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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO USSR: MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY

 Following is text of message from the Prime Minister to Mulroney after her visit to the Soviet Union. Grateful if you would arrange for it to be delivered.
 Begins:

Dear Belan-

I wanted you to have my personal impressions of my talk last Friday with President Gorbachev.

Even as the problems mount, Gorbachev remains confident, ebullient - perhaps just a little less than usual - and apparently in command of events. He talks of putting the infrastructure of a market economy into place in short order, and contemplates a new constitutional relationship between the centre and the Republics.

We spent most of our time discussing the security of Europe and Germany's membership of NATO. Gorbachev's thinking

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on this continues to evolve. There are inconsistencies and contradictions. But even though he still expressed some misgivings at the speed of the moves towards unification, he nevertheless agreed with my position that this was for the German people to decide. He was also very careful not to say, at any point during our talks or our joint press conference, that a united Germany should not (underlined) be a member of He talked a great deal of the need to respect the Soviet Union's security interests and to move towards a European security organization which would transcend both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But I think he realises this is not a practical proposition for the foreseeable future. We discussed his proposal for a joint NATO/Warsaw Pact declaration. I think this offers possibilities. There is no need for us to strive officiously to keep the Warsaw Pact alive. But equally, I believe we could devise a declaration between the member states of the two alliances which would not imply equality but would help the Russians to accept, as I believe they will, a united Germany in NATO.

We discussed nuclear weapons in the light of the US-Soviet summit, and I made clear our view on the continued need for nuclear deterrence. We did not go into detail on the Conventional Forces negotiations, although in our talks we touched on these and on the need to strengthen the CSCE process.

On Lithuania, President Gorbachev pronounced himself heartily sick of the problem, and I got the impression that it does not rank high among his priorities. I pressed him to bridge the gap that remains between his position and that of the Lithuanians, and to start talks with them as soon as possible. He was insistent that any moves towards independence