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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, EAST BERLIN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO
INFO PRIORITY CSCE POSTS, BM BERLIN

YOUR TELNO 392 : GENSCHER'S TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE 11 JUNE

SUMMARY

1. KASTRUP'S ACCOUNT FULLER THAN THAT IN TUR AND THAN HE WILL GIVE TO NATO ON 13 JUNE. SHEVARDNADZE FULL OF TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT. GENSCHER INSISTENT THAT NEW ARRANGEMENTS IN THIS FIELD SHOULD BE AMONG MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCES, NOT BETWEEN THE ALLIANCES THEMSELVES. SHEVARDNADZE EMPHATIC ABOUT NEED FOR A TRANSITION PERIOD BETWEEN GERMAN UNIFICATION AND END OF QRRS. EXPLAINS THAT IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS CANNOT BE EFFECTED BEFORE UNIFICATION. GENSCHER MADE CLEAR GERMANY'S WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THIS YEAR A PROSPECTIVE LIMIT ON THE BUNDESWEHR IF SOME OTHER STATES DID LIKEWISE.

DETAIL

2. KASTRUP BRIEFED THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, THE US CHARGE AND ME THIS EVENING ON GENSCHER'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE AT BREST ON 11 JUNE. KASTRUP SAID THAT HE WOULD BRIEF AT NATO TOMORROW, BUT IN MUCH LESS DETAIL.

3. SHEVARDNADZE HAD PROPOSED THAT THE MEETING SHOULD BE AT BREST, A SYMBOLIC PLACE IN THE HISTROY OF SOVIET-GERMAN RELATIONS AND WHERE HIS BROTHER HAD BEEN KILLED JUST AFTER HITLER'S ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION. FOR THE FIRST TIME, A SOVIET AND A FEDERAL GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD JOINTLY LAID A WREATH AT A SOVIET WAR MEMORIAL. SHEVARDNADZE, WHOSE EMOTION HAD BEEN OBVIOUS, HAD SAID THAT FOR HIM THE OCCASION HAD DRAWN A LINE UNDER THE WAR.

4. THE TALKS LASTED 7 HOURS AND WERE VERY INTENSIVE. SHEVARDANDZE HAD LAUNCHED STRAIGHT INTO THE QUESTION OF GERMANY AND NATO, DESCRIBING IT AS THE MOST COMPLICATED ONE. HE MENTIONED FOUR POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS. BOTH GERMANIES COULD LEAVE THEIR ALLIANCES. OR UNITED GERMANY COULD BE IN BOTH ALLIANCES. OR BOTH ALLIANCES COULD BE DISSOLVED. OR BOTH ALLIANCES COULD BE COMPLETELY TRANSFORMED. HE PROPOSED A COMPLETE RE-SHAPING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ALLIANCES. HE PRESENTED TENTATIVE FIRST THOUGHTS ON THIS, WITH THE

FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

- THE ALLIANCES SHOULD NO LONGER CONSIDER EACH OTHER AS OPPONENTS
- THEY SHOULD STATE THEIR READINESS TO DEVELOP CSCE
- THEY SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO RAISE NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND TO RESPECT THE INVIOLOABILITY OF FRONTIERS
- THEY SHOULD RENOUNCE THE USE AND THREAT OF FORCE AND FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- THEY SHOULD AGREE TO HOLD IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS WHEN A CONFLICT OR A THREATENING SITUATION AROSE
- THEY SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO MOVE TO DRASTIC DISARMAMENT AND THE CREATION OF PURELY DEFENSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES
- THERE SHOULD BE ZONES OF THINNED OUT FORCES
- THERE SHOULD BE A MECHANISM FOR REGULAR CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE ALLIANCES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOME JOINT COMMITTEES BETWEEN THEM
- THERE SHOULD BE MORE CBMS, FOR INSTANCE EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION ON MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND ARMS PRODUCTION, LIMITS ON EXPENDITURE ON ARMS, AND JOINT EXERCISES
- THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE ALLIANCES SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED AND A JOINT PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE TWO ALLIANCES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED
- WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS WERE AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCES SHOULD BE OPEN FOR OTHER CSCE STATES TO JOIN.

5. SHEVARDNADZE HAD RECOGNISED THAT ALL THIS NEEDED FURTHER THOUGHT AND SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE TWO ALLIANCES. HE WOULD TALK TO BAKER ABOUT HIS IDEAS, IN CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT.

6. KASTRUP SAID THAT GENSCHER HAD REPLIED THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER THESE IDEAS WITH HIS NATO ALLIES. GENSCHER HAD SAID THAT HE WAS NOT FAVOURABLY DISPOSED TOWARDS A DECLARATION OR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCES, AND WOULD GREATLY PREFER TO DEVELOP RELATIONS AMONG

ALL THE MEMBER STATES OF THE TWO ALLIANCES. SOME OF SHEVARDNADZE'S IDEAS MUST BE EXAMINED FOR THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CSCE. OTHERS WOULD AFFECT STRATEGY. YET OTHERS WOULD AFFECT EXISTING STRUCTURES. BUT GENSCHER HAD SAID THAT HE BASICALLY AGREED THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES OF THE TWO ALLIANCES MUST BE RE-SHAPED. THE NATO SUMMIT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR THIS.

7. KASTRUP SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD SET OUT EMPHATICALLY AND FULLY HIS CASE FOR A TRANSITION PERIOD BETWEEN GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE LIFTING OF QRRS. KASTRUP WOULD NOT REPORT THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION TO NATO. GENSCHER HAD CHALLENGED SHEVARDNADZE TO SAY WHICH INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN UNITY COULD NOT BE RESOLVED BEFORE A CSCE SUMMIT. SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID THAT THE FOLLOWING MATTERS COULD NOT BE CARRIED THROUGH BY THAT TIME:

- ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCES
- THE PROBLEM OF THE FORCES OF THE FOUR POWERS IN GERMANY. SO LONG AS US FORCES WERE ON WEST GERMAN TERRITORY, SOVIET ONES MUST STAY IN EAST GERMANY. (KASTRUP COMMENTED THAT SHEVARDNADZE, THOUGH SPEAKING OF THE FORCES OF THE FOUR POWERS IN GERMANY, HAD LAID ALL THE STRESS ON US FORCES)
- THE LEVEL OF THE FORCES OF UNITED GERMANY
- THE FUTURE OF THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE TWO GERMANIES
- DEVELOPMENT OF CSCE.

8. GENSCHER HAD REPLIED THAT GERMANY WANTED FULL SOVEREIGNTY FROM THE MOMENT OF UNIFICATION. UNITED GERMANY SHOULD NOT BE BURDENED WITH OPEN QUESTIONS. SHEVARDNADZE HAD NOT SOUGHT TO COUNTER THIS. GENSCHER HAD REJECTED ANY PARALLEL BETWEEN SOVIET AND WESTERN FORCES IN GERMANY, ON THE BASIS OF THE FREE CHOICE OF THE GERMANS AND OF EUROPEAN STABILITY. GENSCHER AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD AGREED NOT TO REVEAL TO THE PRESS THAT THEY HAD DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF A TRANSITION PERIOD.

9. KASTRUP SAID THAT GENSCHER AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD DISCUSSED IN A TETE A TETE THE QUESTION OF FUTURE LEVELS OF NATIONAL FORCES. GENSCHER HAD SAID THAT GERMAN FORCES COULD BE COVERED AMONG OTHERS IN A PARTICULAR ZONE. BUT THERE MUST BE NO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST UNITED GERMANY. THE MATTER SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN VIENNA. IF A

RESULT WAS ACHIEVED IN VIENNA, GENSCHER COULD IMAGINE THAT 2 PLUS 4 COULD TAKE NOTE OF IT. SHEVARDNADZE HAD AGREED THAT VIENNA WAS THE PLACE TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT. HE HAD ACCEPTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST GERMANY. GENSCHER AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD NOT REFERRED TO POSSIBLE NUMBERS FOR FORCE LIMITS. GENSCHER HAD TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT AGREEMENT ON THIS MATTER COULD TAKE THE FORM OF A DECLARATION OF INTENT LINKED TO A CFE I AGREEMENT OR MIGHT EVEN BE MORE (IE AN ACTUAL PART OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT). KASTRUP COMMENTED TO ME THAT THE BASIS OF THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN GENSCHER AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN THAT THE QUESTION OF FUTURE FORCE LIMITS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED DURING CFE I.

10. KASTRUP SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE AND GENSCHER WOULD MEET AGAIN BEFORE THE 2 PLUS 4 MINISTERIAL MEETING ON 22 JUNE. THEIR MEETING WOULD PROBABLY BE IN THE FRG NEXT WEEK. (I UNDERSTAND FROM OTHERS IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT THAT THE MEETING IS LIKELY TO BE ON 18 OR 19 JUNE AND THAT KVITSINSKI WILL BE HERE ON 15 JUNE).

11. I ASKED WHETHER GENSCHER AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD DISCUSSED THE QUESTION, OFTEN MENTIONED RECENTLY IN THE GERMAN MEDIA, OF NEW WESTERN CREDITS FOR THE SOVIET UNION. KASTRUP REPLIED, CAREFULLY AND CAREFULLY, THAT THIS MATTER HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND GERMAN DELEGATIONS AT THE BREST MEETING. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE MINISTERS IN TETE A TETE.

12. KASTRUP COMMENTED THAT SHEVARDNADZE WAS OBVIOUSLY CASTING AROUND FOR IDEAS WHICH COULD MAKE GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF NATO PRESENTABLE DOMESTICALLY IN THE SOVIET UNION. THERE WAS NO CLEAR SOVIET POSITION YET, AND NONE WAS LIKELY TO BE FORMED UNTIL AFTER THE CPSU CONGRESS NEXT MONTH.

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