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TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELNO

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

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AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, OTTAWA, UKDEL NATO

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO USSR: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

 Following is text of message from the Prime Minister to President Mitterrand after her visit to the Soviet Union. Grateful if you would arrange for it to be delivered. Begins:

Dog: Mr President

I was grateful for your message about your talks with President Gorbachev at the end of May, which I found very helpful in preparing for my own talks last Friday. We shall be providing detailed briefing for our partners in the context of political cooperation, but I wanted to send you my personal impressions.

Even as the problems mount, Gorbachev remains confident, ebullient - perhaps just a little less than usual - and apparently in command of events. He talks of putting the infrastructure of a market economy into place in short order, and contemplates a new constitutional relationship between the centre and the Republics.

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We spent most of our time discussing the security of Europe and the problem of Germany and NATO. Gorbachev's thinking on this continues to evolve. There are inconsistencies and contradictions. But he was very careful not to say, at any point during our talks or our joint press conference, that a united Germany should not (underlined) be a member of NATO. He talked a great deal of the need to respect the Soviet Union's security interests and to move towards a European security organisation which would transcend both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But I think he realises this is not a practical proposition for the foreseeable future. We discussed his proposal for a joint NATO/Warsaw Pact declaration. I think this offers possibilities. There is no need for us to strive officiously to keep the Warsaw Pact alive. But equally, I believe we could devise a declaration between the member states of the two alliances which would not imply equality but would help the Russians to accept, as I believe they will, a united Germany in NATO.

We discussed nuclear weapons in the light of the US-Soviet summit, and I made clear our view on the continued need for nuclear deterrence. We did not go into detail on the Conventional Forces negotiations, although in our talks we touched on these and on the need to strengthen the CSCE process.

On Lithuania, President Gorbachev pronounced himself heartily sick of the problem, and I got the impression that it does not rank high among his priorities. I pressed him to bridge the gap that remains between his position and that of the Lithuanians, and to start talks with them as soon as possible. He was insistent that any moves towards independence must be within the framework

CONFIDENTIAL IMMEDIATE of the Soviet constitution. The media are reporting that he has now agreed to talks. If so this would be very encouraging. He realises, however, that the economy has to be his main immediate task, although I am not sure that even now he really understands how a market economy functions. I had a robust session with Marshal Yazov and the Soviet Chiefs of Staff. My impression is that they are quite realistic, both on the subject of Germany in NATO and on nuclear weapons, but somewhat overwhelmed by the practical problems of withdrawing from Eastern Europe and their shrinking armed forces. I also went both to the Ukraine and Armenia, and the strength of nationalist feeling is tangible in both. Clearly Gorbachev has no early respite in sight. Ends. I look formed to seeing you in Oublin. HURD YYYY No distribution NNNN NNNN