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OF 121300Z JUNE 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, EAST BERLIN, PARIS
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 INFO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN (FOR WESTON)
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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

GENSCHER'S TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE IN BREST, BYELORUSSIA,
 11 JUNE

1. Genschler telephoned on 12 June to brief the Secretary of State about his talks with Shevardnadze in Brest on 11 June. He had asked Kastrup to call you in, with your US and French colleagues, before going to brief others (presumably NATO) in Brussels.
2. Genschler said that Shevardnadze had concentrated on ideas for links between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. He had floated 12 ideas, but not as a package. These included some ideas from the Helsinki Final Act:
 - a joint Parliamentary body.
 - talks between senior NATO and Warsaw Pact military men.
 - agreement on no first use of nuclear weapons. Genschler

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said he had ruled this out.

- a common statement which would be open for adherence by the neutral Europeans as well.

Genscher had told Shevardnadze of the view at Turnberry that a joint statement or declaration between the different states in the two alliances would be better than one between the two pacts as such. The Secretary of State agreed.

3. The Secretary of State asked if Shevardnadze had sought to argue against German membership of NATO. Genscher said that he had not done so: he had instead been looking for ways of making membership acceptable to the Soviet Union.

4. On numbers of troops in the central region Genscher had told Shevardnadze that an agreement on numbers would be for CFE I bis. There should be no discrimination against, nor singularisation of, Germany. But, Genscher had added, there would be no objection if the 2+4 wished to take note of an intention to agree numbers in a CFE I bis. Shevardnadze had seemed to accept this idea.

5. Shevardnadze had reverted to the idea of a transitional period between German unification and the abolition of quadripartite rights and responsibilities. Genscher said he had been firm in rejecting the idea. He had also told Shevardnadze that the SPD, especially in the GDR, were misleading the Russians about the length of time available for unification. He had explained the FRG's fears about renewed or increased GDR emigration. Genscher said that Shevardnadze had been impressed by the figures.

6. Shevardnadze had suggested that he and Genscher should meet again before the 2+4 Ministerial in East Berlin on 22 June.

7. Shevardnadze had also spoken with approval of the Turnberry message from NATO foreign ministers. Genscher had the impression that the Russians were now trying to prepare their public opinion for the inevitability of German membership of the

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Alliance. Gorbachev's speech to the Supreme Soviet earlier on 12 June bore out this impression.

8. The Secretary of State asked whether Genscher and Shevardnadze had discussed economic and financial matters. Genscher said the Russians had asked for talks between experts including bankers. They were thinking of credits, and guarantees of credits. Genscher said Chancellor Kohl would be writing to President Gorbachev, linking all these matters together. Any guarantees would have to be approved by the Budget Committee of the Bundestag.

9. In reply to the Secretary of State's question, Genscher said that he and Shevardnadze had not/not discussed Poland.

10. At a press conference after their talks Shevardnadze had said that he foresaw agreement on the 2+4 issues ahead of the CSCE summit. When Genscher had spoken of a CSCE summit in November, Shevardnadze had not reacted.

11. At the end of the telephone call Genscher and the Secretary of State agreed that the two issues needing urgent work were troop numbers in Central Europe and links between, or a joint statement by, the members of the two Pacts.

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