALLY BINDING DECLARATION AND A CEILING ON NUMBERS, EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE NOT READY TO HAVE NAVAL AIRCRAFT INCLUDED. THE AMERICANS HAD GIVEN ALL THEY COULD ON HEAVY ICBMS, WITHOUT RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF SS18: BUT THEY HAD BEEN ABLE TO USE THIS AS A LEVER TO SECURE REFERENCES TO LIMITING ICBMS AND MIRVED MISSILES IN THE STATEMENT ON FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, WITHOUT INCLUSION OF THE REFERENCE TO SLBMS WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD SOUGHT. THE TUSSE OVER THIS LAST ASPECT HAD CAUSED THE FINAL DELAY IN SIGNING THE VARIOUS AGREEMENTS ON 1 JUNE. THE STATEMENT ON FUTURE OBJECTIVES WAS IMPORTANT IN SETTING OUT A CLEAR CONCEPTUAL PROSPECTUS, BASED ON AMERICAN PRIORITIES. ON START, AS IN OTHER AREAS, IT WAS INTERESTING THAT AKHROMYEV PLAYED A LEADING ROLE, NOT ALWAYS NEGATIVE, BUT AS PROTECTOR OF THE CROWN JEWELS.

6. ON CFE, THE AMERICANS HAD SECURED AN EXPLICIT COMMITMENT FROM THE RUSSIANS THROUGH THE JOINT STATEMENT, TO INTENSIFYING WORK WITH A VIEW TO COMPLETING THE TREATY THIS YEAR AND TO THE PROPOSITION THAT THE CSCE SUMMIT SHOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER THE CFE AGREEMENT IS QUOTE READY FOR SIGNATURE UNQUOTE. SURPRISINGLY IT HAD NOT TAKEN MUCH DIPLOMATIC PRODDING TO SECURE THIS, EVEN THOUGH IT PUT THE RUSSIANS FIRMLY BACK ON THE HOOK. AS REGARDS SUBSTANCE, BARTHOLOMEW SOUGHT TO PUT THE BEST LIGHT ON THE DISCUSSIONS, CLAIMING THAT THEY HAD BEEN BETTER THAN IN MOSCOW LAST MONTH AND THAT THE PROGRESS ON ARMOUR, DESTRUCTION AND VERIFICATION HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS. NEVERTHELESS HE HAD CONCEDED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD STONEWALLED OVER THE KEY ISSUE OF AIRCRAFT, PARTICULARLY OVER THE NUMBER OF AIR DEFENCE INTERCEPTORS AND THE EXCLUSION OF LAND-BASED NAVAL AIR. MANPOWER HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED OTHER THAN AT THE OUTSET WITH KARPOV, WHO HAD PROPOSED THAT THE OTTAWA AGREEMENT SHOULD NOW BE RECORDED IN THE TREATY TEXT AND THAT OTHER MANPOWER LEVELS IN CFE WOULD BE A MATTER FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSION BY THE TWO PRESIDENTS. IN THE EVENT, NEITHER GORBACHEV NOR ANYONE ELSE REVERTED TO THE QUESTION IN ANY WAY. THIS WAS NOT TO SAY THAT THERE WAS NOW NO CONNECTION BETWEEN GERMAN UNIFICATION AND CFE, ONLY THAT THEY DID NOT SEEK TO OPERATIONALISE THESE CONCERNS IN

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WASHINGTON. VERSCHBOW COMMENTED AT THIS POINT THAT IT WAS CLEAR THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO HAVE A MORE CONCRETE IDEA OF WHAT WAS ON OFFER BY WAY OF NEW CSCE ARCHITECTURE BEFORE THEY WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES IN CFE.

7. AS REGARDS OTHER ARMS CONTROL TOPICS, BARTHOLOMEW CITED THE NON-PROLIFERATION STATEMENT WHICH INCLUDED FIRMER COMMITMENTS FROM THE RUSSIANS THAN BEFORE ON ADHERENCE TO MTCR-TYPE GUIDELINES AND SUPPLIES TO THE MIDDLE EAST. ON OPEN SKIES, THE AMERICANS HAD MADE A REAL EFFORT AND HAD GIVEN KARPOV A JOINT STATEMENT BASED ON PRINCIPLES WHICH EVERYONE ELSE HAD AGREED TO AT BUDAPEST. THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE RESPONSE.

8. REGIONAL ISSUES.

KIMMITT SAID THAT AKHROMEYEV HAD REMAINED PRESENT THROUGHOUT, SUGGESTING THAT HE WAS VIRTUALLY GORBACHEV'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. THE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN RELAXED, FREE-WHEELING, CANDID AND OPEN. WHILE NO BREAKTHROUGHS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED, MANY IDEAS HAD BEEN EXCHANGED AND A BETTER BASIS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION NOW EXISTED. SPECIFIC POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

- AFGHANISTAN. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE COMMON GROUND ON THE NEED TO PROMOTE THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AS THE MECHANISM FOR ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT GOVERNMENT, BUT DIFFERENCES REMAINED OVER THE ROLE OF NAJIBULLAH IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

- MIDDLE EAST. THE PRESIDENT HAD RAISED THE ATTEMPTED TERRORIST OPERATION NEAR TEL AVIV AND SAID THAT ARAFAT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO CONDEMN THIS IF THE PEACE PROCESS WERE TO MOVE FORWARD. THE RUSSIANS HAD AGREED TO FOLLOW UP.

- EMIGRATION TO ISRAEL. GORBACHEV HAD SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN BOMBARDED BY COMPLAINTS FROM THE ARABS ABOUT RESETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND LOOKED FOR ASSURANCES FROM ISRAELIS AND THE UNITED STATES BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO EVIDENCE IN THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS OF ANY INTENTION TO BACKSLIDE ON COMMITMENTS TO FACILITATE EMIGRATION - IMPROVED AIR LINKS ETC - DESPITE WHAT HE SAID AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE.

- CENTRAL AMERICA. GORBACHEV PLEDGED CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR NICARAGUA. ON CUBA, THE AMERICANS HAD URGED HIM TO DISSUADE CASTRO FROM SUPPLYING ARMS TO THE FMLN IN EL SALVADOR AND HE HAD UNDERTAKEN TO PROBE THEM ON THIS.

- KASHMIR. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER AND WITH OTHERS TO RESTRAIN THE INDIANS AND PAKISTANIS. THE RUSSIANS SAID THEY HAD MADE APPROACHES ALTHOUGH THEY HAD NOT YET SENT AN EMISSARY OF THEIR OWN.

- EAST ASIA. BUSH RAISED THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES AND EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE JAPANESE CLAIM. GORBACHEV WOULD NOT BE DRAWN BEYOND THE STANDARD LINE THAT THIS WAS A BILATERAL

SOVIET/JAPANESE PROBLEM.

- S EAST ASIA. ON CAMBODIA, THERE HAD BEEN BASIC AGREEMENT. ON KOREA, GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS INTENDED TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE SOUTH, PARTICULARLY FOR ECONOMIC BENEFIT, AND WAS CANDID ABOUT HIS DETERMINATION TO PROCEED EVEN THOUGH IT COMPLICATED RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA. THE AMERICANS HAD RAISED THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM AND GORBACHEV EXPRESSED CONCERN BUT WAS CLEARLY MORE FOCUSED AT THIS STAGE ON THE SOUTH.

- AFRICA. IN ADDITION TO ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA THE MAIN FEATURE WAS ETHIOPIA WHICH WAS DISCUSSED BRIEFLY AND A JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED. GORBACHEV HAD BROUGHT NEWS OF ETHIOPIAN AGREEMENT TO PERMIT RELIEF FOOD VIA ASSAWA AND THE AMERICANS HAD MANAGED TO CONVERT THIS QUICKLY INTO A STATEMENT WHICH WENT BEYOND HUMANITARIAN AID AND SUPPORTED THE POLITICAL EFFORT IN THE REGION.

9. BILATERAL, TRANSNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

THERE HAD BEEN 14 AGREEMENTS AND 11 JOINT STATEMENTS. VERSCHBOW SAID THAT ECONOMIC RELATIONS HAD BEEN GIVEN A PARTICULARLY STRONG BOOST IT HAD BEEN TOUCH AND GO TO THE LAST MINUTE WHETHER THE TRADE AGREEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED AND THIS HAD BECOME POSSIBLE ONLY AFTER AN UNDERSTAND HAD BEEN REACHED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT SUBMIT IT UNTIL AFTER PASSAGE OF THE SOVIET EMIGRATION LAW. IT HAD FURTHER BEEN CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT DEVELOPMENTS ON LITHUANIA WOULD AFFECT PROSPECTS. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PRESIDENT HAD RAISED THE FAILURE TO RESOLVE 12 OF THE 20 LAST REFUSENIK CASES. THE RUSSIANS SAID THAT THEY WERE STILL WORKING ON THEM. HE HAD ALSO RAISED ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE SOVIET UNION AND URGED GORBACHEV TO SPEAK OUT MORE FIRMLY. HE HAD EVIDENTLY AGREED TO DO SO.

10. NO DATE HAD BEEN SET FOR A RETURN SUMMIT IN MOSCOW. VERSCHBOW SPECULATED THAT THIS MIGHT OCCUR AT THE END OF THE YEAR IF A START AGREEMENT WAS THEN READY.

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